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CENTURY

A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION

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BY

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TO
CHANCELLOR DAVID STARR JORDAN

NOTE

THE present work is the outcome of a course of lectures delivered at Stanford University, California, during the second semester of the academic year 1912-13. The original purpose of this study, and its main object, was to supplement the usual University courses in French literature. But I trust it may be found of some use for the general reader who wishes to follow with intelligent interest the tangled problems of modern French life. I need hardly say that within the short compass at my disposal I could barely give the outlines of my immense subject. I tried to eschew unnecessary details, but, in order to avoid vagueness, and to make the book a practical instrument of study, each section is preceded by its synopsis, chronological and genealogical tables are added to all the historical parts, and working bibliographies are appended. The aim of these, as of the whole book, is not to be exhaustive, but to point out the next step — the most available and clearest account of the subject, and especially the bibliographic instruments for further investigation. For practical purposes, only French and English authorities have been directly quoted. The plan adopted involves repetitions: but this artistic defect was found to be atoned for by pedagogical advantages.

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CHAPTER I

THE FOUNDATIONS

THE COUNTRY—THE RACE—THE TRADITION

1. THE COUNTRY.

The theory of environment—France: situation—Size—Historical connection with the Mediterranean world—Geographical affinities with Northern Europe—Mountainous regions and basins—Extreme variety of aspects and climates: the main regions—Natural unity: the rôle of the depression of Poitou—But unity chiefly a historical achievement—Resources: fertility overrated; harbours, rivers, and mineral wealth mediocre—But many-sided, well-balanced—The human factor predominant.

THAT the habitat has a profound influence on the individual and especially on the race was a favourite conception fifty years ago with such historians as Taine and Buckle. Renan went so far as to make geographical conditions responsible for the religious beliefs of a people: "The desert," he said, "is monotheistic." Over a century before, Montesquieu made the "theory of climates" one of his guiding principles in the interpretation of history, and we are told that this notion can be traced, through Jean Bodin, as far back as Hippocrates himself. The present tendency is to shift the emphasis onto the concept of race. The growth of Anglo-Saxon communities preserving their essential traits under the most various skies, the coexistence of widely different races in the same country, seem to show that physical environment is only one of the factors in the formation of a people, and probably not the most determinative. On the other hand, it may be said that colonial migrations are comparatively recent, and that the wanderers have kept in touch with

the main body of their race, which preserved its traditions and maintained its standard: what a millennium of separate existence would do for them we do not know. Furthermore, even though environment may not radically influence the character of the race, it undoubtedly affects its destiny and policy. Had the English lived for centuries in the centre of a massive continent devoid of coal and intensely hot, their racial qualities might have been the same as at present: but the manifestations of their genius would obviously have been different. Let us therefore see what Nature has done for the region we call France, and to what extent geography controls or explains its destinies.

France is a country of Western Europe, comprised between $51^{\circ} 5'$ and $42^{\circ} 20'$ of latitude N., and in longitude between $4^{\circ} 42'$ W. and $7^{\circ} 39'$ E. It is thus almost exactly half-way between the North Pole and the Equator. Practically the whole of the British Isles lies north of France. Germany is on the average 5° farther north: the northernmost point in France is on the same latitude as Dresden, the southernmost point in Germany on the same latitude as Dijon. Within the same zone in the Northern Hemisphere we find Central and Southern Germany, Austria-Hungary, Southern Russia, Turkestan, the deserts of Mongolia and the greater part of Manchuria; in America, Oregon and Washington, the Great Lakes, New England, and the part of Canada which was once New France from Connecticut to Labrador. On account of the influence of the Gulf Stream and of the prevailing west winds, the greater part of France is more temperate than its latitude would suggest. France is in the heart of the region best suited to the development of the white race.

European France, without its North African provinces and its huge colonial dominions, is a small country compared with such giants as the Russian Empire (41 times larger), the United States or Brazil (16 and 17 times), Australia (13) or even Russia in Europe ($10\frac{1}{2}$). Texas is considerably larger, and California not much smaller. In comparison with other Western European States, France does not look so insignificant. It is decidedly inferior only to Austria-Hungary. The difference

favour of the German Empire is negligible (Germany, 208,780 square miles; France, 207,170). The British Isles are barely one-fifth the size of France. France is thus too large ever to be that powerful neighbours will absorb her or turn her into their satellite, as might be the case with Denmark, Holland, or Belgium; but it is not a huge, self-contained continent or sub-continent, capable of evolving an independent culture. It is an organic, essential part of a larger unit, Western Europe.

By far the most important point in this connection is that France, and France alone, borders at the same time on the Mediterranean, the Atlantic, and the North Sea. Thus she is both a Northern and a Southern Power, but not in the same degree. Historically, the whole of France belongs to the Mediterranean world, of which Rome was so long the centre. The valley of the Rhone and the isthmus of Gascony afforded easy access to the north and the west, as far as the Seine, the Rhine, and the Atlantic Ocean. Thus Gaul was early conquered by Roman arms, Roman law, and the Latin language. But this conquest was due to the overwhelming superiority of Roman civilization, not to any natural unity of the so-called Latin world. Geographically, France is primarily a Northern country like England and Germany. It turns its back on the rest of the Roman Empire. From Italy it is separated by the highest mountains of Europe, the Alps; from Spain, by the lower but less accessible Pyrenees. It has less than 400 miles of coast on the Mediterranean, against 700 on the North Sea and the Channel, and 865 on the Ocean. The western half of that Mediterranean coast is marshy and feverish; the eastern half is cut off from the rest of the country by abrupt and barren hills, even by mountains. The highroad from the Mediterranean to the North, the Rhône Valley, is fertile enough, but exceedingly narrow; the river is abundant and picturesque, but impetuous and almost untamable—"a mad bull rushing southward," as Michelet called it. On the contrary, between France, North Germany, and Belgium there are no natural obstacles. The Moselle, the Meuse, the Scheldt, have the upper part of their course in France. The north-eastern boundary of France is purely artificial. The heart of French power, Paris, is far

to the north. France was thus destined to be the country where North and South would meet and blend.

A first glance at a relief map of France will show that all the mountains and high plateaus are found south and east of a line drawn from Bayonne, on the Gulf of Gascony, to Givet, where the Meuse enters Belgium. However, this first impression is deceptive. It does not take into account the fact that Brittany is a mountainous region too, but worn down to a tableland of moderate height by centuries of active erosion. With the help of geology we get a truer conception of the structure of France. In the north-west, a mass of granite, Brittany, with its satellites, Vendée, Maine, and a part of Normandy.* In the centre, a huge triangular mass of extinct volcanoes and eruptive rocks—the Central Mountains (Massif Central; Mont Dore, 6,188 feet), buttressed by the long chain of the Cevennes (Lozère, 5,584). To the south, the abrupt and jagged wall of the Pyrenees (Vignemale, 10,820). In the south-east, the Alps (Mont Blanc, 15,800), and, north of the Alps, two minor ranges, the wave-like Jura (5,500) and the Vosges with their characteristic domes (4,480).

These masses leave between them room for three main basins of varying importance: in the north, the Parisian basin, which comprises all the watershed of the River Seine, plus the middle course of the Loire; in the south-east, the basin of Bordeaux in the plain of the Garonne, vast and rich, but less extensive and less fortunately situated than that of Paris; in the south-east the long and narrow valley of the lower Rhône and the Saône, a great highway of commerce, but so cramped between the Cevennes and the Alps that it could not become the centre of national existence.

These four mountain regions and these three basins, with their innumerable subdivisions, present a remarkable variety of aspects, infinitely greater than could be found on a similar area cut out of some vast geographical unit like the valley

* This affords a curious and perhaps fanciful case of correlation between geographical and historical facts. The great civil war in the West during the Revolution raged almost exclusively on primary rocks.

the Mississippi or the Russian plains. France is both a maritime and a continental country, one in which mountains and level stretches alternate in constant contrast. It is an epitome of the whole of Europe, a microcosm. Too often regarded by the old domain of the Capetians—the Seine and the middle Loire—France is defined as an amiable land of well-tilled fields and gardens, not strikingly picturesque, moderate in all things, essentially sociable and civilized in the character of its landscape as well as in that of its inhabitants. This tells only a part of the tale. It leaves out Brittany, with its tormented coasts ever assailed by a wild ocean; the Central Mountains, whose weird beauty was discovered by Ruskin and Stevenson, and the titanic wall of the Pyrenees. The highest summit of the mighty Alps, Mont Blanc, is on French soil, and the purely French Alps of Dauphiny tower as high and are even more sheer and formidable than the most famous Swiss mountains. The Rhône Valley, less commercially rich, less plentifully advertised than that of the Rhine, surpasses it in rugged grandeur. Serenity, harmony, are not more characteristic of France as a whole than uncouth impressiveness and romantic beauty. In this case, as in many others, the Isle-de-France, Paris, and the garden of Touraine fail to give a true picture of the rest of the country.

Varied in its aspects, France is no less varied in its climates. French geographers generally recognize seven. The Parisian or Sequanian region, under the influence of its northern latitude, mitigated by its proximity to the Channel, has a cool climate (mean temperature 50°), equable in the main, but offering constant variations: a climate of samples, which fanciful meteorologists liken to the proverbial fickleness of the Parisian mind. Rains are light but frequent; they often make winter slushy rather than severe, and summer as cool and wet as spring. The Breton or Armorican climate, under the influence of the Gulf Stream, is a little warmer (51.8°) and decidedly maritime: cool summers that do not allow the vine to thrive, very mild winters, frequent mists and rains. The Girondin climate reigns over Gironde and the basin of the Garonne. It is also a maritime climate, mild and seldom too dry, but, on account of its more

southern position, warmer and sunnier than that of Brittany (53.6°); it is ideally suitable for wine, fruit, and cereals. The Central Mountains vary in climate according to their exposure, altitude, and geological formation; on the whole, the Auvergn climate is cool (51°) but extreme; summers may be locally scorching, winters are almost invariably very hard. Snow, rare and light in the West and South of France, here falls heavily and covers the ground for months. The Vosgian or eastern climate embracing northern Franche-Comté, eastern Burgundy and Champagne, and the whole of Lorraine, is typically continental with long sharp winters, brief and hot summers which enable the vine to prosper on favoured hill-sides (average 48.2°). The Rhodanian or Lyonnese climate, farther south and on a lower altitude, but uninfluenced by the sea and hemmed in by mountains, is warmer (51.8°), extreme, changeable, with abundant rains. The Mediterranean climate, by far the warmest (57.5°) offers mild winters, long, dry summers, when nature assumes that appearance of deadness so characteristic of Northern Africa or the South-Western United States; a "choleric" climate withal, as Michelet would have it, with sudden downpours and thunderstorms, with winds raging from the Mediterranean or down the air-shaft of the Rhône Valley. Sheltered by the Alps, the Riviera in winter is a paradise.

In spite of this endless diversity, France presents an undeniable character of unity. The seven or more great regions which we have sketched would have formed separate geographical entities, had not communications been comparatively easy between them. From the Mediterranean to the Ocean the pass of Naurouze (640 feet) offers such convenient access into the Garonne Valley at Toulouse that a canal was built through it as early as the days of Louis XIV.* There are only a few miles from the Rhône to the Upper Loire, while the Saône has long been connected by waterways with the Middle Loire, the Upper Seine and the Rhine. Most important of all is the depression of Poitou: had it not been so wide and so level,

* Its transformation into a ship canal, "Canal des Deux-Mers," has even been repeatedly proposed.

Garonne Valley and the whole South-West, as rich and for long time more cultured than Northern France, would have intained or recovered its independence, which it lost through crusade against the Albigensians. The fate of France was then decided on the fields which stretch between Orleans, Tours and Poitiers (Attila; Clovis; Charles Martel; Hundred Years War; 1871, etc.).

Thus the country, such as we know it, seems to us remarkably well-balanced, and Strabo came to the same conclusion many centuries ago. Its rich contrasts do not amount to antinomies. There are practically no centrifugal tendencies: even Brittany, manifestly different, but too small to live apart and with no other neighbour but France, has no desire to secede. However, we should not exaggerate the "natural" unity of France. It is easy to see a posteriori how the different regions came together and remained together—but would not other formations have been possible? This not only in the North-East, where the arbitrary political frontier takes little account of natural or linguistic boundaries, but even in the South-East and the South-West. France is the result of physical geography, no doubt, but also of an equilibrium between contending influences of races and cultures, and perhaps still more of a definite long-continued policy. What holds France together is the Capetian tradition first of all, then the principles and souvenirs of the Revolution and a strictly centralized form of government. This centralization system we take to be one of the causes, rather than the result, of national unity. The Convention, which had so deep an instinct of French tradition, fought like grim death for the indivisibility of the Republic, against all federalists. France is the product of the human will—the will of kings at first, then the will of the people.

It remains for us to examine what resources France offers to its inhabitants. In spite of a widespread and flattering prejudice, France was by no means bountifully endowed by nature. Barren mountains cover nearly one-third of her territory. Except for her narrow golden belt, Brittany is sterile. The Landes are vast tracts of shifting dunes, partly

reclaimed under the Second Empire. There are traces in Sologne and the Dombes of the marshes that once covered a large portion of the country. Almost at the gate of Paris, Champagne-Pouilleuse (beggarly) is a bare, bleak plain. No part of France compares in rank luxuriance with the tropics, or in inexhaustible agricultural wealth with the Chinese loess, the Russian tchernozem, the valleys of the Nile and of the Po. Much of the present fertility of France is due to unremitting labour: hence the peculiar love of the French peasant for that soil which requires such efforts, but repays them without stint.

Neither is France ideally well favoured for commerce. Its position on four seas is advantageous. But, compared with England, Japan, Italy or Greece, its shape is massive, its coastline small in proportion to the total area, and, in consequence, its coast-wise trade comparatively unimportant. The most maritime province, Brittany, is the most un-French. There are few good natural harbours. Brest, the best in spite of a dangerous pass, is far from all centres of production. Le Havre is ever on the defensive: the sea, it was aptly said, is British at heart: it scours the English coast, deepens its harbours, and chokes with silt their French rivals. As a highway of commerce, the longest river, the Loire, is almost useless; the most abundant, the Rhône, is too much of a torrent ever to rival the Rhine or the Elbe; the Garonne is worse than mediocre; the unassuming Seine alone is excellent and capable of almost indefinite improvement. Already as smooth and regular as a canal, 11 feet deep as far as Paris, it could easily be made accessible to large sea-going vessels.

France is poor in minerals. Precious metals are almost non-existent; coal, "the bread of industry," is found only in a few districts, especially in the North, in geological formations more broken and more expensive to work than in England. The total output amounted in 1911 only to 38 million tons, against 455 in America, 268 in England, 234 in Germany. Iron is more abundant, especially since the discovery of the rich basin of Briey in Lorraine. But iron and coal are not found side by side, and there is no cheap way of conveying the one to the other. The proposed North-Eastern Canal, between

metallurgic basin of Lorraine and the coalfields of the north, would be an extremely difficult and costly piece of engineering.

These facts may explain both the small density of the French population, lower than that of all its neighbours except Spain, and the thrifty, hardworking, cautious character of the people. France is a country where gambling and large ventures, as a rule, do not pay. There is no doubt that the French are unduly conservative and even timid in business; but the less rapid growth of their commerce and industry within the last thirty years, compared with the substantial progress of England and the giant strides of America and Germany, is due primarily to natural obstacles which they have done wonders to overcome.

On the other hand, France is well-rounded in its economic life, almost self-supporting, at the mercy neither of foreign supplies nor of one exclusive national staple. It offers a sufficiency of all essentials — bread, vegetables, fruit; the French would add, wine—all of excellent quality. Beef and mutton hardly compare with the English products: but poultry is plentiful, and “la poule au pot,” which good King Henry VIII. wished every one of his subjects to enjoy of a Sunday, is a toothsome dish. Long centuries of civilization have given France industrial treasures as precious as coal and iron: an artistic tradition and generations of skilled craftsmen. Owing to the immense variety of her resources, although each in particular may seem mediocre, France weathers industrial crises better than her more venturesome and reckless rivals.

In other words, nature in France is not oppressive. It did not lay upon man too heavy a curse, nor did it demoralize him through excessive bounty. The result is that in France the human factor is all important: there are no geographical influences that can be traced inevitably. It has been said that the oppressive splendour of Indian nature was “pantheistic”; that the awful simplicity of the desert was “monotheistic”; that we wanted to express in the same fanciful style the well-balanced, almost negative quality of nature in France, “rationalism” is the word that would immediately come to our mind.

§ 2. THE RACE.

(a) *Language*.—Romanic or Neo-Latin—Flemish, Breton, Basque—North and South, langue d'oïl and langue d'oc; supremacy of Northern French undisputed—French beyond the limits of France—Restricted significance of language affinity.

(b) *Historical Ethnography*.—Celtiberians, Gauls, Romans, Franks—Minor elements: Greeks and Arabs—Constant infiltration—Polish and Italian refugees—The Jews—Same basic elements as in England—Proportions undefinable—The Celtic problem as an example of ethnographic confusion.

The study of European races has been likened to a quagmire. In hardly any other question has such havoc been wrought by loose thinking applied to insufficient or conflicting data. "Anthroposociology" has in many cases been naught but the pedantic glorification of popular prejudices. The brilliant and suggestive works of Vacher de Lapouge, Gustave Lebon, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, for instance, are often marred by the assertiveness common to pseudo-sciences and to sciences in the making. The very term "race" is exceedingly vague. When we speak of Aryans, Semites, Mongolians; of Slavs, Celts, and Teutons; of Latins and Anglo-Saxons, we have three or four widely different conceptions in our minds. Race is often used for linguistic group: a pernicious confusion to which we owe the myths of "Aryan" and "Latin" races. Anglo-Saxon is a purely historical term, which denotes but two elements in the make-up of an extremely complex population. Celt and Teuton may refer to linguistic differences, but also to somatological differences, such as stature, pigmentation, and the shape of the skull. Finally, the French or the Spanish "race," for instance, means nothing but France or Spain considered as an ethnic unit. Three thousand years of migrations, wars, and peaceful intercourse have tangled European conditions to such a point that linguistic, ethnic, anthropological, and political boundaries are seldom, if ever, found to coincide.

(a) *Language*.

The French speak a Romanic or Neo-Latin language, like the Italians, the Spaniards, the Portuguese, and the Rumanians.

Let us note that France has not yet achieved the degree of linguistic unity she is often credited with. First of all, there are three allogenic groups. The Flemings in the North use a Low-German dialect, in almost every respect similar to Dutch. Brittany, after adopting Latin like the rest of Gaul, was re-Celticized in the fifth century by invaders from Cornwall, and Breton is but slowly receding before French. The Basques, who still ride on the Western Pyrenees, still preserve their mysterious language, Euskara or Euskaldunac, apparently unrelated even to the other agglutinative tongues in Europe, Finnish and Magyar. These heterogeneous elements are of no great significance in French national life. Within the Romania proper, the dialects of Nice and Corsica are undoubtedly more closely related to Italian than to Northern French, thus lending some colour to the claims of the "Irredentists"; whilst Catalan, spoken in French Pyrenées Orientales as well as in the most industrial part of Spain, is no less evidently akin to Provençal rather than to Castilian. More important is the fact that French is still divided into Northern and Southern, *Langue d'oïl* and *Langue d'oc*, *Francien* and *Provençal*. The boundary, broadly speaking, starts from the Gironde and ends near Berne in Switzerland, by way of Angoulême, Montmorillon, Montluçon, Lyons, and the crests of the Jura; but many border dialects are of such mixed character that no very definite line can be drawn. At every turn we meet this profound difference between North and South, with Poitou as a debatable borderland between them. But this linguistic division is not the cause of any political difficulty. The official status of Northern French is nowhere challenged, and there is no threat of national or cultural disruption in the revival of Provençal literature. In spite of Mistral's genius, one may doubt whether there be any future for the eclectic and artificial literary medium which he and his friends created, by ransacking the lore of many provinces and many centuries.

While French is not the sole language spoken in France, its domain extends beyond the French boundaries. In Belgium the southern provinces speak Walloon, a French dialect, with Liège as its stronghold and Brussels as its northern limit.

About half of German Lorraine, round Metz, and a few villages in Alsace are French of speech as well as French of heart. French is the language of some 700,000 Swiss in Neuchâtel and Vaud, as well as parts of Fribourg and Valais. The upper valley of Aosta, in Italy, also speaks French. Even in the Flemish parts of Belgium and in Alsace, in spite of political hostility on the part of "Flamingants" and Pangermanists, the upper classes are bilingual. The same is true of Luxemburg, of large sections of Switzerland, and especially, until recent times, of Rumania. But this leads us into the cultural diffusion of French, which has nothing to do with race, and will be discussed in its place.

Language affinity is a bond the historical, sentimental, and practical importance of which we have no desire to minimize. Yet, in the nineteenth century at least, French thought and French life were much more deeply influenced by England and Germany, and even by Scandinavia and Russia, than by Spain or Italy, and it can be shown that England, during the same period, kept in closer touch with Italy than France did. The use of related languages need not imply any moral or mental similarity. To bracket together as "Latin" traits the fortitude and impassiveness of ancient Rome, the artistic joyousness of modern Italy, Spain's gloomy pride and mysticism, France's wit and logic, would be, to say the least, venturesome. Still less are kindred tongues the evidence of descent from the same stock. The common "Latinity" of a Rumanian and a Portuguese proves no closer blood relationship than could be traced between a Lowland Scot and an Alabama negro—who both speak English dialects. Language is a historical and a cultural, but not properly a racial, factor.

(b) *Historical Ethnography.*

Shall we come to a more correct conception if we attempt to give the "ethnic formula" of a nation, in other words, if we enumerate the ingredients which contributed to its formation in the course of history? In France we find layer upon layer of invaders. France is attractive and accessible; it is the western extremity of the immense series of plains which stretch across

the north of Europe and Asia; and it ever was the easiest highway from North to South. The Gauls, whatever they may have been, were neither aborigines nor even, perhaps, the first conquerors of the land. The primitive inhabitants are often referred—darkly—as Celtiberians, and the Basques are sometimes held to be a remnant of these early occupiers of the soil. After the Gauls came the Romans, who subdued the south of the country from 154 to 121 B.C. (*Gallia Braccata* or *Narbonensis*, modern Provence) and the rest, as far as the Rhine, under Julius Cæsar, from 58 to 51 B.C. Four centuries later, after a long period of gradual infiltration, sometimes checked, sometimes encouraged by Rome, Gaul was flooded with migrating Barbarians. The Visigoths, the Burgundians, and the Franks took up their abode in the land. The invasions, properly so-called, ended with the pulse of the Huns and of the Avars. In the ninth and tenth centuries the Northmen harried the coasts, penetrated far inland along the valleys of the Seine and of the Loire, and finally secured the rich province which still bears their name (Normandy). The prehistoric and shadowy Celtiberians, the Gauls, the Romans, the Franks, and the Northmen, such are the main elements of the French people. All other historical influences are so small as to be almost negligible. The Greeks founded several cities on the Mediterranean shore—Nice, Monaco, Antibes, and especially Massilia—Marseilles. The Arabs, defeated by Charles Martel, occupied Aquitania for some time, and to their sojourn some ethnographers ascribe the sporadic existence of Saracenic types among the Southern peasantry. There is practically no trace of the protracted English tenure of Normandy, nor of Spanish rule in Franche-Comté. All invasions of France since the Hundred Years War were so short and of so purely military a nature that they could not affect the population in any perceptible degree. More important than all spectacular crises are the constant and silent migrations which have never completely ceased in modern times and continue to the present day. Throughout the nineteenth century France has attracted Poles, Russians, and Italians, driven from their countries by the tyranny of the Tsars or of Austria. The number of these refugees was never very large, but they were an

élite, and Polish names in particular are not infrequent among French writers and scientists. The immigration of common labourers is surprisingly small, in view of the facts that France is both richer and more sparsely populated than her neighbours and that there is no legal restraint to the inflowing of foreign workmen. Belgians, Italians, and Poles, however, are an ever increasing factor even in rural districts at harvest-time, and especially in industrial centres. The fear that Germany might conquer the rest of Lorraine, Champagne, and Franche-Comté by a process of endosmosis seems unfounded. Modern Germany, in spite of the tremendous increase in her population, has no men to spare; and in Germany as well as in French Lorraine, it has been found necessary to call in Polish and Italian labour to work the newly developed iron mines. The French have absolute faith in their power of assimilation, and the presence of a hundred thousand Germans in Paris is a factor of lasting peace between the two neighbours.

Shall we count the Jews among these foreign elements? That would be an error as well as an injustice, for the French Jews, some 60,000 altogether, do not in any way stand apart from the rest of the population. This was not exactly the case with the Alsatian Jews before 1871; this is not the case either with the extremely small international aristocracy of finance; Algeria, of course, has her own problem; and we are told that within the last few years Paris has been developing a Ghetto in the Saint Gervais district. But the Franco-Jewish families of old standing are, as a rule, well-to-do rather than wealthy, and less prominent in the commercial world than in the professions, literature, and science. Even the well-known racial type has become so attenuated as to be barely perceptible. In the Dreyfus case, as we shall see, Antisemitism proper played a minor part, and Drumont's *Libre Parole* is a *vox clamantis in deserto*.

Curiously enough, the ethnic components of the French people are exactly the same as those of the English, viz., primitive Celts, Roman conquerors, German invaders. The community of origin was made all the closer by the Norman conquest. The army of William, made up of adventurers from all Northern France, was not Scandinavian, but French. This may account

the brown eyes of a large proportion of the British aristocracy, recognized by the Teutomaniac Chamberlain. We must admit that in both cases, Britain and France, we do not know in what proportions the original elements were mingled. Moreover, Lapouge and Ammon were able to prove, a very slight difference in the prolificity or mortality of these various elements would be sufficient radically to alter their numerical relation within a few centuries. The French are in the main Gallo-Romano-Franks: we cannot give any exponents to the terms of this formula. Furthermore, the present tendency among historians is to minimize the importance of invasions. These movements, which loom so large in chronicles and traditions, seem to have affected only a small proportion of the population. The Gauls were only a ruling class. The Romans, north of the Alps, were few; even the veterans and traders who settled in the country were not necessarily of Roman blood. The Franks proper were a tribe. Even the cultural influence of conquest is often overstated. Gaul was evolving a stage of culture very similar to that of Rome when its development was absorbed by that of Imperial City. Fustel de Coulanges tried to prove that the Germanic invasions were not responsible for the rise of feudalism. In history as well as in geology, cataclysmic theories are more and more abandoned.

For a century and a half, from Boulainvilliers to Augustin Thierry and even to Henri Martin, the attempt was repeatedly made to use ethnography as a key to history. Sieyès cried out against the French aristocracy: "Let us send them back to their German marshes, whence they came!" Many considered the Revolution of 1830 as the final emancipation of the Gallo-Franks held in subjection by the Franks since the sixth century. These theories are fanciful in the extreme. Long before the end of the Middle Ages the nobility had been racially assimilated to the rest of the population. Nay, it had probably been renewed in its entirety, not once but several times, and particularly during the Crusades. There is no sign that at the time of the Revolution the nobility had any purer "Frankish" blood in its veins than the bourgeoisie.

Let us note finally that the historical migrations of peoples

are not always a clue to the present distribution of types and races. This difficulty is best exemplified by the Celtic question. The ancients, Cæsar in particular, described the Celts or Gauls (for they used the terms almost indiscriminately) as a tall, rude race. This description corresponds to our present conception of the Teutons. Chamberlain considers the original Celts, Slavs, and Germans as all equally Teutonic. The very Teutons who joined the Cimbri were possibly a Celtic tribe. Linguistically Celtic denotes a number of languages driven to the extreme verge of Western Europe—one just dead in Cornwall, others dying or fighting for life in Brittany, Wales, Ireland, and Scotland. Racially, there are few peoples standing farther apart than those who speak Celtic languages: the Bretons are much more akin to the Auvergnats, the Bavarians, and the Russians than to the Irish or the Scotch.

§ 3. THE RACE (*continued*).

(c) *Anthropology*.—Criteria—Limitations—The Nordic, Celto-Slav and Mediterranean races in France—The French a racial medley—Their unity an act of will.

(d) *Psychology of the French People*.—Collective psychology may be a delusion, but has formative influence—(1) Cheerfulness—(2) Nervous temperament—True of Paris and the South, not of France as a whole—(3) Sociability—(4) Intellectualism—These traits the result of France's natural heterogeneity and self-conquered unity. They veil, but do not destroy, the common human substratum.

(e) *Note: Race from the Eugenic Point of View*.—Racial decadence—The alleged lowering of the stature—The falling birth-rate.

(c) *Anthropology*.

So we now turn from historical ethnography to anthropology, which with callipers, measuring tape, and colour scale, ought to give us definite data. Many tests can be applied: stature, build (stocky or slender), pigmentation (skin, hair, and eyes), shape of the skull and face (facial index, facial angle, cephalic index), form of the nose, texture of the hair, etc. For the distinction of races, stature, pigmentation, and the cephalic index combined are the criteria generally adopted.*

* *Cephalic index*: simply the breadth of the head above the ears expressed in percentage of its length from forehead to back. As the he

We should bear in mind from the outset that there are extremely few pure specimens, *i.e.*, individuals in whom all the characteristics of a given type are actually found together. The "types" defined by anthropologists are more or less ideal conceptions. Ammon wrote to Ripley that out of thousands of skulls he had measured in Baden, a stronghold of the Alpine type, he could not find a single perfect specimen of that type. The truth is that if the different varieties of Europeans are considered as races, we are all mongrels. This is truer of rich accessible countries than of "centres of isolation" like Scandinavia and Corsica; truer of the aristocracy and the professions, easily cosmopolitan, than of the common people. That excessive faith can be placed in the cephalic index alone is made evident by a curious fact: the Basques and the Jews are among the most strongly individualized races in the world, isolated, the former in their mountainous habitat and their mysterious language, the latter as a result of their religion and the universal popular prejudice against them. As types, they are unmistakable. Yet their cephalic index varies with that of the surrounding populations. Spanish Basques are considerably longer-headed than French Basques. Algerian and Portuguese Jews are longer-headed than Polish Jews. Any relation between cephalic index and intelligence is disproved by the fact that the longest heads are found among the degraded Australian aborigines, and that the negro race as a whole is more dolichocephalic than the Teutonic.*

Most anthropologists recognize three main races in Europe. The Nordic, or Scandinavian, is dolichocephalic, tall and blond. The Mediterranean is also dolichocephalic, short, but slender, and dark. The Alpine, or Celto-Slavic, is brachycephalic, short, inclined to stockiness, with brown hair and brown or grey eyes. All three exist in France—the first in the North, the second in

the South. The Alpine type is proportionately broader, that is, more fully rounded, viewed from the top down, this cephalic index increases. When it rises above 80, the type is called brachycephalic; when it falls below 75, the term dolichocephalic is applied to it. Indexes between 75 and 80 are characterized as mesocephalic (Ripley).

* The index of the late Henri Poincaré, philosopher and mathematician, was over 83. Cf. Dr. Toulouse, *Henri Poincaré*.

the South, the third in the areas of isolation, Brittany, Central Mountains, Alps. In no other country are more than two of the main races fully represented.*

Some of the French of Savoy are actually the broadest-headed population in the world, and some districts in Auvergne have a shorter population as any in Europe, the Lapps excepted. But the great majority of the French are exactly what the layman would expect them to be: they offer few extremes, an immense diversity, and a mean average about equal to that of Europe as a whole. They are neither tall nor short, neither very fair nor very dark, neither very long- nor very round-headed. In other words, there is no French race properly so-called. The French from the anthropological point of view, are in every way similar to the other inhabitants of Central and Western Europe. Environmental and social differences are in their case of much more importance than race. You can tell a peasant from a mechanic, and both from a city clerk, much more easily than a Rhinelander, a Bavarian, and a Saxon from a Champenois, a Parisian, or an Orléanais.

Yet there is a French *people*, different from all others. What a true cosmopolitan or internationalist would dream of denying the fact? But this unity, which implies neither homogeneity nor uniformity, is the product of environment and history. All national groups which have enjoyed centuries of separate existence form literally huge families, ever bound closer together by long-continued intermarriage or "in-breeding" on a large scale. There is no Frenchman who has not in his veins some blood of the three, four, or five "primary races" which, according to

* Brinton makes a fourth race, the Kymric, brachycephalic, but tall and reddish, and states that it also is found in France. Deniker has six "primary" races, of which five are living in France: the usual Nordic, the Cévenole, which corresponds to the Alpine or Celto-Slavic, a tall Atlanto-Mediterranean, a short Ibero-Insular, both dark and dolichocephalic, and which are subdivisions of the orthodox Mediterranean; finally an Adriatic or Dinaric race, brachycephalic but tall, which other authorities consider merely as a Nordic-Alpine hybrid. All these divisions fail to take into account a curious group of peasants in the South-West (Dordogne), fairly tall, dolichocephalic but broad-faced, with high cheekbones and dark hair. This type, which recurs also among the Berbers, has been identified with the prehistoric Cro-Magnon race, occupying the same habitat.

anthropology, inhabit France at the present day. Thus ethnic types are artificial, and none the less real. They are incessantly in the making, approximating to a certain national ideal, or at least to a certain national average.

But more potent far than blood-relationship is the bond of unity provided by tradition. A thousand years at least of common life, the leadership of the same kings, the treasure-house of the same literature, the moulding influence of the same customs and the same laws, all these, and not common descent, have given the French their "like-mindedness"—even when they are most fiercely at odds with one another—their national individuality. And even more than tradition, the common aspirations of the race are the true basis of its unity. And these factors cannot be gauged by means of the callipers. This is recognized even by those writers who make the most extravagant claims for race in the physiological, the breeder's acceptance of the term. Thus Chamberlain finally abandons all anthropological tests, and holds that Teutonism is not a physical fact, but an ideal. Whoso thinks "Teutonically" is a Teuton, be his cephalic index what it may. He whose soul is French needs no other credentials. This, be it said in passing, is the impregnable principle on which France bases her claims to Alsace-Lorraine. Whether, as some would have it, racial complexity is a condition of culture, is more than we can affirm. At any rate, in the case of France, this complexity is of profound significance for the future of the country. France is a racial medley, an epitome of Europe: if ever the natural increase of her population should fail to keep pace with economic opportunities, she could draw almost indefinitely from her neighbours without losing her synthetic identity. The incarnation of French patriotism in 1871 was the son of an Italian, and the roll of French worthies of the nineteenth century contains many a German name. So long as her soil is tilled, her language spoken, and her ideal kept alive, the nation cannot die.

1) *Psychology of the French People.*

Thus our problem, the definition of the French people, can be solved neither by linguistics, ethnography, nor anthropology, but

by collective psychology. This kind of study, of which Taine, Boutmy, Fouillée, Lebon, Demolins, Bodley, Brownell, Barrett Wendell have left us brilliant or popular models, is as dangerous as it is attractive. The collective mind, if it exist at all, is so many-sided and unstable that no delineation can ever be more than a working hypothesis of very doubtful and provisional value. Where is the dreamy, unworldly, metaphysical and sentimental Germany of yester-year? Where the solid, matter-of-fact, law-abiding, tradition-loving, antisocialistic England so dear to bourgeois economists and politicians of the last generation? Where is the France whose radical unfitness in the colonial field was a by-word a few short years ago? Where is the unchanging Chinese? We shall have to challenge many such generalizations in the course of this chapter and of this book.

We do not profess to know whether there is any ultimate justification for "national psychology." But there is at least one tangible element in it: the image of a people in their own minds and in the minds of their neighbours is one of the ideal forces which help frame their destiny.

The traits of the French character on which most observers French as well as foreign, seem to agree, can be summarily analysed as follows:

Most obvious perhaps is a certain cheerfulness, not exuberant and spasmodic, but gentle and suffused through the daily routine of life. It neither implies nor excludes true happiness and genuine good-nature. There is no mixture of sentiment in it and it has a decided bend towards mockery. In all these respects it is different from Italian joyousness, English good humour or German *Gemüthlichkeit*. Most of all does it differ from the outbursts of sheer animal spirits which alternate in the Anglo-Saxons with long stretches of intense earnestness. The French cannot indulge in rollicking nonsense, but they cannot repress a smile in the midst of the most serious discussion. This tendency, combined with common sense, is the basis of French wit. Applied to spiritual problems it may be called Voltairianism; in moral questions it often leads to "Gallic levity" or bantering cynicism. Lafontaine, Voltaire, and to a certain extent Renan, are its highest representatives in literature.

le Gavroche, the heroic gamin, may be taken as its clearest symbol.

A second trait, no less apparent, is a nervous temperament, high-strung, excitable, expansive and explosive, quickly moved to enthusiasm and to despair. This was ascribed of old to their Celtic ancestors, and it remains true in the nineteenth century. The constant fermentation of the Parisian mind, the fickleness of Parisian fashion, the instability of political regimes until 1870 and of Ministries after that date, are offered as instances of this tendency.

Before proceeding with our analysis, let us note that these two traits are correlated: the first acts as a corrective to the second. Excitable as they are, the French need the check of their light-hearted scepticism. Whatever they take seriously they take tragically. Songs and jests, after all, are better than civil wars and persecutions.

But when in the preceding paragraphs we used the word "French," we were conscious of its inadequacy. These two traits, gaiety and excitability, are not characteristic of France as a whole, but of certain parts only—Paris and the South. The other provinces are earnest, persevering, conservative, with a tendency to stolid gravity and even to melancholy. Whoever is acquainted with French peasants will never hear without a smile the usual talk about French liveliness. But Paris obscures the rest of the country, except the irrepressible South. Some spectacular events in French history, some minor characteristics of French literature, may be explained by these traits, but they hardly affect the main tenor of French life. France has known a dozen regimes within eighty years: this was a crisis in the life of the nation, similar to the one England went through in the seventeenth century. But for eight hundred years the French had remained obstinately loyal to the Capetian dynasty. Napoleon restored much of the ancient regime under different names, and France, after a hundred years, has hardly changed anything in the administrative institutions he created. Ministerial instability is more apparent than real: in most cases, a change of government means only a reshuffling of the old pack. Each general

election for the last forty years has shown the steadiness of the electorate, moderate as a whole, slowly moving towards the Radical Left, without any of those sudden "swings of the pendulum" and "landslides" so frequent in British and American politics.

In the same way, the so-called Gallic or Parisian strain in French literature, with its easy wit and smiling scepticism, is but one of the elements of French thought—the most unique, perhaps, but by no means the most important. It may boast, with the unknown authors of *Renart*, the fabliaux and farces of the Middle Ages, of Rabelais, Montaigne, Lafontaine, Molière, Voltaire, Renan, Anatole France—in some of their aspects. But the more numerous and the greater masterpieces at all epochs are of a more earnest nature. The mediæval epic, the poetry of the Renaissance, the drama and Christian philosophy of the seventeenth century, Jean-Jacques and Buffon in the eighteenth, the Romanticists and the Realists in the nineteenth—where is the Gallic levity of all these?—Calvin, Pascal, and Alfred de Vigny are no less French than Meilhac and Halévy. The two tendencies coexist and are equally French. Their blending—gravity relieved by a smile—gives a unique charm to the conversation of many French priests and scholars.*

A third characteristic of the French is their sociability. By this we do not mean mere good-fellowship, but the predominance of the social over the individual elements in every form of human activity—and, as a consequence, the predominance of the formal over the spontaneous. We find this in society life, in which French tact, diplomacy, savoir-vivre and etiquette have become so many by-words. The ransom for these admirable qualities is a propensity to circuitous conventionalities, a certain lack of bluntness which less polite people are apt to misunderstand. In art, the same turn of mind leads to the worship of taste and style, in which the French are passed masters; it may also lead to superstitious reverence for set rules and canons, to pseudo-

* Cf. Renan's *Souvenirs d'Enfance et de Jeunesse*, Anatole France's *Histoire Contemporaine*. The peculiar cheerfulness and excitability of the French have not seldom been ascribed to the long-continued drinking of light wines.

sicism and all its evils. In the moral world, the same tendency is revealed in the potency of social sanctions—honourific awards, popularity, applause, infamy, ridicule. Honour is the Frenchman's conscience. From the injustice of men he would appeal, not to the everlasting God revealed in his soul, but to posterity; that is to say, to public opinion in the future. In this supremacy of the collective mind we cannot fail to recognize a victory of will over instinct. Heavy are the losses of such a triumph entails. We may doubt whether it is worth while. Yet the greatest cause the world is fighting for, social justice and universal peace, cannot be won except through a curbing of primitive individual instincts. The French ideal, artificial though it be, means a striving from chaos to order, from barbarism to civilization.

The fourth cardinal feature of the French mind we might call "intellectualism." The French are not pre-eminently mystical, sentimental, or imaginative, and they yield the palm of practical sense to the "Anglo-Saxons." Their domain is logical thought. This is intimately connected with the preceding characteristic, collectibility. Since the individual is subordinated to the collectivity, "common sense," or conformity with the general experience and judgment of the race, is held supreme. "Common sense" is but the popular name for "reason," still the goddess of many a French mind. The French are passionate reasoners and rationalists. They love abstract ideas with an intensity which their neighbours can hardly realize. Mysticism, sentiment, imagination, unchecked by reason, seem to them individualistic, that is to say, erratic and unruly. Even facts are despised as disorderly until they have been reduced to logical laws. The *Champs-Élysées* of Versailles, the historical theorems or the literary syllogisms of Taine, are evidences of this turn of mind. The love of the French for abstract ideas is one of their nobling features. It imparted to their revolutions, and even to individual cases like the Dreyfus affair, a universal significance. In personal matters the French may be tempted to veil the truth for the sake of politeness: but on questions of principles their intellectual sincerity is uncompromising. They are fearlessly honest thinkers, and so averse to comfortable self-delusion

that they take a sort of bitter pride and pleasure in believing the worst: hence the destructive, pessimistic, almost cynical strain in their literature. This is not a thing of yesterday. Becque and Zola were the legitimate heirs of Lesage, Molière and La Rochefoucauld.

Each dominant trait in an individual or in a nation is accompanied by its reverse and complement, which is a reaction or protest against it. The total picture is the result of these contrasts. Thus French cheerfulness has always had a background of pessimism and misanthropy. The French love of change is ever fighting against the French love of routine. French formalism is paid for by outbursts of licence whenever outward checks are removed. French indulgence for political fictions is redeemed by intellectual courage and candour in matters of principles, and the fierce radicalism of the French mind is corrected by its sensitiveness to ridicule.

The sociability and logicalness of the French are not "racial" traits, since there is no French race. They are not found fully developed in remote districts or among the lowest strata. It is in urban centres, in Paris especially, that we find them full-blown, and most of all perhaps among foreigners won over to French ideas—Max Nordau, Novicow, Jean Finot. These traits are not racy of the soil; they are the product of education—a collective education continued for two thousand years. But they have penetrated very deep. France has an immense middle class, in conscious touch with the life of the country. And these traits have passed into the language, which has thus become a school of urbanity, logic, and abstraction, so that it is not possible for a young peasant to be taught standard French without receiving indirectly some of the spirit of Molière and Voltaire.

These essential qualities are the natural result of France's heterogeneity. They are the qualities indispensable to smooth intercourse among foreigners. The many peoples, the several races which inhabit France have little in common, except what is common to all men. In sentiment and imagination they differ so radically that they cannot understand one another: abstract reason is the one universal bond of union. At the

the time, and this is the paradox, the miracle of French history, the heterogeneous and often warring elements want to remain united: that is why everything that might lead to disruption is immediately outlawed. Woe to minorities, woe to individualism! In a country where the indispensable degree of likeness is maintained only by constant exertion of will-power, nonconformity, dissent, is the worst social sin.

But these traits are merely collective, superimposed. Originality of thought, intensity of feelings, power of imagination, are veiled under conventionalities and abstractions: they are not destroyed. An accomplished American lady told the other day that all the tragedies of Racine seemed to her artificial: the smooth and pompous verse prevented her from discerning the depth and infinite variety of passion depicted in the masterpieces. As one becomes better acquainted with Racine's technique, it recedes into the background, and one realizes that Racine is closer akin to Shakespeare than to Molière. In the same way, under the polished veneer of French society and the attractive generality of French thought, one should remember that there are men and women with the same feelings as their brothers and sisters all the world over. The part of "collective psychology" is not so much to offer tentative explanations as to remove causes of misapprehension.

Race from the Eugenic Point of View.

There is still another sense of the word "race": i.e., the "breed" or "stock" considered from the point of view of its physical fitness. The alleged "racial decay" of the French as well as their moral degeneration were freely and frequently discussed some fifteen or twenty years ago. We shall study in a later chapter the curious fit of pessimism and self-deprecation which was the basis of much of this talk, as well as the herald of a vigorous revival. France suffers from all the ills of the modern world: alcoholism, tuberculosis, venereal diseases, and nervousness. But two facts are generally put forward as irrefutable evidence of this physical decay: the lowering of the minimum height required of French recruits and the steady decrease of the birth-rate. The first fact, however, implies no diminution in the *average* height of conscripts: it simply means that France, wishing not to fall too far behind Germany in military strength, must her population is increasing at a vastly slower rate, was obliged to select an ever greater portion of her young manhood. Should France reduce her army to the same ratio of the total population as in Germany, she

could immediately raise the required minimum. As a matter of fact, the average stature of the French, which as far as we know had remained the same throughout the twenty centuries of their history, is now decidedly on the increase, as the yearly reports of the Conscription Committees will show. And the vitality of individuals is also improving in the country as a whole. There are local areas of degeneration, the result of alcoholism (parts of Normandy) or selective emigration (parts of Auvergne). But the morbidity and the death-rate are lower than they ever were.

The decline of the birth-rate, which began, we are told, in the sixteenth century, has now become such a regular and universal phenomenon among the most civilized nations that the French are no longer singled out as a awful example. New England and Australia are as infertile as France. The Germans are as inferior in this respect to the Poles, whom they despise, as they are superior to the French. This decline seems to be inseparable from our stage of civilization, for causes which cannot fully be discussed in this place. Suffice it to say (1) that the population of France is still increasing, albeit slowly: the deficit of certain years has always been more than made up within the quinquennial period between two censuses; (2) that there seems to be no room for a vast and rapid increase in population, on account of the fairly high standard of living combined with the comparative scantiness of natural resources (undeveloped lands, coal, and metals). This is made evident by the fact that thousands of Central Europeans cross France every year without stopping and proceed to America.

§ 4. THE TRADITION: ANCIENT REGIME AND REVOLUTION.

1. Dramatic character of French history—Real continuity.

2. France grew with the Capetian dynasty—Character of its power: autocratic but national—Eighteenth century: the King captured by the nobles—Progress of radical ideas, failure of reforms—sharp reaction at the close of the regime.

3. The Revolution (a) completes the work of the Capetians; (b) transfers sovereignty from the King, theoretically to the people practically to the Third Estate (bourgeoisie); (c) transfers vast amount of landed property from clergy and nobility to bourgeoisie and peasantry; (d) temporizes and compromises more than is usually thought.

4. Did France need a "saviour" in 1799?—Conditions not desperate—Bourgeoisie wanted to make its conquests secure—"Close the era of revolutions"—The army as final arbiter.

The political history of modern France is intensely dramatic. Within less than a century (1789–1870) the country has tried eleven regimes. None, except the present Republic, has survived the generation of its founders, and every one, even the most powerful at the heyday of its splendour, felt itself threatened by irreconcilable opposition and at the mercy of

incident. Each revolution was no mere pronunciamiento, it brings in only a new personnel and at most a new vocabulary; each attempted to introduce new institutions, new principles, and a different ideal. The formidable crisis of 1789-94 France rent in twain, and the two nations have lived ever since in a state of open or latent warfare.

One part of France still holds as a dogma that the country was born anew during the fateful years of the Revolution and the Empire. The old order, based on prejudice and privilege, was swept away, and from its ruins there sprang the new order, based on Reason and Justice. This is the democratic view, particularly attractive in its broad optimism and its dramatic simplicity: it is the orthodox doctrine taught in State schools and found at its best in Michelet's glowing pages.

For another set of Frenchmen—the conservatives, the pessimists, the disciples of Rivarol and Taine, of Burke and Carlyle,* the body politic is not a spontaneous, still less a voluntary, aggregation, which can be dissolved and reformed at will. It is at the same time anti-natural and organic: whilst it holds in check the evil, or at least the anti-social tendencies of nature, it is the fruit of immemorial and unconscious efforts, the wonderful and fragile growth of centuries. Any rationalistic meddling with its development is bound to end in disaster. Authority, so painfully reared, collapses into chaos. The wolf in man—or, as Taine would say, the gorilla—is let loose. Civilization itself would be engulfed were it not rescued—but at what cost!—by the strong arm of a despot. These men believe in the gospel of authority and tradition. They hold fast to the institutions which have survived the great upheaval: the Monarchy, the Church, and Property. The others would destroy the “immortal principles” of liberty, equality, and fraternity to their logical ends; and this not merely in the political field, but in the domains of international relations, economics, and religion as well. Each party is to the other the power of Darkness, and no reconciliation between the two is conceivable.

The earliest and clearest presentation of this point of view can be found in Rivarol's *Journal Politique National*, August 2, 1789.

Yet it would be an error to consider this conflict as peculiar to France: it is but an extreme case of the antinomy between conservation and progress which is found all the world over. The logical turn of mind of the French, their aversion to compromise when principles are involved, have led both parties to the adoption of definite, consistent, and radical doctrines. The Revolution polarized, as it were, the opposing elements within the nation. But this absolute opposition is more theoretic than real. The vast majority of the people are conservative without fanaticism. In many of the most advanced thinkers radicalism is tempered by Parisian scepticism and irony. The permanent and ineluctable necessities of life have never allowed principles to be carried to their extreme consequences: even the Convention temporized and compromised. If we look below the stormy surface of French political life, we find a deep, slow and steady stream unaffected by the winds above. However sudden and tragic French revolutions in the nineteenth century may have been, it remains a question whether in point of actual performance any of them meant much more than an average general election in Great Britain. The great Revolution itself that "titanic birth of a new world," is less of a break in French traditions than is commonly believed. Early in the eighteenth century, Saint-Simon was conscious of the levelling, anti-feudalistic, and bourgeois trend of the Bourbon monarchy. Chateaubriand was justified in his paradox that "the Revolution was made long before it broke out." De Tocqueville and Albert Sorel have shown conclusively that the theories and methods of the ancient regime were continued almost unaltered under the new, as well in home affairs as in diplomacy. In spite of appearances, French history is continuous. The Monarchy of Louis XIV, the Empire of Napoleon, the Republic of Gambetta are parts of the same tradition. Whoever ignores or despises the past cannot fully understand the present.

France was moulded, if not actually made, by the long line of her Capetian kings. None of them was a genius, and only one was a saint. Yet, through eight centuries, they managed to round out their domain and establish their authority. The country grew in extent and in self-consciousness with the power

or rulers. In 1789 their work was almost complete. The frontiers of France reached almost everywhere the limits of the French speech. The vast process of consolidation, unification, centralization, which was to turn feudal chaos into the modern state, had been hastened by Richelieu and Louis XIV. No province with any political significance was suffered to exist. The King was no longer merely the first of the nobles—*primus inter pares*. He was the Lord's anointed, endowed with enormous powers, and the etiquette of his Court was almost oriental. Yet he was not an Oriental despot, but rather the equal of the Roman Emperor—the State personified, the embodiment of law. All authority was vested in his officials, appointed by him, responsible to him, and whom he selected freely from the lower nobility and the bourgeoisie. Thus the ancient regime was an autocracy indeed: the independence and traditions of the judiciary barely tempered that absolute character. But as an autocracy guided by and exercised through democratic elements. It served the interests of the people at large, and was directed against all privileges and intermediate authorities. It was, in fact, a levelling, simplifying, rationalizing agency. So long as the King remained on the whole true to this national character of his power, the French were obstinately loyal to his dynasty. Individual faults were condoned with surprising indulgence. And even when decades of war, waste, and open misgovernment had ruined affection and respect, the great mass of the people, while despising Louis the Great and hating Louis XV, Well-Beloved, still pinned their faith to the Bourbon monarchy.

But throughout the eighteenth century the regime was untrue to its inner principle. Louis XIV had effectually ruined the power of the nobility, and Versailles was merely a place of gorgeous servitude: the King, surrounded by the host of his favorites, became their prisoner in his turn. There was a fundamental difference between the monarchy of Henry IV, and even Louis XIV when Colbert was in office, and that of Louis XV, the King of the nobles, absolutely out of touch with his people. Louis XVI, hailed as a new Henry IV, was too weak to resume the true tradition of his race. Privileges were retained

whilst the services they once corresponded to had long ceased to be performed: meaningless, burdensome, vexatious, they became intolerable with the progress of radical ideas favoured by the nobles themselves. The aristocracy applauded Voltaire, Rousseau, Diderot, and even the direct and destructive attack of Figaro's monologue: they lionized Franklin and were filled with genuine enthusiasm for American liberty; but at the same time a sharp reaction perpetuated injustice, made the future more hopeless. At the close of the ancient regime, Chevalier de Catinat, Fabert, could not have become generals or marshals; Bossuet, Massillon, Fléchier could not have become bishops. "Never were more manorial registers made (for the exacting of feudal dues) than after 1786; feudal taxes were heavier than they had ever been since the sixteenth century."† The result was inevitable: the financial straits of the government driven to bankruptcy by its extravagance and maladministration, provided the opportunity for sweeping reforms. In three months (May 5 to August 4, 1789), with comparatively little bloodshed and amidst universal rejoicings, the ancient regime was destroyed.

But the Constituent Assembly was simply crowning, in a few weeks, the patient work of the Capetian line. The suppression of all surviving privileges, whether they belonged to a caste, an order, a corporation, or a province; equality before the law; uniformization of territorial divisions, jurisdiction, weights and coinage, taxes and local government—all these measures, hasty though they were, and illiberal at times under their apparent logic, would have secured the hearty endorsement of Francis I and Richelieu. Even the so-called Civil Constitution of the Clergy, the stumbling-block of the Revolution, was strictly in accordance with the Gallican policy of the French kings, summed up by Bossuet in the Declaration of 1682. That there should be no intermediate powers of

* Edict of Saint-Germain on the status of officers, 1781.

† Cf. Aimé Chéret, *La Chute de l'Ancien Régime*.

‡ Ph. Sagnac, "La Propriété Foncière et les Paysans," in *L'Œuvre Sociale de la Révolution* (p. 229); also J. Louthisky, *L'Etat des Classes Agricoles en France à la veille de la Révolution*.

ences between the individual subject and his sovereign. The guiding principle of autocracy as it was that of the Jacobins. Although they had "learnt nothing and forgotten nothing," the restored Bourbons, in 1815, were only enabled to preserve many of the administrative reforms of the Revolution.

But it is obvious that the Revolution was no mere return to the national tradition of the old kings. The weakening of that very notion of tradition, the substitution for it of "reason," were indeed among the chief characteristics of the movement. And although the "reason" of eighteenth-century Frenchmen was bound to move along certain lines determined by their history, the difference between the principles soon became evident. The authority of the sovereign remained as absolute as ever, but sovereignty was transferred from the prince to the nation. Election took the place of heredity or arbitrary choice, and was applied even to the army and to the clergy. This meant no less than the recasting of a world. By ruining the basis of traditional authority in matters political, the Revolutionists, disciples of the Philosophers, shook the basis of historical religion as well, and henceforth "abuses" and "superstition" were denounced in the same breath. Although in 1792-93 the terms "democrat" and "patriot" were synonymous, the historical Fatherland, with its mystic appeal to sacrifice, could not for ever stand in the light of modern rationalism. The universal Republic was already an ideal of the Revolution. Finally, the condemnation of privileges and heredity in the political State, the wholesale confiscation of long-established property as a measure of national expediency, pointed to a radical revolution in the economic and social field. This danger did not appear for many decades: the conspiracy of Babeuf can hardly be called the dawn of modern socialism. Private property was one of the "sacred rights" recognized by the Declaration, and death was later decreed against whoever should dare to propose an "agrarian law." * The sale of "national property," composed of the confiscated

* A souvenir of the Gracchi.

domains of the clergy and of emigrating nobles, changed the course of the Revolution, and by some writers is held to be the whole of the Revolution. The most numerous and most conservative classes, the peasantry and the lower bourgeoisie had at last free access to the ownership of land, their immortal memorial dream. This immense redistribution of property to the collectivity was in deep agreement with the basic principles of the Revolution, but in flat contradiction to the prejudices and professed beliefs of the very men who voted it. It was an emergency measure, founded on the old *raison d'état-salus populi*. Although it was by its very nature an expedient, an exception, it overshadowed for a generation all the other aspects of the movement. Although it was practically an act of socialism, it created that most powerful antisocialist interest, an innumerable army of small landed proprietors.

In thus substituting one dogma for another, the sovereignty of the people for the right of divinely ordained ruler, the authority of reason for that of tradition, there is no doubt that the Revolution abandoned the safe ground of experience and indulged in abstract theorizing. "Perish the Colonies rather than a principle!": this oft-quoted phrase is supposed to sum up the shallow rationalism of the Jacobins, fanatically blind to living realities. Yet this is but one face of the truth. Historians with a systematic turn of mind like Taine, fail to see the sane, cautious, solid side of the great Assemblies. There is much more "opportunism" in the Revolution than some of its critics would have us believe. Until the 10th of August, 1792, the constitutional monarchy of Louis XVI was an attempted compromise between tradition and principle. Not only was hereditary monarchy retained, but manhood suffrage was not introduced, and the provisions of the Constitution of 1791 in this respect were less liberal than the last concessions of the old regime in 1788. After Thermidor 9, 1794, there was a sharp reaction against intolerant Jacobinism; the Thermidorian Convention and the Directoire were bourgeois regimes, trimming their sails pretty close to the wind. But even during the height of the crisis the Montagnards and the Terrorists themselves were prompt to

nize the limit of immediate applicability of their principles. Sufficient attention is generally given to the fact that two of the most important, wisest, and most liberal measures of the Revolution were passed under the rule of the Jacobins, and we were taught to consider as raving fanatics. It was Danton, a prominent member of the Club, the friend and accomplice of Robespierre, who induced the Convention to reject the theoretical and unworkable plans of public education proposed by Romme and Lepeletier de Saint-Au-
reau: his own system established absolute liberty for any one to open a school, under the supervision of local voluntary associations. Not even priests or nobles were debarred from that liberty, and subsidies were to be given to all institutions, in proportion to the number of their scholars. By the decrees of September 18, 1794, February 21 and May 30, 1795, the Convention, tired of persecutions, schisms, and newfangled theories, decreed the absolute separation of Church and State. It was under the Thermidorian reaction: but before the fall of Robespierre, and under his inspiration, a halt had been called to religious persecution.*

Thus the Revolution as an "indivisible block" is a legend, as said with due respect for the veteran statesman who made this catchword famous.† We can distinguish at least four elements: continuation of the national or Capetian tradition; application of philosophical principles; vast transfer of property due to the stress of circumstances; and, in every detail of administration as well as in many capital decisions, a remarkable willingness to listen to experience and to compromise with necessity.

Hence comes it that the Revolution ended in apparent failure and led to a despotism worse than that of Louis XIV? Had it been a mere nightmare, a carnival of mob violence tempered with philosophical fanaticism, it would not have lasted so long, achieved so much, and created such a powerful tradition. A dark picture has often been drawn of the situation on the eve of the Consulate—an empty treasury, disorder everywhere, a victorious coalition closing upon exhausted and

demoralized France—such is the abysmal chaos from which Napoleon is supposed to have rescued the country. But the picture is overdrawn; the situation was by no means so desperate as in 1793. The victories of Brune and Massena soon retrieved the early disasters of the war. The royalist insurrections in the West and in the South could not compare in intensity and in organization with those of five years before; the work of Hoche in Vendée had been well done. Persecutions had practically ceased; royalists were openly active and Catholic worship was free. The economic condition of France was not to be measured by the hopeless financial troubles of the Government. War was self-supporting, tribute being levied on friend and foe. Conscription was a safety valve, a remedy to unemployment. Industry on the large scale was in its infancy: local industry, with insignificant capital and a rudimentary organization, did not suffer so radically from the prevailing disorder as our more complex economic system would under similar circumstances. Society under the Directoire indulged in pleasure and luxury with a freedom which shows the rapid recuperation of the country. France was still mainly an aggregation of small agricultural communities, and the peasants were not badly off. Roads, canals, bridges were in a dilapidated condition: but this handicap was compensated in many ways. The peasantry had acquired land; all the feudal dues had been abolished and the number of compulsory holidays greatly reduced; national taxes were collected with great laxity by the local authorities and were paid in depreciated paper-money. On his return to France, Lafayette was struck with the change (1799): “You know how many beggars and starvelings there used to be in your part of the country: now none is to be seen; the peasants are richer, their land better tilled, their women better clothed.”* There is no doubt that France was not on the downgrade.

If, therefore, society expected a “saviour,” it was not with the hope that he would undo the work of the Revolution, but that he would make it secure. Although the two decisive events, the insurrections of July 14, 1789, and August 10, 1792, were the

* *Mémoires*, quoted by Taine, *Origines*, x. 114—this before the coup d'état of Brumaire could have modified the state of the country.

work of the people, the whole movement had been inspired, led, and finally confiscated by one privileged order, the Third Estate or bourgeoisie. That ruling class was craving for peace and order, so as to enjoy its newly acquired social prominence and wealth. Two dangers were to be guarded against: a restoration of the ancient regime and the advent of democracy. So the bourgeoisie wished for a government of the same origin as itself; but as powerful, as conservative, as that of the kings. The mass of the people would not object; they felt no sympathy for the impotent oligarchy of the Directoire. They were not averse to autocracy; ten centuries of absolute monarchy, the collective dictatorship of the Convention, had prepared them for Cæsarism.

It was manifestly from the army that salvation was to be expected. The army was fast becoming professional and pretorian, but it still represented patriotism, efficiency, success. It had created organized republics abroad, from Holland to Naples: why should it not attempt the same task at home? It was the very embodiment of national strength: the civil government, in comparison, seemed a mass of corruption and factious strife, doomed to impotence and failure. It was, then, natural that clear-sighted politicians should cast their eyes about for some energetic and unscrupulous general, willing to put the Directoire out of its misery. Augereau, Hoche, Joubert, Moreau, many others, including such lesser personalities as Hédouville, were thought of for the work. Augereau was naught but a coarse soldier, and might have been a convenient instrument in skilful hands. Hoche was one of the noblest characters as well as one of the ablest commanders of the time, and might have been a French Washington. But history cannot indulge in might-have-beens. Through his undoubted genius as a general and as an administrator, through his no less unique power of histrionic self-advertisement, through his total absence of scruples and his boundless ambition, the Corsican imposed himself as the man of the situation. His political patrons and accomplices—Sieyès, Barras, Talleyrand—still attempted to use him as a cat's-paw, with the uncomfortable suspicion growing upon them that they were his tools. On the 18th of Brumaire (November 9, 1799), after a coup d'état which was a clumsy farce, Napoleon Bonaparte, at the age of thirty, became the master of France.

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§ 4. THE TRADITION: ANCIENT REGIME AND REVOLUTION.

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CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

I. THE REVOLUTION

- 1789 May 5. Summons of the States General.
June 17. National Constituent Assembly.
June 20. Oath of the Tennis Court.
July 14. Storming of the Bastille.
August 4. Voluntary surrender of feudal rights.
- 1791 June 20. Flight of the King to Varennes.
October 1. Legislative Assembly (to September, 1792).
- 1792-99 War between France and the Coalition. (1) Prussia and Austria.
- 1792 June 20 and August 10. Insurrections. The Tuileries invaded.
Louis XVI suspended.
September 2-7. Massacres in the prisons of Paris.
September 20-21. Victory of Valmy. Meeting of the Convention.
First Republic.
- 1793 January 21. Execution of Louis XVI. War against England, Spain, Sardinia. Civil War in Vendée and the South. Committee of Public Safety. Reign of Terror. Marat. Dictatorship of the Jacobins and Robespierre.
- 1794 July 27 (Thermidor 9). Fall of Robespierre.
- 1794-95 Thermidorian Reaction.
- 1795-99 Directoire (cf. Table II).

CHAPTER II

NAPOLEON

Growth of Napoleon's power—Three main elements: glory, efficiency, tyranny.

§ 1. MILITARY GLORY.

"L'Épopée"—Napoleon as stage-manager—The army: its variety of gorgeous uniforms—Pageants—Monuments of triumph: columns, arches, temples—Pretorianism: Napoleon-worship in the army—Its limits—The seamy side of militarism: looting on the heroic scale—Reluctant heroes—Growing indifference of the country.

The burden—Financially light—Conscription drains the blood of the nation.

THE 18th of Brumaire marks the beginning of a prodigious adventure. The fate of the nation became identified with that of one man, and that man, in spite of all his realistic genius, was intoxicated with his own vertiginous ascent. Napoleon's name stands alone during those fifteen years. It irresistibly evokes the ideas of martial glory, political tyranny, and administrative reorganization. For the sake of clearness, we shall consider separately these three aspects of the Bonapartist regime. But we need hardly say that in Napoleon the conqueror, the efficient ruler, and the despot were one and the same. The reader should also bear in mind that Napoleon's unlimited autocracy did not spring full-grown into existence. Posterity knows that the 18th of Brumaire meant a new departure in the course of French history, but the contemporaries were unconscious of any portentous change. France received the news with curious apathy. There was practically no opposition; but neither was there any sign that the country, in a frenzy of enthusiasm, was consciously

hurling itself into servitude. A coup d'état was no striking novelty; the Directorial machinery had three times already been thrown out of gear. Five unpopular Directors were superseded by three "Provisional Consuls," that was all. One of these, Roger-Ducos, was insignificant enough. Another, the former Abbé Sieyès, oracle of the Constituent Assembly and political philosopher, was the incarnation of moderate, pacific, and, in a sense, liberal ideas. Bonaparte was a young general famed no less for his administrative and diplomatic achievements than for his victories on the battlefield. All were apparently loyal to the cause of the Revolution. There is no reason to doubt that, for a few months at least, the ideal of France and the ideal of Bonaparte were the same: at home, order without reaction; abroad, peace with honour. One of the first acts of the young Consul was to put away his military uniform. He made at once public overtures of peace to England and Austria. The treaties of Lunéville and Amiens were his best titles to the grateful admiration of the French. When hostilities were resumed, as much through England's fault as through his own, he was skilful enough to throw the whole burden of responsibility upon the enemy. On the 18th of Brumaire, losing his self-control at a critical moment, he had relapsed into the turgid style of his youth and called himself "the God of Fortune and War." But this strangely prophetic utterance was not taken seriously at the time. In Bonaparte some Frenchmen would see a General Monk, some a Washington,* many a Cromwell, few, as yet, a Cæsar—none, not even himself, could anticipate Napoleon.

Bonaparte's ambition knew no internal check: he had no scruple, a limited culture, and boundless contempt for "ideology" and "imponderable" forces. The miracles of the Revolution and those of his early career had left the word "impossible" without a meaning. Circumstances made him, in France, the arbiter of all parties and the servant of none; in Europe, the autocratic head of the most powerful State, flushed with victory, drilled in ten years of war, a generation ahead of its opponents in national spirit and revolutionary tactics. Thus his apparent

* The ceremony in honour of Washington, early in the Consulate, seemed to imply a promise.

power grew year by year, and his ambition with it: until the sane ruler of 1800 turned into the monstrous self-idol of 1812, and the whole crazy fabric collapsed like a house of cards.

Napoleon's rule was essentially despotic, but it found its justification in its popular origin, its glory abroad, its efficiency at home. Of these, glory, in popular imagination, is by far the most potent. Although the French have recovered from their latest attack of Napoleonitis, the campaigns of the First Empire are still referred to as "L'Épopée," the French *Iliad*, the epic of war par excellence: and few men indeed, even in England, even in America, can resist the intoxication of that unexampled series of triumphs. It was the time when the battery of the Hôtel des Invalides boomed incessantly, spreading throughout Paris the news of some dazzling victory—Austerlitz, Jena, Friedland, Wagram; the time when the French armies entered one foreign capital after another—Rome, Madrid, Vienna, Berlin; when the Empire, with its allied and feudatory States, spread from the Tagus to the Vistula; when Napoleon's brothers wore crowns in Westphalia, Holland, Naples, and Spain; when at Erfurt the Emperor had Talma, his favourite tragedian, play before an audience of kings; when soldiers said of some old comrade of theirs—Berthier, Bernadotte, or Murat—of plebeian origin and risen from the ranks like themselves: "He has been *promoted* Grand Duke, Prince, or King," as in our humdrum days they would say: "He has been made Major-General." Even in the prose of Thiers—the incarnation of Philistine common sense—the story of the Empire reads like a fairy-tale.

But although plain truth was stranger than fiction, Napoleon was not yet satisfied. The art of self-advertisement and lavish display has ever been an essential element of statecraft: the new Cæsar could have out-Barnumed Barnum and given useful hints to our popular journalists. His bulletins and proclamations are masterpieces in that line. It was he, and not Desaix, who received credit for the battle of Marengo; Jena has cast into the shade the parallel and more meritorious success of Davout at Auerstaedt; the useless slaughters of Eylau and Essling are still counted by the French among his victories.

All his failures, and the achievements of everybody else, are glossed over with consummate skill. Fouché's impardonable offence was his independent and energetic attitude at the time when Napoleon was hemmed in by the Austrians in the Lobau Island and the English had landed at Walcheren. No theatrical star ever engineered her success with more skill and care and monopolized more jealously the limelight than Bonaparte.

The army was no longer merely an instrument of defence and conquest: it was a gorgeous pageant for the entertainment of his innumerable subjects. The austere Republican troops of Kléber and Hoche, barefooted, with their plain blue uniforms threadbare and tattered, were succeeded by regiments of all kinds, origins, and colours. Famous to the present day are the Grenadiers and Voltigeurs of the Line; the Hussars, each of their ten regiments with some distinctive detail of dress or equipment; the twenty-six regiments of Mounted Chasseurs, a dashing light cavalry; the Dragoons, the Lancers, the Cuirassiers, the splendid Carabiniers, with red-crested helmets and a golden sun on their steel breast-plates. To these French troops, old and new, were added foreign auxiliaries of all nations, regular levies from allies and friends, volunteers from neutral States—Swiss, Spanish, Bavarian soldiers, Illyrian sharpshooters, the admirable Polish light-horse, whom the French people have not yet forgotten, Albanians and Greeks, a battalion from the Ionian Isles, a squadron of Tartars. The pride of Napoleon's heart was his Guard. The arch-egotist had but few genuinely human sentiments: his affection for his old "Grumblers" was one of them. The Guard, old and new, grew to be a host in itself. Towards the end of the regime it numbered ninety-two thousand men. But it was a host of picked soldiers. All corps, except the Carabiniers, were represented in it. Most intimately connected with the Master were the Guides, his constant companions, whose uniform was the green livery of his household; and most picturesque were the Mameluks, with green turbans, rallying round horse-tails, a devoted band who fought bravely throughout all these wars and were massacred in 1815 by the fanatical populace of Marseilles.

All these troops were splendidly arrayed for show rather than for efficiency and comfort. The tight-fitting uniforms, the rigid and tremendously high collars, the towering fur cap of the grenadier are a joy for the military painter—Gros, Géricault, Ingres, Charlet, Meissonnier, or Detaille—but they must have been purgatory for the wearer—we have Coignet's word for it, and that "Groggnard" is not addicted to excessive grumbling. Magnificent were the staff-officers, all a-glitter with heavy braids of gold on their bright red or blue uniforms, with gorgeous plumes swaying over their heads. This reached a climax in brilliant cavalymen like Lassalle, and especially in Joachim Murat. This swashbuckler and circus rider on the heroic scale spent twenty-seven thousand francs on feathers for the single campaign of Prussia. By a supreme contrast which reveals the romantic taste of the great conqueror, Napoleon himself would affect to remain "the shorn one," the "little corporal"—entering Berlin in a plain uniform and with a penny cockade on the characteristic "little hat," or wrapped through many campaigns in his no less famous riding-coat of grey.

After the pageant of his reviews, victorious returns, and triumphal entries, he would erect to his own glory more lasting monuments, theatrical but effective pastiches of that Roman splendour which haunted his imagination. The Little Corporal would pose as Cæsar. Thus were planned the Boulogne and the Vendôme columns, both crowned with his statue; the Temple of Victory, which was to become the Church of St. Mary Magdalen; the Arch of the Carrousel, a correct imitation of that of Septimius Severus; the "Arc de l'Étoile," not completed until 1836, and which its size and location, the simplicity of its line and the beauty of its sculptural ornamentation make wonderfully impressive. He wanted posterity to be dazzled, as well as his own generation. And he succeeded. The act of the Commune, tearing down the Vendôme column, is considered by all orthodox historians as a piece of barbarous folly.

It was not in appearance alone that the army had changed since Republican days were over: the whole spirit was different. We have no wish to idealize the "Volunteers of 1792," or to depreciate the patriotism, endurance, and courage of Napoleon's

soldiers. But for a few years the army had been democratic, disinterested, devoted to the ideal: Bonaparte's proclamation to his troops at the beginning of the Italian campaign struck a new note. Henceforth professional pride and ambition, the contempt of civil life, the greed of booty, and fanatical loyalty to one leader, will take the place of Republican virtues. Pride and loyalty Napoleon knew how to foster better than any general before or since. First of all, he was genuinely interested in the welfare of his men, and would pay attention to the minutest detail of their camp or barrack life. They were naught but tools in his hands, but, as every good workman, he loved his tools. The rank and file felt that in his abruptness, his familiarity, his occasional coarseness with them there really lurked a sort of rough-and-ready affection. The great Emperor was one of them. In a sense they were his family. He bribed them with childish and heroic distinctions: the splendid uniforms referred to above, silver swords or rifles "to the brave," and the Cross of the Legion of Honour, which has remained a potent factor in French life to the present day. He even stooped to trickery: he would stop, apparently by the merest chance, before some private soldier, call him out by name, remind him that he had seen him in Italy, at the Pyramids, or maybe in Spain. The little comedy might have been arranged in all its details beforehand, but its effect was unfailing. There were higher elements in the devotion of the soldiers to their Emperor: loyalty, hero-worship, a sense that they were sharing with him his vertiginous glory, that under his guidance they were ruling the world.

However, we must not believe that the devotion, even of the Old Guard, was as blind and pure as legends will have it. It was not without a cause that he called his Grenadiers "grumblers," and, after 1807, when they ceased to understand the purpose of his continuous wars, the grumbling was bitter and loud enough. Not only at Leipzig and in Russia, but just before Wagram, Coignet heard strong words of blame and disaffection. Neither should we refuse to see the faults of the heroes of the Grand Army. The permanent element within its ranks soon developed all the vices of professional soldiery: brutality, arrogance, dishonesty, drunkenness, and profligacy. The last two,

combined with the exhausting tasks imposed by the Master, brought worse havoc than sword or bullet. Epidemics were frequent, enteritis a constant menace. Broussais, the great doctor, preached temperance, but in vain.

With all their grumbling, the French soldiers loved their flag. The Germans of the Rhine Provinces, although recently annexed, were no whit behind the French of old France in courage and loyalty. Some Italian troops were willing, and the Poles were heroic to the last. But the allies and auxiliaries, pressed into service in hostile parts and vassal kingdoms, were driven to the slaughter like cattle, and ever ready to stampede. Coignet, in his Memoirs, has a gruesome tale of a rabble of stragglers and deserters who had shot their officers on the march to Moscow. With extreme difficulties he led them back to headquarters, where some six-score of them, mostly Spaniards, were executed to teach the rest a lesson.

If the privates drank, gambled, and stole, they were merely following the example of their superiors, from Marshal to sergeant. Napoleon himself made looting a part of military administration. He rifled Italy for the Directoire, and the penniless adventurer found himself rich at the end of this one campaign. He confiscated private and public properties, imposed fines, war taxes and indemnities, in a grandiose manner which every one imitated on a more modest scale. Masséna made himself particularly infamous. Soult was not a bad second, nor were most of the others lagging far behind. Napoleon seized the ill-gotten gains of Masséna to the amount of six million francs, and the hero of Zurich and Genoa did not dare to protest. But in most cases the Emperor would close his eyes. "The soldier must have his reward," he said; and he thought that the misdeeds thus condoned would place his Marshals at his mercy. It was a great mistake: corruption breeds ingratitude. The men whom he despised despised him in return, and betrayed him in his hour of need. It is no pleasant task thus to dwell on the seamy side of a splendid period. Yet it must be done, if we want to have a true picture of the times.

Even though Napoleon's contemporaries did not know all the sordid tales which have gradually come to light, they were not

impressed with the country's warlike glory in exactly the same way as we might expect. No doubt Napoleon aroused fanaticism in many of his soldiers, in young men brought up in the worship of the national hero, in citizens of the annexed provinces, for whom he represented the new regime with all its benefits; among his enemies, in particular in England, he was hated and feared with an intensity which gave him a superhuman, if satanic, importance. But with the majority of the French this was by no means the case. They appreciated the internal order and efficient administration that the Consular and Imperial Governments gave France; but in spite of loud semi-official demonstrations, victories no longer tickled their vanity. After ten and twenty years of continuous and triumphant conflicts, they were sated with military glory. "Another victory!" they would say at each new bulletin, and shrug their shoulders with growing indifference. Marengo was genuinely popular, because it saved France from the nightmare of invasion—although Zurich was really the turning-point in the fortune of the campaign. Austerlitz and Jena still roused some enthusiasm. The wars of the following eight years brought little joy and many dark misgivings. It is reported that Napoleon, noticing that he was greeted at the Opéra with an outburst of applause less enthusiastic than usual, turned to his staff officers and said: "Gentlemen, we must be ready to enter the field within a month." But Napoleon was mistaking for a popular demand his own craving for the exciting game of war. He also felt that his regime of autocracy, barely tolerable under martial law, as it were, could not survive a prolonged period of peace. He is not alone responsible for the wars of his reign: France and Europe are not without their share of guilt; England in particular failed to understand the Revolution, and acted with the same combination of cunning, violence, and selfishness as the Emperor himself. Yet it is impossible to shift the main burden from Napoleon's shoulders. A greater genius or a better man, a Hoche, a Carnot, a Washington, or even a Lafayette, might have preserved peace on the strict terms of Lunéville and Amiens.

Whilst by degrees the intoxication of glory was leaving the French, the burden of war grew heavier. We do not mean,

However, the financial burden, for that was surprisingly light. First of all, the armies of the Empire, gigantic as they seemed to contemporaries, were not large compared with modern "peace" establishments. In the Grand Army, as it entered Russia, there were only 355,913 Frenchmen, and probably one-third came from recently annexed provinces—Rhine, Piedmont, &c. The present Republic keeps nearly 600,000 men under arms (with the navy and the colonial troops) and is going to increase that number. The administration of the army formed a separate department, distinct from the War Office and ably directed by civilians; if there was much plundering abroad, there was comparatively little corruption and waste at home: Napoleon himself supervised closely his military contractors. Above all, Napoleon made war self-supporting: "War must provide for war" was his maxim. Hence the crushing tributes laid under different pretexts on the conquered, and even on neutral States. Portugal and Spain were thus bled, the one of 20,000,000 fr. in 1801, the other of 24,000,000 fr. in 1806. The result was that in 1814 the war-debt of France was extremely small, whilst England was staggering under hers.

But the cost in blood was more grievous. At first the middle class did not suffer: the Revolutionary regime of universal service was mitigated in 1800 and in 1804; only a certain portion of the contingent designated by lot (*tirage au sort*) joined the colours, and those whom fate had thus selected could pay a substitute (*remplaçant*). But already after Jena it was found necessary to call in every one, and even to levy 80,000 men who should not have been drafted until the following year. In 1808, 160,000 men were called one and two years ahead of time. In 1809, three "classes" (yearly contingents) already liberated were called back and two more levied in anticipation. In 1813, 180,000 national guards, who had previously been exempted from service in the regular army, either because they were too weak or had families to support, were drafted into the active forces: these and boys from the schools were the pale and puny "*Marie-Louise*," who, in smock-frock and wooden shoes, fought heroically at La Fère-Champenoise. Some three million Frenchmen thus ventured their lives from 1800 to 1815,

and it was asserted officially by M. d'Hargenvilliers, Director of Conscription under Napoleon, that 1,750,000 died of wounds, disease, fatigue, and exposure. Whoever attempted to escape his fate (*réfractaire*, defaulting recruit) was hunted down like a criminal; after 1811 his family and friends were made responsible for him. The sons of prominent families were compelled to become officers, and in certain cases actually kidnapped into Saint-Cyr; they were hostages for the good behaviour of their parents. Every year the Moloch of war was growing more insatiable, and there was no relief to be hoped for—except in defeat. Napoleon was a true prophet when he told Madame de Rémusat: “Do you know what people will say when I disappear? They will say, ‘*Ouf!*’”—an expression of intense relief.

§ 2. THE REORGANIZATION OF FRANCE.

Administrative Reorganization.—Efficient but hasty—Was over-centralization inevitable?—The Concordat and the University: their failure—The Civil Code: its merits, influence, and limitations—The Prefectoral administration—“A free career open to all talents”—Privilege soon creeping back.

Political Reconstruction.—Democracy conjured away—Napoleon the arbiter of all parties, the prisoner of none—The four Assemblies: elaborate impotence—Universal suffrage: the list of notables, the plebiscites—The Press gagged—Bastilles restored—“The Emperor's pleasure”—Baleful influence of Napoleonism.

Glory abroad, efficiency at home! We have seen how far from pure that glory was, and the terrible price France had to pay for it. The civil reorganization of the country is a much better title: this it is that makes the difference between a Napoleon and a Tamburlaine. He himself thought, or at least said, that his achievements in civil life would far outshine his bloody victories, and that his Codes were a monument to his memory more lasting than Austerlitz. The spectacular reconstruction of France under the Consulate is one of the brilliant pages in history. He assumed control of a nation renovated by a radical revolution, teeming with young but misdirected energies, untrammelled by old conventions and prejudices—a nation which in ten years had already achieved wonders. But that country

was panting and bleeding after a decade of foreign and civil wars. The one thing she wanted was internal peace and order, and these the strong government of Bonaparte undoubtedly provided. As soon as normal conditions were restored, the transformation was magical, and the man who was not the promoter, but an important factor in that transformation, should receive his due meed of gratitude. In a few months chaos disappeared; in a few months—therein lies the unique appeal of this great work, and its fault. It was efficient, but hasty. Many worthless ruins of the old regime were hurriedly adapted to modern needs, because they lay ready at hand; many curious and promising attempts of the Revolution were no less hastily discarded, because they were still in the experimental stage. In everything regularity, unity, authority, which make a fine show and bring about immediate results, were preferred to liberty, competition, local differences. In this Napoleon was following his own inclination as a military commander, used to rigid discipline; but he was also continuing the tradition of monarchy by divine right; he was one of those “beneficent despots,” “enlightened tyrants,” praised by the philosophers of the eighteenth century; he was true to his Jacobin origins. This explains why there was so little opposition to his activities, and why there was and still is so much admiration for them. Some historians, Mr. Bodley among others, seem to think that Napoleon had a profound knowledge of the French mind, and that with a Latin, Catholic, logical and equalitarian nation, no better course could have been followed. But did not Napoleon bank on the least admirable traits of the French character? Even if Mr. Bodley’s definition of France be accepted *in toto*, there is such a thing as national education and evolution. At the close of the Revolution the coexistence of radically different parties and religions had led, through sheer weariness, to the most natural and most desirable solution—liberty for all. The Thermidorian Reaction and the Directoire had been driven to this without approving of it theoretically, and with occasional relapses into fanaticism. The regime of liberty had not yet borne all its fruit, because foreign affairs and home politics were still unsettled; but several sects lived side by side, peaceably on the

whole, and the restoration of order immediately brought about the creation of many schools. The Concordat with Rome, the creation of the Imperial University monopolizing the whole educational system of the country, were decidedly reactionary steps, methods used by the Consul or the Emperor for enforcing discipline and strengthening autocracy. We shall examine these two great measures in later chapters; but we may say at once that both failed. No regime had worse difficulties with Rome than Napoleon's: less than ten years after the signature of the Concordat the Emperor was excommunicated and the Pope his prisoner. No country has had a worse Church problem than France throughout the nineteenth century, whilst the United States have developed normally on the basis of liberty. The monopoly of State education broke down by the vote of the Falloux law in 1850, after forty years of bitter conflict. But even before that time it utterly failed to restore or to create in France that unity which the sovereign was hankering after. Napoleon's admirers claim that France was not fit for a liberal regime. The truth is that she was not yet educated up to one. But there was no advantage in postponing by several generations the moment when this severe and indispensable apprenticeship should begin.

The Civil Code is Napoleon's best work. Of course the actual labour of compiling the 2,281 articles which it contained was done by professional jurists—Tronchet, Bigot de Préameneu, Portalis, Maleville, Cambacérès, Treilhard, etc. But the rôle of Napoleon was not merely that of a sovereign who "is pleased to order" that a thing shall be done, endorses and promulgates it when it is completed, and ascribes to himself all the merit. It was through his decision and energy that the project was elaborated in the incredibly short time of four months. He took active part in the long discussions that followed in the Council of State, and often astonished his highly trained collaborators by the keenness and breadth of his intelligence. He had to conquer the opposition of the Tribunate and the Legislative Body, still endowed with some sparks of independence, and he did not scruple to use unconstitutional expedients. The Code, finally promulgated on March 21, 1804, deserves indeed

the name which Europe gave it spontaneously from the first—*Code Napoléon*. Its influence throughout the world was enormous. Not only was it introduced into all the countries then under French control, and preserved by some after the downfall of the Empire (Rhenish Prussia, Naples, Belgium, Holland, Poland), but it was imitated by many foreign nations or States, from Rumania to Bolivia and Louisiana. This success is due to the eclectic and moderate character of the Code, in which Roman law, common law, royal decrees, the jurisprudence of the old courts of justice, the doctrines of the French law authorities, the legislative intentions of the Revolution, are harmonized and made workable. This very eclecticism and the haste with which the work was done prevent it from ranking very high as the embodiment of a social philosophy; from that point of view, we are told, it is full of vague definitions and inconsistencies. But most historians are agreed that it represented a progress on the chaotic legislation of the past and on the unsystematized, not seldom impracticable, laws of the Revolution. For instance, the inheritance laws, restricting the liberty of the testator, may seem to us dangerously narrow; but they were a compromise between the excessive privilege of the first born, under the ancient regime, and the compulsory division in equal shares enacted by the Revolution.

The Code was strictly conservative—eschewing bold and untried ideas; this is manifest in its decided “masculinism.” It was even, in some respects, reactionary: it restored slavery in the French colonies—a wretched policy which was to cost France San Domingo. The great principle of the Revolution, equality before the law, was respected at first; but in 1808 special dispositions were made for the new Imperial nobility, and the system of entail (*majorat*) by which Napoleon wanted to make it a permanent element in the structure of French society. In this, as in so many other respects, the Emperor was spoiling the achievements of the First Consul.*

* The other codes: *Code de Procédure* and *Code d’Instruction Criminelle*, 1806, *Code de Commerce*, 1807, *Code Pénal*, 1810, are much less important and proved of much less permanent value. The Commercial Code in particular had to be repeatedly remodelled, and the Penal Code was decidedly reactionary.

Probably the most far-reaching and typical part of Napoleon's reorganization was the administrative side, the Bureaucracy. France's officialdom became a grand machine, of perfectly symmetrical design, and in which the minutest wheels received their impulse from the central motive power in Paris. The civil service of the Kings had been hampered in two ways: the privileges of provinces, towns, corporations, parliaments, nobility, and clergy often made the enforcement of regal law extremely difficult; and the central government, capricious as well as despotic, discouraged efficiency. The Revolution had swept away all privileges, and even during the rule of Terror had left some autonomy to the local elective assemblies. But these bodies, ill-prepared for their task, unchecked from above, failed in many cases to maintain order and decent government. That they were capable of improvement under closer supervision of the national authorities is infinitely probable: Napoleon preferred to take away from them any particle of real influence and to vest all power in the hands of his representatives, the Prefects. The immediate result was brilliant. Napoleon had in a high degree the gift of the born ruler: that of selecting the right men, irrespective of their origin. His Prefects were, most of them, able administrators, and devoted, for the time being, to his person and his system. He kept them up to a high standard of efficiency by his own example of tireless industry and by his constant supervision. Even now, French "Bureaucrats" are conscientious and painstaking, remarkably honest, and, until recently, comparatively independent of political patronage. But the huge machine, without the master mechanic who put it together and kept it in perfect trim, is growing sluggish and wasteful. Initiative is discouraged; routine rules supreme; mediocrity is a condition of regular promotion, and favouritism is rife. No red-blooded Frenchman has ever come into personal contact with "les bureaux" without being temporarily converted to anarchism. The evils of the system are evident. But it has become a bad habit which cannot be shaken off. Moreover, it is an admirable instrument of mild and legalized tyranny, which no Government is strong or disinterested enough to discard. Thus every successive regime, the democratic and social

Republic of 1848 as well as the Catholic and feudal Restoration of 1815, has piously preserved the legacy of Louis XIV and Napoleon. At any rate, this permanent Bureaucracy absorbed the shocks of repeated revolutions, and gave the national life of France a continuity that political history would not lead us to expect.

The best feature of Napoleonic rule was, as we have said, that the right man was put in the right place, irrespective of his origin: émigré and regicide were equally welcome if they were willing and able to serve. The master kept his magnificent promise: "a free career open to all talents." Just as every private had a Marshal's baton in his knapsack, the humblest clerk could dream that he too some day would rule the civil affairs of a department or even of a vassal kingdom.* The Empire did not last long enough to mar this fine beginning. But Napoleon did not rest satisfied with his legitimate titles: the crowned servant of the Revolution, the Emperor of Parvenus. He wanted to reconcile to his regime the old aristocratic and bourgeois families, and with this end in view he promoted their sons, in court, diplomatic, and military positions, and even in the civil service, with scandalous rapidity. Thus in the latter part of his reign the worst evil of the eighteenth century, class privilege, was creeping back.

The third way in which Napoleon veiled or justified his despotism was to present it as the outcome and embodiment of democracy. The word "Republic" did not completely disappear until 1807. There was the shadow of a Constitution, a show of elections, and even the personal authority of the First Consul and of the Emperor rested on plebiscites. Napoleon's power grew by degrees: in 1799 it was far from absolute, and no less legitimate, after all, than that of the Directors whom he superseded. The other two Provisional Consuls were not reduced at first to absolute impotence, and in the different assemblies room was found for men of note and independence, like Grégoire, M.-J. Chénier, Benjamin Constant—even for personal enemies

* Like Rœderer at Naples, Lebrun and d'Alphonse in Holland, Beugnot in the Grand Duchy of Berg.

of Bonaparte. But, placed as an arbiter between conflicting parties and classes, Napoleon played them off against each other with admirable skill. The bourgeoisie were averse to direct universal suffrage and genuine democracy, because they sincerely believed that the people were not prepared to rule, and because they wished to preserve their own social and economic privileges. They were in favour of a strong executive because they were eager for material order. So they raised no serious objections when Napoleon annihilated universal suffrage in fact, whilst maintaining the name. But they would have liked to retain for themselves some political rights, more than a semblance of constitutional government: their ideal was already that of the bourgeois monarchy of Louis-Philippe. On the other hand, the people were indifferent to parliamentary forms in which they had no part. Their sympathies went, not to the bourgeois liberals, but to the ruler of revolutionary origin, crowned by victory, confirmed by a plebiscite, and who represented in their eyes patriotism and democracy. Both bourgeoisie and people were willing to put up with some degree of dictatorial government as long as the war should last, and in order to prevent a return to the old monarchy. Thus, leaning sometimes on the people, sometimes on the conservative elements, always on the army, Napoleon suppressed every opposition and destroyed every remaining check.

There were four assemblies: a Senate, "guardian of the Constitution," a Council of State to elaborate laws, a Tribunal to discuss them, a Legislative Body to pass upon them without saying a word. But all the members of these assemblies were the Emperor's nominees. The Tribunal was reduced from one hundred to fifty members, so as to eliminate whoever had shown any independence; and in 1807 it was finally suppressed, because "it still preserved some of that restless and democratic spirit which had long troubled France." The Council of State was a useful body of specialists and administrators, but not a deliberative assembly. The Legislative Body had no authority. The Senate, richly endowed, was a model of subserviency, and even of servility—until the day after Napoleon's downfall. With his Imperial Decrees and his "Senatus Consulte," Napoleon could legislate without let or hindrance.

Universal suffrage was disposed of in the same clever manner: it became a hollow shell. "Confidence should be at the basis of the social pyramid," said Napoleon after Sieyès, "and authority at the apex." In virtue of this principle, all electors were to select one-tenth of their number: these names formed the communal or district lists, from among whom the district officials were appointed—by the central government. One-tenth of these first names formed the departmental list; one-tenth of these the national list, whence all national officials were taken. These lists were to be made once for all, and vacancies filled up at long intervals. But they were not even completed: it was a mere parody of universal suffrage. As for the plebiscites, they were taken on open registers, without any check or guarantee. The records of some parishes contain nothing but the total number of "ayes"; others have long lists of names all in the same handwriting. Anyway, the Consular Constitution was put in application long before the returns of the plebiscite were known.

Thus relieved from any parliamentary check, Napoleon proceeded to silence every other possible form of opposition. All political newspapers—and the Revolution had yielded a plentiful crop of them—were suppressed except thirteen, and even these could be suspended or snuffed out of existence at will. Madame de Staël was kept exiled from her beloved "ruisseau de la rue du Bac" * for the crime of having some social influence, and her book on Germany was confiscated and destroyed without any explanation. After Wagram, the Emperor ordered Fouché to take the sons of the ten most prominent families in each department and train them for the army. "If they protest," he added, "answer that such is my pleasure." Eight State prisons were created "for criminals who did not fall under any definite article of the law, or whose trial would be dangerous for the State, or whom it was desirable to save from the death penalty out of consideration for their families." This amounted to the restoration of the Bastille and the "lettres de cachet." † The murder of the Duke of Enghien, captured in neutral territory, and

* The gutter of Ferry Street.

† Arbitrary warrant of imprisonment.

shot with the scantiest apology for a trial, is the best known, but not the worst, of Napoleon's high-handed deeds.*

We have dwelt at some length on the military, administrative, and political activities of Napoleon, because they had on the whole of French, and even of European, civilization a baleful influence which is not yet spent. Not only is he in a large degree responsible for the slaughter of three million young men whose death left Europe permanently weakened; not only did he create, or at least revive, modernize, and strengthen, a tradition of anti-liberal, compressive government which even the present Republic is not able to shake off; but he fostered throughout Europe a spirit of violence, a feeling of international diffidence and hatred, which has not yet been dispelled. If Germany, for instance, has not always been true to the highest ideals of her own poets and philosophers, the fault lies chiefly with Louis XIV and Napoleon the Great.

§ 3. SOCIETY AND CULTURE UNDER NAPOLEON.

(a) *Society*.—Settling down after the Directoire—The Consular Court—The Imperial Court—The new nobility—The old nobility—The Austrian marriage—Growing disaffection in all classes.

Material prosperity—Great public works—Agriculture in progress—Industry and commerce encouraged—Disastrous effect of the Continental Blockade.

(b) *Culture*.—Transitional—"Pompadour culture" dying out—Sciences extremely brilliant—Popular literature.

The Epigoni of classicism—Greco-Roman revival—Dullness of literature—Stiffness of art—Insignificance of thought.

The dawn of romanticism—Mediævalism and the "Troubadour Style"—Influence of foreign literatures—Melancholy—Religiosity—The army as a school of picturesqueness—Romantic elements in Napoleon himself.

(a) *Society*.

Social life in France suffered a total eclipse during the fateful months of the Terror. But immediately after the fall of Robespierre it resumed its former activity. Yet a great change has come over it. The exquisite aristocracy of the old regime had disappeared. Many were dead, others in concealment, the rest

* Cf. his dealings with the Pope and with the Royal Family of Spain.

attered abroad. Their places were filled by the unscrupulous
 ng that economic upheavals always bring to the fore: army
 ractors, stockjobbers, land speculators, "rotten" poli-
 ticians,* all eager to enjoy their newly-gotten wealth. The
 thermidorian reaction and the Directoire rank with the English
 restoration, the French Regency, and the Second Empire among
 e periods of cynical pleasure-seeking and gilded corruption.
 1800, when Bonaparte assumed control, the shudder of '93
 is a thing of the past, the fever for instant enjoyment had
 ated, and it was a comparatively easy task to restore normal
 nditions.

The First Consul took up his abode at the royal palace of the
 ileries, and his circle, "although not yet a Court, was no
 nger a camp." Joséphine did not turn into a respectable
 atron, as would have become her years and position; but her
 nduct no longer was an open scandal, as in the days of her
 idowhood or during Napoleon's absence in Italy and Egypt.
 er frail Creole beauty was already fading, but she had retained
 ough all her adventures the tact and charm of her class, and
 er heart had still the degree of easy kindness that utter
 riviality will allow. Bonaparte, just turned thirty, would show
 t times the playfulness of a boy. His old comrades still
 ddressed him familiarly. So there were days of genuine and
 ecent enjoyment at the Tuileries, and especially at the country
 eat at Malmaison.

But with every step towards the Empire the official circle
 grew more like a Court, and it soon became Napoleon's desire
 o rival the magnificence and etiquette of Versailles under
 Louis XIV. An elaborate ceremonial was devised, which the
 Emperor superintended with minutest care: but, in fits of
 uncontrollable impatience, he often upset at the last moment
 he most painstaking arrangements. The absorbed silence of
 he Master, his feverish haste—which left his guests half-starving
 —his sudden outbursts of soldier-like brutality, even with
 women, chilled any attempt at easy badinage or free interplay
 of fancy. Even Louis XIV, sun-god though he was, remained
 at Versailles a gentleman entertaining friends: Napoleon's

* Cf. Barras, "roi des pourris."

courtiers at the Tuileries, Saint-Cloud, or Compiègne would often be reminded that they were in the lion's lair. The theatrical costumes of civil officials, the glittering uniforms of the military, the massive furniture after Roman patterns, the heavy classical ornaments of the newly decorated halls, everything contributed to enhance the impression of splendour without taste, grandeur without cheer, and unfathomable ennui.

Napoleon brought forcibly together incompatible elements: a new nobility of soldiers, politicians, and officials, and all the representatives of the old aristocracy that he could coax, bribe, or coerce into his service. The former Jacobins and the old Marquises had one another in cordial contempt. It took three-quarters of a century for these two classes to amalgamate. Napoleon had dubbed his lieutenants Marshals of France—an appropriate reward. But he also invented for his family and the most prominent of his civil collaborators magnificent and meaningless dignities. Joseph was Grand Elector; Cambacérès, Arch-Chancellor; Lebrun, Arch-Treasurer, and, not without some conscious irony, the sickly and scholarly Louis Bonaparte was made Grand Constable, and Murat, the dashing horseman, Grand Admiral. Dignitaries, Marshals, Ministers, Senators, and even the mayors of important cities, received high-sounding titles, from Prince down to Baron. Napoleon tried to make this newfangled nobility permanent by a system of entail (majorat) that would perpetuate great estates in their hands. This nobiliary system has been sharply criticized. It was manifestly contrary to the principles of the Revolution. Yet conditions were not the same as in America. It was manifestly impossible as well as undesirable to blot out centuries of French traditions, recorded in the names of the ancient aristocracy. If a nobility be preserved at all, it should be, as in England, ever open to brilliant merit. But in England the accession of new elements is gradual; only a few peers are created at a time, and never without presenting guarantees that they are gentlemen. In France the sudden influx of Princes and Dukes, some of them risen from the lowest classes, and with no education but that of the camps, could not fail to bring about strange and ludicrous results. Sardou has exhausted the farcical possibilities of the

theme in his clever drama, *Madame Sans-Gêne*: the wife of Marshal Lefebvre, Duke of Danzig, she was a worthy laundress by training, and irremediably vulgar; but her new dignity did not rob her of popular common sense, mother-wit, and courage. Socially, the new courtiers had everything to learn; Napoleon tried to have them drilled by Madame Campan, a former servant of Marie-Antoinette, who was keeping a fashionable school for young ladies. The Napoleonic nobles remained parvenus for a long time. Even at present their descendants, like Messrs. Davout, Duke of Auerstaedt, or Lannes de Montebello, are prouder of their plain historic names than of their gaudy titles *in partibus infidelium*.

The revolutionary and military element was only one part of the new Court. Napoleon tried to win over survivors of the old nobility, and he succeeded in a way which that proud class, after 1815, would fain have forgotten. The "Usurper" was served by La Feuillade, Montmorency, Brancas, Gontaut, Gramont, Colbert, Turenne, Choiseul, without mentioning the notorious Talleyrand, and many other authentic aristocrats of the very highest rank. He treated them *in petto*, and not seldom openly, with the contempt that their combined servility and haughtiness so richly deserved. "Only people of that sort know how to serve," he said. They served, but they neither loved nor respected. And compelled to associate with heroic and vulgar dukes and their impossible duchesses, they sought revenge in imperceptible ironies and courtly epigrams, in which Talleyrand was passed master.

Napoleon's hankering after the old order grew ever stronger. His union with Joséphine, a notorious adventuress of the petty nobility, was a brilliant match for him when he was naught but a struggling young officer. But it was now the last link with his shady and revolutionary past. He severed it, and married an Austrian Archduchess, Marie-Louise. The political advantages which the Imperial George Dandin expected from such an alliance proved illusory. His young wife, whom he loved, did not love him in return. The people saw with regret the doom of poor Joséphine, gracious in spite of all her frailties. She became a symbol; a legend grew round her; it seemed

as though the Revolution and the golden time of the Consulate were receding beyond recall when the companion of Bonaparte's halcyon days retired to Malmaison; until comparatively recent years, Joséphine remained popular in France.* But Napoleon gained the inestimable advantage of being able to refer to Louis XVI as "my uncle."

Although the Emperor had secured the temporary and nominal adhesion of some illustrious families, many were the noblemen who remained irreconcilable. Numerous émigrés did not return until 1814, with their Princes. Others preserved in their country domains, or in their residences of the Faubourg, an attitude of enforced neutrality. The best representatives perhaps of sane, liberal, and patriotic ideas, Lafayette, broadest-minded of aristocrats, and Carnot, most moderate of Terrorists, stood aloof from a regime which had become frankly despotic. The upper middle class in the cities were, as a rule, fascinated rather than conquered; the lower middle class and the people did not miss political liberty in the same way, and were more dazzled by the material success of the Empire: yet their support was not unanimous and whole-hearted. In 1814 the hostility in certain parts of the West and the South was intense. This disaffection was due chiefly to the curse of conscription; in 1811 there were 80,000 defaulting recruits, whom the "infernal columns" hunted down with relentless severity. Something of Napoleon's shameful treatment of the Pope was known among the French peasantry, although the Imperial censorship suppressed or coloured any news that bore on that subject. The immense popularity of the Emperor is a posthumous legend.

Napoleon hoped that material prosperity would be his mainstay. Civil war came to an end early in 1800, thanks to Hoche's lieutenant and successor, Hédouville. Brigandage, although never absolutely suppressed, was held in check and disappeared almost everywhere. The magnificent system of royal roads, which had gone to ruin under the Republic, was rapidly restored; great public works, canals and bridges,

* It seems that the animosity against Napoleon III has been harmful to the popularity of his grandmother.

were undertaken everywhere.* The transfer of property to the peasants themselves, and the suppression of vexatious privileges, had renovated France; taxation, so unjust, chaotic, and loosely collected before the Revolution, now seemed wonderfully equitable and light. So the progress of agriculture was striking. Industry and commerce were encouraged. The efficient management of the Treasury, the creation of the Bank of France, gave financial stability. Richard Lenoir, Philippe de Girard, Oberkampf, Jacquard, among inventors and captains of industry, received moral or material support from the Government. Unfortunately, the grandiose and mad policy of the Continental Blockade entailed heavy sacrifices. France and her satellites were closed against English and colonial goods. A system of licensed smuggling had to be introduced to mitigate the hardships of total exclusion; but in spite of that, many products reached fabulous prices, and France had lost her best customer. Coffee and cane sugar became rarities. Many substitutes were offered for the former, and the beetroot industry was created—a permanent acquisition. It must be said that many parts of France did not suffer so heavily from this rabid protection as did the maritime regions, and especially Holland, which was reduced to bankruptcy. On the whole, there is no doubt that France was then more prosperous than she had been for ages, and some at least of the credit was due to the Government. Whether this material prosperity was not purchased at too high a cost is another question.

(b) *Culture.*

From the point of view of culture, the Empire is a transitional period, without any definite characteristics of its own. The Epigoni of classicism and the forerunners of romanticism are found side by side, and in many instances the two influences are seen, combined or conflicting, in the same individual. The spirit of the age might be adequately symbolized

* *E.g.* the Ourcq and Saint Quentin Canals, the Bordeaux bridge, the Simplon road, etc. The transformation was even more striking in countries temporarily annexed to France; wonderful activity was displayed, for instance, in Illyria and Dalmatia.

in Chateaubriand's country seat, "la Vallée aux Loups"; to a modest brick cottage the great artist prefixed a portico supported by two columns of black marble and two caryatides of white marble, "For," he said, "I remembered I had passed through Athens." He wanted to add a tower at one end of the pavilion, but had to be satisfied with "simulated battlements" on the outer wall. "I was thus anticipating the craze for the Middle Ages which is at present making fools of us all." * The incongruity of the scheme does not seem to strike him at all.

One thing, it is plain, had vanished beyond recall: the exquisite immorality redeemed by perfect taste and intellectual daring, in which Voltaire, for instance, was steeped. For good and evil, that had been a unique period, intensely modern and thoroughly French. We find it expressed in the vivacious conversations of the salons and petits soupers; in the elegant private residences which are still pastiched all over the world; in the paintings of Fragonard, Boucher, and Watteau; in the furniture and ornaments designed by Gouthières, Oppenord, Cafféri, Martin, Riesener. After the stiff majesty of Louis XIV at his zenith; after the gloomy hypocrisy of his decline; before the maudlinism and bathos for which Rousseau and Diderot were partly responsible; before the return to antiquity which marked the last quarter of the century—there was a charming and wicked moment, a world which had brought the art of sensuous enjoyment to its perfection and was going to ruin with a smile. For that age the term "Pompadour culture" has been suggested. Its art, now prized so highly, its thought, wonderfully clear and brilliant within narrow limits, were held in the utmost contempt by the new generation. Hardly any survivors of that time were left in France; † a number, living abroad, had given France an undying fame for frivolous elegance. Chateaubriand met a few of these amiable fossils, like Saint-Lambert and Madame d'Houdetot, the Philemon and Baucis of unlawful love. The sins of that time are still with us; they are eternal. But the culture which gave them the

* *Memoires*, ed. Biré, iii. 6-7.

† Cf., however, de Boufflers, 1788-1815.

glamour of exquisite elegance is a closed chapter in European history.*

In one respect, on the contrary, the culture of the Empire continues that of the preceding age, without interruption, without decadence, even with increased brilliancy: it is in the scientific domain. In 1794 Condorcet was executed because he was a Girondist, and Lavoisier because he was a tax-contractor (*fermier-général*). Coffinhal is reported to have said: "The Republic has no need of scientists." But these were exceptions, and the monstrous sally of Coffinhal was contrary to the principles and practice of the Convention. As a matter of fact, the Revolution and the Empire honoured scientists, who, in their turn, served the country in every capacity, as investigators, as technical advisers in military and industrial matters, as teachers, and even as administrators. Scientists, who do not live in the past, showed little regret for the ancient regime. As a rule they were not averse to an "enlightened tyranny." They appreciated a "tyrant" who understood them and took pride in calling himself one of them; Bonaparte was a member of the scientific section of the Institute of France,† and took a large body of scientists with him in his Egyptian expedition. Many famous men have been accused of servility in their relations with Napoleon; the decadence of literature, the silence imposed upon the political and social world, brought the favour enjoyed by science into bolder relief. But it brought out also the brilliancy of its achievements. Then lived and worked Lagrange, Laplace, Legendre, Lalande, among mathematicians; Gay-Lussac, Monge, Arago, Thénard, Guiton de Morveau, Berthollet, Fourcroy, Vauquelin, among physicists and chemists; Lacépède, Lamarck, Geoffroy-Saint-Hilaire, Cuvier, among natural philosophers; Broussais, Corvisart, Laennec among physicians; Larrey and Dupuytren among surgeons. Carnot, who was a great mathematician as well as a military engineer and the renovator of modern tactics, lived

* In European, not exclusively in French history; for the Pompadour culture was that of all aristocracies about the middle of the eighteenth century.

† Equivalent to the former, and present, Academy of Sciences.

in retirement; but practically all the others held the highest positions as directors of important departments, inspectors, senators. Lacépède was President of the Senate, Cuvier was Councillor of State. Napoleon encouraged foreign scientists as well, not only those who, like Volta, were his Italian subjects or the subjects of his allies, but even enemies; a prize of sixty thousand francs was presented to Humphry Davy in 1807. In many respects this was the golden age of French science.

We need hardly say that neither pseudo-classicism nor incipient romanticism gives a true idea of the life and taste of the average Frenchman under the Empire. The broadly Gallic romances and farces of Pigault-Lebrun, which are still read in French barracks, are more typical than *Atala* and *René*; the melodramas of Pixérécourt and Duval, which are interesting links in the history of the French stage, were immensely popular. The songs of Désaugiers are bright and racy, perhaps truer to type, as Professor Babbitt would say, than the more famous ones of Béranger, whose career began under the Empire. Perhaps the most pleasing and truest documents would be the paintings and coloured prints of Boilly,* and the comedies of Picard. These are wholesome and entertaining productions, cleverly though simply constructed, without any pretension to philosophy and style, but full of easy wit, truthful observation, and common sense. Picard is a dramatist of the same class as Dancourt and Labiche, far superior to the cleverer but less sincere playwrights of the Scribe-Sardou type. His *Provincial Town*, for instance, well repays perusal.

But in the upper spheres classicism still held sway, and that classicism was decidedly more classical than at the time of Boileau. During the closing years of Louis XV there had been a movement of return to antiquity, which continued throughout the reign of Louis XVI and became irresistible under the Republic and the Empire. Of this tendency, Saint Genevieve's Church (the Pantheon), by Soufflot, is an early sign. The painters Vien and David had routed the pupils of Watteau and Boucher before the Revolution broke out. Under the Convention, Roman simplicity, Roman patriotism, Roman civic

* Also the portraits of Isabey.

virtue were the order of the day, and the names of Greek and Roman heroes took the place of the banished saints; the forerunner of socialism called himself Caius Gracchus Babœuf. Under the Consulate, everything Roman was deliberately pastiched; the political terms—Consul, Emperor, Senator, Tribune—show the trend of thought. Costumes and furniture bore the same mark. Architecture especially showed Roman influences, not only in the triumphal monuments already alluded to, but in office buildings and in private residences.* The art critics of the time went so far as to deride the work of seventeenth-century architects as “barbarously modern” and “not in conformity with the eternal models of antiquity.”† In literature, Laharpe’s *Lycée* was the standard authority, and Geoffroy was the growling guardian of dramatic traditions. The tragedies of M.-J. Chénier, Baour-Lormian, Arnault, Brifaut, Laharpe, Legouvé, Luce de Lancival, were models of insignificance; lack of genius, timidity of taste, and a rigorous censorship contributed to maintain that dead-level of mediocrity. Epic poetry on a monumental scale was abundant; for whatever faults Imperial literature may have had, improductivity and lack of ambition were not among them. But in spite of official encouragement, neither epic nor heroic poetry would flourish in those epic and heroic times. The old “Pindar” Lebrun, who sang mechanically one regime after another, was still an easy first. The most typical, most successful kind of literature during a period when most of literature was devitalized was “descriptive poetry,” sometimes humorous, mostly didactic. The veteran Abbé Delille was considered the greatest poet of recent times—a skilful versifier, he was not without merit in his craft, and unrivalled in the art of describing ingeniously the commonest objects without ever using the proper term. In philosophy, the last “Sensualists”—or rather Sensationists—the last disciples of Condillac, Destutt de Tracy, Morellet, Garat, Volney, Laromiguière, even Degerando and Cabanis, continued the tradition of the Encyclopedists, not unworthily. But

* *E.g.*, extension of the Palais-Bourbon for the Legislative Body, Palaces of the Quai d’Orsay, Exchange, etc.

† Saint-Victor, *Tableau de Paris*.

their political independence had called upon them the hostility of the Master, who made the word "ideologist" a term of contempt.

These Epigoni of the classical age were of widely different merit. In literature they are past redemption. In philosophy they are undistinguished. In architecture, some of the buildings begun under Napoleon had a certain appropriate majesty. Chalgrin's triumphal arch is better than any of its Roman models, whilst the work of Percier and Fontaine was not devoid of elegance. In painting David is a great master in spite of his ultra-classical bend, and as the official painter of Napoleon left us some admirable compositions.* The furniture and costumes were not beautiful in themselves: but they have a distinctive style, the last style modern France has known. There is some justification for their repeated revivals of favour.

"The dusk of the old order fought with the dawn of the new," if we may borrow from M. Merlet one of his characteristic phrases. The Romantic revolution was not to break out, in France, until 1820: but it had been under way for wellnigh half a century. One of its essential elements was the return to the Middle Ages, those centuries of chivalry and faith contemptuously ignored by Boileau. But Voltaire in his *Zaïre*, in his *Tancrède*, had already gone back to the times of the Crusaders, the knights, the tournaments. Under the Empire in spite of the predominance of classicism, the germ had developed. Creuzé de Lesser paraphrased the *Romancero* and wrote an immense medley—some fifty thousand lines!—on chivalry. About 1810, d'Arlincourt and de Marchangy began to popularize mediæval lore. Michaud commenced his *History of the Crusades*. Raynouard was rediscovering Provençal literature, and in his enthusiasm ascribed to it an influence it never had. For this Pre-Romantic love of the mediæval has been coined the expression "Troubadour style," which connotes false heroism, silly sentimentality, incongruous local colouring, combined with the insipid elegance of pseudo-classicism. Of this, the song "Partant pour la Syrie" † is perhaps the most perfect type. It is easy to be

* Especially the famous "Coronation."

† With music by Queen Hortense. Almost a national anthem under Napoleon III.

severe with these first attempts. But it was under such influences that Hugo, Thierry, Michelet were brought up.

A second element we shall find in romanticism is "concrete cosmopolitanism"—the knowledge and appreciation of foreign literature, as opposed to the abstract universalism of the classics. This was already well developed. Letourneur, Ducis, under the ancient regime, had translated or adapted Shakespeare. Ossianism was a craze, and almost a disease, which did not spare Napoleon himself. Delille published a version of *Paradise Lost*. Klopstock, Gessner were already known; Schiller was given the title of French citizen, and Benjamin Constant translated his *Wallenstein*. Creuzé de Lesser, Raynouard were calling attention to the earliest monuments of the Southern literatures; Sismondi, to the history of the Italian republics. And it was in 1810 that Madame de Staël attempted to publish her epoch-making work on Germany, which was suppressed by the Imperial police.

Melancholy is another Romantic trait. The wide popularity enjoyed by Young's *Night Thoughts*, Rousseau's *Nouvelle Héloïse* and Goethe's *Werther* before the Revolution shows that the frivolity and also the sanity of the classical age were already on the wane. Byronism was full-blown in Chateaubriand's *René* (1802) when Byron was a mere schoolboy. Nor was Chateaubriand alone. Bernardin de Saint-Pierre was still alive, a link between Rousseauism and romanticism proper. His brother-in-law, Cousin de Grainville, wrote a sombre prose epic, *The Last Man*, full of magnificent passages; then, appropriately enough, he committed suicide. The elegies of the time are far superior to the odes, epics, descriptive or didactic poems, and tragedies. It was his dreaminess and melancholy that commended Ossian to the French public. Millevoye, Chénedollé are worthy precursors of Lamartine. Even Fontanes, most frigid of official versifiers, found inspiration in *All Souls' Day*, and Parny, among his licentious erotic pieces or his anti-Christian mock-heroics, has passages full of tender sadness. Senancour's *Obermann* (1804) is particularly typical; solitude, melancholy, religiosity without religion, incessant brooding that paralyzes action, all the elements of the famous "disease of the

century" are found in that book, in the early dawn of the Empire.

A reaction against intellectualism and abstract logic, a return to sentiment and faith on the one hand, to tradition and authority on the other; a will to believe and even to make-believe—in a word, a revival of Catholicism under many different aspects, was also characteristic of the period. Of this revival, Royer-Collard, Maine de Biran, de Bonald, and especially de Maistre and Chateaubriand were the leaders. This tendency did not bear all its fruit until after the Restoration, which it prepared; but its beginning with the accession of Bonaparte in 1800 and its growth throughout the Consulate and the Empire are unmistakable.

Finally, whilst that age of brutal energy and picturesque achievements, that "age of ancestors" which shaped the world anew, was apparently satisfied with the canons of an obsolete tradition, the romantic glamour of real life could not fail to influence its art and literature in spite of all classical prejudices. Even David could not help putting colour and movement in his modern scenes—the "Coronation," the "Distribution of Eagles," etc.; and his pupils, Gérard, Gros, went even farther in that direction. Gros, in particular, in his "Plague at Joppa," in his "Battle of Aboukir," in his "Battle of Eylau," shows all the qualities which the romanticists will later on prize so highly; and it was under the Empire, in military subjects, that Géricault began his career. The new Cæsar was fast supplanting Greek and Roman heroes as the centre of an epic cycle. Napoleon himself, in spite of his Italian ancestry, his classical features, his Roman aspirations, and the practical character of much of his work, was in certain respects a romanticist. The contrasts and dangers of his adventurous career; his constant hankering after the elusive and gorgeous East; his fatalism and superstition; the gloom and isolation of omnipotence: all these were either the signs or the causes of a Romantic turn of mind. And this would find expression in his love for Ossian, or better in sudden outbursts of unacademic eloquence, which give him a brilliant place in French literature.

The character of the Imperial period is therefore more

complex than is generally thought. The personality of Napoleon, his incessant wars, his immense work of reconstruction, his ever-growing tyranny, fill the centre of the stage. The graces of the old world are dead, but its conventionalities, in the form of pseudo-classicism, are more oppressive than ever. Genius is in exile or in opposition. Thus the first impression is one of artificiality and tedium. But, even apart from the absorbing personality of the Emperor, there are redeeming features in this period of fifteen years. The foundations of modern France are laid, not for her best interests, but with majestic symmetry and solidity; the country is tranquil and prosperous; science is unusually brilliant; and the first rays of the Romantic dawn whiten the distant hill-tops.

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
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

II. *NAPOLÉON*

- 1769 August 15. Born at Ajaccio, Corsica.
- 1793 Contributes to recapture of Toulon.
- 1795 October 5 (13 Vendémiaire). Suppresses a rising in Paris (the "whiff of grape-shot").
- 1796 March 9. Marriage with Joséphine de Beauharnais.
- 1796-97 Italian Campaign.
- 1797 October 17. Peace of Campo-Formio.
- 1798-99 Egyptian Expedition.
- 1799 November 9 (18 Brumaire). Coup d'État. Provisional Consul.
- 1800 Second Italian Campaign. Marengo.
- 1801 Peace of Lunéville with Austria.
- 1801-2 Concordat and Organic Articles.
- 1802 Peace of Amiens with England.
- 1802 August 2. Consul for life.
- 1804 December 2. Crowned Emperor. Civil Code.
- 1805 King of Italy. Third Coalition. Ulm. Trafalgar. Austerlitz. Peace of Presbourg (with Austria).
- 1806 Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine. Battles of Jena and Auerstaedt.
- 1806 November 21. Berlin Decree (Continental Blockade).
- 1807 Eylau, Friedland. Peace of Tilsit.
- 1808 Spanish War. Creation of the Imperial University.
- 1809 Fifth War with Austria. Essling. Wagram. Peace of Vienna.
- 1810 Marries Marie-Louise of Austria.
- 1811 Birth of the King of Rome.
- 1812 Russian Expedition. Moscow. Beresina.
- 1813 The War of Liberation. Battle of Leipzig.
- 1814 Campaign of France. Paris taken by the Allies. April 11. Abdication. May 4. Elba. Return of the Bourbons.
- 1815 March 1. Lands near Cannes. March 20. Arrives in Paris. The Hundred Days. June 18. Waterloo. June 22. Abdication. October: Saint Helena.
- 1821 May 5. Death of Napoleon.

THE BONAPARTE FAMILY

CHARLES DE BONAPARTE, d. 1785; m. Maria Letitia Ramolini, d. 1836



(The American Bonapartes are issued from a first marriage of Jérôme.)

CHAPTER III

CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY

§ 1. *Unity and Divisions of the Period.*—*The Crisis* (1814–16)—The first Restoration—Failure of the Bourbons—The Hundred Days; Waterloo—Embitter the feud between France and Europe—Give the start to the Napoleonic-democratic legend—The Second Restoration: the White Terror.

§ 2. *The Restoration* (1816–30).—Moderate liberalism under Decazes, 1816–20—Reaction under Villèle, 1821–28; Clericalism: the Jesuits, the "Congregation"—Revival of liberalism in Europe and in France—Return to liberalism with Martignac, 1828–29—Reaction under Polignac, 1829–30—Fall of the Bourbons.

FROM 1814 to 1848 the Government of France was a constitutional monarchy, closely modelled upon that of England: even Napoleon, during his brief return to power, had to put up with principles and institutions imported from over the Channel. As the richest taxpayers alone had the right to vote, only one class, a limited aristocracy of wealth, the upper bourgeoisie, was directly represented. No radical change took place in the financial and foreign policies of France under three kings and two flags: it was a time of recuperation, economy, and peace. The Romantic movement was coextensive in duration with the political domination of the middle classes: it was its complement and a protest against it. In many respects, therefore, these thirty-four years of constitutional monarchy form a well-characterized unit.

But we should consider separately three main divisions of this period. First of all, the tragic introduction to three decades of calm: the years 1814–16 saw the fall of the Empire, the return of the Bourbons, the Hundred Days and Waterloo, the

second Restoration and the carnival of reaction known as the White Terror: a brief crisis, but fraught with consequences which even yet are potent in French political life. The Revolution of 1830 separates the Restoration from the July monarchy; although it did not affect the essential principles of society, it wrought many important changes. Politically, the last vestiges of the ancient regime disappeared: the prerogative of the King, the hereditary of the peerage, had the same fate as their symbol, the white flag of old France. The Legitimist nobility sulked in its aristocratic faubourg; the extension of the franchise, the development of commerce and industry, reduced the political importance of landed proprietors and increased that of business men. The ghost of feudalism being exorcised, plutocracy and philistinism ruled supreme, and the bourgeoisie, having attained its goal, found itself obliged to defend its position against militant democracy. Romanticism, which during the first decades of the Restoration sought its inspiration in absolute monarchy and the Catholic Church, now veered towards liberalism, and at the close of the reign of Louis-Philippe was deeply tinged with humanitarian socialism.

§ 1. UNITY AND DIVISIONS OF THE PERIOD.—THE CRISIS (1814–16).

In 1814, defeated in his admirable campaign of France, unable to save his capital, abandoned by the Marshals he had created and by the Senate he had packed with the most servile of his followers, feeling that the country was at last exhausted, indifferent, or even hostile, Napoleon was compelled to abdicate, and withdrew to the island of Elba. We should guard against the romantic and sentimental instinct which prompts us to idolize great victims, even those who deserve their fate. The attitude of Napoleon's servants, cruel and cowardly though it seemed, was not a sudden explosion of ingratitude: it marked the end of a nightmare. For several years, whoever approached the Emperor long enough not to be blinded by his halo of glory had suspected or found out that he was no longer in his right mind: but his prestige was still so great, his control of the governmental machinery so absolute, that no one dared "bell the tiger."

Napoleon out of the way, the Bourbons were the only possible solution. Not that France was sighing for their return and had kept green the memory of the old regime: the staunchest friends of the old monarchy were still in exile, and the great majority of the French either had been benefited by the Revolution or had rallied to the new order under Napoleon. But the Emperor had gradually led France back to monarchical institutions, whilst his tyranny made the despotism of the Louis seem light in comparison. It was he who prepared the return of his successors, or, in Talleyrand's terms, "made their bed." Europe would accept no perpetuation of the Empire, with Marie-Louise as Regent or Joseph as Lieutenant-General. Both the Allies and a large part of France still shuddered at the memory of the Terror, and a second Republic was not seriously considered. It was evident that any new dynasty, French or foreign, would strike no roots in the national soil.*

So the Bourbons, whose "legitimate" claim was indisputable, were imposed by the victors upon a nation which felt for them neither enthusiasm nor irremediable hostility. The old Jacobins and the Imperialists were reduced to impotence. The middle class and the peasantry were reconciled as soon as the essential conquests of the Revolution were guaranteed by a Constitutional Charter.†

In a few months the Bourbons spoilt their every chance of reconciling modern France to their rule. King Louis XVIII, obese, gouty, half-paralysed, was devoid of prestige, but not of common sense: his easygoing scepticism, his desire to end his days comfortably on his throne, saved him from fanaticism and made him a tolerable constitutional king. But even he, in the insolence of his restored power, affected to consider the Charter as a free grant on his part, and dated his return "the nineteenth year of his reign." His brother, Monsieur, Count of Artois, known hitherto for the dissipation of his youth and his cowardly selfishness during the Revolution, was the type of

* Bernadotte seems to have been a candidate.

† These conquests embraced civil equality, representative government, and the confirmation to its present owners of Church and other property confiscated and sold during the Revolution.

those emigrating nobles who had "learnt nothing and forgotten nothing." It was the open boast of his clique that the Charter was but a decoy; that confiscated properties and abolished feudal rights would soon be restored to their rightful owners; that justice would soon overtake the criminals who had played a part in the Revolution. The heroes of the late wars were treated as little better than bandits.* France had a vision of the old regime at its worst, shorn of its historical glamour, embittered by twenty-six years of defeat and exile, attempting to fasten itself once more upon her.

Meanwhile Napoleon was busy in his microscopic domain of Elba. Restored to health by a few months of comparative repose, aware of the fact that the Allies were planning to murder him, or to kidnap him and keep him in closer confinement, informed of the growing unpopularity of the Bourbons, he launched forth in his most desperate and most romantic adventure. Eluding the enemies' cruisers with the same fortune as in 1799, he landed near Cannes on March 1, 1815. Within three weeks he was in Paris, all the troops sent against him having joined his ranks. "The eagle had," once more, "flown from steeple to steeple to the towers of Notre-Dame."

Louis XVIII and his Court fled in indecorous haste. But it should not be assumed that Napoleon's return was unanimously, or even generally, welcome. "They have let me come as they have let the others go," Napoleon himself remarked. It was evident that the new Empire would have to be radically different from the old: a Constitution closely resembling the Charter was drawn by a bitter opponent of autocracy, Benjamin Constant, and its title, "Supplement † to the Constitutions of the Empire," was a polite fiction meant to soothe the vanity of the sovereign. The plebiscite by which this instrument was ratified revealed the indifference and diffidence of the people—barely one-fourth of the electorate took the trouble of going to the polls. The ceremony in which it was promulgated seemed a vain show, and Bonaparte's theatrical costume failed to impress the Parisian crowd at the Champ de Mars, turned into a Champ de Mai. The Emperor felt himself surrounded by secret or

* Les brigands de la Loire.

† Additional Act.

open enemies—Masséna, Lanjuinais, Lainé. He had to call to his aid men whom he had kept away on account of their liberal opinions—Lafayette, Carnot, his brother Lucien. Worst of all, he did not dare to dismiss Fouché, who had betrayed him once and was ready to betray him again. And Europe was irreconcilable. Davout managed to levy and organize an army of 200,000 men. Napoleon, indifferently served by second-rate lieutenants like Grouchy, himself listless, drowsy, lacking in his former daring and keenness, was crushed at Waterloo on the 18th of June, 1815. Four days later he abdicated for the second time, and within a few weeks he was a prisoner on the British ship *Bellerophon*.

Had Waterloo been as brilliant a victory as it was an utter rout, the fate of the world would have been essentially the same. Waterloo might have happened several years earlier and gone by the name of Pultusk or Lobau; it might have been delayed by a few years, if luck had served Bonaparte. The final result was inevitable. He was waging war, not even for his own sake, but for *its* own sake, against the interests of Europe, against the interests of France and of his dynasty. The wonder is that the collapse did not occur earlier.

But these Hundred Days of Empire had far-reaching consequences. First of all, they made more difficult the healing of the breach between France and Europe. The Allies had been comparatively moderate in 1814; they had been treated by at least a part of the Parisian population as friends and deliverers, and Alexander of Russia, for one, had behaved as such. But, infuriated by their renewed fear, they were merciless and brutal in 1815. Henceforth the conservative powers of continental Europe considered France as a constant source of danger to their domains and their principles. On the other hand, Waterloo and the second invasion rankled in the French mind for fifty-five years, until worse disasters effaced the memory. Curiously enough, the mad venture of the Hundred Days was the starting-point of the democratic-Napoleonic legend. Had the Bourbons handled the situation with a little more skill, Napoleon would have remained in the popular mind what he was in 1814—a great military genius, but a tyrant. 1815

wiped away ten years of absolutism and made him again what he was at the time of the Consulate: the heir, the champion, the "crowned soldier" of the Revolution, the defender of the tricolour flag, the representative of the national spirit against invaders. The reaction in Europe and in France gave some substance to this conception: Napoleon, the arch-enemy of kings, must have been the friend of the people, the Prometheus of Democracy. With consummate skill, he assumed that new rôle at Saint Helena, until even some of the German patriots who had so heroically risen against him began to worship him as blindly as the French. His romantic exile in a remote island served his glory infinitely better than commonplace retirement in England or in America.

The most immediate result of the Hundred Days was a recrudescence of reaction in France. The Royalists, after their ridiculous discomfiture, returned more enraged than in 1814, and more obviously the protégés of the foreigners. The White Terror held Languedoc and Provence in its grip. The hero of Bergen, Marshal Brune, was murdered by the mob at Avignon because he had held command under Napoleon in the last campaign. It was not safe even for royal officers to interfere with the vengeance of the savage Southern bands. Nor was violence the monopoly of the irresponsible populace. The Court was clamouring for blood. The elections of August 24, 1815, gave a Chamber of Deputies which Louis XVIII, in the first flush of enthusiasm, called "introuvable" (matchless). Ney, whose conduct in 1815 is indefensible, but who was "the bravest of the brave" and had done wonders in the retreat from Moscow, Labédoyère, a chivalrous young officer, were shot by French bullets. The Provosts' Courts, no less anti-constitutional and hardly less bloodthirsty than the Revolutionary Tribunal of the Convention, carried on the work of ruthless repression. The Ultra-royalists claimed to be more royalist than the King; their motto was "God save the King, in spite of all," i.e., in spite of himself if need be. They were so eager to "purify" everything, magistracy, army, administration, that Louis XVIII expressed the fear that they would finally "purify him." The most conservative statesmen in Europe, Nesselrode,

Wellington, realized that a few more months of such a regime would lead to a renewal of the civil war. Louis XVIII, although he maintained in theory the integrity of his divine right, was in practice liberal and moderate. De Richelieu, his Minister, was an upright and enlightened man. Chiefly under the influence of Decazes, the dissolution of the "matchless Chamber" was decided upon (September 5, 1816). On the 4th of October a more reasonable body was elected, and the Restoration started on its normal course. But so bitter were the memories of these few months that only a miracle of patient skill could have bridged the gulf between modern France and the legitimate monarchy.

§ 2. THE RESTORATION (1816-30).

Two kings only, the two brothers of Louis XVI, were destined to ascend the restored throne of the Bourbons. Their reigns, very different, as were their personalities, were none the less curiously symmetrical: both began in reaction, saw an effort towards liberalism, and a final relapse into reaction.

We have just sketched the short and violent period of Ultraroyalism to which the dissolution of the "matchless Chamber" put an end. From 1816 to 1820 moderation prevailed under the inspiration of Decazes, a personal favourite of Louis XVIII. An electoral law gave the franchise to any Frenchman over thirty years of age, not otherwise disqualified, who paid 300 francs in direct taxes. No one could be elected unless he were over forty and paid 1,000 francs in direct taxes. There were barely 90,000 electors in France, and only 15,000 who were eligible to the Chamber. Yet this was a progress on the sham organization of Napoleon. An Army Bill was presented by Gouvion-Saint-Cyr, and remained the law of the land, without any essential modifications, until after the war of 1870. The term of active service was six years. The contingent was drawn by lot and fixed at 40,000 a year. As nearly 150,000 young men became of age every year, the great majority of the people escaped the burdensome honour of serving with the colours. Substitutes were accepted: so the sons of the wealthy classes who had drawn an unfavourable number had the possibility of buying themselves off. (1818.) Thanks to his friendship with Alexander

of Russia, de Richelieu, who was still the nominal head of the Ministry, secured the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of France two years before the time appointed in the treaties of 1815 (November 18). Finally a liberal law on the Press was passed. Thus were all the great questions which confronted the Restoration settled in a cautiously progressive spirit. But the growth of liberalism, visible at each yearly election,* incensed the Ultra-royalists and began to frighten some of the moderates: even Richelieu, open-minded though he was, felt uneasy, and withdrew in 1818. The King still supported Decazes, and granted him the "batch of peers"—mostly civil and military servants of Napoleon—which he needed in order to overcome the opposition of the Upper House. But when Isère sent to the Chamber of Deputies—which refused to admit him—Grégoire, the former member of the Convention and Bishop of the Constitutional Church, the Ultras affected to consider this election as a scandal, a provocation, and a menace; Decazes himself, a skilful trimmer rather than a man of stanch principles, seemed ready to amend the electoral law in a reactionary sense. While he was thus wavering in his course, the act of an irresponsible fanatic drove him from power. Louvel stabbed to death the Duke of Berry, second son of the Count of Artois, in whom centred the Bourbons' last hopes. With cruel injustice, this crime was ascribed to the tolerant policy of the Minister, and, in spite of the King's reluctance to part with his favourite, Decazes was compelled to resign.†

Then followed, under Richelieu (1820–21) and Villèle (1821–28), a period of reaction, barely tempered by the waning influence of Louis XVIII until 1824, open and thoroughgoing under Charles X. A law giving the richest taxpayers a double vote secured the return of ultra-royalist deputies in such numbers that the "matchless Chamber" found its match at last (*Chambre retrouvée*). In order to perpetuate themselves in power, the Ultras passed a law making the Chamber septennial

* One-fifth of the Chamber was renewed every year.

† Louvel's intentions were frustrated: seven months after the death of his father "the child of the miracle" was born—the Duke of Bordeaux, Count of Chambord, the last representative of the elder branch of the Bourbons.

as a whole, without partial elections every year. With such an instrument in the hands of a skilful politician like Villèle, the work of reaction proceeded apace. This aroused a corresponding degree of bitterness among the Liberals, so that even when conservative legislation was justifiable it was violently combated. The indemnification of the nobles whose property had been confiscated under the Revolution was, after all, a wise measure: it made for the reconciliation of old and new France, and confirmed once for all the titles of the new owners. The 1,000,000,000 francs (really only 625,000,000) required for that purpose did not burden the Budget, for at the same time the rate of interest on the national debt was reduced to 3 per cent. A very moderate Bill, the effect of which was to be limited to the richest families, attempted to secure to the eldest son, in certain cases only, the bulk of his father's estate. The aim of this measure, like Napoleon's "majorats," was to preserve a rich landed aristocracy. Public opinion considered it as a step towards the restoration of primogeniture, and it was thrown out by the House of Peers. Yet, in such a case, it was the compulsory equal division enacted by the Revolution and insufficiently corrected by Napoleon that was anti-liberal: many disinterested thinkers have come to believe that the excessive subdivision of property in France has serious drawbacks. But it was obviously class legislation, and as such obnoxious to the French, who hold equality dearer than liberty or even justice.

If these efforts of Villèle were defensible, the rest of his policy was naught but aggressive reaction. Education was placed entirely under the control of the Church. A law against sacrilege, punishing with death the desecration of the Host, seemed to make the dogma of transubstantiation part of the French Code. A law on the Press, called by its author, Peyronnet, "a law of justice and love"—and infamous ever since under that name—was meant to curtail the most essential privilege of a civilized country: that of free discussion. It was evident that war was declared on liberty, and that in the name of principles. In the eyes of those Ultras who were not mere bigots or short-sighted defenders of obsolete privileges, man was of his nature evil, and needed the constant check of a

divinely appointed authority. Freedom meant licence and rebellion; right and truth alone should be free, and the guardians of these were the church and her temporal arm, the King. It is because of the principles underlying the policy of Charles X that the French were so sensitive to any infringement of their liberties. The offences of the Restoration in that line were venial compared with those of the Convention and the two Empires: what France was afraid of was not so much despotism as theocracy, or priestcraft, or "clericalism."

And clericalism was rife. The Ultras called themselves the Knights of the Throne and the Altar. The King himself was atoning for his flighty youth by the most rigid orthodoxy. France was covered with "missions," processions, and pilgrimages, not unlike the revival meetings in this country. This in itself would have been legitimate enough, had not undue pressure been brought to bear on the population, had not the alliance of the Church with a political party been so intimate. France shuddered at the thought of a vast conspiracy to give her over to "the men in black." There was some exaggeration in these fears, but the occult, half-mythical society called the "Congregation" and of which Charles X was a member, was undoubtedly a power in those days. And the Jesuits, the incarnation of uncompromising theocracy, had returned in spite of the strict laws against them, under the thin disguise of "Fathers of the Faith."

We must not forget that before the Revolution the nobility and the bourgeoisie were Voltairian, and that the return to Catholicism after the crisis was by no means unanimous. In many cases it was hardly more than a poetic pose or a sentimental fashion. Many old families of provincial nobles, judges, and lawyers had preserved their Gallican or Jansenist traditions, and were absolutely out of sympathy with the men who controlled the Church party. With the people of the cities the Jesuits were a bogey, as they are to the present day; and the peasantry were afraid that the ascendancy of the clergy would mean the re-establishment of tithes. Clericalism then, rather than absolutism, proved the ruin of the Restoration.

Curiously enough, the fear of clericalism at home, and

Catholic sympathies in foreign affairs, led to the same result: the revival of liberalism. The Restoration of the Bourbons in France was part of the general system of the Holy Alliance, which everywhere defended conservation, authority, legitimacy. Now it happened that three Catholic countries were at that time agitating for their rights: Ireland with O'Connell, Belgium subjected to Protestant Holland, Poland oppressed by the Tsar. The Greeks, a Christian nation, were fighting heroically against the enemies of their race and of their religion. In all these cases the Catholics had to side with the people against established governments, and this was bound to shake their faith in conservatism and absolutism at home. The conversion of the leading Romanticists to liberal ideals is due in no small degree to their interest in the Greek cause and the heroic example of Byron.

A wave of liberalism was now sweeping over Europe. The wars of 1813-15 had been in the eyes of the peoples wars of national independence; in the eyes of their sovereigns, wars of conservation, to crush a power of revolutionary origin. The nations had rallied round their dynasties in the holy crusade against the oppressors: now that the nightmare was gone, they were clamouring for the promised reforms, for the rights which they had come to know through those very French invaders they had so stoutly driven back. The same evolution was taking place in France. Napoleon was dead; his tyranny was no longer feared, his glory shone all the more brilliantly in contrast with the absence of prestige of a government imposed by the enemy. Bonapartism, liberalism, and democracy went hand in hand.

Meanwhile Villèle had further weakened his position by wounding the pride of Chateaubriand, hitherto one of the most influential champions of the regime. So his task was growing ever more difficult: the National Guard, reviewed by the King, greeted him with cries of "Down with the Ministry!" Villèle at bay dissolved the National Guard, dissolved the Chamber of Deputies, and through a fresh batch of peers reconquered the majority in the Upper House. But the elections went against him, and he was forced to retire.

With the greatest reluctance Charles X formed a neutral

Cabinet, with liberal tendencies, headed by a former lieutenant of de Villèle—a moderate and skilful statesman, a persuasive orator, Martignac. Unfortunately, Martignac was not heartily supported by the Liberals, whilst the Ultras assailed him with unrelenting violence and the King manifested his dislike of his policies. In 1829 he was succeeded by the Prince of Polignac. The knell of the Bourbons had sounded. The very name of Polignac was hateful to the French since the days of Marie-Antoinette. The Prince himself was a mystic, a blind believer in absolutism, at the same time obstinate and frivolous. To the remonstrances of the Chamber he replied by a decree of dissolution. New elections were held, and the hostile majority grew from 221 to 279. Then the King, interpreting according to his own desires an ambiguous article of the Charter, annulled the second elections, and modified of his own authority the electoral and the Press laws. It was a coup d'état, and no adequate military preparations had been made to sustain it by force. The liberal bourgeoisie refused to submit. By closing their shops, they practically forced the people into the streets. The narrow, winding, ill-paved thoroughfares of the time were favourable to the insurgents. Confusion prevailed in the councils of the monarchy. In three days, the "three glorious days" of July, the throne of the Bourbons was overthrown and the tricolour flag waved once more over the Tuileries.

§ 3. LOUIS-PHILIPPE (1830-48).

§ 3. *Louis-Philippe*, 1830-48.—The Orleanist compromise—Influence of English precedents—The "legal country": its narrow basis—Casimir Périer and a strong government—Thiers, Guizot, Broglie—Parliamentary intrigues: Thiers, Guizot, Molé—Guizot: uncompromising resistance—Fall of Louis-Philippe.

§ 4. *General Characteristics of the Political Regime*.—Peaceful policy: under the Restoration; under Louis-Philippe—Peace at any price coupled with Napoleon-worship.

Bourgeois oligarchy: first consequence: the people driven to secret societies and insurrections—Second consequence: high tone of political oratory—The Press.

The Revolution of 1830 was an ambiguous victory: the liberal middle class had started the resistance, yet the final

success was due to the intervention of the people. Who had sown, and who should reap? The Bonapartists had no leader, for the dying "Eaglet" was but an insignificant Austrian prince; Napoleon's brothers lacked energy and prestige; Louis Napoleon, who believed in the destiny of his race, was an obscure young man without any immediate claims. The Republicans were distrusted by the ruling class: not only were the imperishable memories of the Terror working against them, but, for the last fifteen years, they had been unable to assert their existence except through riots and conspiracies. Only if Lafayette had lent them the authority of his long experience and of his immense popularity would they have had any chance of success; but Lafayette preferred the rôle of a Monk to that of a Washington. Those constitutional monarchists who resisted the ordinances on purely legal grounds should have been satisfied with the abdication of Charles X, the accession of the boy-king Henry V, and the regency of the Duke of Orleans. There were a few days of uncertainty. To what extent the Duke of Orleans had carried his intrigues *before* the Revolution; to what extent Thiers and other Liberals were committed to his cause, is not yet fully known. But one point is certain: the influence of English precedent; the memories of the Revolution of 1688 were potent in the minds of these Parliamentarians, great students and admirers of the British Constitution. The parallelism between the histories of the two nations, at an interval of a century and a half, was indeed striking. In both a legitimate king was beheaded and a military leader rose to supreme power; in both the old line was restored and a first king, good-natured and sceptical, managed to die peacefully on the throne; in both the bigotry of a second king determined a crisis, which led to the setting aside of an incorrigible race. All this seemed to call for the last term of the evolution: the substitution of a new branch of the royal family, whose power would be indubitably of constitutional origin. This was a case of deliberate historical plagiarism.

As in every French revolution (1792, 1848, 1870), whilst the moderates were trying to minimize the consequences of the change, the radicals were setting up a Provisional Government of

their own at the Paris City Hall. The Duke of Orleans took a bold and diplomatic step, and went to that stronghold of republicanism, to receive, as it were, the investiture of the populace. Thanks to the protection of Lafayette, who stood on a balcony with him and recommended him as "the best of Republics," the Duke, Lieutenant-General of the Kingdom since the abdication of Charles X, became constitutional King of the French, with a revised Charter and the tricolour flag.

But the July monarchy, established through a series of skilful intrigues ratified by a minority of deputies without any constitutional rights, never submitted to the vote of the country as a whole, rested on insecure foundations. From first to last it was called by good observers "a compromise," a "truce," a "bridge"—anything but a permanent settlement. The Legitimists could not but feel that Louis-Philippe had tricked his young cousin out of his throne. The Bonapartists were able to claim that Napoleon's Constitution alone had been ratified by the people. The Republicans realized that their blood had been shed for a cause not their own. Had the Duke been satisfied with a regency, he might have prepared the reconciliation between modern France and her ancient dynasty. Had he dared to face a plebiscite, he might have founded a truly national monarchy. As it was, he was the elect of a handful of bourgeois politicians. The hereditary peerage was abolished, the amount of taxation necessary to obtain the franchise reduced to 200 francs, and unvarnished plutocracy prevailed. In the eyes of the law, 200,000 electors were the whole country (*le pays légal*), and the July monarchy steadily refused to enlarge these narrow limits.

For a few months Louis-Philippe had to pay for his elevation by stooping to flatter, not merely the bourgeoisie, but the populace. It was the time when any rabble of loafers could call their new King to his balcony and have him smile, bow, and sing the "*Marseillaise*"—abominably out of tune; the time when the Church of Saint-Germain-l'Auxerrois and the Archbishop's palace were sacked by the mob, and when priests hardly dared to show themselves in the streets. But the

King was waiting for his opportunity; he soon got rid of his radical Ministers, and Casimir Périer assumed control.

Casimir Périer's ministry was cut short by death, but it remains the type of the "government that governs," or, as the French put it, "the government with a grip." The victors of 1830 had already split into two factions, the party of resistance and the party of movement. The one considered the Revolution as closed, and meant to restore discipline; the other looked upon the "Three Glorious Days" of July as merely the beginning of indefinite reforms. Casimir Périer belonged emphatically to the former. Eminently successful in spite of his overbearing manners, he perished a victim of the cholera in 1831. The King, whom he had reduced to a mere figure-head whilst making his throne secure, wondered whether the loss of such a masterful servant were not a blessing in disguise.

Then followed, after an interregnum of a few months, and under the nominal leadership of "illustrious swords," Marshals of the Empire, another efficient Cabinet in which Thiers, Guizot, de Broglie formed a trinity of talent, ably supported by specialists like Humann and de Rigny. It was during this period that the Republicans made a last desperate stand* and that the romantic dash of the Duchess of Berry from Marseilles to Vendée ended in failure, betrayal, and the unsavoury scandal of the prison of Blaye. But on the whole order was maintained, the ruins of 1830 repaired, and progress resumed its normal course. The most creditable achievement of this Ministry was Guizot's law on primary education, the first determined effort in that line.

From 1836 to 1840 the political see-saw was at its worst; Thiers, Molé, Guizot alternate in power, fighting tremendous word-battles in which their personal positions alone were at stake, striking immoral alliances,† and resorting to every kind of political trickery. Finally, when the Eastern imbroglio proved fatal to the second Cabinet of Thiers, Guizot became the actual head of an administration destined to last as long as the monarchy.

* Barricades of Saint-Merry in Paris, June, 1832, and April, 1834.

† The Coalition of 1839.

Guizot is a commanding figure in French history. "Journalist, professor, historian, administrator, Cabinet Minister, Premier, dictator of the Huguenots, there is hardly any branch of human activity in which he did not play a prominent part. But he was as unpopular as he was admired and respected; as selfish for his class as he was disinterested for himself; as blind to the state of the country at large as he was clear-sighted in his bourgeois Parliament; austere, but relying, like Walpole, on political conscience-jobbing; high-minded, but flourishing before the electorate the motto 'Enrichissez-vous!'"* a great historian, but a poor prophet, who explained with assumed infallibility the progress of civilization, and, not long before the Revolution of 1848, declared, 'The day of universal suffrage will never come'; a great intellect, but with blinkers; a great heart, but outwardly cold; a great leader who wrecked his party; a great conservative who, through sheer blundering and obstinacy, plunged his country into a revolution."†

For over seven years Guizot worked in closest harmony with Louis-Philippe—without any subserviency on his part, for both were agreed on a policy of conservation: peace at any price abroad, inertia at home. The opposition summed up the achievements of the Ministry in the oft-quoted "Rien, rien, rien!"‡ Lamartine complained that France was "bored to death." The regime was threatened with "the revolution of contempt." But Guizot manipulated his 250,000 electors and the State officials in the Chamber who were entirely at his mercy. General elections and parliamentary debates gave him handsome majorities. This upper bourgeoisie was legally the whole country; the rest of France he would ignore.§

* Get rich!

† From *French Prophets of Yesterday*.

‡ Three times nothing.

§ A serious blow was dealt to the dynasty when the heir apparent, the Duke of Orleans, was thrown out of his carriage and died in a few hours. This remarkable prince, a thoroughgoing Liberal and a true "son of the Revolution," left a son who in his manhood displayed the same qualities, although not quite the same charm and brilliancy. But the Count of Paris was then a child, and the prospective regency was entrusted to the Duke of Nemours, the least popular of Louis-Philippe's children.

Meanwhile scandals were breaking out in the closed oligarchy of wealth: a peer was condemned for murder, two Ministers arraigned for corrupt practices. Yet the extension of the franchise to lesser capitalists (paying 100 francs in direct taxes) and to men who had received a superior education * was systematically refused. A campaign of political banquets created an extraordinary stir in the country. Lamartine, hitherto unattached to any party, took the lead in the reform movement. His *History of the Girondists* idealized certain aspects of the Revolution and was as popular as any novel. The last of these banquets was interdicted by the Government. A demonstration took place, however, which soon assumed ominous proportions. A timely sacrifice could still save the regime. Whilst the King, long wavering, finally dismissed Guizot, the first shot had been fired, the agitation had turned into a riot, and the riot into a revolution. With creditable humanity, the old King refused to fight for a crown which the Paris populace had let him pick up and had the right to take away. He, like Charles X, abdicated in favour of his grandson, and with less dignity than the last Bourbon, hastened on his way to exile.

§ 4. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POLITICAL REGIME.

The Restoration and the July monarchy were systematically peaceful in their foreign policy. Small credit is due to the Restoration on that score, for France was exhausted, sick of military glory, and closely watched by a formidable coalition. The expeditions in Spain, in Morea, the battle of Navarino, and the conquest of Algiers failed to create any popular enthusiasm for the white flag. It has been asserted that Charles X was preparing by a diplomatic campaign the recovery of the Rhine provinces; if this be the case, he fell none too soon. The *pacifism*—it was a principle with him—of Louis-Philippe was much more creditable, for, after the Revolution of July, France was eager to tear up the treaties of 1815, avenge Waterloo, and support the democratic uprisings throughout Europe. It took all the King's patience and sanity to quiet the excitement of the country without ruining at once and irreme-

* "Adjonction des capacités."

diably his own position. Several times, in colonial difficulties with England, or when Thiers wanted to fight all Europe on behalf of Mehemet Ali, it was the King's own intervention that preserved peace—perhaps not with all the appearances of honour. Louis-Philippe knew he had to govern a skittish nation, proud of its epic victories, chafing at the memory of recent disaster, and, after a generation of calm, more eager than ever for the fray. There are in France, perhaps more than in other countries, a Don Quixote and a Sancho Panza. The French bourgeois, as Doudan, the cleverest of them, once said, want at the same time to doze cosily by their glowing fireside and to be roaming, barefooted heroes, on all the battlefields of Europe. Louis-Philippe took the side of Sancho Panza. To Don Quixote he gave as a sop the strictly limited expedition to Antwerp, and especially the dashing and picturesque campaigns in Algeria, safe from diplomatic complications or dangers to the unity of European France; the young princes, the Duke of Orleans, the Duke of Aumale, won their spurs on African soil. He also gave quixotic France a gorgeous pageant of Napoleonic glory. The monuments in commemoration of the Imperial wars were completed; Napoleon's Marshals were covered with honours, made peers, ambassadors, prime ministers. The remains of Napoleon himself were brought from Saint Helena by the sailor prince, Joinville, and laid to rest with theatrical splendour under the gilded dome of the Invalides. This policy was apparently successful; on the day of the "return of the ashes" (December 15, 1840) the King was wildly cheered, and no one seemed to remember that the Emperor's nephew and heir was a political prisoner. But duplicity is a dangerous game. Louis-Philippe fostered the military spirit and gave it but hollow satisfactions. Had he had the courage of his opinions, had he dared to preach as well as to practise the gospel of peace, France might have been spared the wars of Napoleon III.

Political life under the constitutional monarchy offered certain peculiarities mainly due to the small number of electors. The worst and most obvious of these was that the majority of the people had no lawful mode of expressing their opinions; denied a vote, they prepared revolutions. The Restoration and

The July monarchy were honeycombed with secret societies. Fortunately for France, military conspiracies, so common in Spain, never had any success north of the Pyrenees; * a number were attempted in 1822, and the memory of the four sergeants of La Rochelle is still preserved in popular tradition. The failure was just as dismal when the Emperor's own nephew, at Strasbourg in 1836 and at Boulogne in 1840, came to place himself at the head of his supporters. "Carbonarism," imported from Italy, was a counterblast to the secret organizations of the Jesuits and the Congregation. Many liberal bourgeois, and even Lafayette, belonged to these political bodies, whose influence was great in the preparation and direction of the revolutionary movement in 1830. Under Louis-Philippe the secret societies were republican, with vague socialistic tendencies, and prepared many an insurrection; some of them, the "Seasons," the "Families," the "Rights of Man," represented an immense effort which might have been used to better ends. Barbès and Blanqui were the two principal heroes of these daring and foolish ventures: Barbès, rich, handsome, generous, the Bayard of eternal rebellion; Blanqui, small, dark, mysterious, a monomaniac of conspiracy, who spent half his political life in the prisons of four different regimes.† As a rule the secrets of these societies were in the hands of the police, through spies and traitors like de la Hodde. Attempts against the life of the sovereign were frequent, but isolated individuals, or at worst very small groups of fanatics, were responsible for them. It is significant to note that the advent of universal suffrage practically ruined the influence of these agencies.

On the other hand, the limitation of the franchise to a small, well-to-do, educated class had its advantages. Never was the tone of political discussion so high as under the Restoration. The statesmen of those days had broad principles to discuss, and they treated them with an earnestness, a loftiness of

* Both on the 18th of Brumaire and the 2nd of December the army was a tool, but not the prime mover.

† He conspired against the second and the third Republics, as well as against Louis-Philippe and Napoleon III. Cf. G. Geffroy, *L'Enfermé*, biography as entrancing as any novel.

purpose, a wealth of information, which, in spite of a certain stiffness and pedantry, did great credit to the French Parliament. It was the heyday of Royer-Collard, the Grand Master of the Doctrinaires, every one of whose speeches was a lesson in constitutional law; of de Serre, Martignac, Camille Jordan, de Barante, de Broglie, Casimir Périér, who attempted to hold an even balance between the principles of authority and liberty, the policies of conservation and progress; of Benjamin Constant, General Foy, Manuel, the great orators of pure liberalism. The debates on the Press laws of 1819 and in 1827 were magnificent.*

Under Louis-Philippe the talent of the orators was undoubtedly as great, but the plane of debate was lower. Berryer was the noble defender of a lost cause, that of the legitimate monarchy; Montalembert, "the young peer," as he was then called, was the aggressive champion of Catholicism against the teaching monopoly of the State; Lamartine remained a poet even in the Chamber of Deputies, and his prophetic intuitions were at times more truly practical than the short-sighted common-sense of a Thiers.† But these were "outsiders." Among the actual leaders, Thiers, with his keen though narrow intelligence, his mastery of details, and his Southern fire, made financial problems as clear and as entertaining as a drama. Molé was an able debater, who once held his own against a coalition of the greatest speakers in the House. Guizot had scholarship, strength, and above all dignity. Yet all the great discussions of the time are marred by the intrusion of personal ambitions or spite.‡ There is something positively offensive in the constant assumption of high-mindedness and infallibility on the part of politicians whose very existence was based on class privilege and conscience-jobbing, and whose short-sightedness was leading the country to a disaster. The utter disgust expressed by Alfred de Vigny in *La Maison du Berger* and *Les Oracles* might very well be the verdict of impartial posterity.

* Guizot, Villemain, and Cousin were then on the border line between political and academic activities.

† Cf. on the railroad question.

‡ Coalition, Belgrave Square Pilgrimage, etc.

The political Press was influenced by the same conditions. The papers were few and expensive, until Emile de Girardin revolutionized journalism in 1836. The *National*, with Armand Carrel and Thiers, could boast that it had overthrown Charles X and elected Louis-Philippe. The *Débats*, ably edited by the Bertins, was a political power. These newspapers, not easily accessible to the masses, were supplemented by pamphlets such as those of Paul-Louis Courier, masterpieces of keen satire and studied simplicity, and especially by the songs of Béranger. The popularity and influence of these light productions was immense under the Restoration. Béranger held up to ridicule the clerical party,* the nobles of the old regime,† and the legitimate monarchy itself;‡ he exalted a cheap Voltairian theology§ and the Napoleonic legend.|| He was by no means a great poet, but his deftly turned verses set to catchy tunes made him a popular idol until 1830: the fall of his arch-enemy Charles X ruined his trade. During the first years of Louis-Philippe's reign the political cartoons attained a degree of daring and influence hard to rival at any other period. The King's personal appearance, his pear-shaped head, his umbrella, were mercilessly caricatured, and he was freely likened to Robert Macaire, the embodiment of glib unscrupulosity and a favourite on the stage. The laws of September, 1835, after the infernal machine of Fieschi had killed forty victims, limited the freedom of the Press and put an end to the scandalous licence of the illustrated papers.

§ 5. SOCIETY.

§ 5. *Society*.—Balzac's *Human Comedy* as a document: merits and limitations—The aristocracy: its silver age under the Restoration; sulks under Louis-Philippe—The upper bourgeoisie—Louis-Philippe's Court—The middle and lower bourgeoisie: its weaknesses and solid virtues—Commerce and industry—Agriculture.

§ 6. *Culture*.—Romanticism—Its origins—Its four phases—Survival of classicism—Popular art and literature—Eclecticism.

There is hardly any library in the world that does not possess

* "The Men in Black."

† "The Marquis of Carabas."

‡ "The Coronation of Charles the Simple."

§ "The God of Good Fellows."

|| "The Memories of the People."

an admirable description of French life under the Restoration and Louis-Philippe: Balzac's *Human Comedy*. This immense cycle of some ninety-seven different works, in which five thousand characters move with extraordinary intensity of life, embraces every aspect of society.* Balzac is such a master of realistic detail, he gives us such convincing inventories of household furniture, such accurate notations of city noises and odours, such flawless transcriptions of legal documents, such apparently artless reports of meaningless twaddle; he knows such cunning devices for enhancing the lifelikeness of his work like the free introduction of well-known historical characters and the elaborate genealogies connecting many of his fictitious heroes, that we might be tempted to take his word as authoritative. It may be useful to note a few limitations of this undoubtedly great painter and historian. First of all, his humble origin in spite of the "de" he clapped to his name, of a powerful but coarse physical make-up, devoting all his energies to the pursuit of wealth, condemned by constant financial stress to unremitting toil, he was not eminently qualified to describe the upper reaches of society, with which his direct acquaintance was late, and at best very slight. The noble faubourg did not always talk like the characters in Musset's exquisite *Proverbs*, and some of Balzac's vulgar duchesses may be true enough to life. But there is sufficient evidence that the tradition of wit and good-breeding did not suffer a total eclipse at that time. Balzac, incessantly dunned by creditors and compelled to take his walk before sunrise in order to dodge the bailiff, over-emphasized the sordid side of life. His angelic ladies are insignificant dolls. His good people are mostly fools. His favourite heroes are monsters.

In this latter characteristic we find a trace of the great realist's unconquerable romanticism. He was the contemporary of Hugo and Dumas: Goriot belongs to the same poetic generation as Quasimodo. France, from 1815 to 1848, however bourgeois and peaceable it seemed, was haunted with fears or hopes of new upheavals and tremendous adventures; this was natural

* *Scenes of Private Life, Provincial Life, Parisian Life, Political Life, Military Life, Country Life,*

ough after the experience of the previous quarter of a century. Hence such extraordinary stories as *Ferragus*, *The Thirteen*, the blood-curdling avatars of Vautrin. This side of Balzac's novels is a document on the state of mind of his contemporaries rather than a description of actual conditions. The standard romantic hero is Byronism incarnate: all pride, gloom, and revolt. He is Didier, Hernani, Rolla, Antony, handy with his dagger, preferably a bastard, more or less of a devil-worshipper and a "contemner of kings and laws." Balzac offers us a curious transcription of that type in the heartless world-conqueror, unscrupulous, handsome, and cold, whose sole passion is wealth and power: Maxime de Trailles, Rastignac.*

Now the best authority on this period, Thureau-Dangin, notes that these exquisite ruffians were by no means numerous and prominent under Louis-Philippe, whilst they were typical of the Second Empire; they were "les hommes forts," de Morny in real life, M. de Camors in the novel, d'Estrigaud on the stage. Balzac, then, taught rather than described that particular form of perversity. This problem involves the question of the relations between civilization and literature. It may be affirmed that Balzac did not create his Rastignacs *ex nihilo*: the Regency, the Directory, had already offered examples of the combined dandy, rake, and financier. On a larger scale, Napoleon, Talleyrand, and Fouché, for whom Balzac entertained such unlimited admiration, were not bad models. After the riotous display of energy under the Revolution and the Empire, many Frenchmen found the humdrum life of the Restoration very tame indeed; but great wars were at an end, and the era of great enterprises, heralded by the Saint-Simonians, was not yet a reality. The pent-up energy that Balzac—or Beyle for that matter—felt in himself found no outlet except in the comparatively narrow field of Parisian society. It was not Balzac who created "les hommes forts" of the Second Empire; de Morny was a full-fledged bird of prey in the early forties. It was the introduction of railroads, the development of public works, great industries, banking on

* Rubempré and Vautrin in *Splendour and Misery of Courtesans* are a Rastignac in two persons; Madame Marneffe in *Cousin Bette* is a female de Trailles.

the large scale, that gave them at last a field worthy of their power. Balzac therefore was only in a small degree a teacher of immoral ambition: he was partly a chronicler and partly a prophet.*

This aristocracy which Balzac failed to describe accurately was, under the Restoration, in its silvery old age. The splendour and charm of the ancient regime were gone for ever; but urbanity remained, made up of courtly wit and subdued dignity. This was true of Louis XVIII himself, who, in spite of his infirmities, did not lack quiet majesty, and who, as a true eighteenth-century nobleman, was still appreciative of a deft epigram. However, there is a less admirable side to the aristocracy of the Restoration. Many returned émigrés, like the Count of Artois (Charles X) himself, were out of touch with modern France. They had fallen under the rule of narrow-minded priests: their intellects were stunted, their religion formal, their hearts cold. After the death of the Duke of Berry there was no trace of light-heartedness left in the Court; it became almost as melancholy as that of Louis XIV under Madame de Maintenon. After the Revolution of 1830 the last survivors of the ancient regime walled their doors and windows to the new world, and the old King himself spent the six weary years of his exile in the impenetrable gloom of Holyrood, the Hradshin and Olmütz.

But whilst some of the best families thus isolated themselves in their pride, a fair portion of the nobility and practically all the upper bourgeoisie kept up the highest traditions of French society. There is little glamour about the Restoration, although it was the era of romanticism, and we are apt to consider it as an uninteresting period. Yet on closer acquaintance one cannot help feeling a strange attraction towards the refined circles of that time. They were elegant without extravagance: Versailles was a memory, and the gaudy splendour of the Second Empire was still far off. The art of polite conversation was not lost, but the frivolity and cynicism of the Pompadour era had perished in the storm. Genuine interest was given to literature—the number

* An entertaining document on the social influence of romanticism is Louis Reybaud's clever satire, *Jérôme Paturot à la Recherche d'une Position Sociale*; on the same subject, deeper, apparently more objective, Flaubert's novels, *Madame Bovary* and *L'Education Sentimentale*.

of aristocratic poets is worthy of notice—and especially to politics, not, it must be again confessed, without a shade of pedantry. Salons were political powers in those days. The Duchess of Duras was the leader of the strict Legitimists. The Duchess of Sainte-Aulaire, Decaze's mother-in-law, gathered the doctrinaires at her receptions, whilst the moderate liberals dallied at the Duchess of Broglie's, the daughter of Madame de Staël. Madame Récamier, the incomparable Juliet, had also her social domain, of which Chateaubriand was for many years the chief ornament.

It was to this intelligent upper class, rather than to the fanatical royal circle, that the Duke of Orleans properly belonged. But when he ascended the throne as Louis-Philippe, a great part of the aristocracy shunned his Court, which was flooded with less refined elements. Much fun has been poked at the thriftiness of the Citizen King, whose umbrella is as inseparable from his legendary personality as Louis XIV's wig or Napoleon's grey coat from theirs. Hackney coaches and omnibuses brought to the functions of the Tuileries worthy tradespeople and their wives, influential electors and officers of the National Guard, the best supports of the regime. Simplicity is an admirable quality, even in a king: it must be confessed that Louis-Philippe, a remarkable man in many respects, had some of the weaknesses of the lower bourgeoisie. He was deficient in artistic taste: the transformation of Versailles into a historical museum, an excellent thought in itself, was partly spoilt by his irredeemable philistinism. Strange to say, many members of his family were highly gifted in the artistic line. The young Duke of Orleans liked to gather in his part of the royal palace (Pavillon de Marsan) the best artists and writers of the time. Victor Hugo was his particular friend. Princess Marie was more than an amateur sculptor, and the Duke of Aumale, an able historian, was also the last and most brilliant type of the princely Mécenas.

Of the bourgeoisie that held power under Louis-Philippe through the 240,000 electors,* so much harm has been said

* Two hundred and forty thousand electors with their immediate families would represent about 1,000,000 inhabitants. But the ruling bour-

that we would fain take up its defence. Thrift, industry, honesty—at least due respect for the Code—a decent family life, all these qualities were theirs, abundantly. They were useful citizens, albeit philistines. They were sane and respectable, and a country in which “sanity” and “respectability” should ever become terms of opprobrium would be in a dangerous path. As for their narrow-mindedness and narrow-heartedness, their class-selfishness and smug self-satisfaction, these are also matters of history. The July bourgeoisie were no whit worse than their early-Victorian congeners over the Channel; and without professing any great admiration for the theistic philosophy they had learned from Voltaire, Béranger, and Victor Cousin, one may hold that Chadbandism was not immensely better.

Commerce and industry on a large scale hardly existed at all under the Restoration. The change came gradually under Louis-Philippe. France was at least a generation behind England in this respect, and the era of railroad construction did not begin in earnest until 1842. It was the time when Monsieur Poirier * had to pile up his million (francs) sou after sou in forty years of ceaseless labour. Many working men still lived in close touch with their masters. They had preserved some of their old customs, although the former Guilds remained abolished. The “companions,” after a long period of apprenticeship and probation, were admitted into the craft and initiated to its “mysteries”; when going on their “tour of France,” they found in each city an inn kept by “the Mother.” The “Children of Solomon” and those of “Master James” went back to Hiram and a Provençal colleague of his, both architects of Solomon’s temple. But the development of modern industry was soon going to sweep these picturesque survivals away. In their ruthless desire to derive the greatest possible profit from their expensive machines, and steeled against humanity by the prevailing doctrines of political economy, the employers kept their men, women, and children

geoisie was really larger than that. Two or three times that number considered themselves as represented by the richest of their class.

* Augier, *Le Gendre de Monsieur Poirier*.

working from twelve to sixteen hours a day. Unions and strikes were against the law. The Lyons insurrection, with its threatening motto, "To live by our work, or to die fighting," the utopian dreams of the early socialists, were the harbingers of a new economic age.*

Nothing was changed in the condition of the rural classes. Small holdings were the rule. The gradual spread of better methods was shown in the increased yield per acre. A sliding scale of custom dues afforded ample protection to producers, while enabling grain to be imported whenever the crop failed at home. Whilst the Empire had rehabilitated and extended the main roads, for strategic as well as for economic reasons, the Restoration, and particularly Louis-Philippe, developed a network of local branch roads—a great boon to the population. The system of canals begun by the ancient regime and Napoleon was completed, the mail-coach service accelerated, the aerial telegraphy of Chappe (semaphors) made to link all the important cities.† In short, this period was one of good home administration and steady material progress, but without any startling change.

§ 6. CULTURE.

The dominant factor in French culture under the Restoration and Louis-Philippe was romanticism. It coloured all forms of art: the Gothic revival in architecture with Lassus and Viollet-le-Duc is as much a sign of it as the painting of Delacroix, the music of Berlioz, or the poetry of Victor Hugo. Jean-Jacques Rousseau is often called the ancestor, and Chateaubriand the father, of the Romantic school. But the movement did not attain full consciousness of its aim until about 1820, when Lamartine's *Meditations* took France by storm. On the other hand, the failure of Hugo's *Burgraves*

* Cf. Chapter VI.

† Atmospheric conditions, of course, interfered, disastrously at times, with the working of the Chappe system. In 1836 the news came to Paris that Louis-Napoleon had started a rising at Strasbourg; then the communication was interrupted by fog; the anxiety of the Government may well be imagined.

in 1843 is generally considered as the end of militant romanticism. Thus its life of a quarter of a century falls entirely within the period we are studying.

There are static ages, as it were, ages of stability, when the cardinal principles that rule society are universally accepted when individuals, institutions, and ideas are classified and hierarchized in a way that seems rational. There may be discontent in such ages, but the general impression is one of repose and order. Such were, according at least to Saint-Simon and Auguste Comte, the two great classical centuries of French civilization, the thirteenth and the seventeenth. There are critical periods, on the contrary, times out of joint when principles and institutions no longer harmonize, when individuals are torn between their obvious duty to the existing social order and their perhaps higher duty to the aspiration within their own hearts. These are periods of doubt and despair of revolt and millennial hopes. The middle of the eighteenth century marks the beginning of one of these critical eras, and Rousseau, the incarnation of disharmony, was its prophet. Goethe in his youth, Schiller, Byron, Shelley, and in France Chateaubriand took up the tale. And that was romanticism. It is the consciousness of some disorder, either in society, mankind, nature, or the individual. The romanticist feels himself alone in a cold, unsympathetic universe: he is restless, melancholy, led to suicide or revolt. He rebels against conventional authorities: tradition, common sense, social discipline. He follows inspiration in all things—mysticism in religion, imagination rather than reason in intellectual matters, and passion rather than law and prudence. He is thus a transcendental egotist in his contempt of accepted values, in his belief in his own intuitions. Such a state of mind may be abnormal, even diseased; yet it is indispensable to progress “lest one good custom should corrupt the world.”

French Romanticism went through four different phases. The first was reactionary, from 1802 (*Génie du Christianisme*) to about 1825. Weary of rationalism and pseudo-classical mythology, it sought to return to Catholicism and feudal monarchy, both of which, indefensible in reason, appealed to

entiment and imagination. The masters of that period are Chateaubriand, de Maistre, de Bonald, Lamennais. Lamartine, Hugo, Vigny, in the early part of their careers, were Catholics and Royalists. The Liberals, on the contrary, were Voltairians and classicists.

Then, shortly after the accession of Charles X (1824) began a new development: romanticism veered towards liberalism. This was due to the disappointment felt after ten years of unpoetical Bourbon government; to the rise of the Napoleonic legend; to the sympathy for struggling nationalities, and in particular the Greeks; and, in a minor degree, to the personal prestige of Chateaubriand, who had quarrelled with his former friends, the absolutists. In his preface to *Hernani*, Victor Hugo defined romanticism as "liberalism in literature." This led to the Revolution of 1830, and, immediately afterwards, to the second avatar of Lamennais—liberal Catholicism and the campaign of the newspaper, *The Future*.

Liberal romanticism was also doomed to disappointment, for the power set up in 1830 was by no means poetical, or even truly liberal. Lamennais, who had tried to reconcile the Church and the State in the principle of liberty, was condemned by the State and excommunicated by the Church.* The result of this disappointment was a period of spiritual anarchism. Romanticism consumed itself in empty rebellion for art for art's sake. Chateaubriand withdraws from active life. Lamartine refuses to join any party. Vigny, after consulting "the Black Doctor," concludes that he must remain "free and alone." George Sand has no message but empty rebellion against accepted standards. Musset and Gautier, who have just reached maturity, will never go beyond amused scepticism in all social efforts. This period is often considered as the most typically romantic. So it is, both in theory—for pure romanticism can lead nowhither but to aristocratic anarchism—and in point of fact, for it was the moment of greatest productivity of the school.

But most romanticists would not be satisfied with this

* Prosecutions against *The Future* and its school, Encyclical *Mirari Vos*, cf. Chapter VIII.

gospel of negation and despair. Disappointed in reaction, disappointed in political liberty, they found a new ideal in utopian democracy, verging on socialism. In this the influence of the Saint-Simonians was considerable; the Lyons insurrection, with its echo in the streets of Paris, opened the eyes of many to the new social problem. Lamennais passed from liberal Catholicism to free Christianity and apocalyptic democracy. George Sand was converted to the same cause. The Revolution of 1848, led by Lamartine, was the joint triumph of romanticism, democracy, and socialism.

The influence of romanticism was not only profound, but extensive. Thousands of young men and women were, for a few years at least, carried by that great wave of enthusiasm. A few lives were wrecked thereby; there were epidemics of suicide, and many an Emma Bovary was led to adultery and death through the passionate declamations of George Sand. But not a few lives were ennobled, and even though Jérôme Paturot should turn into a commonplace hosier, his early poetical dreams must have been a source of pride and comfort to him in his shop. Fashion bore the mark of romanticism. There were mediæval houses and pieces of furniture, and even mediæval costumes. To romanticism we owe the magnificent development of history with Chateaubriand, Thierry, Quinet, and Michelet—and it was the study of history which prepared the second half of the nineteenth century for the philosophy of evolution. Chateaubriand begat Michelet and Michelet begat Renan.

On the other hand, we must not believe that classicism was totally defeated. In architecture and sculpture, the classical arts par excellence, the arts of repose and balance, romanticism never held full sway. No large civil building was erected in the Gothic style.* The statues or groups of Pradier, Cortot, even of Rude and David d'Angers, are conservative and academic compared with those of Carpeaux and Rodin, one or two generations later. In painting, Ingres is the uncompromising and not unworthy champion of classical tradition: his "Apotheosis

* Whereas in England Gothic was used for the Houses of Parliament and even for railway stations.

of Homer" is a profession of faith. In literature, the last classicists remained in exclusive control of the Academy until about 1840, and when Hugo and Vigny became at last members of that illustrious body, the revival of Corneille's and Racine's masterpieces by Rachel, the success of Ponsard's *Lucrèce*, were sufficient evidence that classicism had not capitulated.

It is in neither of the rival schools that we must look for the average literature of the time, but in such neutral compositions as the songs of Béranger, the innumerable plays of Scribe or the spicy novels of Paul de Kock; it is also in the enormous romances spun out for serial publication by Alexandre Dumas and Eugène Sue, two literary "captains of industry" whose works were immensely popular with all classes; it is especially in "eclecticism." The French constitutional monarchy was an eclectic regime, an unstable compound of tradition and liberty, and eclecticism seems in many respects the keyword of the period. Thus Casimir Delavigne, and after him Ponsard and Augier, tried to combine some of the picturesqueness and dramatic vivacity of romanticism with the sober regularity of the old French tragedy. The same combination is found in many painters. Horace Vernet, the last of a long and famous line, and Louis-Philippe's especial favourite, left innumerable battle-scenes which are still widely popular. Paul Delaroche, a Casimir Delavigne on canvas,* gave historical pictures which are a sane and creditable compromise between the styles of Ingres and Delacroix.

Romanticism did not evolve a philosophy: this is not to be wondered at, since it is, of its very nature, anti-rational. It borrowed ideas, or rather impressions and themes, from many systems—orthodox Christianity, Saint-Simonism, strange astro-theosophical dreams, the socialistic humanitarianism of Pierre Leroux. The reaction against eighteenth-century rationalism, and especially against its late development, materialism, took place in philosophy as well as in literature. Royer-Collard, and especially Maine de Biran, started it. Cousin crushed the last disciples of Condillac. Borrowing from Plato and Hegel to form his eclectic "spiritualism,"

* Cf. "Les Enfants d'Edouard," treated by both.

he became under Louis-Philippe the dictator of French philosophy. But the wisdom of all the ages, combined, as he thought, in his system, amounted to little more than the glorification of common sense and a revamping of Rousseau's *Savoyard Vicar*.

The period of constitutional monarchy is never mentioned by many a Frenchman without a smile and a shrug. It certainly lacked the spectacular brilliancy of the two Empires; it did not inspire fear, either at home or abroad, and thus it secured but little respect. Progress was steady but slow: there was no magic touch of the wand, as in 1800 or in 1852. But neither Charles X nor Louis-Philippe, with all their shortcomings, led France into such an abyss as the two Napoleons. Peace, prosperity, a magnificent development of art and literature: surely these should atone for the undeniable taint of philistinism in the governing class.

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CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

III. CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY, 1814-48

- 1814 First Restoration: Louis XVIII.
- 1815 March 20 to June 22. Return of Napoleon. The Hundred Days
Second Restoration.
- 1815-16 Peace of Vienna. White Terror. "Chambre introuvable."
- 1815-18 Ministry of the Duke of Richelieu.
- 1818-19-20 Ministries Dessoles-Decazes and Decazes.
- 1820 February 13. Murder of the Duke of Berry.
September 29. Birth of the "child of miracle," the Duke of
Bordeaux, Count of Chambord.
- 1821 May 5. Death of Napoleon.
- 1821-28 Ultra-royalist Ministry of de Villèle.
- 1823 Spanish Expedition.
- 1824 "Chambre retrouvée" (Ultra-royalist).
- 1824-30 CHARLES V.
- 1825 "Milliard" compensation to émigrés.
- 1828-29 Martignac Ministry (semi-Liberal).
- 1829-30 Polignac Ministry (Ultra-royalist).
- 1830 July 5. Capture of Algiers by the French.
July 26. Arbitrary Ordinances issued by the King.
July 27-29. Revolution of July. The "Three Glorious Days."
- 1830-48 LOUIS-PHILIPPE Ier, King of the French. (The Citizen-King: the
Bourgeois Monarchy; the July Monarchy.)
- 1830 Ministry Broglie-Guizot-Lafayette.
- 1830-31 Ministry Lafitte.
- 1831-32 Ministry Casimir-Périer. Cholera.
- 1832 Rebellion of the Duchess of Berry.
- 1832-36 Ministry Thiers-Guizot-de Broglie.
- 1834 Insurrections in Lyons and Paris.
- 1835 Fieschi's infernal machine. Repressive laws (September).
- 1836 October 30. Louis-Napoleon at Strasbourg.
- 1836-40 Ministries Thiers; Guizot-Molé; Molé; Soult; Thiers.
- 1839 Republican Insurrection in Paris.
- 1840 Second Thiers Ministry. Diplomatic difficulties (Eastern Ques-
tion).
- 1840 Louis-Napoleon at Boulogne. Remains of Napoleon I brought to
Paris.
- 1840-48 Ministry Soult-Guizot.
- 1842 Death of the Duke of Orleans.
- 1848 Revolution.

HOUSE OF BOURBON IN THE OLDER AND YOUNGER (ORLEANS) LINE

Henri IV, d. 1610

Louis XIII, d. 1643

Louis XIV, d. 1715

Louis, the Dauphin, d. 1711

Louis, Duke of Burgundy, d. 1712

Louis XV, d. 1774

Louis, the Dauphin, d. 1765

Louis XVI
d. 1793

Louis XVIII,
d. 1824

Charles X,
d. 1836

Louis, the
Dauphin,
d. 1789

Louis
(Louis XVII)
d. 1795

Louis,
Duke of
Angoulême,
d. 1844

Charles,
Duke of
Berry,
d. 1820

Duke of Bordeaux,
Count of Cham-
bord ("Henri V")
d. 1883

Philip, Duke of Orleans, d. 1701

Philip, the Regent, d. 1723

Louis, d. 1752

Louis-Philippe, d. 1785

Louis-Philippe (Egalité), d. 1793

Louis-Philippe I (King), d. 1850

Duke of Orleans, Nemours
d. 1842

Duke of Prince of Duke of
Joinville, Aumale, Montpensier,
d. 1896 d. 1900 d. 1897 d. 1890

Count of Paris,
d. 1894

Duke of Chartres

Duke of Orleans
("Philippe VII")

CHAPTER IV

NAPOLEON III, 1848—70

§ 1. POLITICAL CONDITIONS.

1. *Political Conditions: the Republic.*—The Revolution of 1848—Democracy—Socialism—The Constituent Assembly—The Days of June—Reaction—Election of Louis-Napoleon: its causes and its meaning.

2. *The Coup d'Etat and the Empire.*—The coup d'état: its causes and significance—Influence on French thought—Character of the Second Empire—Spiritual gloom—Did the Empire stifle intellectual life?

The Roman Question.

THE Revolution of 1848 was an accident. The insurrections of Lyons and Paris, in 1831, 1832, and 1834, were better concerted and more formidable. They were not repressed without bloodshed, but the Government issued stronger from the battle. In 1848, more tact on Guizot's side, more decision on the part of the King, Bugeaud called earlier and given a free hand, and monarchy might have been saved, at least for a season. Perhaps a single random shot on the boulevard des Capucines was responsible for the catastrophe. But the fact remains that after eighteen years of a wise, peaceful, and prosperous reign, Louis-Philippe was at the mercy of an accident, and that fact is significant. The July monarchy, the result of a compromise, perhaps of an act of trickery, had lived on sufferance, without striking root deep in the soil. Legitimists, Catholics, Bonapartists, Republicans, Socialists, all were against it. It represented and satisfied no one except a portion of the bourgeoisie. By monopolizing power for nearly eight years and refusing any electoral reform which might endanger his political position, Guizot divided the forces of the middle class, which, even

united, was a narrow basis for a political regime. Thus Louis-Philippe fell, unpitied, unregretted in France and in Europe, except by a few personal followers.

The Revolution of 1830 seems to have been hailed in France with genuine enthusiasm: it was a great battle between the old and the new, a confirmation of the principles of 1789. The Revolution of 1848 was received with mixed feelings. Some of the victors were ashamed of their victory. The masses in the provinces were astonished rather than gratified. But the democratic elements in the cities were triumphant. It was understood, among Republicans, that in 1830 the Duke of Orleans had tricked them out of the fruit of their labours. This time, they meant not to be so easily duped.

And circumstances favoured them. The Revolution had come as a surprise. No single party was known to have a majority in the country. A republic, at least as a temporary expedient, seemed the only possibility. All opposition parties had agreed in branding Louis-Philippe's government as that of a minority, every party expected from the people at large a verdict in its favour; thus for a moment Legitimists and Catholics joined with the Bonapartists and Republicans in their advocacy of universal suffrage. This formed a motley crowd: the divine right of kings, the divine right of the people, international and social brotherhood, military supremacy and glory—all these ideals could not easily be reconciled. But all had this character in common, that they were ideals, and appealed, not to common sense and self-interest but to imagination and sentiment. Thus democratic romanticism prevailed for a time, because of its vague, generous appeal, and because no other solution was ready; and the most harmonious and vaguest of poets, Lamartine, became the fitting representative of an unpractical and idealistic revolution. The evolution which commenced in 1824 was now complete: the very poet who sang the coronation of Charles X was at the head of a democratic republic. This triumph had been delayed by eighteen years of clever, shifty, materialistic government, but it had come at last. It was, indeed, as the Germans called it, "*ein heiliges und tolles Jahr*." A year? In France, it was only a season. In a few weeks the dream was shattered.

The Constituent Assembly was at first imbued with the same spirit of generous optimism as the Provisional Government. But as early as the 15th of May, on a futile pretext, Barbès, Blanqui, Raspail and the Revolutionists, their followers, invaded the legislative hall. The affair was a miserable failure, but it was sufficient for breaking the charm. Diffidence, fear, hatred, banished for a while, reasserted their empire. Lacordaire, who on the 4th of May had fraternized with the people, sent in his resignation after the 15th. Socialism was no longer looked upon with sympathetic tolerance. The unreasoning dread of the "Red Fiend" was growing among peasants and bourgeoisie alike.

National workshops had been organized, both as a recognition of the socialistic right to employment and as a measure of relief for the intense economic crisis which the Revolution had brought in its train. Well meant, but poorly organized, they soon became the parody rather than the realization of Louis Blanc's scheme. An ever-increasing number of men of all descriptions were paid forty cents a day for digging trenches in the Champ de Mars and filling them up again. The national workshops were suppressed with as much clumsiness as they had been managed. The result was the most formidable insurrection that Paris had yet seen. General Cavaignac was made Dictator. He suppressed the rising with the ruthless energy of a soldier trained in Algerian campaigns. Thousands of insurgents were summarily judged and sentenced to transportation. There was both in the struggle and in the repression an element of implacable ferocity which had been absent from French history since the darkest days of the Terror. The Days of June are an all-important date in the evolution of French thought. Optimistic romanticism was ruined. Its utopian ideas were supposed, not with full justice, to have been tried and to have failed. Its representatives were set aside as dangerous or unpractical: in December, Lamartine, once the idol of the people, polled 17,000 votes out of an electorate of eight millions. The conservative classes trembled retrospectively at the thought of the danger they had just gone through. They craved for authorities that would maintain material order, and moral order as one of its conditions. The Church and a strong government! Such was the cry of the frightened bourgeoisie. "Let us throw

themselves at the feet of the bishops!" said Duvergier de Hau-
 nne, a former member of the liberal opposition.

It is often asserted that in December, 1851, Louis-Napoleon
 strangled the harmless, generous, idealistic Republic of 1848.
 As a matter of fact, political and social reaction began immedi-
 ately after the Days of June. The true character of the following
 twenty years was determined before their political form. Had the
 republic survived, it would, for many years, have been as conser-
 vative as any Empire, and possibly more cruel. In June, 1848,
 and in May, 1871, it was shown that repression under a collective
 and anonymous government could attain a degree of severity which
 would be unsafe for the strongest autocrat.

The Assembly, swept by the eloquence of Lamartine—it was
 its last and most fatal victory—decided that the President should
 be elected directly by universal suffrage. After some hesitation,
 it refused to make former pretenders, *i.e.*, Louis-Napoleon,
 eligible. Representative Thouret made a motion to that effect,
 but he withdrew it after hearing the Prince speak a few words:
 "I thought this man was dangerous," he said; "I was mistaken."
 General Cavaignac was still chief executive, and official pressure
 was everywhere exerted in his favour. He was an honest and
 able man, a true republican, and the actual "saviour of society."
 But, for the conservatives, he was too incorruptibly republi-
 can, whilst the democrats could not forget his rôle in June.
 So, in spite of his great services, he was passed over. The
 Royalists could not agree on a candidate of their own: the
 two branches of the house of Bourbon were never fully re-
 conciled. In 1830 and in February, 1848, the people had
 strongly expressed its aversion for both, and the memories of
 these two catastrophes were still too fresh for an open mon-
 archical campaign to be immediately possible. Advised by
 Thiers and Montalembert, the conservatives decided to vote for
 Louis-Napoleon. Such a policy, on the part of Orleanists and
 legitimists, seems at present suicidal; it was, to say the least,
 fortuitous. Thiers and his friends wanted to use the pretender as
 cat's-paw. These bourgeois politicians, so matter-of-fact
 themselves, had failed to gauge the force of Napoleonic sentiment
 in the country. Louis-Philippe himself, it will be remembered,

had toyed with it, fostered it, in the hope that it would satisfy in a cheap, safe manner the people's craving for glory. It was the same clever, dangerous game that the conservatives wanted to play in 1848. "Let the people satisfy, in a harmless manner their fancy for a Bonaparte. The pretender was known to be a dolt; in less than four years he would reveal his utter incapacity and ruin his own cause. While making himself impossible, he would accustom the public mind to the idea of a true restoration. In the meantime, Thiers would be the power behind the throne."

Thus Louis-Napoleon received the support of the conservative elements. He had already in his favour the vast majority of the country-folk, among whom the "Legend" had been spread by Marco-Saint-Hilaire, Dumas, Béranger, and less directly by Thiers himself and Victor Hugo. Even among the democrats he had many supporters; they preferred him to Cavaignac, the "butcher of June," and they remembered that he had written a vaguely socialistic pamphlet on the extinction of pauperism. On the 10th of December, 1852, he was elected President by 5,434,000 votes to Cavaignac's 1,448,000. Ledru-Rollin and Raspail, the democratic candidates, had less than 500,000 votes between them. Lamartine, in whom the spirit of February, 1848 was embodied, received only 17,000.

It was an overwhelming triumph. Napoleon III, in after years, always claimed that his true title to power was neither hereditary nor the coup d'état, but the popular election of the 10th of December. There could be no doubt as to the sincerity of the vote or its meaning. In choosing Louis-Napoleon simply because he was a Bonaparte, the people did certainly not express their wish for a parliamentary republic. On December 10th the Empire was virtually made. Thiers's prophecy, often quoted as a wonderful instance of political foresight, came three years later—three years after Thiers himself had helped to make its fulfilment inevitable. The coup d'état, the "crime" of 1851, was but the natural consequence of the presidential election. The long delay astonished and disappointed the peasants, who had voted, not for a republican magistrate, but for a Napoleon.

Louis-Napoleon's term of office was to expire in 1852. According to the Constitution, he could not be re-elected. An attempt

was made to have this provision altered, but it failed. The whole Constitution was impracticable. Alone the authority which the President derived from his Imperial origin and his large popular majority gave some unity and some outward peace to the political life of the country. In 1852, with his retirement, this precarious peace would come to an end. Everything would be put in question again. The situation was in some respects as threatening as in 1848. The Constituent Assembly, with all its confusion and lack of experience, was well-meaning, generous, optimistic, and, on the whole, moderate. Its successor, the Legislative Assembly, was sharply divided between a dominant conservative party and a strong minority of advanced democrats. The good old "Republicans of 1848" had disappeared. Neither party bore any love to the existing form of government, and it was well understood that neither would be stopped by constitutional scruples. The conservatives wanted to make their present hold of the country permanent; the democrats wanted to reconquer the Republic, which was no longer theirs since the Days of June. A restoration and a new revolution was in sight—either entailing bloodshed, an economic crisis, and the dreaded "leap in the dark." The Royalists confessed that they did not "hope to reach the Promised Land without crossing the Red Sea." Revolutionary societies were growing everywhere. Thus, in a country which as a whole was panting for peace and stability, political parties were almost openly carrying on two conspiracies.

The Prince-President had his own hopes: but he alone seemed to stand for the nation at large instead of special interests. He had skilfully disentangled his cause from that of any party. He was the nominee of the conservatives no doubt, but of the conservatives in the broadest sense, and he was the elect of the whole people. He had no programme but his name: it made him the traditional representative of strong government, but also of the national will; a prince, but of a revolutionary dynasty and known for his democratic sympathies. He allowed the conservative majority to take measures for curtailing universal suffrage, the great conquest of 1848; when they had thus committed themselves, he opposed them, and stood as the defender of the nation's right. By the coup d'état of the 2nd of December,

1851, he dissolved the Assembly, "restored" universal suffrage, and appealed to the people as to the supreme arbiter.

Thus the revolution expected for 1852 was averted by another of a different kind—an act of violence, no doubt, a piece of illegality, a perjury, but not more so than all other revolutions. Of all the many sudden changes of regime in France, this was one of the freest from innocent blood, and the only one which was immediately and formally ratified by the country. A unworkable Constitution, which had made its own revision almost impossible, was doomed to a violent death.

§ 2. THE COUP D'ÉTAT AND THE EMPIRE.

Louis-Napoleon's hope was to make himself the grand arbitrator between parties, and to achieve a work of national reconciliation and reconstruction similar to that of his uncle in 1800. Unfortunately the coup d'état was spoilt, and made very different from what the gentle dreamer expected. Violence to a Constitution which no one meant to respect much longer was more justifiable than the revolutions of February, 1848, and September, 1870; but the massacre on the Boulevards, the wholesale arrest, transportation, or exile of Republicans, Socialist members of secret societies, ticket-of-leave men and dangerous criminals, pell-mell, all that was without excuse, even on the score of policy. That was the true "crime of December," justified irreconcilable opposition, like that of Victor Hugo. It partly invalidated the result of the plebiscite of 1851, which Republicans were able to claim, was influenced by terror and tainted with fraud. { Who was responsible for this perversion of the coup d'état? Perhaps Saint-Arnaud, Magnan, and the other generals who wanted, by this display of savage energy, to magnify the danger from which they had saved society. Perhaps Morny and the financiers, who were anxious to reassure conservative interests and to deal a crushing blow to social democracy. Perhaps the unscrupulous adventurers who surrounded the Prince wished to bind him to them by ties of complicity in the crime: the Emperor was heard to complain that he had to drag Persigny and Morny like a convict his chain and ball. Perhaps they meant to take precautions against his socialistic leaning

Perhaps there was as much blundering as Machiavelianism in all this useless rigour: the mysteries of the coup d'état are not all cleared up even yet.

One thing is certain, and this is why we have dwelt at such length on those critical days: the coup d'état gave its stamp to the Second Empire. The whole regime, like its initial act, bore the mark, not only of the kindly, well-meaning Prince whom no one ever approached without loving him, but also and chiefly of Saint-Arnaud, Persigny, Morny, Maupas. By one of its aspects at least, what was meant to be a truly national government seemed the filibustering adventure of a few middle-aged men of doubtful morality. Popular ratification, unheard of prosperity, victorious wars, could never wash off the stain.

The seven million votes cast in favour of Louis-Napoleon only served to chill democratic feelings in the hearts of poets and thinkers. Even the great Romanticists grew discouraged and pessimistic. The new generation despised the "rabble" as much as their elders had glorified the "people." They wanted to avoid any contact with the populace and to conceal from them all their emotions. Vigny's attitude of aloofness and stoic silence, exceptional twenty years before, became more general. Men like Taine, Renan, Leconte de Lisle, Flaubert, were, or tried to be, indifferent, "impassible," "objective."

Such was the origin of the Second Empire, and such remained its character: the triumph of force and of material interests. Bonapartism stood for glory abroad, order and progress at home; but it was the glory which is assured by a large and well-drilled army rather than by a righteous cause; the order that an efficient police force can maintain; the kind of progress which is measured in miles of railroads. In achieving these ends, Napoleon III was for a few years eminently successful: he had nobler aspirations, which he failed to realize. The uneducated masses and the clique of self-seekers supported his government: the élite of all kinds, with a few notable exceptions, distrusted it and him.

Hence the note of sadness which prevails in literature throughout these twenty years. Romantic idealism was hopelessly defeated, and the whole world was darkened.* The new

* Cf. Baudelaire's sonnet, "Le Coucher du Soleil Romantique."

generation received in its early manhood the bitter gift of experience. They tried, above all things, not to be dupes; they guarded themselves against the ennobling illusions of their elders. The frivolous were cynical; the serious-minded stoically pessimistic. For this note of bitter discouragement the Empire is partly responsible. But we should not lay everything to the charge of the political regime. Democratic politicians like Camille Pelletan * accuse it of creating an oppressive atmosphere in which literature was stifled, and of restricting by open force the liberty of thought. They would have us believe that the Spirit of France was taken in exile with Quinet and Victor Hugo. These are wild exaggerations: the "Tyranny" was not so thoroughgoing. Most great writers, after a while, lived on fairly good terms with "Tiberius." Mérimée and Sainte-Beuve were Senators; About, Augier, Renan, Taine, and even the Socialists Proudhon and George Sand, were the friends of the Emperor's first cousins, Prince Napoleon and Princess Matilda; Vigny was thought of for preceptor of the Prince Imperial; Leconte de Lisle, known to be a Republican, was secretly pensioned by Napoleon III.

The one thing the Empire stifled, at least for seven or eight years, was political life. The Government could very well have dispensed with its unfortunate method of interfering in elections and occasionally tampering with the returns: it was absolutely sure of an overwhelming majority. The privileges of Parliament had been curtailed; only a summary report of its sessions was made public. The Press was "muzzled." Home politics had thus lost all interest. But this was no disadvantage to thought or literature; it gave authors leisure and a public. The "Silence of the Empire," so oppressive to a generation of debaters and journalists like Thiers, gave quieter men a better chance. Under a different regime, Leconte de Lisle or Flaubert might have been lured from their proper task; Taine, Renan, Schérer would perhaps have found it more difficult to secure a hearing. It was a good thing for Victor Hugo not to be any longer a Peer of the Realm or a member of the Legislative Assembly: his political

* Cf. Camille Pelletan, *Victor Hugo homme politique*. Also Ed. Schérer, "L'Ere Impériale," *Etudes sur la Littérature Contemporaine*, iv.

duties in exile were light and intermittent; they left his energy intact for his greatest works. The period of the Second Empire is by no means the most brilliant in the nineteenth century, but it holds an honourable rank. It would be ludicrous, as the Bonapartist writer Augustin Filon confesses, to speak of an "Age of Napoleon III"; it would be an injustice to call the whole period barren, and to make the regime responsible for such sterility.

Nor is it any more exact to pretend that the Empire sought to restrict the liberty of thought. We hold no brief for Bonapartism, but we must dwell for a moment on this point, which of course is of commanding interest to the student of culture. Under Napoleon III the Press was not free: at least, pieces of news were often coloured or suppressed, which was an evil; and - scurrilous abuse was sternly discouraged, much to the benefit of good journalism: masterpieces of allusive irony, in the style of Prévost-Paradol, are all too rare nowadays. It must also be said that Vacherot lost his position at the Normal School, Michelet and Quinet theirs at the Collège de France, that Jules Simon had to resign after the coup d'état, that Taine's academic life was made intolerable, that Renan's course was suspended and eventually suppressed. In spite of all these facts, we believe that in all essentials thought and speech were as free then as they are now. The regime was not liberal; but, materially irresistible, it was powerless in all spiritual affairs. The thinking classes in France were divided into radically opposed camps, each too strong to be silenced by its opponents, even with the assistance of the Government. That Government, being a hybrid, a monarchy "by the grace of God and the will of the people," a reactionary power of revolutionary origin, could not side wholeheartedly with either party; and, especially after the Italian campaign, it frequently sought the support of the free-thinkers against the Church. This conflict existed even within the Imperial family: the Empress was a stanch Catholic, Prince Napoleon was "anti-clerical," the Emperor was everything and nothing. As a result, not of any enlightened tolerance on the part of the rulers but of conditions beyond the reach of any political regime, thought, especially religious thought, was

actually freer in France than in England, where the liberty of the Press was officially unbounded. There, writes Hilaire Belloc, "a sort of cohesive public spirit glued and immobilized all individual expression. One could float imprisoned as in a stream of thick substance: one could not swim against it." The French public spirit was not cohesive: the Empire had no consistent doctrine which it might attempt to impose by force.

Such was the political background at home;* with foreign affairs we have little to do, except in one respect: the Roman question was ever present under the Empire; it marked its beginning, its climax, and its end; it reacted on home politics, it influenced religion, thought, and literature.

✓ Pope Pius IX inaugurated his pontificate with liberal reforms which roused the enthusiasm of Europe; he seemed destined to be the evangelical, democratic Pope after the heart of Lamennais and Victor Hugo; his popularity had much to do with the religious attitude of the Revolution of 1848. But in November, 1848, after the assassination of his Minister Rossi, he fled to Gaeta, and a Roman Republic was created. Cavaignac held French troops in readiness, should intervention prove necessary. It was part of the compact between the conservatives and Louis-Napoleon that these troops should be employed to restore papal authority. Thus France, still nominally a Republic, suppressed a sister Republic, and this was the prelude to reaction in France

* For seven years after the coup d'état the Empire remained an unmitigated autocracy (*l'Empire Autoritaire*). Popular elections were held in 1852, 1857, and 1863, but the Government, undoubtedly supported by the immense majority of the people, repressed even the mildest forms of opposition. From 1859, and especially 1863 to 1869, we can trace a somewhat jerky and reluctant progress from "authority" to "liberty" (*l'Empire Liberal*). The *Senatus-Consulte* of September 8, 1869, and April 2, 1870, transformed the Empire into a parliamentary monarchy of the English type. However, the Emperor remained the responsible head of the State, and through plebiscites he could enter into direct communication with the people at large, over the heads of Ministers and deputies. This last avatar of the regime, submitted to popular suffrage, was endorsed by over 7,000,000 votes against 1,500,000. Emile Ollivier, the new Premier, a converted Republican and a great orator, was a lover of peace and liberty, and there is little doubt that the experiment was, on the whole, satisfactorily received. The tragic adventure of 1870 did not give it time to fulfil its promises.

himself, "a Roman expedition at home," in the words of Montalembert.

With short intermissions, the Pope remained under the protection of French bayonets until after the fall of the Empire. It was the price paid by Napoleon for the support of the Church.

The price must often have seemed heavy to him, for he was at heart an Italian patriot, had taken part in his youth in an insurrection against papal domination, and had probably been a Carbonaro. He would at least have liked to use his influence for securing liberal reforms in the Roman States; but the Pope, supported by the French conservatives, refused to listen to any suggestion. The Emperor was "caught"; he could not withdraw his troops, for that would have weakened his position in France and strengthened that of Austria in Italy.

In 1859 Napoleon III, after secret negotiations with Cavour, engaged France in a war against Austria in favour of Italian independence. The war was immensely popular with the masses, and Napoleon was never so near gaining the loyal support of the Parisian working men; the revolutionary Faubourg-Saint-Antoine hailed him with enthusiasm as he left for the front.

But the Franco-Italian victory opened the question of Italian unity. In spite of some political shilly-shallying, Napoleon did not put any serious obstacle in the way of Piedmont, and within one year modern Italy was made, with the exception of the Venetian province and what remained of the Pope's dominions.

The French Catholics held the Emperor responsible for the partial dispossession of their pontiff. Napoleon was attacked with such bitterness that he had to suppress the great Church paper, *L'Univers*, and to seek for supporters among the more advanced elements. But he did not dare to change the whole basis of his power; he tried to reconcile his sympathy with Italy and the Liberals on the one hand with his traditional alliance with the Church on the other. It seems now proved, as Prince Napoleon had affirmed long ago, that the Roman question alone prevented Victor Emmanuel from joining the French side in

1870.* A fortnight after the fall of the Empire, the Italian troops entered Rome.

For twenty years Rome was the pivot of French politics, at home and abroad. For ten years at least it was the chief centre of interest of French intellectual life. The number of books and pamphlets which it elicited is prodigious. The Roman question was considered as a test of conservatism in all things. When the great preacher Lacordaire became a candidate to the French Academy, Guizot, a Protestant, Thiers, an unbeliever, objected to him as not sufficiently "Roman." The temporal power of the Pope was a battleground and a symbol.

§ 3. SOCIETY.

§ 3. *Society*.—Documents: literature; the Press; graphic documents—Material activity: the Saint-Simonian spirit—Solidity of this prosperity—Glitter.

Old French society—The exiles—The Court—The pleasure-seekers—"L'homme fort"; de Morny.

§ 4. *Culture*.—Reaction and materialism—Apparent failure of idealism—The second "mal du siècle"—Gloom not due to the progress of science and industry—Realism: brilliancy of art and literature—Science: the new spirit—Positivism and evolution—Three moments: 1856, 1860, 1867.

. Of social conditions under the Empire we shall say little, because there is too much to be said. The period still lives in the memory of our parents, and there remains a mass of historical material which has not yet been sifted and classified. It has left us no single collection of documents comparable in value to Balzac's *Comédie Humaine*. But many dramatists and novelists of lesser range have attempted to portray their own times with at least an effort towards scientific objectiveness and accuracy. The plays of Augier, Dumas, Théodore Barrière, Sardou, Meilhac and Halévy are of great value for the historian of manners. So are, if due caution be exercised, some novels of the Goncourts, Feuillet, Erckmann-Chatrian. After the fall of the regime we had Zola's mighty and coarse twenty-volume series, *Les Rougon-Macquart*: a sordid, pessimistic, one-sided

* Cf. Bourgeois and Clermont, *Rome and Napoleon III*.

view of life, with an excessive wealth of accurate details, and, in spite of all its heaviness and vulgarity, an undeniable breadth of epic treatment. Less powerful, less repulsive, less systematic, lighter, truer, finer, are Daudet's somewhat hasty sketches, such as *The Nabob*.

The newspapers were comparatively few on account of the stringency of the Press law; but they maintained, on the whole, a very high standard: *Le Journal des Débats*, the organ of the liberal-conservative opposition: *Le Temps*, also moderate in tone, but more advanced than the *Débats*; *L'Univers* (for a time *Le Monde*), Veuillot's ultra-Catholic paper; Havin's *Siècle*, Voltairian, bourgeois, carrying on a sort of licensed semi-opposition; Guérault's *Opinion Nationale*, tinged with Saint-Simonism, democratic, but not irreductibly hostile to Bonapartism, and supposed to represent the ideas of Prince Napoleon. The official Press was by no means so brilliant, and *Le Moniteur* and *Le Constitutionnel* are at present remembered only on account of Saint-Beuve's collaboration. Among the reviews, Buloz's *Revue des Deux-Mondes* retained its primacy. It was, like *Les Débats*, an organ of the parliamentary opposition—Orleanist or moderate Republican. But it was rather more advanced, and, in philosophical matters, freely open to bold critics of the Church or even of Christianity: Lanfrey, Schérer, Havet, Renan, for instance, were among its contributors. The liberal Catholics had their magazine, *Le Correspondant*, with de Falloux, Montalembert, Pontmartin, de Laprade: a small group, but influential in Academic elections.

Beside the political papers and the great magazines, there swarmed what was justly called "la petite Presse," which, debarred from treating the burning questions of the day, enjoyed on all the rest almost excessive freedom. It gives a good idea of one small section of Parisian society, and good instances of one minor aspect of Parisian wit. *Le Figaro* then stood almost at the limit between the "legitimate" and the "small" Press. It was one of its chroniclers, Rochefort, who, by applying the methods of the professional humourist to political matters in his weekly *Lanterne*, won such immediate and undeserved popularity. Strange to say, great and grave men were occasional

contributors to these "smart set" papers. In Aurélien Scholl's *Nain Jaune* are found eloquent and intensely earnest criticisms of contemporary poets by Leconte de Lisle. Taine was the personal friend of Marcellin (Planat), the founder of *La Vie Parisienne*, for which the austere philosopher wrote his *Thomas Graindorge*. In *La Vie Parisienne* can be seen some of Constantin Guys' wonderful sketches, which, with the spirited drawings of Gavarni, Daumier, and Cham, give us a more vivid idea of the times than the photographs of Nadar and Disderi, the portraits painted by Cabanel, Flandrin or Winterhalter, the large historical canvases of Yvon, or Meissonier's brilliant miniatures.

The most striking character of this society was the intensity of its material activity. Industry on a large scale had developed under Louis-Philippe, but, for a long time, at a moderate pace. Under the Second Empire there was a sudden, and, as it then seemed, boundless expansion. The trunk lines were hastily completed and added to; steam navigation was developed; an ironclad navy created; telegraphy first applied; the Suez Canal commenced and completed, mainly as a French undertaking. Most of the great cities were practically rebuilt: at Marseilles, for instance, hills were levelled, whole districts torn down, and a new harbour conquered on the Mediterranean. The best known, the most spectacular of these colossal transformations was that of Paris under Haussmann: truly a formidable work, hasty, faulty in many respects, but in spite of errors—excesses and shortcomings—one of the wonders of the nineteenth century. More actual work may have been done during certain years of the Third Republic: but that spirit of triumphant material expansion—the spirit of Bismarckian Germany, or of the American North-West at the present day—no longer prevails in contemporary France.

This industrial and commercial development was so intense, so exuberant, that it assumed a sort of poetic grandeur—the epic of productivity and wealth. In the case of Napoleon III himself, materialism had undoubtedly its mystic side, and there were at least remnants of religious enthusiasm in the activities of such men as the Pereires. We must remember that the

Neo-Christian" and socialistic disciples of Saint-Simon, the very men whose mania, as it was then called, had amused Paris in 1830-32, were believers in the Gospel of Industry, and at the time of the Second Empire had become shrewd and successful business men, bankers, and railroad magnates. The Compagnie Générale Transatlantique, with the Pereires, remained for a long time one of their strongholds. Michel Chevallier, the economist who with Cobden secured some measure of free-trade between France and England, had been a Saint-Simonian; the "father" of the Church himself, Prosper Faubert, in spite of incurable illusions mixed with charlatanism, was as a capable railroad official and a pioneer promoter of the Suez Canal. There is, we must confess, something strangely attractive about the material activity of the Empire: its reckless daring, its breadth of inspiration, the undeniable generosity of some of its motives, appeal to us much more than the cautious solidity of Louis-Philippe.

Much of the material prosperity enjoyed by the country at large was the reward of hard work, enterprise, and foresight. And the compressive paternalism of the Government had its counterpart in a series of beneficent measures. The "Crédit Foncier," a national mortgage bank imitated everywhere, was Napoleon's earliest creation. Mutual help and co-operative associations were encouraged. Strikes ceased to be a crime in the eyes of the law. Vast stretches of marshy territory were reclaimed in Sologne and the Dombes, whilst the desolate Landes of Gascony became a huge plantation of pine. Reafforestation was carried on with efficient energy. New breeds of horses and cattle were introduced. Local and national agricultural expositions contributed to the spread of better methods of cultivation. Taine was not a Bonapartist, and when not blinded by political passion he was a keen observer: after extensive journeys through the length and the breadth of the land, his verdict was: "One must confess there is in this country a sudden expansion of public prosperity, similar to that of the Renaissance or of the time of Colbert. . . . The Emperor understands France and his century better than any of his predecessors." *

* *Carnets de Voyage*, p. 112 (1863).

This prosperity was by no means all glitter: the way in which the country recovered after 1870 showed that the economic conditions were fundamentally sound. Nothing, therefore, would be more unjust than to see in the Second Empire a regime of stockjobbers, card-sharpers, swashbucklers, and prostitutes. But there was much glitter and many dark points. To Guizot's advice under Louis-Philippe, "Get rich!" the Second Empire seemed to add: "And get rich quickly!" The whole regime seemed to be the fruit of successful gambling: penniless adventurers found themselves at one stroke among the rulers of France. The spirit of recklessness, luxury, and pleasure was evident everywhere, and displayed itself with a universality and a cynicism unrivalled except under the Regency and the Directoire. "Imperial corruption" has remained a by-word, and even after discounting the natural hostility of Republican and Royalist historians, there is much truth in the censure. The bourgeois regimes of Louis-Philippe and Victoria had their own sad and sordid tales to tell, it is true: immorality was invented several thousand years before the Empire. The Government, aware of the evil, would offer rewards to edifying literature, and prosecuted *Madame Bovary*, which, to the jaded taste of our own times, seems only a distressing but salutary book. All efforts were in vain; the taint would spread instead of receding.

Old French society, of course, was not dead. In the noble Faubourg-Saint-Germain, Legitimists and Orleanists, partly reconciled through their common opposition to the Government, waged against it their clever and harmless warfare of epigrams, allusions, and academic intrigues. Even they were not wholly untainted by the Parisian atmosphere: Veillot complains that the balls in Catholic aristocratic families were reported in terms better fitting for a description of Mabilles; spirit-rapping séances were given—the craze gained even Lacordaire—and vaudeville stars like Theresa gave performances in the homes of the old nobility. Yet on the whole, and even in Paris, these conservative elements represented at least some traditions of dignity and honour. In the provinces they had kept purer: Veillot's correspondence affords us an occasional glimpse of an honest, narrow, delightful world of simple-hearted village priests and

country squires, fond of an innocent pun, a good song, and a little, not brilliantly clever, but sound to the core. But these great conservative forces either kept aloof from the Empire or supported it blindly, without exerting any social influence of national importance.

Napoleon III lacked the support of another great moral power: that of the earnest democrats, either exiled or held in suspicion for their loyalty to a noble ideal. Hugo, Quinet, Barras, seemed the incarnation of Right and Justice persecuted by tyranny. As a matter of fact, France was freely opened to them after 1859, and the "tyranny" was but the expression of the national will. Yet the irreconcilable opposition of these men was for the regime a constant source of moral weakness.

The room which was thus left empty was hastily filled by a few deserving men and many questionable characters. The Imperial Court itself was brilliant rather than select. Napoleon III, a prince every inch of him, but spoilt by an adventurous career, bound to early companions and accomplices, and with a slightly blurred sense of the sanctity of his marriage vows, was not able to give his Court a high moral tone. The Empress, for all her piety and haughtiness, for all her real strength and dignity, was capricious, and often gave herself the airs of an irresponsible woman of fashion. Both were, in a different sense, "parvenus" and cosmopolitans. Imperial Paris was full of "distinguished" foreign visitors, diplomatists, refugees, pleasure-seekers, among whom not a few were "rastaquouères." The representatives of the oldest and most dignified Courts did not always set the best example: the Princess of Metternich was noted for her passion for social amusements. The form of entertainment which remained typical of the period was the fancy-dress ball, so favourable to loud taste, lavish display, and excessive freedom of speech and manners. Amid the gaudy splendours of the new regime, one would sometimes regret the bourgeois Court of Louis-Philippe, whither, history gravely reports, haberdashers and their spouses would repair in an omnibus.

Below this brilliant set, to whose follies title, office, or wit still lent some distinction, others were found, less gracefully

cynical, more heavily frivolous—the newest rich, bankers, contractors, manufacturers, the men who had helped reconstruct Paris, complete the network of railroads, finance all the great undertakings. That was a mixed class, in which ranked foreign Jews, bourgeois of good old stock, peasants come to the metropolis “in their wooden shoes.” Much lower, adventurers, bohemians, gamblers and jobbers of all kinds, d’Estrigauds and Giboyers; in the lowest depths, yet loud, patent, assertive, a perpetual world’s fair, a professional carnival for the chance visitor, the virtuous country cousin, the foreigner anxious to denounce, after experience, the vices of the modern Babylon. These circles existed, and still exist, in all modern capitals; but in Imperial Paris they shaded off into one another in subtle and unexpected ways. All were whirling in a feverish round of pleasure, ever more rapid, dizzier, more maddening, aptly described by Meilhac and Halévy in *La Vie Parisienne*, and symbolized by Carpeaux’s wonderful group before the Opéra: dancing Bacchants, drunk with music and motion, and, in the centre, the mysterious, haunting figure of a Genius, tense, Mephistophelian, yet with the wistfulness of higher things.

The hero of this society was “l’homme fort,” the strong man—a sceptical, heartless, and unscrupulous man of pleasure and business. De Morny, Napoleon’s illegitimate half-brother, was the ideal “homme fort.” Cool, elegant, superior; a Don Juan who gambled on the stock market and held all political wires in his hand; a wit, an epicure, a leader of fashion, who affected to treat a matter of State in a careless, disdainful manner and to concentrate his mind on a farce, a menu, or a cravat, he was one of the worst and one of the most fascinating men in the century. Sane, liberal, tactful, courteous when he chose, he made an admirable President of the Legislative Body; at the same time, cruel in cold blood, he was probably responsible for the worst features of the coup d’état; corrupt to the core, he sold his influence to Jecker for a few millions, and thus got his country entangled in the senseless and ruinous Mexican war. Luckier than more deserving men, he died in the heyday of the regime he had founded, served, and dishonoured. His life was like his birth—splendid, but with

bar sinister.* In literature, we have a number of "hommes forts." The two extreme types are perhaps Monsieur de Lamors, slightly idealized, who retains not only tact and taste, but a sense of honour, and a heart open to a great passion, and d'Estrigaud, one of the deepest-dyed villains that ever graced the French stage.

4. CULTURE.

The Second Republic after June, 1848, and the Second Empire from beginning to end, form a period of reaction, characterized by pessimism and materialism. The Government rested on brutal force—either the sheer might of bayonets, or the no less unreasoning power of the masses, directly represented by one man and drowning the voice of the élite. It was neither democracy nor monarchy by divine right, but an empirical hybrid, meant to restore and preserve material order. The world of production was industrialized; the working man lost his individuality; the personal relations, the almost familial bonds, the sense of responsibility and loyalty between employer and employee were vanishing; fast disappearing also was the old spirit of the good craftsman, who was not a machine or the servant of a machine, but an artisan, almost an artist, proud of his traditions, of his tools, of his skill. The power of the Church was greater than ever, but it was as a bulwark of reaction. Spurious miracles, degrading superstitions, the crushing out of every velleity of liberalism, the scurrilous tone of the Catholic Press, the dictatorship of a powerful but vulgar journalist, Veuillot, war declared on modern civilization by the Syllabus, Papal Infallibility proclaimed by the Council of the Vatican—these were so many signs of the hardening, materializing, coarsening influences at work within Catholicism. In art reigned realism, and Flaubert's novels, with their minute notation of sordid details, are typical of the prevailing state of mind; in science, the experimental method; in philosophy, positivism, not even the positivism of Comte, in which mystic elements were not lacking, but the unvarnished materialistic agnosticism of Littré.

* Cf. Frédéric Loliée, *Le Duc de Moray*; Alphonse Daudet, *Le Nabab* (Daudet had been one of the Duke's under-secretaries).

This reaction was due, first of all, to the apparent failure of idealism in all its forms. For eighteen years the political principles so ably defended by the austere doctrinaire Guizot, and the natural religion of the eloquent eclecticist Cousin, had been used as a mask by a small and selfish class, whose hypocrisy France had long found out. No wonder the French shrugged their shoulders when "liberty" or "the true, the beautiful, and the good" * were mentioned. The religious exaltation of the Saint-Simonians and the liberal Catholics had led to nothing. Romanticism in literature had grown tiresome before 1848; romanticism in politics, or utopian socialism, had come to a tragic end in June, 1848. Doctrines and principles, as well as flights of fancy or gushes of emotion, had all proved deceptive. So the cry was for "facts, facts, facts," as the only true guides. At any rate, this materialistic age, except in the case of the shallowest of its representatives like About, did not fall into the damning sin of self-satisfaction. It preserved in its positivism the haunting regret of vanished dreams: hence the melancholy or despair of all thinkers and poets—of Flaubert, Leconte de Lisle, Madame Ackermann, Amiel, Taine. It is the second "mal du siècle," less vague, less sentimental, and deeper than the first.

With this disenchantment of the French mind coincided a sudden expansion of material activity, due to the creation of railroads, popular banking, large public works, and all the economic instruments of the modern world. On account of this coincidence, material progress was often made responsible for the harsh and cynical tone of the time. This is only partly true. The arraignment of locomotives as agents of demoralization and vulgarization is sheer nonsense. Were men guided by a living faith, they would bless the locomotive as a good and faithful servant. It was not prosperity that bred scepticism and cynicism; it was pre-existing disenchantment that checked or darkened the joy men would naturally have felt in material progress. The time of the Reformation was also one of economic expansion, and Ulrich von Hütten cried: "O tem-

* Title of Cousin's famous book, a popular epitome of the philosophy he had been preaching for thirty years.

pora! O seculum! es ist eine Lust zu leben!" The same holds true of science. Darwinism did not make the world meaner or sadder; the world, morally depressed by other causes, interpreted Darwinism in terms of its own pessimism.

All this, however, is but the dark side of the picture. Industrialism, fostered by the Imperial Government, increased the material comfort of the working classes and led to a wider diffusion of education. There was much that was harsh and gloomy in realistic art and literature; yet we must remember that the greatest names in 1860 are hardly less famous than those of the glorious generation of 1830. In art we have the great sculptor, Carpeaux; admirable landscape painters, Théodore Rousseau, Daubigny, Dupré; Courbet and Manet, the most typically naturalistic; and the two extremes, Corot, so full of poetic grace, Millet, with his quiet and almost tragic simplicity.* Lefuel and Visconti were not unequal to the task of completing the Louvre, and Charles Garnier's Grand Opéra has been imitated all over the world. In literature, besides the great survivors of romanticism, Hugo, Michelet, George Sand, Dumas père, Gautier, de Vigny, we have Flaubert, Leconte de Lisle, Augier, Dumas fils, Baudelaire, Banville, Veillot, the Goncourts, Meilhac and Halévy, a list of which any time or nation would be proud. Criticism, and history based on criticism rather than on imaginative sympathy, were perhaps the most typical products of the realistic age; then it was that Sainte-Beuve completed his *Port-Royal* and wrote his *Monday Talks*, Taine his *Essays* and his *English Literature*, Renan his *Studies* and the first volumes of his *Origins of Christianity*.

But science was the chief glory of the time. There had been periods when France could boast as many glorious names in the scientific field; the first quarter of the century, in this respect was fully equal to the third. But under Napoleon I science was merely one of the branches of human activity, co-ordinate with others—literature, philosophy, religion. Under Napoleon III the absolute supremacy of science was evident. Literature

* Beside a host of other artists, Cabanel, Paul Baudry, Ribot, Fromentin, Troyon, Henri Régnault, etc.

with Flaubert, criticism with Sainte-Beuve, philosophy with Comte, Littré, Taine, religion with Renan, bowed before the scientific spirit.

This scientific spirit was no longer the same as during the eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth. Its ideal was no longer mathematical, mechanical, or static, but organic and dynamic. The notion of absolute and simple laws, analogous to geometrical axioms, and from which consequences could be deduced by a logical process, had been supplemented by the idea of adaptation and growth—in a word, of evolution. This idea was not introduced by Darwin; the inception and success of Darwinism on the contrary were a sign of the times. The fearless criticism of the eighteenth century, the commotions of the Revolutionary Age, the philosophical efforts of Kant and Hegel, had shaken the faith of men in the old absolute authorities. Universal relativism, the constant flux of phenomena, the “category of becoming” were substituted for eternal stability, the “category of being.” In the words of Renan, the *study* of any subject became the *history* of that subject. Now the historical spirit was the chief contribution of the Romantic Age to culture. Childish though it might seem to the following generation, the love of Hugo and Dumas for vanished civilizations and local colouring was an early striving towards the doctrine of evolution.

The chief difference between the Romantic spirit and the scientific spirit of 1850 is one of method. Romanticism was essentially subjective. Positivism studies the facts of nature objectively. Sainte-Beuve, Taine, and later Zola, pretended to be “naturalists,” “physiologists.” Observations, and, whenever possible, experimentation, are the main avenues to knowledge. Leverrier’s mathematical discovery of Neptune in 1846 was, in popular imagination, the last and most brilliant achievement of abstract science, based on logic and mathematics; the new type of scientists are men like Claude Bernard, the physiologist, Berthelot, and especially Pasteur, the chemists, who are indefatigable laboratory workers.

Public opinion, in France and abroad, has not yet learned to judge the Empire fairly. After eighteen years of insolent

prosperity, it ended in disaster: *Væ victis!* But it would be slander on human nature to maintain that a great nation was raped, bribed, or cowed into submission, for eighteen years, an utterly worthless regime. The Second Empire had its moments of genuine usefulness and legitimate splendour.

If we want to see it at the zenith of its power, we should consider it in the years 1855-56, blindly supported at home, triumphant abroad, still in the freshness of its hopes and enthusiasm, strengthened by the success of the Exposition and the birth of the Prince Imperial. In 1860 the picture is even more brilliant; a second victorious war, more popular than the first, and led by the Emperor himself; new provinces added to France; the working classes almost reconciled; a general amnesty extended to political offenders. But there was one dark side to this picture: the Roman imbroglio. In 1867 we have a mixture of splendour and misery which struck even the contemporaries and remains typical of the whole period. The reconstruction of Paris, in its main lines, was completed; the Exposition, admirably planned by Le Play, was a great success. Princes, kings, emperors, entertained three and five at a time, seemed to pay their court to their overlord. Wealth and strength were manifest everywhere. Yet there was gloom in all that magnificence, as in a golden autumnal landscape. The Emperor prematurely old and sick; abroad, Sadowa, Luxembourg, Queretaro, a series of rebuffs and disasters; at home, the growing alienation of the Catholics, the irreconcilable and threatening attitude of the new generation. The new Paris was fine, but its creator, Haussmann, would soon have to be sacrificed for confessed extravagance and suspected peculation; the Exposition showed immense industrial development, but it was surrounded with pleasure resorts which made material progress seem futile or even dangerous. Everywhere a sense of uneasy satiety, of restless torpor, of undefinable dread. Hello, the prophet, wondered that the Tuileries were not yet ablaze and that the Barbarians should so long delay their coming. The splendours of 1867 are still unforgotten, but to thoughtful contemporaries they seemed entrancing and oppressive, like some gorgeous and feverish dream.

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CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

IV. SECOND REPUBLIC AND SECOND EMPIRE, 1848-70.

- 1848 February 22-24. The Revolution of February. Second Republic.
Provisional Government (Lamartine).
May 4. Constituent Assembly.
June 23-26. The Days of June. Cavaignac Dictator.
November. Constitution promulgated.
December 10. Louis-Napoleon elected President (proclaimed December 20).
- 1849 April to August. Roman Expedition. Reaction in France.
May. Legislative Assembly (Conservative).
- 1851 December 2. Coup d'État.
December 20. Coup d'État confirmed by Plebiscite.
- 1852 December 2. Napoleon III, Emperor of the French.
- 1853 Marries Eugénie de Montijo y Teba.
- 1854-56 Crimean War. Siege of Sebastopol. Treaty of Paris.
- 1855 Exposition.
- 1856 Birth of the Prince Imperial.
- 1858 Attempt of Orsini on the life of the Emperor. Napoleon and Cavour prepare the—
- 1859 War against Austria. (Magenta. Solferino. Peace of Villafranca.)
- 1860 Nice and Savoy joined to France.
- 1860-64 Liberal Evolution of the Empire.
- 1861-67 Mexican Expedition.
- 1867 Exposition.
Luxembourg Question. Queretaro.
- 1869 Constitutional Evolution. General Elections.
- 1870 January 2. Liberal Ministry (Emilie Ollivier).
May 8. Constitutional Reforms ratified by Plebiscite.
July 15. Declaration of Franco-Prussian War.
September 1. Battle of Sedan.
September 4. Fall of the Empire.
- [1873 January 9. Death of Napoleon III.]

CHAPTER V

THE THIRD REPUBLIC, 1870—1913

§ 1. THE "TERRIBLE YEAR," 1870-71.

§ 1. *The Terrible Year, 1870-71*—Causes of the Franco-German War—The principle of nationalities—The policy of compensations or "tips"—Responsibility of the whole nation in the declaration, preparation, and conduct of the war—Sedan—Fall of the Empire.

Government of National Defence—Trochu—Gambetta—Fall of Paris—Peace—National Assembly.

The Commune: causes, character, evolution—Repression—Influence.

§ 2. *Recuperation. Foundation of the Republic. Conquest of the Republic by the Republicans.*—Financial recuperation: Thiers and the liberation of the territory—Public works—Military and diplomatic recovery—1878: the Exposition and the Berlin Congress; France resumes her position.

Constitutional reconstruction: monarchical majority, but divided—MacMahon—Legitimist Pretender refuses to compromise—Constitution of 1875: provisional and "omnibus."

The crisis of the 16th of May, 1877—Failure of the Conservatives—Resignation of MacMahon—Conquest of the Republic by the Republicans.

WE do not believe in the fatalistic delusion of "inevitable wars," but we must confess that no conflict was ever more difficult to avert than that between France and Prussia. "From the day of Sadowa the two nations were like two locomotives rushing towards each other on a single track." All parties in France and all generations, the old monarchy, the Republic, the Empire, held that the Rhine, the north-eastern boundary of ancient Gaul, should by right be that of France. This vague dream of centuries had become a reality from 1795 to 1814. In the minds of the French the annexation of the Rhine provinces was not an ordinary conquest nor even the resumption of a lost

domain, but the free reunion of brothers: for the France of 1795 meant, ideally, liberty, equality, and fraternity. It must be said that the local population did not offer any resistance, and that for twenty years the Republic and the Empire had no more loyal citizens and no more devoted soldiers than the Rhinelanders. Hypnotized by the memories of that period, democrats, humanitarians, pacifists like Hugo and Quinet, still cherished the belief that France would some day tear up the hateful treaties of Vienna and reconquer her "natural frontiers."

Germany, on the other hand, after a long eclipse and a whole century of upward efforts, had at last grown to the full consciousness of her national unity. She would not any longer be the favourite battlefield of all the princes in Europe; she would not allow any more part of Deutschtum to be distracted from the common fatherland; nay, turning her eyes back to the time of her glory, before the century of religious wars, she wanted her lost provinces to return to the ancestral home: and by this Alsace was meant. The Münster of Strasbourg was a national heirloom, the loss of which in 1681 was deeply felt even by the disunited, oppressed, and decadent Germany of that time.

Thus the ambitions of France and those of Germany were in conflict. It would have taken patience rather than cunning and generous sympathy rather than force to compose these differences and allay these inveterate suspicions. The two countries, forgetting mediæval dreams and obsolete traditions, should have realized that within the last hundred years the debatable borderlands between them had become culturally assimilated to their respective masters. The Rhine provinces, indifferent to German unity in 1815 and in closer sympathy with Paris than with Berlin, had become as patriotic as any part of the Confederacy.* Alsace had preserved her Teutonic vernacular, but she had gone through the new birth of the Revolution with the rest of France and was now French to the core.

Napoleon III might have been the instrument of this difficult reconciliation: it was in harmony with his sentiments and his principles. He hated war: war was contrary to his Saint-

* Cf. an admirable presentation of this development in Clara Viebig's novel, *Wacht am Rhein*.

Simonian ideal of industrial productivity and abhorrent to his heart, whose kindness no qualified witness has ever challenged. He was sincere when he proclaimed in October, 1852: "The Empire means peace." The horrible spectacle of the battlefield of Solferino was one of the causes that led him to end the Italian campaign in such an abrupt and unsatisfactory manner. His foreign policy was based on the principle of nationalities: all ethnic or historical groups which wanted to live free and united under their own flag should be allowed to do so after expressing their desire through plebiscites: a wise and generous conception, which is irresistibly coming into its own, in spite of the jeers of fledgeling Machiavellis and would-be Metternichs. In this respect Napoleon III will some day be honoured as a precursor.

Unfortunately, he was not understood, and he was not even free to act. The irony of fate had made that humanitarian utopist, that "man of '48," the heir of a despotic military tradition and the captive leader of the conservatives. An upstart sovereign, he was bound to be constantly and brilliantly successful or lose his power as suddenly as he had conquered it. Now, France, whose unity had long been completed, had nothing to gain by the principle of nationalities and was bound to lose in relative importance if Italy and Germany became powerful national units. Napoleon could not further his dreams of a new Europe based on justice and peace without apparent disloyalty to his own country. This inner conflict, the hesitancy and haziness of purpose peculiar to the Imperial Hamlet, the underground methods inured in him by twenty years of constant plotting, made his policy an inextricable puzzle, which satisfied no one and threatened everybody. He was driven by the pressure of public opinion to stipulate for what Bismarck bluntly called "tips": Nice and Savoy were the price of his aid to Italy; Mainz, Luxembourg, Belgium were to be the price of his friendly neutrality in German affairs. Disinterestedness is rare among nations: the French are still reproaching their best and their worst kings, Louis IX and Louis XV, for having made peace "like kings, not like merchants." * Bismarck was,

* In this same spirit the United States liberated Cuba and pocketed Porto-Rico as a fee. What is Cyprus but a "tip"?

course, unwilling to yield "a single inch of German soil." In 1866 he secured Napoleon's indispensable neutrality by vague promises: Sadowa enabled him to deny France any compensation. In 1867 he thwarted Napoleon's designs on Luxembourg. He believed that France would not renounce her claims to the left bank of the Rhine without a war. This war he prepared with admirable efficiency, and at the favourable moment he arranged a trap in which Napoleon was caught.

But not Napoleon alone: it is customary with Republican actors and the authors of official text-books to lay the whole responsibility on the Emperor. This is absolutely contrary to facts. The Empire in 1870 was a constitutional monarchy, not essentially different from that of England. A Liberal Ministry led by a former Republican, a Chamber of Deputies elected by universal suffrage and comprising a numerous opposition, were swept off their feet by the wave of popular chauvinism. The newspapers were unanimously and bitterly in favour of war. The Parisian mob thronged the boulevards shouting "To Berlin!" Even at the height of his power Napoleon would have found it no easy task to resist such an explosion of public sentiment. It would have required the old dictatorial methods, the gagging of Parliament, the muzzling of the Press, and the strict enforcement of order in the street. That the country as a whole, more stolid than Paris, was averse to war; that, on the other hand, the reactionary clique of the Empress exerted its influence in favour of it, may be taken for granted. But the fact remains that the responsibility for the whole piece of criminal folly on the French side rests with the Government, Parliament, the journalists, the populace—all the official or self-appointed spokesmen of national opinion.

Lebœuf had boasted: "We are ready, more than ready. There is not a gaiter-button missing." Nothing was ready. The army was in a deplorable state. Favouritism and corruption were undoubtedly rife. The Mexican expedition had drained the resources of the French arsenals. The dashing, erratic warfare against Algerian tribesmen had been for thirty years a school of bravery—and carelessness. An officer, asked if he was provided with a good map of the frontier, half drew his

sword: "Maps! Here is *my* map!" These lion-hearted and light-headed knights had to face the formidable fighting machine scientifically constructed by Moltke and Roon. Here again France and not the Government alone was responsible. The warnings of Colonel Stoffel, the French military *attaché* at Berlin, were not wholly unheeded. Marshal Niel had attempted to reorganize the military system of France.* But the democrats, guided by generous pacific principles and also by their hatred and diffidence of the Empire, opposed his efforts. The middle classes did not want any conscription law that would curtail their privilege of buying their sons off. France had a regular army smaller than that of the allied German States and no trained reserves.

Even with these elements a great military leader could have staved off a crushing disaster. No such leader was found. MacMahon was an honest man and a brave soldier, but devoid of genius. Bazaine, the favourite of the opposition, was cunning rather than skilful, and ever thinking of his own political interests. Trochu was an eloquent theorist whom the Empire distrusted, not without cause: for he showed neither political steadiness nor resourcefulness in an unheard-of crisis. In order to quell the rivalry of his generals the Emperor, sick, enfeebled in mind and body, and even at his best the reverse of a military genius, assumed personal command. Aimless marches and counter-marches led the main French army from the frontier to Châlons and from Châlons to Sedan. These chaotic movements were due to political as well as to strategic considerations. It was the fear of the Republican opposition which prevented a concentration of all available forces under Paris. Heavy is the responsibility of the men who, in the throes of a great war, did not forget their party grievances and paralysed the national Government.

The Emperor had abdicated all control: he followed passively his demoralized troops. At Sedan three generals in succession, MacMahon, Ducrot, de Wimpfen, tried to escape from the iron

* Cf. his famous words, often repeated in 1913: "You are afraid of turning the country into a camp: take care you do not turn it into a cemetery."

circle that the Germans were closing round them. When all hope was lost Napoleon sought death, which spurned him. His last act of authority was to stop the useless slaughter, and he surrendered his sword to the King of Prussia.

Hardly had the news of the capitulation of Sedan reached the capital than the doom of the regime was sealed. The Revolution of the 4th of September, 1870, breaking out at the most tragic moment in the nation's destiny, would be a great crime if any party were responsible for it. As a matter of fact, neither Gambetta nor the other Republican leaders were at all anxious to see the government of their dreams inaugurated under such inauspicious circumstances. It was the mob that invaded the Assembly; the Imperialists had lost heart and did not attempt to resist. Paris was so elated at the downfall of the regime that it seemed to forget the national disaster of Sedan. The boulevards were as cheerful as if the Prussians were not within a hundred miles of the gates. The provinces, overwhelmingly Bonapartist a few months before, were too much used to a passive attitude and too much stunned by the sudden turn of events to organize any formal protest. No change of regime was ever so easy and, in appearance, so spontaneous. As in 1830 and 1848, a compromise was arrived at between the two strategic centres of the Revolution, the Palais Bourbon and the Town Hall. Although the Republic was officially proclaimed it was not organized. The Government was merely one of "National Defence," with General Trochu as its nominal head.

France made magnificent efforts. But fate was against her. Marshal Bazaine, whose duplicity and selfishness verged dangerously upon treason, surrendered in Metz, the "virgin citadel," with the second regular army, the country's last hope. Trochu proved unequal to the task of drilling into an efficient fighting force the vast mob of raw recruits, "mobiles," and national guards congregated in Paris. Persuaded that no effort would avail, he resisted passively, half-heartedly, throwing delusive hints about a mysterious "plan" of his, which never materialized. When the supplies were exhausted, the heroic city had to succumb in its turn. Meanwhile, three improvised armies, one in the North under Faidherbe, one on the Loire under Chanzy, one in the East

under Bourbaki, ill-clad, untrained, lacking guns and ammunition, resisted the victorious Germans much more stubbornly than the veterans of the Empire had done. Belfort, under Denfert-Rochereau, was still holding out. But the country as a whole despaired of retrieving its fortune. An armistice was negotiated, the terms of peace were confirmed by a National Assembly elected in February, and the final treaty, signed at Frankfort, gave up to Germany Alsace, one-third of Lorraine, and a war indemnity of 5,000,000,000 francs.

On the 4th of September, the Parisians had been decoyed by the legend of 1792. At that time, the Prussians had invaded Champagne; the regular army was disorganized by the desertion of its noble officers; a corrupt monarchy was swept away on the 10th of August: six weeks later, the advance of the enemy was checked at Valmy, and France was saved. The same miracle was confidently expected. But it did not take place. Not that Gambetta was inferior to Danton, Chanzy and Faidherbe to Dumouriez and Kellermann, the mobiles and sharp-shooters of 1870 to the volunteers of 1792. But circumstances were different. The progress of military science throughout the century had made the difference between trained and improvised troops more telling. Then, if the Prussians retreated after a slight repulse in September, 1792, it was chiefly because the impending partition of Poland drew much of their attention. The doom of that unfortunate country gave France some breathing time. Finally, the spirit of the bourgeoisie and peasantry was no longer the same. There was no degeneration: but in 1792 the French were fighting for their new regime, for the precious conquests of their Revolution, for liberty and equality. In 1870 they refused to stake their all for the continuation of a desperate war, the result of which was to affect their national entity in a certain degree, but not their daily lives. France was ever rich in heroes: but there never was a whole nation of Don Quixotes.

The elections sent to the Assembly a conservative and monarchical majority. The Republic was emphatically disowned at the polls. The country that had so recently endorsed the Empire had not veered suddenly to the opposite pole, radicalism. It resented Paris's pretensions of changing every few years the form

of government without consulting the provinces. Moreover, the triumph of Gambetta's friends would have meant the continuation of the war.

Then broke out the most terrible insurrection of modern times, the Commune. In spite of an inveterate tradition to that effect, neither the name nor the origin of the Commune had anything to do with socialism. The name was borrowed from the great municipal assembly which, under the first Revolution, had long imposed its law upon the Convention itself. It meant "communal" or municipal autonomy, the refusal of Paris to be governed by the reactionary provinces. Its causes were patriotic, economic, and local. Paris had just gone through a long siege without being able to save the country. A dull and not unjustifiable feeling prevailed that there had been incompetence, if not actual treason, on the part of mediocre and disheartened leaders. Paris received no thanks for its heroic resistance; it was not spared the triumphal entry of the German troops. The conservative Assembly at Bordeaux took away its title of French capital, and gave it, not to Bourges or Tours, which might have been justified for strategic reasons, but to Versailles, the city of Louis XIV, the symbol of the ancient regime. It was a deliberate insult. Debts and rents, long suspended, were made immediately exigible. The scanty pay of the National Guards, which alone kept many of them from starvation, was suddenly stopped. It seemed as though Thiers and his partisans wanted to humiliate and to vex in every way the noble city which had long thought her destiny identical with that of France.

The insurrection of the 18th of March, made in defence of the Republic, was no more unjustifiable than that of the 4th of September. The Second Empire, confirmed by three plebiscites, was as legitimate a government as that of M. Thiers. In the minds of exalted patriots, the capitulation of Sedan and the acceptance of a shameful peace deserved to be visited with the same penalty. The first elections of the Commune showed that the Parisians were fairly unanimous in their support of the new regime, which, considering the circumstances, was then curiously moderate.

M. Thiers made no effort to come to an understanding with

Paris. He at once withdrew to Versailles, gathered an army with the assistance of the Prussians, and proceeded to reduce the insurrection by force. He refused to recognize the insurgents as belligerents, whilst Lincoln had granted that privilege to the Southern rebels. Captured Communards could be summarily shot. It is in answer to this savage procedure that the Commune seized hostages, pure and venerable victims for whose deaths Thiers's obstinacy and ruthlessness is mainly responsible. The rule of the Commune, until the last week, was free from theft and violence.

However, when the insurrection had become a civil war, when it was known that the uprisings of the other great cities had been suppressed, and that Thiers had the situation well in hand, the Commune lost the support of the moderate elements and became the prey of professional revolutionists, some of them disreputable bohemians, others dangerous fanatics, many foreign refugees, the scum of a cosmopolitan city. Even then the policy of the Commune was democratic rather than socialistic. The act generally considered most typical and most reprehensible of those two months, the felling of the Vendôme column on a dung-heap, had been prepared by the anti-Napoleonic campaigns of the bourgeois Liberals.

Finally the Commune was conquered, in a week of horror, the "bloody week," the very name of which still causes every Parisian to shudder. The Communards at bay carried out the threats of universal conflagration which have always haunted the conquered and downtrodden. The lieutenants of MacMahon replied by shooting seventeen thousand men in cold blood, after the fight was won. Forty-five thousand people were arrested, herded in the camp of Satory, cooped up in old hulks for weary months. Eight thousand five hundred were sentenced by drum-head tribunals, as illegal as the Provosts' Courts of 1816 or the Mixed Commissions of 1852, shot, imprisoned, transported. . . . The Terror of 1794 was mild compared with the repression of the Commune. Thiers could boast that he had "bled democracy for a generation." * The apocalyptic horror of the "bloody week"

* The fact that the buildings burnt by the Commune were chiefly those in which the financial and administrative records of the Empire were kept

made a profound impression on the French mind. A furious wave of reaction, worse than after June, 1848, and December, 1851, swept over the country, and upset the mental balance of sane and progressive men like Taine and Renan. International socialism was denounced as the cause of the upheaval, and socialism did not deny the accusation; * almost all the victims were proletarians, and the Commune ended undoubtedly as a class struggle. This stream of blood still lies between French capital and labour, perpetuating hatred. It cannot be denied that Thiers's ruthlessness was efficient in exorcising from French political life that irresponsible Caliban, the Paris mob, which, ten times in a century, had imposed its brutal dictatorship. Would God this great boon had not been purchased at such a heavy price!

2. RECUPERATION. FOUNDATION OF THE REPUBLIC. CONQUEST OF THE REPUBLIC BY THE REPUBLICANS.

After ten months of foreign and civil war, France was covered with ruins. She set herself at once to the double task of repairing the havoc wrought by the "terrible year," and of establishing a permanent form of government.

The war indemnity was paid off with a rapidity which astonished and disappointed Bismarck. He had hoped that France would be financially crippled for a generation, and lo! 42,000,000,000 francs were offered in July, 1872, when Thiers asked for 5,000,000,000. The German troops which were to occupy certain parts of France until the final settlement withdrew on

Tuilleries, Cour des Comptes, Prefecture of Police, Ministry of Finances) have rise to the suspicion that the incendiaries had been the tools of financiers and politicians interested in the suppression of damning evidence. But there is no other proof than the old maxim: *Id fecit qui prodest*.

If this account of the Commune should seem biased to the English reader, he may find its main points confirmed in the works of such patriotic and conservative writers as Paul and Victor Margueritte or Gabriel Hanotaux. The day is fortunately over when it was not safe, even for Victor Hugo, to breathe a word of sympathy and pity for the Communards.

* On January 17, 1913, when Vaillant, the Socialist candidate for the Presidency of the Republic, received 70 votes, the result was hailed by his friends with cries of "Vive la Commune!"

September 20, 1873. Thiers conducted these financial and diplomatic operations with undoubted skill and success. Yet Gambetta must have been moved by the desire of winning over the veteran statesman to his own side when he proclaimed him, with an eloquent gesture, "the liberator of our territory." Even M. Hanotaux, a great admirer of Thiers, admits that France could have borrowed money on much more favourable terms if the President of the Republic had exercised a little more care.

By a curious paradox of finance, the sudden afflux of wealth into Germany brought about a serious crisis, whilst the drain on the resources of France was not immediately felt.* Railroads, bridges, public and private buildings had to be rehabilitated; a chain of fortresses had to be erected along the gaping Eastern frontier; military stores had to be replenished. Commerce and industry boomed as in the best years of the Second Empire. In 1878 an International Exposition was held in Paris, and although it lacked the somewhat meretricious splendour of 1867, it was a magnificent evidence of France's prosperity. Meanwhile, the army had been reorganized by the vote of conscription with a five-year term of service (1872). A new onslaught on France, which Bismarck was meditating in 1875, was averted by the friendly intervention of England and Russia, and by the time of the Berlin Congress (1878), France had resumed her rank as one of the Great Powers in diplomacy and in military strength. This rapid recovery of the country was not the work of any party. It proved, for one thing, that the Empire had accumulated vast material resources without sapping the moral vitality of the people. The men in power from 1871 to 1878 were the conservatives. But to the Republicans belongs the credit of having intelligently and unselfishly supported the Government whenever the welfare of the fatherland was at stake.

If we turn to the second aspect of this period, constitutional reorganization, we find on the contrary naught but party squabbles, intrigues, compromise, and as a result so unsatisfactory that the development of France has been hampered by it ever since. We have seen that the monarchists were in control of the National Assembly, and why. But, elected on the question

* Norman Angell, *The Great Illusion*.

of peace or war, it is doubtful whether they had a genuine and permanent majority in the country. Moreover, they were divided among themselves. The Liberal bourgeoisie supported the claims of the Count of Paris, grandson of Louis-Philippe—the representative of constitutional monarchy, the principles of 1789, and the tricolour flag. The great landowners, the old nobility—returned in unexpected numbers, on account of their personal prominence at a time when the political world was disorganized—championed the cause of the Count of Chambord, grandson of Charles X, the representative of monarchy “by divine right” and the white flag of the ancient regime. Thiers, supposed to be an Orleanist, promised to remain neutral between the different parties. But he was not radically averse to a Republic, now that he was at the helm, provided it be a “conservative republic,” a republic without the Republicans. The monarchists realized that his game was no longer theirs, and, in spite of his services, they trapped him into resigning (May 24, 1873). Marshal de MacMahon was elected in his place; that worthy soldier was a passive tool in the hands of reactionary politicians. Messrs. de Broglie and Fourtou called their compressive policy the “restoration of moral order.” It seemed as though nothing stood in the way of a return to monarchy. Bonapartism had not yet recovered from the crushing blow of Sedan, nor democracy from its supposed connection with the Commune. A fusion of the two royalist parties was arranged. The Count of Paris went to Frohsdorf to recognize the Count of Chambord as the legitimate head of his family and the sole claimant to the throne. The future Henry V, who was childless, was to adopt the Count of Paris as his successor. The negotiations failed on a question of colour. The legitimist pretender refused to give up the white flag of his house. He would not be the “legitimate king of the Revolution.” The tricolour would have made him the successor, not of Charles X, but of Louis-Philippe. The liberal Royalists, and MacMahon himself, knew too well the temper of the French people to consider for a moment the restoration of the old regime, with its hated symbol, as possible. But the Orleanists alone were not able to enthrone their candidate, who, moreover, had just renounced his immediate

claims, against a coalition of Legitimists, Bonapartists, and Republicans. The situation had come to a deadlock. The only thing to do was to prolong the power of MacMahon for seven years, hoping that within that term Providence would remove the obstacles. As the country could not remain without an organization, as the Bonapartists were gathering strength, a sort of neutral or "omnibus" Constitution was voted, suitable for any eventuality. It was of the orthodox parliamentary type, with a responsible Cabinet, a Senate, and a Chamber of Deputies, the latter elected by direct universal suffrage. It was agreed, by a plurality of a single vote, that the head of the State should be called President of the Republic.* But he was in every respect a constitutional monarch, non-partisan, dignified and irresponsible.

OUTLINES OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 1875.—*The President of the Republic* is elected for seven years by the two Houses of Parliament meeting together (at Versailles) in "Congress." He is irresponsible. He can be re-elected (Grévy was in 1886). He appoints Ministers and can dissolve the Chamber of Deputies, but only with the concurrence of the Senate (MacMahon did in 1877).

The *Deputies* are elected for four years by manhood (wrongly called universal) suffrage, each in a separate constituency (circonscription: this is the scrutin uninominal or scrutin d'arrondissement). From 1885 to 1889 lists or tickets, instead of individual candidates, were balloted for in the larger district known as département (scrutin de liste). A majority of the registered voters is required to elect on the first ballot; a mere plurality is sufficient on the second ballot (scrutin de ballottage).

The *Senate* is composed of three hundred members, elected for nine years, and renewable by thirds every three years. They are elected in each department by a special college composed of the deputies and general councillors of the department, the district councillors (conseillers d'arrondissement) and delegates from the municipal councils. Both Houses have exactly the same rights and privileges. As a matter of Parliamentary practice the Budget is submitted first to the Chamber, which also has a practical monopoly of overthrowing Ministries (except the Bourgeois Cabinet in 1896 and the Briand Cabinet in 1913, defeated in the Senate).

The *Cabinet*, or Ministry, or Council of Ministers is composed of twelve Ministers (at present) and a varying number of Under-Secretaries of State (from two to five). They are appointed by the President, but responsible chiefly to the Chamber of Deputies. Any Member of Parliament can "interpellate" (question) any Minister, upon which a vote is taken, and a Cabinet defeated in an important division is immediately expected to resign. A change of Ministries is not followed as in England by a Gen-

*Wallon amendment. The final draft of the Constitution was passed by 508 votes to 174.

Electoral Election, and party ties are looser, so there is no check on the destructive propensities of the individual members. It may be said that the Ministry is merely a joint committee of the two Houses, revokable at will. In other words, the Executive is absolutely subordinated to the Legislature.

The *Prime Minister* assumes control of the most important department at the time. This is generally, but not invariably, the Department of the Interior. Except the Ministers of War and Naval Secretaries, who have frequently been generals and admirals, practically every Minister of the Third Republic was a Member of Parliament.

This Constitution of 1875, with unimportant changes, endures to the present day, and there is no important movement afoot for its revision.* It has preserved France from adventures, and must therefore be considered a successful compromise. Its great fault, the impotence of the nominal head of the State, is not inherent in its principle, but is the result of a crisis, which we are now going to relate.

The general elections gave a popular majority to the Republicans, under the joint leadership of two widely different men, Thiers and Gambetta. The conservatives, who still controlled the Presidency, and, by a narrow margin, the Senate, did not want to lose their hold of France without a fight. They prevailed upon Marshal MacMahon to dismiss his Republican Premier, Jules Simon (May 16, 1877) and to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies.

Official pressure was everywhere exerted in favour of the Royalist-Catholic coalition. De Broglie tried once more to "boss" (*faire marcher*) the electorate. It was the alliance between the conservatives and the Church, more than anything else, which ruined their cause. Anti-clericalism became the rallying cry of the Radical party. Gambetta led an admirable campaign, and Thiers, on his deathbed, encouraged the Republicans. The same majority, with hardly any reduction, was returned to Parliament. A coup d'état of the Royalists at Bay was feared. But MacMahon was a loyal soldier: he had strained to the utmost, he refused to violate, the Constitution committed to his keeping. He accepted his defeat and formed

* The electoral reform known as "proportional representation" is not a constitutional change.

a Republican Ministry. He took the first opportunity to resign as soon as the war cloud in the East was dispelled and the European position was over * (1879). A few weeks before, the senatorial elections had taken from the Royalists the control of the Upper House. In 1881 the Communards were amnestied. Thus the Royalists had been compelled to organize the Republic, and the Republicans had conquered it. The normal life of the new regime could now begin.

§ 3. THE OPPORTUNIST REPUBLIC, 1879-99.

§ 3. *The Opportunist Republic, 1879-99.*—Result of the 16th of May—annihilation of the Presidency, paralysis of the Executive—The Opportunists—The group system—Shifting combinations and coalition Ministries—Crises: Boulanger—Colonial expansion—The Russian alliance.

The Freycinet plan of public works—Popular education—Anti-clericalism.

§ 4. *The Dreyfus Case and the Radical Block, 1899 seq.*—The Dreyfus case—Meaning of the "affair"—Intensity of the crisis—Waldeck-Rousseau, Galliffet, Millerand: the Ministry of Republic—Defence—Anti-clerical reprisals—Weakness of constructive policy.—Rupture of Radicals and Socialists.

But the crisis of the 16th of May had one disastrous effect. MacMahon had used to the utmost his constitutional prerogative against the representatives of popular opinion: it became a cardinal principle with the Republicans that the President should be as neutral, as insignificant, as "innocuous" as possible. Thus they chose to succeed the Marshal a veteran of '48 Jules Grévy, a skilful lawyer, a staunch Republican, but not a forceful personality. Until 1913 it may be said that Presidents were chosen for negative reasons—because they were "safe" men: youth, talent, energy, popularity, were insuperable disqualifications.† Thus the French Constitution was

* He died in 1893, universally respected.

† To Grévy succeeded in 1887 Sadi Carnot, the grandson of the Organizer of Victory, a man of faultless dignity in public and private life, but without any of the qualities of a leader. After Carnot's assassination in 1894 an energetic President was selected, Casimir Périer: but as soon as the terror of anarchy blew over, Parliament and his very Cabinet tried to snub and paralyse the chief executive. A great capitalist, unpopular with

own entirely out of gear. For thirty-four years there has been no independent Executive. The President was not even a figure-head. The Ministry was a mere joint committee of the two Houses which could be recalled on the most futile pretext. Politics were vague and powerless entities: the situation was controlled by small cliques, the clientele of some influential member. Hence the amorphous, acephalic character of politics under the Republic, compared with English and American constitutions. Hence the rise of a class of professional politicians, interested as a rule, but devoted to their own interests and to those of their narrow constituencies, whilst the vital interests of the country as a whole had no organized and permanent representation. The paralysis of the Executive makes the Government a caricature rather than an adaptation of English parliamentarism. The period from the resignation of MacMahon to the death of Félix Faure may be called the "Opportunist" Republic. There was a split in the victorious Republican party. The Radicals were not true to the old programme of the opposition under the Empire; of these M. Clémenceau was the most brilliant representative. The Opportunists, led by Gambetta himself, wished to tackle each problem in its turn "as opportunity offered." But the presence of a monarchical opposition, and the memory of long campaigns waged in common, prevented the Republicans from dividing into real homogeneous parties of the Anglo-American type. Most of the administrations formed during these years were "concentration" or coalition Cabinets, in which all fractions of the Republicans were represented, although the more conservative, the Opportunists, were generally the predominant element. These parliamentary combinations were exceedingly unstable, and Ministries which lasted two years, like those of Jules Ferry (1883-5) and Jules Méline (1896-8) were regarded as instances of wonderful longevity. These constant changes did not affect the country quite so disastrously as might have been feared. A permanent appeal to the masses, Périet could not appeal to public opinion, and was compelled to resign in a few months. Félix Faure was a man of humble origin, undistinguished in every respect, whose fondness for monarchical etiquette reminded the French of the famous "Bourgeois Gentilhomme." Of the saying, *nil nisi bonum*.

bureaucracy, not submitted, as in America, to the spoils system carried on the business of government with exasperating slowness and want of foresight, but with tolerable thoroughness and undoubted honesty. And in the ministerial kaleidoscope each new combination was made up of old elements. As M. Clémenceau was reproved for overthrowing so many Cabinets he answered, "I never combated but one: they are all the same." In spite of appearances due to a faulty Constitution, France in the eighties and nineties of the last century was not a seething mass of political experiments, but a democracy of peasants and small shopkeepers, cautious and averse to change.

But these divisions of the Republicans, and the disrepute into which their squabbles had caused them to fall, brought about repeated crises. In 1885 the Monarchists reconquered many seats in Parliament. In 1886 the Bonapartist and Orleanist pretenders acted with an indiscretion which led to their expulsion. In 1888-89 General Boulanger, handsome, popular, unscrupulous, started a great movement in favour of the revision of the Constitution. His plan was to substitute a Republic of the American type, with a strong Executive elected directly by the people, for the helpless parliamentary regime established by the compromise of 1875. This attracted to his party many democrats and some of the noisiest Socialists (Rochefort), while patriots athirst for "revenge" saw in him the future deliverer of Alsace-Lorraine. The conservatives worked in conjunction with him in so far as his efforts tended to the overthrow of their common enemies. This adventure, a mixture of legitimate aspirations and shady intrigues, of sane principles and raw demagoguery, collapsed before the united and spirited defence of the parliamentary Republicans. The conservatives had their revenge in the Panama scandals, which broke out in 1890-92 and in which as many as one hundred and four politicians were said to be involved. But in spite of divisions, attacks, and scandals the Republic was unshakeable. The centennial celebration of the great Revolution was a triumph, and in 1893 the Pope himself, Leo XIII, advised French Catholics to "rally" to the existing Government.

Beyond the frontiers this period was marked by two develop-

ments, colonial expansion and the Russian alliance. The movement of colonial expansion meant that France, whilst giving up the immediate hope of reconquering the lost provinces, had become again a self-confident, aggressive nation. In twenty years an immense empire was added to the scanty overseas dominions of the Republic. Tunis was conquered in 1881, Tonquin in 1885, Madagascar in 1885 and 1895, the Ivory Coast and Dahomey in 1887, and in 1893 Brazza won for his adopted country a vast share of the Congo basin. The old colony of Senegal was extended as far as the Niger. The mysterious city of Timbuctoo passed under the tricolour, and the Sahara became mainly "a French desert." With Lake Tchad as a point of junction, all the Western African possessions of France formed a solid whole. The only set-back in this triumphant progress was the unfortunate withdrawal from the Anglo-French condominium in Egypt (1882). The Marchand mission was an ill-considered attempt to reopen the Egyptian question, and led to the Fashoda crisis (1898). Jules Ferry was prominently identified with the colonial expansion of France. Unpopularity was the first reward of his efforts, and few statesmen were ever more bitterly assailed than the "Tonkinese." Next to Jules Ferry, Bismarck is entitled to the gratitude of the French. The Iron Chancellor encouraged his Western neighbours in their exotic ambitions, probably in the Machiavellian hope of embroiling them in difficulties with Italy and England. The conquest in two decades of an overseas domain second to that of England alone is an achievement of national energy and perseverance which even anti-colonists cannot fail to admire.

The alliance with Russia was a necessity. France needed an ally against Germany, and that ally could not be England, still faithful to her policy of splendid isolation, and in keen rivalry with France in the colonial field. Russia had been duped by Germany at the Congress of Berlin, which postponed by a third of a century the rightful settlement of the Balkan question. The triple alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy made an association of Russia and France indispensable to the preservation of equilibrium in Europe. There is something shocking at first in this "marriage of convenience" between the

land of the Revolution and a semi-Asiatic, autocratic Empire. The Tsar orders his soldiers to shoot down the strikers who sing the "Marseillaise," the song of militant democracy, while he listens bareheaded to the strains of the same "Marseillaise," the national anthem of his "friends and allies." After a few years of half-ludicrous, half-touching enthusiasm the Russian alliance is no longer popular with the masses; but it has for a while dispelled the nightmare of renewed aggression, and no one seriously proposes to do away with it.

In the economic field a great effort was made to complete the network of roads, railways, and canals. The Freycinet scheme, all too inclusive, frittered away countless millions on local public works, according to what Americans call the "pork-barrel system," whilst the main arteries of commerce were not improved so rapidly as in neighbouring countries.* The mitigated form of free-trade imposed by the Emperor in 1860 was finally given up in 1892. M. Méline, the chief representative of the agricultural interests, secured the vote of a protective tariff, which is still in force, with little prospect of immediate relief.

The development of popular education is by far the most creditable achievement of the Third Republic. From 1880 to 1882 Jules Ferry had a series of laws enacted which made elementary education gratuitous, compulsory, and non-sectarian. In twenty years illiteracy was almost wiped out; for a country predominantly rural, France compares favourably with any European nation. These laws were by no means anti-religious. Moral teaching was to be based on the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, and the sacredness of duty. A day was set apart in which children could receive religious instruction from their respective priests and ministers. But the Republican party had not forgotten that the clergy had been their worst enemy from 1849 to 1877. Jules Ferry wanted to debar

* Le Havre, for instance, is still unable to admit the largest steamers in the Atlantic trade, which dock at Southampton; and the Paris Ship Canal, planned by the most competent engineers—Belgrand, Bouquet de la Grye—was submitted to Parliament in 1886, endorsed by a sort of referendum in 1892, and is not yet authorized in 1913.

authorized Orders like the Jesuits from teaching. The Senate refused him its sanction. Then by a series of decrees which were enforced with some ruthlessness the Minister dissolved and expelled these illegal corporations. Besides, the Catholic Church had not yet given up her claims to absolute control over education. The Ferry laws were violently denounced, the central schools taxed with "godlessness," lay teachers ostracized, and in remote districts dangerously persecuted. No wonder that the body of State educators has gradually become hostile to the Roman priesthood. However, it was not without reluctance that the Opportunists were driven to anti-clerical measures. As soon as the conflict abated they were willing to make a truce. When Leo XIII advised French Catholics to be loyal citizens of the Republic, Spuller responded by preaching the "New Spirit" of tolerance and reconciliation.

THE DREYFUS CASE AND THE RADICAL BLOCK FROM 1899 *seq.*

These dreams of national reconciliation were shattered by the outbreak of the Dreyfus case. In 1894 a captain attached to the general staff, Alfred Dreyfus, was arrested on a charge of high treason, tried in secret, and sentenced to life imprisonment in a distant and unhealthy possession—Devil's Island, off the coast of French Guiana. The trial and the condemnation caused little excitement at the time. Some indignation was expressed because this Semite with a German name, a member of the bourgeois class, escaped with his life, whilst the death penalty was so liberally applied to the sons of the people for minor breaches of military discipline. The first efforts of the Dreyfus family, in 1896, met with nothing but indifference. In 1897, however, it leaked out that Dreyfus had been condemned on the strength of documents not communicated to himself or to his counsel, and the use of which was manifestly illegal. Chance put Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart on the track of an officer of doubtful reputation—Major Esterhazy—whose handwriting bore a striking resemblance to that of a memorandum supposed to have been written by Dreyfus, and which had been the main evidence against him. So far the case was of purely personal and technical interest: errors and illegalities occur

in all countries, and are all too often difficult to redress. But the men who were responsible for the initial mistake or injustice managed to identify their cause with that of the army as a whole. Then began an extraordinary crisis which held the world breathless and shook French society to its very foundations. The personality of Dreyfus was lost sight of. The Jewish captain became a mere strategic point round which raged the eternal battle between conservation and revolution.

The conservatives honestly believed that Dreyfus, condemned by a jury of French officers, was guilty of the most dastardly crime; the campaign in his favour was engineered and financed by an international committee or "syndicate," grouping all the agencies interested in the downfall of France: Jews, Freemasons and Protestants, England and the Triple Alliance, Socialists and anarchists, the enemies of the faith, the enemies of the flag, the enemies of society. As a matter of fact this horrific syndicate was the merest nightmare. The first Dreyfusists were patriots and bourgeois—Senator Scheurer-Kestner, an old Alsatian, and Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart, a devoted soldier. Sympathy for an innocent victim, respect for law and justice, were the only feelings which urged them.

But the hoax of a "Syndicate of Treason" succeeded and the tremendous blunder was made. All the forces of conservation—the nobility, the wealthy classes, the monarchists, the army, the Church—were banded together in their defence of society; and the belief in Dreyfus's guilt became somehow bound up in their minds with law, property, order, patriotism, and religion. Independent men refused to accept the new dogma and the new inquisition which made it a punishable offence to probe the mysteries of the "affair." Protestants, scientists, liberals of all schools flocked to the banner of free investigation. The Revolutionists, reluctant at first to take sides in that "squabble among bourgeois," soon saw their chance. It was the conservatives themselves, the pillars of society, who identified conservation with secret methods of violence and fraud. Thus in a country in which for over a century the old and the new had fought almost uninterruptedly; the conflict assumed a political, a social, a spiritual signifi-

ance. It was the battle of absolutism against the Revolution, of dogmatism against criticism, of the Church against the scientific spirit, of authority against liberty. France was torn as she had not been for a whole generation. Public meetings were held for and against the retrial of Dreyfus, and not seldom ended in pugilistic encounters; innumerable publications appeared; league was set up against league. It was a magnificent storm, a combat in which the protagonists were not afraid of taking their all—position, friendship, and life itself—and in which the very masses were ennobled by unselfish passion.

Esterhazy, formally accused of the crime for which Dreyfus had suffered, was tried by a military court and acquitted. The last chance of securing legal redress had thus disappeared when Zola stirred the country with his letter, "I accuse!"—the Luther-like protest of unconquerable conscience (January 13, 1898). The persecutors of Dreyfus, still in power, were growing uneasy. One of the most sincere among them, M. Cavaignac, Minister of War, felt the need of justifying his own belief and published damning documents. On August 30, 1898, Colonel Henry was compelled to confess that the chief of these had been forged by himself. On the following morning he was found dead in his cell.

The revision of the Dreyfus case was now inevitable. The Court of Cassation, the supreme court of appeal in the French legal system, quashed the judgment of 1894 and sent Dreyfus before another military tribunal, which met at Rennes on August 7, 1899. This second "Council of War," under pressure of conservative prejudices, came to an unconvincing, ill-balanced verdict: Dreyfus was found guilty, but with "extenuating circumstances," and by only five votes to two. So far as Dreyfus was concerned, this second injustice was immediately remedied by a free pardon, granted on September 21, 1899. An amnesty covering all the offences connected with the Dreyfus case was voted in order to restore internal peace.

But the national stain remained. In 1904 the revision of the 1899 trial was ordered. The Supreme Court annulled the second judgment *absolutely*, i.e., without sending the captain before a third "Council of War." In so doing it undoubtedly

stretched the letter of the law, to the great indignation of the anti-Dreyfusists. Dreyfus was thus fully rehabilitated. Clémenceau, one of his most ardent champions, was then in power, and made the reparation as solemn as the injustice had been glaring. Dreyfus was promoted to the rank of major, and was decorated with the Cross of the Legion of Honour in the very place where he had been degraded twelve years before. The remains of Zola were transferred to the Panthéon. Colonel Picquart, whom the intrigues of his enemies had driven from the army, was reinstated with the rank of brigadier-general, and soon became Minister of War.

Meanwhile the "affair" had radically affected French politics. For a time the anti-Dreyfusist coalition, or Nationalist party, looked formidable. It controlled the army, and a military coup d'état establishing a theocratic-plutocratic dictatorship was hourly feared. The President of the Republic, Félix Faure, was known to be in sympathy with the reactionary element. But he died suddenly (1899), and the Nationalists made the tactical mistake of assailing with the utmost violence the most likely candidate for his succession—M. Emile Loubet. M. Loubet was a cautious, level-headed man, who, as President of the Senate, had not committed himself to either party. The attacks of the conservatives alone turned his election into a triumph of the Dreyfusists. With the great statesman, Waldeck-Rousseau, the latter assumed power. All columns of "the army of Justice" were represented in the new Ministry: socialism by Millerand, the old military aristocracy by General de Galliffet. It seemed as though the most intelligent and upright portion of the upper classes would unite with the proletarians in an orderly work of democratic and social progress. To the Dreyfusist coalition of Socialists, Radicals, and Moderate Republicans the term "block," coined by Clémenceau several years before in a different connection, was ultimately applied. This "block," with many gradual changes, is still in power at present.*

The defensive policy of the Block was obviously mapped

* Cf. the recent agitation about Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam, a belated episode of the "affair," January, 1913.

ut. It was necessary to curb the political influence of the Church and to check the growth of anti-Republican pretorianism in the army. The Church was the first to suffer. We shall see in a later chapter how most religious Orders were suppressed in 1903; how the latent conflict with Rome came to a head in 1904, when the French Ambassador to the Vatican was recalled, how Church and State were finally separated in 1905. The difficult task of "republicanizing" the army and navy was entrusted to General André and M. Camille Pelletan. The former felt justified in making use of secret notes and denunciations sent in by Freemasons, just as many of his predecessors had been influenced by notes and denunciations of clerical origin. But France did not want to substitute a camarilla of bigoted freethinkers for the occult power of the priests, and the ministry of General André ended in a series of unsavoury scandals.

Like most coalitions, the Block was weak on the positive side. Of all the great reforms long promised by the Radical party, hardly any was carried out in a generous and statesmanlike manner. Only one system of railroads, the Western line, was taken over by the State, and it has been woefully mismanaged. The old age pension scheme, voted after interminable delays, was found more cumbrous, more fraught with difficulties than the system adopted in England. The income tax is still in the air. Even the most obvious result of the Dreyfus case, the suppression or at least the radical reform of special military courts in time of peace, has not yet been attained.

The Radicals and the Socialists, after a few years of half-hearted collaboration and constant bickerings, have agreed to separate. The Radicals, numerically the most important element in the Block, are now a party without a programme, that is to say, a party of mere politicians. The last few Cabinets are still nominally "advanced," and they relapse once in a while into their traditional attitude of hostility towards the Church, militarism, and plutocracy. But these, as a rule, are empty demonstrations. The bourgeois Republicans of all denominations aspire to the formation of a party of social conservation, whose sole enemies would be the Socialists, trade unionists, and anti-

militarists. The sooner this evolution is completed, the sooner definite lines are drawn, the better for French political life, which suffers from the prevailing confusion of all party names, principles, and policies.

§ 5. SOCIETY.

5. *Society.* Continuation of the July monarchy—The aristocracy: an impotent survival—Democracy not yet in control—Rule of the bourgeoisie—Extent and subdivisions of that class—Social prejudice against producers—Its dangers and advantages.

6. *Culture.*—Continuation of realism—Influence of the Terrible Year: pessimism (Taine); irony (Renan)—Decadence?—Revival of mysticism—Cultural aspects of the Dreyfus crisis—Empirical idealism.

Socially as well as politically, the Third Republic is a continuation of the July monarchy. There was in the Second Empire, with its recklessness and display, with its velleities of humanitarian democracy, an element of adventure and romance which disappeared in the purely bourgeois and parliamentary regime inaugurated in 1875.

The old aristocracy has lost much of its prestige and all its power. In the absence of a Court it has no natural centre. It is overshadowed in wealth, and not seldom in culture, by the upper bourgeoisie, and by the cosmopolitan world of business and pleasure. It is flooded with spurious nobles, now that the nobility no longer forms an organized body, capable of defending its privileges; the growth in the number of titles under the Republic has been stupendous.* The genuine aristocrats

* Now that there is no sovereign to confer titles of nobility, the following expedients are resorted to: (1) There is a tendency to consider every name that begins with the separate particle *de* as noble, although this is by no means the case; people whose names begin with the syllable *de*, write it in two separate words: Derancy becomes *de Rancy*. This is an easy first step. (2) Names of estates are freely appended to patronymics, at first between modest brackets: M. Gautier (*de Clagny*), then as part of the real name: Durand d'Aubervilliers; then the original name is quietly dropped: D. d'Aubervilliers. Any printer of visiting cards can confer nobility for a few francs: this is not punishable by law, unless the assumed name rightfully belongs to another or is used for dishonest purposes. (3) Every title that ever was or came near being in the family is revived without any respect for genealogical law. (4) Titles can be had for cash from certain needy foreign Governments, among which the Holy See is

not stem the tide: besides, they can no longer afford to be exclusive. The greatest families are linked with American plutocrats and even with Jewish captains of finance. The "dynasties of the Crusaders" are not degenerate; beside their hereditary taste and breeding, their love of sport and their cosmopolitan outlook make them vastly superior in mind and energy to the second generation of parvenus. But, as a class, their glory has departed. It is a significant fact that in modern France the term "bourgeois" includes all capitalists, titled or not, and that a duke is now part and parcel of the "bourgeois" system.

Whilst aristocracy has lost its influence, democracy has not fully asserted its power. All Frenchmen are entitled to a vote, without any property qualifications; yet the bourgeois have efficiently entrenched themselves in all strategic positions. Direct universal suffrage does not apply to the election of the President and of the Senate: no executive, administrative, or judicial function is elective. Practically all deputies, Socialists included, are, and have always been, capitalists, landowners, or professional men, *i.e.*, bourgeois. A high school certificate, the *baccalauréat*, is required at the entrance of every official or professional career; but secondary education is not free, and the number of scholarships granted to the children of the poor is not larger than it was under the ancient regime; this is a very efficient fence round the bourgeois preserves. Another fence is the long period of probation, practically unremunerated, in most state offices and in the professions; during those years a poor man's son would starve. As late as 1905 the sons of the middle class, by taking some degree which required time and

so most reputable and the most expensive; there are Jewish papal courts. (2) Handsome contributions to the monarchical cause will elicit from the leaders of the movement, or even from the secretaries of the pretenders themselves, a letter of acknowledgment which is generally sufficient to authenticate the assumed name and title. When the Foreign Office announced the intention of looking into the nobiliary titles of its aristocratic diplomats there was such an outcry and so many threats of resignation that the matter was dropped. Likewise a proposed sumptuary tax on titles which would have led to an investigation of aristocratic claims and thus winnowed the chaff and grain, was defeated by a combination of egalitarians and spurious nobles.

money, but little genius, served only one year in the arm whilst the majority of their poorer compatriots had to give five and three years of their young manhood. The social line between smock-frocks and frock-coats is much sharper than in America, where many a wealthy man remembers his blue-jean days.

But there is no question of a conflict between the "masses" and the "classes." The bourgeoisie itself is legion. Any one who wears decent clothes and uses decent French is a bourgeois. The ruling class is so huge that it has to be subdivided; the French distinguish the lower, the middle, and the upper bourgeoisie. The lower stratum is not within easy reach of the toilers themselves: a grimy face, horny hands, and a rough tongue, are serious disqualifications; but it is freely open to their sons. Peasants and mechanics all over the country work themselves to death and deny themselves everything that the son may study and become a "monsieur"—an underpaid State official or teacher. It takes more money, ambition, or luck—generally a second generation—to prepare a professor, a lawyer or a doctor. To these all hopes are open: the Presidency of the Republic, the Academy, and even, if they have more cleverness than backbone, the sacrosanct gates of the Faubourg Saint-Germain; for aristocratic traditions are in need of talented plebeian defenders.

French social life is still ruled by the old feudal prejudice that manual labour is servile, and even that any gainful occupation is demeaning. The French ideal is not so much wealth as freedom from ignoble toil. We need hardly say that this conception does not spring from laziness, for French industry is proverbial. Throughout the nineteenth century every small manufacturer or tradesman aspired to the moment when he could abandon his business, which he really loved, and, on a minimum competency, set up as a gentleman. This trait is by no means new: M. Jourdain, two hundred and fifty years ago, was ashamed of his father's trade. But until the Revolution this tendency was checked by the very hierarchization of society which made the upper reaches almost unattainable to the greater number; so that there were bourgeois dynasties, not only

igned to their position, but proud of their traditions in their hereditary line of business. After 1789, everybody's secret idea was to rank among the spenders.

This social prejudice against producers has far-reaching consequences. First of all, the limitation of the offspring; every man wants his son to be a gentleman as soon as possible, and the only gentleman in the family is all that an average household can afford. The eldest son's privilege has thus been restored, in spite of the law, through the preventive suppression of younger sons. Then, as State offices and the professions are the most direct avenues to bourgeois respectability, they are encumbered with aspiring young men, whilst agriculture, commerce, industry, and manual labour are deprived of their natural leadership. The work of material production, thus despised, is too often left to narrow-minded and sordid petty capitalists, thrifty and hard-working enough, but deficient in foresight and enterprise. Meanness may be as bad a source of extravagance as reckless daring; the business as well as the national affairs of France, since the triumph of the middle class, have too often been conducted in a "petit bourgeois" spirit which is at the same time stingy and tasteless.

On the other hand, there is much to be said in favour of the French turn of mind. The excessive caution shown in economic activities gave France wonderful financial stability, even in the midst of the worst crises. The more go-ahead nations—America, England, Germany—have all been compelled, in time of stress, to borrow from the inexhaustible "woollen stockings" of the French peasants. This cautious method is tolerably well adapted to an old country which has few natural resources still untapped. Socially, there are advantages in the aristocratic prejudice which ranks the spender higher than the toiler. There is in France an immense class which is keenly bent on money-getting, but which considers money as a means for securing independence, not as an end in itself. The disinterested and cultured public is unusually large, and, as H. G. Wells pointed out, a French bookshop, by the side of licentious literature, will offer a wealth of thoughtful works hard to match in any country: this is the bright side of the "gentlemanly ideal."

Finally, it must be said that these conditions show signs of rapid and accelerating transformation. The development of scientific industry, the keenness of international competition, are driving out the dull and plodding capitalist of old, as well as the would-be gentleman of leisure; and they are giving rise to a new race of energetic business men proud of their business. The corresponding drawback is that industry and commerce on the large scale will no longer be accessible to the sons and grandsons of the people, and that a new feudalism is fast arising. On the other hand, the best of the labourers, no longer lured by the possibility of entering the bourgeoisie, will devote their energies to the interests of their own people. In a keen war of the classes, rather than in the present system of permeable hierarchy, may be found the salvation of twentieth-century France.

§ 6. CULTURE.

The realistic spirit which we have attempted to define in the preceding chapter remained the dominant influence during the first twenty years of the present Republic. But the influence of the "Terrible Year" must be noted. It brought about a recrudescence of pessimism and scepticism. Towards the close of the Empire idealism was reviving under new forms: faith in science; the peace movement, with Passy, Gratry, Loyson, Dunant; even the International Working Men's Association, were signs that the age of pure materialism and moral depression would soon be over. But the war broke out; after the downfall of their "aggressor" Napoleon, the Germans continued their relentless advance; victorious, they plundered and slandered their foe, ascribing the brutal victory of sheer numbers to moral rectitude and intellectual superiority. Then came the Commune and the carnival of arson of the bloody week: it seemed as though society were rocking on its foundations. Paris had twice been conquered, and Paris was the New Jerusalem of democracy. Worst of all, perhaps, was the fact that no immediate regeneration followed the disasters. France recovered, she was not born anew. The nation continued its humdrum existence, amid the squabbles of parties. The hopes of revenge had to be given

* When the dreams of palingenesis through Catholicism, or monarchy, or democracy, or socialism, or military victory, grew dim and vanished, France was left a sadder nation—and a sicker one, if true wisdom can exist without a lodestar. Taine and Renan, the leaders of French thought, were deeply affected. Neither had been a democrat: both became reactionists. Taine spent the last twenty years of his life on his bulky and powerful arraignment of modern France, *Les Origines de la France Contemporaine*. His morbid imagination, the result of an indomitable will hampered at every turn by an ailing body, found full scope in this gloomy masterpiece. In a crescendo of darkness he described the ancient regime as rotten to the marrow, the Jacobin Revolution as a combination of intellectual foolishness and tigerish rage, Napoleon as a monster of selfishness and ferocity. This sombre turn of mind is exactly the same that we find in “naturalistic” literature, in “slices of life” and the “cruel” plays of Henri Becque, in the pathological romances of Zola. If some of the strongest and best-intentioned writers swallowed in filth and called it “science” or “nature,” this delusion was evidently a form of disease, the result of repeated shocks. Not only because her eastern frontier is gaping, but because her very soul is veiled with gloom, can modern France be called a “wounded nation.”

A second form of disease, more insidious, was the amiable Pyrrhonism affected by Renan in the last fifteen years of his life. Cynicism, however courteous and smiling it may be, is but a mask for despair. Renan had renanized before 1870: but earnestness was still predominant in him; after 1871 he seemed to sink deeper and deeper into universal indulgence and irremediable flippancy. He apologized to Béranger’s “God of Good Fellows,” a “good, easy-going little god,” whom he had bitterly denounced twenty years before. His “transcendental disdain” assumed the shape of continuous irony, which spared neither goodness nor truth, and seemed to respect sensuous beauty and

* Even at present one still hears occasionally of “la revanche,” especially east of the Rhine, where it is a bugbear carefully preserved by the militarist. Note that “revanche” does not mean strictly “revenge,” but rather “getting even,” or still better “getting back one’s own.”

pleasure alone. Renanism, we sincerely believe, was superficial in Renan himself. He remained faithful to his heavy, self-appointed task of scholarly research, and published just before his death his "thoughts of 1848," *The Future of Science*, his first and last confession of faith. But the disease, slight in the master, spread to minds of less resisting texture, and laid them waste. In Anatole France and Jules Lemaître, Renanism had exquisite graces, and did not permanently stifle conscience. In the first works of Maurice Barrès it is simply exasperating, and it became positively nauseous in numberless literary anarchists, whose brood is not extinct.

This pessimism, either sombre or flippant, found its expression in the popular delusion of decadence, which the French entertained and spread abroad during the twenty years of Opportunist rule. There is a prodigious literature in France, denouncing or taking for granted the hopeless decay of the country and the race: a group of poets even assumed the name with a sort of inverted pride. Hardly anything in the facts of national life justified such a verdict. Military defeat, licentious literature, parliamentary scandals, and even a falling birth-rate are not special to France.* Education was spreading; hygiene fast improving; the death-rate decreasing steadily; the average span of life was lengthened; the stature of conscripts showed constant progress. Wealth was expanding, new colonies were acquired, the Government was free at last from the constant menace of coup d'état or revolution, whilst art, science, literature were not unworthy of France's glorious traditions. These years of national discouragement were in many fields a period of very creditable activity.

"Decadence" was a mere catchword, used with some complacency by a small cosmopolitan set in Paris, and which did not describe even that set accurately: for corruption under the Republic is hopelessly mediocre and "petit bourgeois" compared with that of Byzantium, London under Charles II, or the Regency of the Duke of Orleans. Others caught the infection, simply because decadence was fashionable, or because they would

* Cf. Jena, the Restoration in England, the rule of Walpole, the birth-rate in New England or Australia.

rather slander themselves than keep their mouths shut. Patriots so took up the cry: looking backward, they regretted the days of bygone supremacy, in the old selfish delusion that the progress of our neighbours must needs injure our own interests. More sane, saner and more generous, simply made use of that ready whip to lash their compatriots into greater activity. This phantom of decadence was exorcised during the Dreyfus case. France was rent asunder, but each party became conscious of high principles and inexhaustible energies.*

In the early nineties, as the patriarchs of realism were disappearing from the scene, a new spirit arose, which was simply a reaction against excessive positivism, a return to mysticism—with its usual train of æstheticism and sentimentality. Darwin and Spencer lost ground; the influences of Wagner, Ibsen, Tolstoy were syncretically combined. The Pre-Raphaelite craze spread over the Continent. Even Emerson was pressed into service.† Anything to get away from "the troughs of Zolaism"! The Neo-Catholics, with Paul Desjardins and de Vogüé; the Rosicrucians and Neo-Magians with Sâr Joséphin Péladan; Maeterlinck in his early plays and poems; the Symbolists, the Decadents, with their ancestor Baudelaire and their immediate forerunner Villiers de l'Isle-Adam: all these offered a curious blend of mystic aspirations with anarchistic or reactionary *pose*, and one can hardly blame Dr. Max Nordau for detecting in them all the stigma of degeneration. Yet it was essential that the rights of the ideal should be reasserted. Dr. Max Nordau's criticism is irrefutable, but, taken absolutely, it would destroy the music of life at the same time as a few morbid affectations. This neo-romantic movement was still the privilege of a few, when the Dreyfus crisis interrupted its normal development.‡

The Dreyfus crisis was not a new departure, but an epitome of

* Cf. the anthropo-sociological studies of Vacher de Lapouge, in which the majority of the French were declared racially inferior to the English; *The Psychological Laws of the Evolution of Peoples*, by Gustave Le Bon; later, the *Causes of the Anglo-Saxon Supremacy*, by Demolins.

† Abbé Victor Charbonnel.

‡ An important symptom of the reaction against positivism, in a man of the dogmatic type in whom no sign of looseness or degeneration could be found, was Brunetière's famous phrase: "the bankruptcy of science."

all previous struggles between authority and liberty. France lived over again the fight against Charles X and the "Congregation," the Roman Question of 1849, the battle for and against Duruy at the close of the Empire, the two conflicts known as "the Moral Order" and "the Sixteenth of May" under MacMahon. All the forces of conservation, as we have said—property, patriotism as embodied in the army, religion as embodied in the Catholic Church—were arrayed against all the forces of Revolution—Protestantism, Freethought, science, socialism. This glorious conflagration of ideas and passions, this dramatic review of France's cultural history for the last hundred and fifty years, had a unique educative value; but it brought no new message. On the contrary, its retrospective character was shown by the revival of half-forgotten fossils: even old Voltaire was galvanized on behalf of the Cause.* When the actual strife was over, it was realized that individualistic democracy of the Clémenceau brand, or materialistic, pseudo-scientific free-thought, were no longer the powers for progress they thought themselves to be. It took several dismal years to disentangle the temporary alliances made during the Dreyfus case: years of disheartening squabbles and slowly sinking hopes.

Now French life seems to be resuming its normal course. And this course may be defined as the resultant of the two tendencies: *positivism*, but divorced from dogmatic materialism; and the *neo-mysticism* of the nineties, but freed from the affectations and excesses inevitable in a new movement. The tone of French thought at present is curiously anti-rationalistic: it is a blend of realism and faith, which gradually approximates the Anglo-Saxon standard. Of this tendency, William James and Henri Bergson are the prophets, and if labels are judged indispensable, *empirical idealism*, or *pragmatism*, will do as well as any. The same spirit prevails in the Modernist school, among the Neo-Traditionalists of "L'Action Française," the social-Catholics of Sangnier's "Furrow," the Protestant group "Faith and Life"; it is particularly clear in the philosophy of the Syndicalist movement as expounded by G. Sorel. Each

* A good, popular collection of eighteenth-century reprints was published by Cornet at Angers.

ol, each period in the past, has had a watchword or a catchword: for Voltaire, this was "reason"; for Rousseau, "nature"; for Robespierre, "virtue"; for Napoleon, "glory"; after the Restoration, "tradition"; for the Romanticists, "passion," and later "human brotherhood"; for the mid-nineteenth century Philistine, "common sense" and "progress"; from 1870 to 1890, in the writings of Taine, Renan, Zola, in official speeches under the Republic, on the lips of Homais's successors, it was "science." At present it is "life." Everything is a "life"; not something to be thought or felt about, but spontaneously *acted*. There are dangers in this new doctrine. It makes for loose thinking: "life" is the easiest justification ever devised for inconsistencies and prejudices. It is the essential privilege of man, even though it be his curse—that he *is* consciously, and *believes* that he can alter his course, in due measure, according to his thought. *Practical Romanism* is an admirable instrument to free men's minds from official fetters: yet liberation is but half the task of philosophy, and it remains to be seen what discipline the new spirit will provide.*

* The author is keenly conscious that this rough sketch of political, social, and cultural conditions in present-day France cannot satisfy any thoughtful reader. His intention—*Deo volente*—is to develop several of the points barely alluded to in this chapter in a subsequent study of *Problems of Contemporary France*.

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CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

V. THE THIRD REPUBLIC, 1870.

- 1870 September 4. Fall of the Empire. Government of National Defence.
- 1871 January 28. Capitulation of Paris. Preliminaries of Peace. National Assembly.
- March 18 to May 22. The Commune. (May 22-28. The "Bloody Week.")
- May 10. Treaty of Frankfort.
- 1871-73 Thiers 1st President of the Republic.
- 1873-79 MacMahon 2nd President. The Government of Moral Order. Attempted restoration.
- 1875 Constitution.
- 1876 Elections: Senate divided, House Republican.
- 1877 May 16. MacMahon dismisses Simon (Republican). De Broglie Ministry. Chamber dissolves. Death of Thiers. New Republican victories at the elections.
- 1878 Exposition.
- 1879 MacMahon resigns. Jules Grévy 3rd President (1879-86-87).
- 1879-81 Education laws. Anti-clericalism. Beginning of colonial expansion (Ferry).
- 1886 Expulsion of French Pretenders.
- 1887-91 Boulanger Agitation.
- 1887 Grévy resigns (Wilson scandals). Sadi Carnot 4th President, 1887-94.
- 1889 Height and collapse of Boulangism. Exposition.
- 1892-93 Panama scandals.
- 1894 Sadi Carnot assassinated. Casimir-Périer 5th President.
- 1894 Captain Dreyfus condemned for treason.
- 1895 President Casimir-Périer resigns. Félix Faure 6th President, 1895-99.
- 1897 Official Proclamation of Franco-Russian Alliance.
- 1898-99 Dreyfus crisis. "Nationalist" and Anti-Semitic Movements.
- 1899 Fashoda incident.
- 1899 Félix Faure dies suddenly. Emile Loubet 7th President, 1899-1906.
- 1899-1902 Waldeck-Rousseau Ministry. Association law.
- 1902-4 Combes Ministry: Anti-clerical policy.
- 1903 Franco-British Arbitration Treaty, 1904. Anglo-French Agreement. Entente Cordiale (Delcassé).
- 1905 Separation of Church and State.
- 1906 Armand Fallières 8th President, 1906-13.
- 1906 Morocco difficulty with Germany. Algeciras Convention.
- 1906 Final decision on Dreyfus Case. Clémenceau Ministry.
- 1911 Renewed difficulties with Germany. Morocco-Congo Agreement.
- 1913 Raymond Poincaré 9th President.

CHAPTER VI

THE SOCIAL QUESTION

§ 1. FORMATION AND DEFORMATION OF BOURGEOIS LIBERALISM.

The Revolution—Property a sacred right—Suppression of feudalism—Importance of that precedent—Absolute individualism (Chapelier law).

The Empire: liberalism degenerates into class legislation—Napoleon restores bourgeois corporations—The “livret”—Article 1781.

Survival of the *Compagnonnages*—The mutual help societies.

THE Revolution of 1789 was even more radical in its economic and social reforms than in pure politics. The old regime was characterized by arbitrary paternalism in the central government; by innumerable traces of feudalism in the tenure and exploitation of land; by a complicated system of guilds regulating and monopolizing each craft and trade. Authority, heredity, privilege, were thus its foundations. Although it had victoriously resisted the onslaught of Turgot in 1776, this economic order was visibly crumbling into decay: the central government was as inefficient as it was meddlesome, feudalism had lost every semblance of justification, and the guilds hampered industry and commerce. On August 4, 1789, the nobility and the clergy gave up their feudal rights and privileges: it was, in theory at least, the end of the ancient regime. On August 23rd, by the Declaration of the Rights of Man, the new order was formally established on the basis of *equal individual rights*.

But property was expressly declared to be one of those “inalienable and sacred rights.” The Constituent Assembly refused to follow the philosophers who, after Rousseau, had maintained that “exclusive property was a theft in a state of

are." * Nor can it be said that the Legislative Assembly the Convention were any more inclined to doubt the absolute character of individual property. The Government held vast forfeited estates of the clergy and the emigrant nobles; permanent collective ownership was not seriously thought of. The distribution of land to the poor ("the agrarian law") was sorely discountenanced, death being the penalty of whoever would propose such a measure. In 1796-97 it was rumoured that Caius Gracchus Babœuf and his "Club of Equals," the organized Communists, had secured the support of 17,000 working men in Paris. But this was a demagogic rather than a socialistic movement, a last effort of the Jacobin populace of the suburbs against the Thermidorian and Directorial reaction, its motto was the old cry: "Bread and the Constitution of 1793." Whatever may have been the number of secret adherents, the conspiracy was easily foiled, and when Babœuf was executed Paris did not stir. Messrs. Lichtenberger and Fernand Jaurès, who have studied the period from this special point of view, come to the conclusion that socialism, at the time of the Revolution, was practically non-existent.

Property was considered as a *right*, not as a privilege, because it was held to be freely accessible to all, and not to limit the liberty of others. This view was in the main perfectly correct at the time. Before the advent of expensive machinery and world-wide trade, agriculture, industry, commerce were local, individual, rudimentary affairs. Any peasant, any working man, endowed with energy, thrift, and foresight could acquire the tools necessary to his labour as well as the skill to use them. What the ancient regime denied him was the chance of using his tools and his skill independently and for his own benefit. Although there were a number of peasant proprietors before 1789, the ownership of land was chiefly the privilege of the nobility and clergy. The guilds had become exclusive and hereditary aristocracies, so that it was exceedingly difficult for an artisan to become a master. The Revolution gave the peasant the possibility of acquiring as much land as he could

* Brissot de Warville: *Recherches Philosophiques sur le Droit de Propriété et le Vol*, 1780. Cf. also Morelly, Fauchet, Mably, and even Mirabeau.

till, and the workman the right of opening a small shop on his own account. It thus sought to create a regime of equal opportunity and fair competition, the ideal of the "laissez-faire" school. In their fear lest the abolished guilds should rise again in a new guise, the members of the Constituent Assembly went to the extreme of forbidding any kind of association among people engaged in the same trade "for the defence of their alleged common interests." * No corporation of any kind should stand between the individual and the State.

But whilst the Revolutionists were firm believers in economic liberty and private property, some of their most important measures can be used as precedents by modern socialists. The wholesale confiscation of estates belonging to enemies of the Revolution is not the clearest case in point: it was an act of war, and in war the ordinary principles of justice are suspended. The assumption by the State of all Church property was nothing but a desperate expedient. The plea that the clergy could no longer hold any possession, since it had ceased to exist as a separate order, was a bold piece of sophistry: for individual churches, abbeys, and monasteries still existed, and were the natural heirs of the abolished "order." Many feudal rights were immediately suppressed without compensation, because they were traces of the domination of one class over another (*féodalité dominante*); yet, whatever their origin, they were in 1789 the *property* of individuals whose interests were greatly injured by their removal. Other rights, like perpetual ground rents, were the result of a contract between landowner and tenant (*féodalité contractante*); they were to be redeemed at a fair price. But, under the Convention (July 17, 1793), they were purely and simply abolished, and the very deeds on which they were based had to be surrendered and destroyed.

The lesson of French history, therefore, in contradiction with the principles of French law, is that private property *can* be confiscated and redistributed, when it no longer justifies its existence by actual services to society. The innumerable peasant proprietors, retail dealers and small manufacturers of France, conscious of the revolutionary origin of their rights

* Chapelier law against coalitions, 1791.

and for many years in the dread of a feudalistic reaction. Since 1848 their dominant fear has been that labour in its turn should challenge the legitimacy of their title. The precedents of 1789-93 have not been lost on the French proprietor: no wonder that they are still haunted with dreams of a new upheaval in which capitalistic property will be treated with the same disrespect that was shown to feudal property a hundred and twenty years ago.

The consequences of this economic revolution are still felt. France is socially more conservative than England or Germany, because the immense class of petty capitalists considers the time created in 1789 as final. But socialism is more radical, more aggressive than anywhere else, because every year, on the 14th of July, the people are reminded that "direct action" did, before, change the face of the world.*

The regime of individualistic liberalism established by the Constituent Assembly ignored class distinctions, and was theoretically fair to all. Employers as well as employees were forbidden to form trade associations, and the labour contract was to be freely debated between man and man. This was fair enough when each master had only a few working men in his employ, and perhaps only one skilled in each special line. If the master had more reserves, he was also likely to have more obligations, and he was less free to move to a different part of the country. In large shops the case is different: each individual workman represents but a fraction of the labour element engaged in the business, whilst the owner or manager represents the whole capital. None but a grim ironist would dare to maintain that Tom, Dick, and Harry can discuss on equal economic

* The rural populations were the chief beneficiaries of the Revolution: (a) feudal dues were abolished without compensation; (b) a vast amount of property was thrown into the market; (c) farm rent, taxes, and the price of State property acquired by the peasants were paid in "assignats" (paper money) at their face value, since assignats were legal currency. But in payment for their produce, the farmers accepted assignats only at the current rate, which fell to 1 per cent. of the nominal value. Thus a peasant whose year's rent, fixed before the crisis, was only 600 livres, could sell a single sack of wheat for 1,200 livres. The old landed proprietors were, of course, ruined by these conditions.

terms with Schneider, Krupp, or Carnegie. Collective bargaining alone could restore equality between the two factors capital and labour. Thus with the development and concentration of industry, the scales were automatically tipped in favour of the masters. Under the Napoleonic reaction, equality was deliberately destroyed. The Constituent Assembly had suppressed all professional associations: Napoleon restored all those whose members belonged to the bourgeoisie. The clergy, the judiciary, public education, were reconstituted into hierarchized and closed corporations. Lawyers, attorneys, notaries, bailiffs, stockbrokers, auctioneers, were organized into monopolistic "orders." The practice of medicine and midwifery, and a number of other trades—druggists, herbalists, butchers, bakers, printers, booksellers, theatre directors, and manufacturers of arms—were regulated by law and protected by privileges. The Chambers of Commerce were revived. Thus the strict prohibition of industrial combines was no longer a natural consequence of general policy, but an exception, and therefore an injustice.

Furthermore, whilst the combination ("coalition") of workingmen for raising wages fell under the law without any exception of or qualification, the combination of employers for lowering wages was punishable only if it were found "unjust and abusive." And the men who were to decide upon that point were not popularly elected judges, as under the Revolution, but magistrates appointed by the central government, and belonging, one and all, to the upper classes.*

Each working man had to carry with him a book ("livret"), and wherever he was employed he had to get his livret signed by the head of the police or by the mayor; he was thus under constant supervision, as if he had been a ticket-of-leave man. The livret was an instrument of servitude, for the master wrote down in it the sums advanced on the wages; and as long as these were not repaid in full, the labourer could find no other employment. A stroke of bad luck, an accident, an illness could thus place him at the mercy of his master, and permanently prevent him from seeking to better his position.

Whilst the rich were taking such elaborate precautions against

* Arts. 414, 415, 416 of the Penal Code, 1810.

the dishonesty of the poor, the poor, if cheated by the rich, had legal means of redress; for Article 1781 of the Civil Code (1804) provided that "the master's word is taken: for the rate of wages; the payment of the salary of the previous year; and the advances on the salary of the current year." The subordination of the working classes was thus officially established. In spite of the law, however, the labourers did not remain absolutely isolated. The old "Companionships" or Brotherhoods (*compagnonnage*) had survived. As they were secret societies, the Government was almost powerless against them. They did not include the whole of the industrial and commercial world, like the old guilds, but only certain trades, and, in those trades, only itinerant unmarried working men, who went from town to town and made "the tour of France." The companions preserved jealously their ancient rites and insignia, handed down, if not from the architects of Solomon's temple, at least from the craftsmen of the late Middle Ages. In 1808 Angoulême was the scene of a bloody battle lasting a whole week, due to the fact that a drunken tanner had betrayed the secret of the order to the shoemakers. Brawls were not infrequent between members of rival societies—"Children of Solomon" and "Children of Master James," "Gavots" and "Devoirants"—and even between different trades of the same rite. The companions treated the probationers or "foxes" * with brutal injustice. By the side of these antiquated ceremonies and mediæval prejudices, the brotherhoods had many social advantages. The companion found everywhere comrades ready to help him on his way, to find work for him, to sing and carouse with him when in health, and to tend him in sickness. So these secret orders were benefit societies of a primitive type. They were at the same time the prototypes of our labour unions, for occasionally the companions would, in spite of the law, combine in order to secure higher wages. Firms which, for one reason or another, had incurred their displeasure were "damned," *i.e.* boycotted. It must be added that the brotherhoods kept up a certain professional and moral standard: a worthless workman could not become a com-

* This term "renard" has recently been revived with the meaning of "scab."

panion. This is probably the chief reason why, in spite of their occasional turbulence, these societies were not more ruthlessly persecuted by the different Governments.*

Under Napoleon, and especially under the Restoration, it was seriously proposed to revive the old guilds; but the new principles of individualism and economic liberalism were still too strong to allow of such a backward step. One form of professional association, however, was tolerated and even encouraged although it fell under the Chapelier law: the friendly, or mutual help, societies. They took no part in the preparation and support of strikes: yet they provided rallying-points for the working classes: they are, much more than the brotherhoods, the link between the guilds and the modern unions. In 1806 their rapid extension seems to have made the Imperial police uneasy: mutual help societies among men of the same trade were condemned. But these associations seemed so harmless that the police soon relaxed its rigour. In 1823, out of 160 *Mutualités* in Paris, 132 were professional groups, with 11,000 adherents.†

§ 2. THE JULY MONARCHY, 1830-48. GROWTH OF MODERN SOCIALISM.

First development of mechanical industries—"Resistances"—The Lyons insurrection—Republican secret societies and their socialistic tendencies.

The Utopian Socialists: Saint-Simon, Fourier, Cabet, Louis Blanc, Proudhon.

The influence of machinery in industry was not seriously felt until the end of the Restoration: France was in this respect two generations behind England.‡ But under Louis-Philippe the transformation proceeded apace; a single workman, an apprentice, a woman, a child, could now do the work of several artisans. As this increased capacity of production was not coupled with a commensurate development of consumption, great hardships fell

* Cf. Agricol Perdiguier (*Avignonnais la Vertu*): *Le Livre du Compagnonnage*, 1841; Martin Saint-Léon, *Le Compagnonnage*, 1901; George Sand, *Le Compagnon du Tour de France*, 1840.

† Paul Louis, *Histoire du Mouvement Syndical en France*, p. 77. Alcan 1907.

‡ In 1810 there were only 15 steam-engines in the country, all but one working at low pressure.

the lot of the labourers: wages came down, and whole populations were pauperized. Discontent assumed three forms: strikes, secret revolutionary societies, and Utopian schemes. The July monarchy was a great era of "resistance." By this was meant the banding together of the working people in order to prevent any further lowering of their wages: a purely defensive movement, to ward off the evil effects of the introduction of machinery. Of these "resistances," the most successful was the Printers' Union, which in 1843 secured a reasonable tariff, revisable every five years. The silk weavers of Lyons were not so fortunate. Their industry, keenly sensitive to political disturbances, had been greatly injured by the Revolution of 1830. In October, 1831, reduced to absolute starvation, they demanded for a tariff of wages that would enable them to keep body and soul together. The prefect thought he could endorse their demands, and some employers agreed to a minimum tariff. But others refused to abide by the decision, and appealed to the central government, which took their side. This disappointment caused a terrible uprising of the weavers: for ten days they were masters of the city. Marshal Soult and the Duke of Orleans were sent to restore order. This insurrection, the first of that magnitude due to purely economic causes, placed the modern social problem before public opinion with dramatic effectiveness. France rang with the threatening motto of the Marseillaise: "To live by our labour, or to die fighting."

The republican secret societies, which were planning a new democratic revolution, were deeply tinged with socialism. The Society of the Rights of Man, for instance, in 1833, gave as its programme "the sovereignty of the people, universal suffrage, the emancipation of the working classes." Whilst the first Lyons insurrection had been due solely to economic sufferings, the second, in 1834, was democratic and social in character. A survivor of Babouvism, Buonarotti, influenced the arch-conspirators of the time, Barbés and Blanqui. A movement planned by them failed miserably in 1839; their "Society of the Seasons" was dissolved, and many of its members fled to London; there they met refugees of all nationalities, among whom was formed, in 1840, the Communists' federation. Karl

Marx joined this association a few years later. The historical connection between the democratic tradition of 1793 and modern Socialist movement is undeniable.

No relief was expected from the Government, entirely in the hands of the bourgeoisie. The franchise was restricted to the richest taxpayers, and there were only 200,000 electors in a country of 30,000,000 inhabitants. This ruling class scorned the idea of free-trade, which was contrary to their prejudices and immediate interests; but to all the demands of the working people they opposed the intangible principle of "economic liberty." When Arago, the great astronomer, made himself the echo of popular discontent, when he said in the Chamber of Deputies that it "was necessary to organize labour," his voice was covered with angry interruptions.

"Practical men" and economists of the liberal school had naught to offer but a choice between smug optimism, belied by facts, and stony fatalism. Before the manifest evils of the modern world, it was natural enough that people should not be satisfied with this double confession of impotence. So they listened to the Socialists, who promised the thing most needed after bread: dreams of redemption from present misery. From 1825 to 1848 there was in France an extraordinary crop of Utopian schemes. Let us note that this was also the heyday of romanticism: sentimental and imaginative socialism is simply the manifestation of the Romantic spirit in the economic field. Many of the great Romantic writers—Lamennais, Lamartine, Michelet, Hugo, George Sand—were deeply influenced by socialistic ideas.

The earliest of these new prophets was Henri Saint-Simon. He is the type of the erratic man of genius. Born in 1760 of noble parentage, at sixteen he was a volunteer under Washington and later made plans for cutting the Isthmus of Panama. He grew rich in land speculations and stock-jobbing under the Revolution, but was imprisoned at the time of the Terror. There it was that he saw in a vision his ancestor, Charlemagne, who revealed to him his Messianic destiny. After his release he studied and travelled, married, lived extravagantly, divorced, and spent the rest of his life in philosophic poverty. Unable

rite with any method, he could not reach the general public, until he won to his cause Augustin Thierry, then twenty years of age. The future historian became his "adopted son" and collaborator. They published a number of periodicals, *Le Politique*, *L'Organisateur*, *Le Système Industriel*, *Le Catéchisme Industriel*. One article alone attracted some notice. In a famous "Parable" (1819) he drew a comparison between the hypothetical loss to France of her 3,000 best scientists, artists, and artisans, and that of the Duke of Angoulême, the Duke of Berry, the great officers of the Royal Household, all cardinals and archbishops, and the 10,000 richest landowners. His point was that society was topsy-turvy, since service and honour did not go hand-in-hand: a discovery for which he was duly prosecuted. He died in 1825, having achieved nothing, and leaving the reputation of a crack-brained Bohemian.

We reserve for another chapter the discussion of his religious message. Suffice it to say that he asserted, against classical economists, that no society could stand if its spiritual principles and its economic organization were not in harmony. When brotherly love and pitiless competition are taught side by side, discord and hypocrisy are bound to prevail. Saint-Simon chose fraternity rather than liberty. In his system, the world was to be governed by a hierarchy of priests, scientists, and "industrialists" (producers of all kinds); but science and industry, devoted to the service of mankind, were holy, so that every profession was essentially religious. The cardinal principles of the new order were tersely stated on the front page of the *Globe*, which, from 1830 to 1832, was a Saint-Simonian paper:—

1. All social institutions must have for their aim the improvement of the moral, physical, and intellectual condition of the most numerous and poorest class.
2. All birthrights and privileges, without any exception, are abolished.
3. To every man shall be given according to his capacity, to every capacity according to its works.

These principles, the social correlatives of his mystic humanitarianism, were generous, but singularly vague. There was, however, a practical side to Saint-Simonism. The master, at a

time when French industry was still in its infancy, had a prophetic vision of modern production, with its scientific management and its unlimited capacity. He communicated his enthusiasm to his disciples—most of whom never saw him in the flesh. The Saint-Simonians preached the gospel of great public works, railroads, maritime canals, free-trade. Father Enfantin himself, that strange combination of the seer and the charlatan, thought of the Suez Canal and was a capable railroad administrator.* The Pereires became high barons in the new aristocracy of finance and founded, among other things, the General Transatlantic Company. The future Napoleon III, although he never was formally a Saint-Simonian, shared most of their ideas; his pamphlet on *The Extinction of Pauperism* might have been signed by one of them, and his reign was their reign. To their credit be it said that these men, at the height of material success, were still loyal to the mystic dream of their youth.

Fourier (1772–1837) was in his own eyes the Newton of social science, for he had discovered that the law of universal attraction ruled human sentiments and human conditions as well as planets and stars. His whole system rested on sensualism: a man has appetites which should be satisfied in the fullest and pleasantest manner. The first task of the reformer, therefore, is to analyze human passions, and to study their combinations. Fourier discovers twelve major passions, which can be combined in 810 characteristic types. His psychology is fanciful to a degree. But the fundamental idea is right: social organization should rest on a comprehensive conception of human nature. The great shortcoming of classical liberalism was that it had reduced its *homo economicus* to a mere machine whose sole passion was to buy in the cheapest market.

No one of these 810 types can be fully himself, nor reap the greatest benefit from his labour, in a state of isolation, or in the state of permanent warfare which we call free competition. In our present inorganic condition, legitimate desires clash, and may often be called vices. In the free and communistic regime of the future, they will all be harmonized. Production will be increased a thousandfold by the association of efforts.

* De Lesseps was directly influenced by the Saint-Simonians.

about will no longer be a curse, for it will become attractive through the free choice and constant shifting of one's occupations. Fourierism is merely an extreme and Utopian form of "naturalism," the doctrine of Rousseau: abolish artificial restrictions, trust to the instincts, and you will restore the golden age. The master boldly applied his principles to the relations of the sexes, and his "phanerogamy" is but another name for promiscuity.* He lost himself in extraordinary cosmogonic dreams. According to him, we have gone through periods of Idemism, savagery, patriarchal culture, barbarism, and civilization, all based on "unattractive industry." We are soon going to enter upon a second cycle: guaranteeism, socialism, harmonism, based on attractive industry. Then will come the final stage of complete harmony, in which, among other wonders, the sea will be turned into "a sort of lemonade," whilst a constant aurora borealis will warm up the pole.

We can hardly understand the influence of such extravagant fancies on men not different from ourselves, who lived but a short century ago. The sudden expansion of industry, the French Revolution, the career of Napoleon, the spread of romanticism, had certainly blurred the notion of practical possibility. Yet men have always been guided by dreams. What is Fourier's Utopia but an Anti-Apocalypse, a vision of material bliss instead of a nightmare of conflagration? But the true cause of Fourier's success, such as it was, lay in the "unit" idea applied to social reform. Since there are only 810 characters, a phalanx of that number (or rather 1,800 with old men "over 120" and children under 4) will be sufficient to realize Harmony on about a square league of ground. This phalanx would live in a handsome and comfortable building—farm, workshop, and palace combined—called the Phalanstery. In this association capital and talent as well as labour would have their proper reward. The experiment would therefore be an easy one to make, and "within two years" of the foundation of the first settlement, the world, dazzled by the magnificent results of association and attractive labour, would be converted

* As a concession to the prejudices of the times, he postponed indefinitely the establishment of phanerogamy.

from its present civilization into the next higher state. Now community life has undoubted advantages, on the ideal side as well as on the practical: the Catholic orders, against which legislation has proved powerless, are a proof of this perennial appeal. Many Fourierists adopted that queer faith simply because it promised the prompt realization of their fraternal dreams. In France, Fourier and his disciple Victor Considérant met with no material success. Two attempts, at Condé-sur-Vesgres and at Citeaux, collapsed before the buildings were fairly under way. In America, on virgin soil, Fourierism was one of the many sects which started socialistic communities. The famous Brook Farm, during the last two years of its existence, was reorganized on phalansterian lines.*

With Cabet the riotous fancy of the early Socialists begins to cool down. His *Icaria* (1840) is still a pure Utopia, but one of a plain and even commonplace type. Cabet spent some time in London after 1834, and his work shows the direct influences of Sir Thomas More and Robert Owen. In 1847-48 he tried to realize his scheme, at first in Texas, then at Nauvoo, the former Mormon colony; both attempts ended in failure. Cabet's *Icaria* and *New Christianity*, devoid of originality and written in accessible style, were widely read by the working classes, and contributed to the formation of genuine socialism.

It is often taken for granted that all pre-Marxian critics of capitalism were sentimental and utopian. Yet this is hardly true of Louis Blanc and Proudhon, both men of no mean ability and a positive turn of mind. Louis Blanc, small in stature, scrupulously neat in appearance, a purist in the use of language, and a historian to whose care and fairness his successors in the same field have paid high tribute, † did not base his doctrines on any financial revelation. Like Arago, he believed that the industrial world was suffering from its anarchy, that "labour should be organized." ‡ After ages of which "authority" and "indi-

* A Fourierist, Godin, who had become a rich manufacturer of stoves and cooking utensils, turned his factory, at Guise (Aisne) into a "Famillistère." This is a sort of adaptation of Fourierism to the framework of modern capitalistic production. The "Famillistère" is still in activity. Cf. the Fourierist elements in Zola's "Gospel": *Work*.

† Aulard.

‡ *The Organization of Labour*, 1840.

alism" respectively were the key-words, it was time for the "fraternalism" to open. Competition leads to increased production, but also to the pauperization of the masses, who, producing more, yet are able to consume but a diminishing proportion of the fruit of their labour. Association would be the remedy: a state of society in which every one would receive according to his needs and give according to his power; in which all salaries would be equal—for greater aptitudes give you greater rights, only greater duties; in which all industrial institutions would be elective, in the same way as political offices. As it is, we are still in Utopia. But Louis Blanc had a tangible scheme to pass from the capitalistic regime to the State socialism which he dreams. National workshops should be established which, on account of their immense superiority, would soon drive out competition. The employers, threatened with ruin, would of their own accord request the State to purchase their industries. The growing impossibility of reinvesting the capital thus produced, and the suppression of heritage in the collateral lines, would soon cause the former bourgeois class to disappear. The conclusion was to expect that in an age imbued with individualistic prejudices, communistic workshops would at once prove more efficient than those in which everything is sacrificed to cheapness and abundance of production.

P. J. Proudhon, the most important and most misunderstood of the early French socialists, was neither a utopist nor a sophist. He claims, in agreement with Auguste Comte, that after the epochs of religion and metaphysics, science alone should prevail, and the Romanticists of political economy had no deadlier critic than he. To intense earnestness, rugged eloquence, and a rare power of logical reasoning he joined extensive and accurate information. But, a man of the people, self-taught, passionate, uncritical, he wielded with dangerous, clumsy strength the double-edged tool of Hegelian dialectics, which he had rediscovered unaided. Thus his thought, sane and moderate on the whole, gave the impression of a dark chaos shot through with such lurid thoughts as his two famous aphorisms: God is evil; Property is theft.

His ruling passion was Justice. His economic formula for justice was "the right to the whole product of labour," which

could be realized only by a fair and free exchange of su-
product. Private *property*, which implies the levy of a tax
on somebody else's labour, is therefore a theft; but individual
possession is a fact and cannot be abolished. The Law, the
State consider it their duty to preserve the existing social order
based on economic privileges; "authority" means intervention
for the perpetuation of injustice, and for that reason Proudhon
calls himself an "anarchist." The constructive side is very
hazy in all his writings. His ideal of free and fair exchange
would be realized through co-operation, "mutualism." The
transformation from the old to the new could be operated, not
through the suppression, but through the "mutualization" of
capital. In 1848 Proudhon proposed to turn the State into
a universal banker that would give its clients free credit. For
himself started a "Popular Mutual Bank," which for political
reasons was not allowed a fair chance. Like most genuine
Socialists, he was indifferent to political labels, and would gladly
have co-operated with Napoleon III: at least he kept up
correspondence with the Emperor's cousin, Prince Napoleon.
His thought, obscure and contradictory though it often was,
influenced deeply the best minds among the Parisian work-
men. In their "mutualism" and their distrust of sheer political
(anarchy), they were his disciples, unless one prefers to say that
he was their mouthpiece. With the disintegration of Marxism
and the growth of a non-political, non-communistic, but revolu-
tionary labour movement, the persistence of Proudhon's influence
has recently become manifest.

§ 3. FROM 1848 TO 1871.

Socialism in 1848—The national workshops—The Days of June—
The Red Flend—The Coup d'état—Persecutions—Saint-Simonian
policy of Napoleon III—Hostility of the industrial workers to the
Empire—Liberal legislation after 1860—Prince Napoleon and
labour—The working men delegates to London—Origin and develop-
ment of the International Working Men's Association.
The Commune.

Thus socialism, in a general sense, was rife about 1848. Even
conservative minds and members of the privileged classes were
toying with the idea. Capitalistic industry was still young in

France. Its enormous powers had not yet fully asserted themselves, whilst its worst features were already apparent. It did not seem unreasonable, then, that a reform of the economic regime should go hand in hand with the radical transformation of the methods of production. When the throne of Louis-Philippe was swept away the Parisian populace insisted upon getting their share of the spoils. And the idealistic democrats who assumed control in February were not systematically hostile to these claims. The Republic was to be "democratic and social." To the bourgeois politicians of the Provisional Government were added Louis Blanc, one of the best-known theorists of socialism, and Albert, a working man. "The organization of labour," "the right to employment" (*droit au travail*), demanded by Arago and Louis Blanc in 1840, were promised, albeit vaguely, in official proclamations. A commission, with Louis Blanc as its chairman, was to meet at the Luxembourg Palace and investigate the social question in all its aspects. In order to relieve the distress caused by the political crisis, national workshops were created.

But it soon became evident that Paris had far outrun the rest of France. The dense mass of petty shopkeepers, small manufacturers, independent artisans, and peasant proprietors, whose small capital represented years of toil and self-denial, saw nothing in socialism but the equal division of property, and shuddered at the thought. The rift between the victors of February soon became irremediable. Lamartine refused to discard the glorious tricolour for the red flag of socialism. The elections sent to the Constituent Assembly a majority of Republicans who, although well-meaning and progressive, were committed to the defence of individual ownership. The Luxembourg commission was given no authority, and its labours remained purely academic. The national workshops were organized by enemies of their first promoter, Louis Blanc. Useless and costly, they grew like an ulcer; as many as 119,000 men were on the pay-roll. They were a "club of loafers, a reserve army of insurrection, a perpetual strike supported out of public money." Their sudden suppression was the occasion of the rising of June. The real cause was the desire, on the part of

the Socialists, to resume the direction of the Republic, which they felt slipping away from them. The Days of June thoroughly roused the conservatives to a sense of their danger. Henceforth the fear of the "red fiend" (le spectre rouge) will be their ruling passion. After the victory of Cavaignac and the ferocious repression which followed it, companies of national guards, organized throughout France, poured into Paris, eager to defend society against the barbarians from within. The leaders of socialism could barely get a hearing in the Assembly. The most active propagandists, if they had escaped the bullets of the "army of order," were imprisoned, exiled, or transported.

However, the ground won in February was not totally lost in June. The Second Republic encouraged working men's associations of all kinds, especially mutual help and co-operative societies. There was an admirable development of these, even during the period of dull reaction in 1849 and 1850. This, much more than the sensational election of the pseudo-socialist Eugene Sue in Paris, showed the vitality of the labour movement. Unfortunately, this auspicious growth was cut short by the coup d'état of December, 1851. Eager to suppress every possible centre of disturbance, the government of Louis Napoleon placed every kind of working men's associations under the ban. Harmless co-operative societies were treated with suspicion, as though they had been revolutionary clubs. Their managers and secretaries were arrested, and in many cases kept in prison or transported for no indictable offence. At Lyons, General de Castellane simply ordered every society to be dissolved. All known Socialists were kept under close police supervision; the proletariat was shorn once more of its natural leaders, and, for ten years, "society knew peace."

We reiterate that Napoleon III had constantly for his aim "the improvement of the material, intellectual, and moral condition of the most numerous and poorest class." The immense public works encouraged by him, and often due to his own far-sighted initiative, were meant to redeem the promises of his pamphlet *On the Extinction of Pauperism*. They were, in fact, national workshops, but of a more permanent and more

ent kind than those of 1848. Many institutions were
oped or created which, directly or indirectly, were to benefit
working classes: model tenement houses, hospitals, con-
nents' homes, baths, State pawnshops, popular loan associa-
etc. Out of the property confiscated from the Orleans
y. 10,000,000 francs were given to social charities. No
Government has so consistently attempted to serve
best interests of the people; it was indeed "Cæsarian
lism."

at the Empire failed to secure the support of the working

All its best efforts were marred by the narrow, compres-
paternalism which made the officials impatient of every
taneous activity. The bureaucracy could not brook inde-
ence; the French hated nothing so much as tutelage.
tever Napoleon offered them they took without thanks,
e that it was their birthright. Moreover, the transformation
dustry was proceeding at such a rate that the progressive
ures of the Government could not keep pace with it. In
e of all efforts, and whilst the standard of life was undoubt-
raised, the poor were getting proportionately more numerous
poorer. One after another the avenues from the proletariat
the capitalistic class were being closed. The scandalous
ary of the cosmopolitan pleasure-seekers, even the splendour
the new Paris and the wonders of the international exposi-
as, had the effect of embittering the labourers.

Until 1859 the Empire was an efficient autocracy; after that
e the regime became markedly more liberal. Napoleon
led the support of the advanced elements against the Catho-
s in his Italian policy, and he felt that sheer compression
s growing impossible in France. A number of progressive
asures were passed. It will be remembered that whilst
akes as such were not punishable by law, any concerted action
the part of the working men was an indictable offence; this
onally was removed in 1864. Mutual help and co-operative
ieties were not only authorized but encouraged. A central
Bank of Credit to Labour" was created in 1863. Article 1781
the Civil Code, obnoxious to wage-earners as a stigma of
gal inferiority, was repealed in 1868.

The Emperor's first cousin, Prince Napoleon, was the centre of an active group of Cæsarian democrats and Saint-Simonians. Guérault was known to be the representative of that group in the Parisian Press. A series of popular tracts, published under the inspiration of Prince Napoleon's friends, failed to dispel the anti-Bonapartist prejudice of the labourers. But it was through the efforts of Guérault and Prince Napoleon that a certain number of working men were sent as delegates to the Exposition of London in 1861. The liberal policy of the British Government in time of strikes, the power of the trade unions, opened the eyes of French visitors to the backwardness of their own land. Moreover, it made them realize of what importance international co-operation would be to the labour world.

In 1863 working men of several nations met again in London to consider the possibility of concerted action on behalf of Poland, then rising against its Russian oppressors. This meeting, although purely political, led to the formation of the "International Working Men's Association" in 1864. The International soon assumed in the eyes of the public an importance which was justified neither by its membership nor by its financial resources. Wild rumours were circulated about the "millions" in men and money of that mysterious power which threatened to engulf present society. The truth was that the International was powerless for lack of funds and for lack of common principles. At first the mutualistic conceptions of Proudhon prevailed in it. Then, at the Congress of Brussels, the collectivists secured control of the association. They had next to fight against the anarchists, led by Bakounine, whom the Marxists did not manage to expel until 1872. Meanwhile the International, rigorously prosecuted by the Imperial Government in 1867-68, had lost all vitality in France. Its apparent revival at the close of the Empire was due to the unsettled condition of the country—agitated by political reform, violent antidynastic attacks, numerous strikes, and rumours of foreign conflict. The International is a creditable but premature attempt, symptomatic rather than influential.

The working men had made the mistake of striking an alliance with the bourgeoisie of the liberal opposition. In 1863 they had

up their plan of having special labour candidates. In 1864 men stood independently and gathered a ridiculously small number of votes (424). In 1869 the labourers elected anti-socialists like Gambetta and Rochefort rather than members of their own class. They believed that if only the *tyranny* were thrown, they would get their own way. But the Empire refused to take a new lease of life; the plebiscite of May, 1870, showed that France was opposed to any thought of revolution. The Franco-Prussian War changed the conditions of the problem. The Empire fell as a result of military defeat. Labour questions faded into the background; the immediate task was to save the country. Then the Commune broke out. We have attempted to show how this insurrection was, at first, patriotic and not socialistic. Before its defeat, it had gradually assumed a strong tinge of nationalism and class struggle. The Versailles Government undoubtedly considered it in that light. Conservative France felt in the shudder of June, 1848; once more the solid earth had moved. Hence the ruthlessness of the repression, which partook of the atrocious character of a class war and a religious persecution. "Democracy was bled for a generation," and with democracy came socialism. Thus the original mistake of labelling the Commune socialistic has become a fact potent for evil. The tragic memories of 1871 gave the struggle of the classes in France a bitterness unknown in more fortunate lands.

SOCIALISM UNDER THE THIRD REPUBLIC.

Revival of socialism—Jules Guesde and Lafargue—Divisions into sects—Millerand and Jaurès—The Dreyfus case: impetus it gave to socialistic ideas—Millerand in Cabinet—Unification in 1904—Rupture with the Radicals.

Social policy of the Radicals: mutualism.

After the Commune there was a lull in the labour movement. The International, everywhere looked upon with suspicion, rigorously prohibited in France,* torn between the Marxists and the Bakouninists, emigrated to America and slipped quietly into oblivion. Most of the leaders of the French proletariat had disappeared in the storm of 1871.

* Dufaure law, 1872.

The struggle against monarchical and clerical reaction absorbed the energy of the rest. There was apparently a return to mutualism and co-operation, a revival of the ideas of Proudhon. The working men's congress of Paris in 1876 was strikingly moderate.

But socialism was growing unperceived. In 1872 a French translation of Marx's *Capital* had been published. Jules Guesde, a young fanatic, keen and rigid like a sword, was starting up his lifelong apostolate of Marxian orthodoxy. With Lafargue, another unswerving, indefatigable propagandist, he expounded his paper, *L'Egalité*, in innumerable pamphlets and lectures on the pure collectivist doctrine. Condemnations only served to spread his influence. Strikes and the agitation in favour of amnesty for the Communards favoured the growth of revolutionary sentiment. The Government refused to allow an International Working Men's Congress which was to be held in Paris in 1889. This illiberal step contributed to the success of the radical elements in the next national convention, at Marseilles in 1893. There the delegates of the working classes formally endorsed collectivism. The Moderates, although outnumbered at Marseilles, were still able to defeat the Revolutionists at Le Havre in 1895 and to drive them to secession. But the Socialist party was born.

Thenceforward the policy of the new party has been to steer a middle course between anarchism and mere "reformism." On the one hand, the Socialists severed all connection with the anarchists, whether those of the moderate Proudhonian type, or those of the revolutionary brand, taking their inspiration from Bakounine and Kropotkine. On the other hand, they guarded against entangling alliances with bourgeois democrats, even the most radical stripe like Clémenceau. They are supposed to take part in election, and yet to remain a foreign, inassimilable element in the political organism. It takes all the impassioned dialectics—or casuistry—of a Guesde to justify this sinuous course between total abstention and frank co-operation. Hence endless debates and numerous divisions.

Until 1904 the Socialists were split up into many shifting groups. The Blanquists, demagogues rather than Socialists

* As was shown by their participation in the Boulanger adventure.

er dreaming of a successful insurrection, without any clear vision of what the day after *that* would bring, were a dwindling survival of the Second Republic and the Commune. The Possibilists (Broussists), on the contrary, considering Marxism as outgrown, the last of the Utopian schemes, wanted to proceed to immediate reforms on the basis of the existing State and municipal services (1882). But, in 1890, a certain number of Possibilists grew tired of the cautious method of their leader, and seceded, forming the Allemanist group. Meanwhile, Guesde and his friends, excommunicating all heresiarchs, kept the Marxian faith pure and undefiled.

With all their violence and narrowness, these little sects presented a tolerably united front to the bourgeois world, and contrived to educate the public. In 1891 and 1893 their cause won two brilliant recruits: Millerand, an able lawyer, a born administrator, firm, clear-sighted, moderate; Jaurès, a professor of philosophy, an idealist, an orator of rare power and wonderful range of adaptability, and a practical politician of no mean order. At the general elections of 1893, fifty socialists were returned, and among them Jaurès, Guesde, Millerand. They at once started in the Chamber of Deputies one of those grand academic debates of which the French are so fond. It was a magnificent tournament of oratory, in which the conservative view was ably defended by Count de Mun, Deschanel, Aynard, Rivet. From an obscure revolutionary movement socialism had become one of the main currents in French national life. In 1896, Millerand, at Saint-Mandé, stated with his usual clearness and authority the three essential points of evolutionary socialism: nationalization of all means of production and exchange, as soon as each becomes ripe for such a transformation; conquest of public powers by means of universal suffrage; international understanding among working people. This programme was endorsed even by the Guesdists, at least as a minimum.

The Dreyfus case was a godsend to socialism. This purely individual affair developed, as we have seen, into a general battle for the sake of justice and truth, and the Socialists happened to be on the right side. The Guesdists, adhering strictly at first to their class prejudice, took no interest in this quarrel among

bourgeois. But even they could not fail to see what advantage it gave them in their campaign against the present regime. The accumulated mistakes of the "pillars of society"—Church, army, nobility, capital—were so many points scored by the Revolution. More generous and wiser in the end was the attitude of Jaurès. The Dreyfus case, he said, is a question of justice. Socialism, in our minds, is synonymous with justice. Therefore every Socialist ought to consider the cause of Dreyfus as his own. Thus, after fifty years of dismal materialism, French socialism was brought back into its traditional channel—broad humanitarianism. For many Frenchmen in 1898, as in 1848, socialism was, not an economic theory, not a political party, not a class organization but an aspiration and a faith. The author, who has lived through these stormy, unforgotten days, can testify to the extraordinary influence of Jaurès. Students and working men, united as of old, hailed him as their prophet. It was then that the rising generation of teachers went over to socialism. Anatole France, the delicate epicure and sceptic, de Pressensé, of Huguenot descent and a contributor to the capitalistic paper *Le Temps*, Emile Zola himself were carried by the tide.

Without the support of the Socialists no Government favourable to the cause of Dreyfus could command a majority in the Chamber of Deputies. So Waldeck-Rousseau, a conservative Republican, but fearless and far-sighted, struck an alliance with "the enemies of social order." He brought together in his cabinet General de Galliffet, an aristocratic soldier famous for his share in the pitiless repression of the Commune, and Millerand, who, in his Saint-Mandé speech, had stated the essentials of socialism. Millerand made a remarkably efficient Minister of Commerce and Industry. Hampered in his legislative action by the social conservatism of both houses, he secured a number of improvements by means of decrees, which his successors did not dare to repeal. His presence in the strongest administration that France had seen for a generation made a deep impression at home and abroad. Socialism had come to stay.

But even the most rabid conservatives did not attack Millerand with such bitterness as his fellow Socialists. Was the theory of class antagonism to be abandoned? Was Marxism to join the

anxiety and Icaria on the scrap-heap of outgrown utopias? the hope of a sudden catastrophe, the "red dawn" heralding millennium, to be laid aside as a myth? The Guesdists did not bear the thought. The elements of violence and envy which a revolutionary party cannot fail to attract were disappointed in the cautious, legal, temporizing method of the Parliamentary Socialists. In 1900 Jaurès had managed to ward off the excommunication which threatened Millerand. In 1904, at the Amsterdam congress, the participation of Socialists in bourgeois governments was formally condemned. At the same time the union, or rather the unification of the French Socialist parties, was at last realized. Jaurès remained within the ranks. These leaders who believed in parliamentary methods were few in number, but exceedingly able, the Independents have all held high positions: Millerand was twice again Minister, Briand twice Premier, Viviani Minister of War, Augagneur, a professor of medicine and Mayor of Lyons, was Minister and Governor-General of Madagascar. Cautious and conservative as they have often proved to be, these men have never abjured socialism.

Meanwhile the electoral progress of the party was striking. In 1906 the Unified Socialists, exclusive of the Independents, polled 894,934 votes; in 1910, 1,107,369. A large fraction of the Radical party, whilst remaining attached to the principle of private ownership, was willing to go very far in the way of State socialism, and even tagged the word "socialist" to its name (partei socialiste). Thus a number of social laws were passed: the Millerand-Colliard law, in 1900, limiting the day's work to eight hours; a law on the compulsory assistance of the aged and infirm (1905); a Sunday rest law, bitterly assailed by the Conservatives, who as a rule are the chief supporters of the Church (1906); a system of old age pensions (1906). As a sign of this increased interest in social legislation, a Department of Labour was created in 1906.

The Radicals, however, feel how weak their position would be if they had no doctrine but reluctant, mitigated socialism. Pure *laissez-faire*, with its brutal individualism, has few supporters left. Only a few Catholic employers and the disciples of Le

Play still adhere to the old conceptions of class subordination, patronage, and charity. Fortunately, M. Léon Bourgeois, for a long time the nominal leader of the Radical party, rediscovered the doctrine of "solidarity." * This principle is now the basis of moral education in the State schools. It forms a sane and safe compromise between the extremes of individualism and socialism. Translated into economic terms, solidarity spells co-operation and mutualism. Co-operation has developed but little, in spite of the efforts of Professor Gide: it would affect the interests of the innumerable retail dealers who are such a powerful factor in French politics. But mutualism is encouraged with almost ludicrous solicitude. There are national celebrations, and special medals are struck, in honour of mutualism. Three presidents—MM. Loubet, Fallières, and Poincaré—have claimed the proud distinction of being the first, second, and third Mutualists in the Republic. No one would deny M. Deschanel the fourth place; and the actual leaders of the movement, MM. Mabillean and Cavé, are undoubtedly clever and successful propagandists. But, with the exception of official orators, no one affects to believe that this expurgated edition of Proudhonism contains the secret of the social sphinx.†

§ 5. SYNDICALISM, ETC.

Syndicalism—Waldeck-Rousseau law, 1884—Hostility of the employers—Direct action—The "conscious minority"—The general strike—Kinship to anarchism—Violence.

Syndicalism and the State employees.

The rural classes.

When the Socialists brought to an end their alliance with bourgeois politicians in 1904, they were not impelled by a mere theoretical belief in class antagonism, they were in danger of losing the leadership of the labour world to a new and formidable rival, syndicalism. Whilst collectivism had grown respectable and harmless, the elements of uncompromising

* The interdependence of all human beings advocated forty years previously by Pierre Leroux.

† This is true of other commendable expedients, like profit-sharing (Leclaire; *Famillistère de Guise*; Boucicaut's *Bon Marché*, etc.).

discontent and irrepressible disorder had rallied round that new flag.

“Syndicats” or trade unions were strictly prohibited from 1791 to 1864; under the Chapelier law no association among working men for the discussion and defence of their “alleged common interests” could be formed, and the “societies of resistance,” although fairly numerous and sometimes successful under Louis-Philippe, were of a more or less temporary, secret, and illegal nature. When concerted action (“coalition”) was permitted in 1864, syndicates, the necessary instruments of such action, were not yet formally authorized. But the Imperial Government pledged itself to a policy of toleration, which was continued by the Republic until 1884. It was then that Waldeck-Rousseau, the brilliant young lieutenant and ablest successor of Gambetta, gave the labour unions their legal status, and instructed his prefects to make easy for them the fulfilment of all required formalities.

Waldeck-Rousseau would have liked to foster in France the development of powerful, highly organized unions of the English type, which he considered as an element of progress and stability. His statesmanlike policy was not understood. The employers clung to the prejudice that every working men’s association was a revolutionary agency, bent upon depriving them of their legitimate share of profit and authority. They succeeded in frightening away from the syndicates all the “good” men, *i.e.*, those of a conservative, respectful, and timid turn of mind. These associations remained, therefore, the rallying-point of the agitators and the malcontents. Their ranks would swell in times of crisis, and be depleted when normal conditions prevailed. In short, labour unions have never been fully acclimatized in France. The Government outwardly favoured them. It subsidized labour exchanges,* which, among other fields of usefulness, were to provide a home for the syndicates. At the same time, the old spirit of diffidence and secret hostility had not vanished. Whilst the State encouraged the labourers of private industries to form unions, it never formally granted the same right to its own employees, just as the kings of old favoured the

* The one in Paris was opened in 1887.

communal movement everywhere except in their own domains. Many unions refused to comply with certain formalities which they considered vexatious, useless, and even dangerous. M. Dupuy took advantage of the conflict to close the Paris Labour Exchange in 1893. In fact, this official home of the syndicates in the capital has repeatedly been turned into a sort of insurrectional fortress which the police had to capture, not without bloodshed.*

The labour unions were supposed to be purely economic associations and to stand aloof from politics. As a matter of fact, their neutrality never was more than nominal. For a long time they were considered as mere branches of the Socialist party. Socialist deputies and journalists pleaded their cause in Parliament and in the Press, Socialist orators came to encourage them with fiery speeches in times of conflict. In 1902 the General Confederation of Labour, created in 1895, practically absorbed the earlier Federation of Labour Exchanges and became the leading factor in the situation. From that time on Syndicalism, fully organized, has become more and more independent of the Socialist party. But it retains the essentials of the Socialist doctrine—the war of the classes, the emancipation of the wage earners, collective ownership of all instruments of production. The difference between the Socialists and the Syndicalists is one of method and spirit. The Socialists believe in political action. The moderate elements among them even believe in parliamentary methods and try to secure immediate social improvements through co-operation with the bourgeois parties. The more radical branch pooh-pooh such attempts, but expect to carry out socialism *in toto* as soon as they have captured the political machinery. In a country like France, governed by manhood suffrage, their aim and their method are not essentially revolutionary. The Syndicalists, on the contrary, have no faith in politics. They ignore the State, which is merely an organization for the defence of capital. They ignore the Fatherland, a

* However, it must be said that a few syndicates were conducted in a less violent and more businesslike method. The Federation of the Printing Trades, ably led by Keufer, has a fine record of efficient service. The Miners' Union, with Basly, and the Railwaymen's Union, with Guérard, secured favourable legislation for their respective industries, on account of the electoral influence which their numbers gave them.

delusion kept up by the governing classes in order to perpetuate their power. Social legislation is a snare. Socialist politicians are mostly professional men, bourgeois by birth, education, association; in a bourgeois assembly, they lose touch with the actual problems of the working classes. Laws with high-sounding labels, but amended by the conservative Senate, hemmed in by restrictive interpretations of the Minister and the Council of State, enforced with reluctance or partisanship by the prefects, the police, the courts, bring no relief to the labourers. The rôle of Parliament is not to initiate reforms: the best it can do is to register them in the Statute-book when they have been conquered by *direct action*. The war of the classes is not political, but economic; it should be waged not in assemblies, but in the streets or in workshops. Its chief instrument is the strike. Not only can the strike secure definite advantages—shorter hours, higher wages, recognition of the unions, etc.—but it has a high educative value. For it makes the antagonism of capital and labour manifest; and it prepares men's minds for the final consummation—the revolution of folded arms, the general strike, which, paralysing the whole bourgeois world, would usher in the new order. What that new order would be is not perfectly clear. This, at least, is certain: mere geographical organization would be subordinated to professional organization, the labour union, rather than the city, would be the social unit, the federation of labour would be more important than the State; in other words, the “political hierarchy would be replaced by economic federalism.”

Strikes are open war. But the silent war of the classes goes on relentlessly, even in times of apparent truce. So *direct action* continues, even when working men are at their posts. They can retaliate against employers hostile to organized labour by doing systematically poor work (“sabotage”), or by taking as long as they possibly can to finish a certain job (“fignolage”). They can thus show their determination to sacrifice the interests of their employers, whenever these interests are in conflict with their own. They can enforce their will through street demonstrations and public meetings, by a display of sheer number if that be sufficient to overawe their adversaries, by open violence

in case of need. Thus was secured the closing of objectionable private employment bureaux.

The Syndicalists know that "organized labour" forms but a small fraction of the active population in France. Furthermore, within that minority, the advocates of direct action and constant warfare are themselves a minority. They have steadily refused, in their congresses, proportional representation, which might place the big and comparatively conservative syndicates in control. They were hostile to the Millerand bill for the compulsory arbitration of labour disputes, which would require *all* working men to vote, by secret ballot, before deciding on a strike. Their argument is that democracy, the rule of mere numbers, is a fallacy. Only the few clear-sighted and energetic men who are *conscious* of their rights and willing to run risks are entitled to leadership. A handful of adventurous pioneers must blaze the trail for the rest. The amorphous mass should follow, and, in fact, does follow. Such is the law of progress.*

Syndicalism is the direct offspring of anarchism: Proudhon is the ancestor of the moderate Syndicalists, Bakounine and Kropotkin the intellectual leaders of the more radical. But anarchism has a double aspect: free association as an ideal, and the violent destruction of the existing order. Violence rather than association is the keynote of the present movement. There has undoubtedly been, within the last sixty years, a re-barbarization of Western Europe which the spread of education has failed to check. Bonapartism and Bismarckism, in some respects, represented the insolent triumph of brute force. The repression of the Commune has filled the brains of the working classes with tragic visions. Darwinism was made to mean "struggle for life and the survival of the fittest." Imperialism and military

* This philosophy, in which can be traced Nietzschean and Bergsonian influences, has been copiously expounded by an involved, paradoxical, and stimulating thinker, Georges Sorel, mainly in *The Delusions of Progress* and *Reflections on Violence*. One curious point of this doctrine is the theory of *myths*. Men need some hope of sudden and complete salvation, a myth embodying all their aspirations. The second coming of Christ was such a myth for the early Church. The general strike is the myth of Syndicalism. Its potency is not to be measured by its practicability: it is a dynamic or creative idea.

patriotism are doctrines of violence. Nations have been living on the principle that might is right. The moral effect of these influences can now be seen.

There is, of course, in syndicalism, as in all gospels of war, something superior to mere brutality. There is a sense of the value of energy and individual responsibility. Dr. Gustave Le Bon and others affected to believe that State socialism would be the refuge of wornout, effete races: syndicalism preaches the strenuous life. There is no flabbiness about it.

It seems as though the worst of the *first* syndicalist crisis were over. In 1906-10 France, in the opinion of many thoughtful observers, was on the verge of a revolution. The 1st of May, 1906, was expected to open the era of conflagration. The postmen's strike, the rebellion of the winegrowers in the south, the general railroad strike, were signs of deep social unrest. No radical change has taken place; but there is a lull in the strife, due partly to the revival of military nationalism. The old machines, parliamentary government and capitalistic industry, continue their course without excessive jerks or friction. But the outlook is by no means reassuring.

The most unexpected development of syndicalism was its success among the State employees. They had always been considered as the mainstays of order, discipline, and the hierarchy. Direct action was the last thing these "knights of the red tape" seemed capable of. They had already what other labourers strive in vain to secure: short hours, steady employment, old age pensions. Their alliance with the revolutionists seemed sheer madness. But they had economic grievances: their wages had not increased so fast as the cost of living.* The only method of improving their condition was through Parliament; but "lobbying" is a slow, uncertain, and above all a humiliating method. The officials grew weary of importuning deputies and senators for favours instead of discussing the terms

* The rate of letter postage had been reduced from 15 centimes to 10; hence a rapid growth of postal business, whilst the staff remained about the same and complained of overwork. The teachers had been expected to devote their evenings to social work (mutual help societies, etc.) and extension classes without any remuneration.

of a contract like free men. They resented especially the growing interference of politicians in matters of appointments and promotions. The French civil service had never been run on the spoils system: the same functionaries, appointed for life, served all Ministries, Governments, or even regimes with the same zeal or the same indifference. The bureaucracy was until recent years an autonomous power in the State. Now, after the Dreyfus crisis, the Radicals thought it was a scandal that the Republic should be served by Monarchists whilst so many good Republicans were kept out in the cold; so they set themselves to the task of "republicanizing" the different public services. This policy had some justification; there had been in the past instances of flagrant anti-republican favouritism. But the abuses did not disappear; they merely changed sides. The friends of Radical deputies were advanced with scandalous rapidity. Young private secretaries were promoted over the heads of tried and faithful specialists. It was against this growing evil, this multitudinous tyranny, that the officials rose in their wrath. Syndicalism was in fashion; so they formed syndicates and sought affiliations to the General Federation of Labour. Not that they were anarchists; all they wanted was that a certain measure of democracy be introduced into the old Napoleonic hierarchy, and guarantees that promotion would be the reward of professional merit rather than of political intrigue. A law defining the status of State employees has long been promised but is ever deferred. It would allow them to form associations, but not syndicates. Some method would be devised for adjusting their difficulties without resorting to strikes. When such a law is passed, if it be broad enough, and generously interpreted, the syndicalist danger will disappear. At present, France offers the paradoxical situation of State employees as a body supporting the General Confederation of Labour—an organization openly at war with the State.*

* It is probable that State employees will be divided into three categories, with slightly different rights: (1) Purely industrial services, arsenals, ship-building yards, gun foundries, match and tobacco factories, etc. (2) Industrial services which cannot be interrupted without inflicting damages on the general life of the country (telephonic, telegraphic, postal,

Sixty per cent. of the French population live on the land, and landowners form more than one-half of the rural classes; there are 3,500,000 peasant proprietors (12 to 15,000,000 with their families). Here we have, therefore, the conditions which the leaders of the "Back to the Land" movement are so eager to restore in Great Britain. This is the main result of the Revolution, which confiscated and sold the estates of the nobility and clergy. The Napoleonic Code gave stability to the new regime, and through elaborate inheritance laws prevented the reconstitution of large domains. As a matter of fact, throughout the nineteenth century there has been no tendency towards concentration; Marxian prophecies are here absolutely at fault.

The division of property has undoubtedly gone to an extreme in France. Each peasant owns but a few acres, which are scattered in small and irregular fields all over the territory of the parish; this is why the French countryside offers such a curious patchwork. Thanks to the obstinate toil of the peasant and to his thrifty habits he can manage to subsist on his diminutive farm. He can even hoard up a few écus in the traditional woollen stocking, until he gets a chance of purchasing another patch of ground. This class is said to be the backbone of France. No one will deny their perseverance and frugality. Under this regime, the country is practically self-supporting and almost free from severe economic crises; and its faculty of recuperation after great disasters is truly marvellous. But one may wonder whether the price paid for these advantages was not excessive. The scattered fields entail an enormous waste of labour; modern methods require larger areas, more capital, more education, a broader outlook, than the plodding French peasant can possess. If he were left unprotected, he could not compete with the large and up-to-date producers of America. This would lead to a recasting of the agricultural system—a terrible crisis, but one which might be followed by an era of indefinite progress. Such a revolution, however, is not to be expected; the peasants are the controlling factor in the political life of the country. On

and railroad services). (3) Administrative officers, tax-collectors, and other clerks, police, teachers, etc. But the distinction is by no means easy to draw.

almost every subject they follow the lead of the cities; but when their immediate interests are at stake they know how to take care of themselves. The one hope of salvation for the country lies in agricultural associations. Whilst the peasants are radically opposed to the collective ownership of land, they are beginning to realize the possibilities of co-operation. Their syndicates—which have nothing but the name in common with the syndicates of industrial workers—will help them to combine the advantages of capital, expert advice and scientific management, with the incentive value and independence of private property.*

France, on the whole, is the country where socialistic ideas are most openly professed and assume the most radical forms. But it is at the same time the land where property is most equally divided. To the huge masses of peasant proprietors, retail dealers, and independent artisans should be added the untold millions of small investors—for rare is the French family that has not a savings bank account or a few francs of rente. The army of social conservation is therefore overwhelmingly strong. The drawback of this system is mediocrity. In spite of all industry and thriftiness, the wealth of France is not increasing so fast as that of her more daring rivals. The policy of saving cents rather than earning dollars is bound to prove disastrous in the long run. Money-making on the large scale has its redeeming features; but there is no hope of salvation for dull and mean materialism, the besetting sin of the petty bourgeoisie.

* M. Jules Méline is the leader of the French agrarians, and during his term of office (1896-98) he served their interests by every means in his power.

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CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

VI. THE SOCIAL QUESTION

- 1789 August 4. (Theoretical) Suppression of Feudalism and reform of Guilds.
 November 3. Abolition of Feudal Regime. Some of the rights to be redeemed.
- 1791 March to June. Laws abolishing Guilds, and Chapelier law prohibiting professional associations of any kind.
- 1793 March 18. Death penalty enacted against whoever should propose an "agrarian law" (for the equal division of property).
 July 17. All forms of feudal property abolished without compensation.
- 1796-97 Campaign, conspiracy and execution of Caius Gracchus Babœuf.
- 1804 Civil Code (based on bourgeois conception of property and liberty of contract. Cf. Art. 1780-81).
- 1825 Death of Saint-Simon.
- 1831 November, and 1834, February. Lyons Insurrection.
- 1832 Dispersion of the Saint-Simonian School.
- 1834 Society of the Rights of Man (socialistic).
- 1837 Death of Fourier.
- 1837-39 Society of the Seasons (Barbès and Blanqui).
- 1840 Communists' Federation founded in London. Cabet's *Icaria*.
- 1841 Louis Blanc: *On the Organization of Labour*.
 Proudhon: *What is Property?*
- 1847 Manifesto of the Communist party, Marx and Engels.
- 1848 February. Revolution in Paris. Democratic and Social Republic. Luxembourg Commission on Labour Problem. Creation of National Workshops.
 June. Suppression of National Workshops. Socialistic Insurrection. Leaders deported or shot.
 September 9. Law limiting day's work to twelve hours.
- 1851 December 2. Coup d'État. Reaction, Socialists deported. Societies dissolved. Right of reunion curtailed. Era of great public works and industrialism.
- 1859 Amnesty. Return of many exiles.
- 1861 Working men's delegates sent to the Exposition of London. Prince Napoleon tries to form a Bonapartist Labour party.
- 1863 General Elections. Manifesto of the Sixty.
- 1864 Prohibition of "coalitions" repealed.
 The International Working Men's Association.
- 1865 Death of Proudhon.
- 1867 Publication of Marx's *Capital* (translated into French, 1872).
- 1868 International Association ruined in France by two public prosecutions. Communists triumph over Mutualists at the Brussels Congress. Repeal of Art. 1781 of the Civil Code, and other Liberal measures. Numerous strikes, 1867-70.
- 1871 March to May. The Commune.

- 1872 Congress of the International at the Hague. Marxists expel Bakouninists.
- 1877 Jules Guesde's first campaign on behalf of Marxism.
- 1879 Marseilles Congress. Socialists assume direction of Labour Movement.
- 1884 Waldeck-Rousseau Law on Trade Unions.
- 1887 Paris Labour Exchange open.
- 1889 International Socialist Congress, Paris.
- 1892-94 Anarchistic outrages. Repressive measures.
- 1892 Law limiting day's work to eleven hours for women and children. Federation of Labour Exchanges.
- 1893 Paris Labour Exchange closed by Government.
- 1895 General Confederation of Labour created.
- 1896 Millerand's Speech at Saint-Mandé, defining Political Socialism.
- 1898 Employers' Liability Act.
- 1898-99 Dreyfus Crisis. Millerand Minister of Commerce and Industry in Waldeck-Rousseau Cabinet. Numerous Socialistic decrees (1899-1902).
- 1899-1900 Numerous strikes.
- 1900 March 30. Millerand-Colliard Law, limiting day's work to eleven hours for men employed in the same shops as women and children.
- International Socialist Congress in Paris.
- 1902 General Confederation of Labour absorbs Federation of Labour Exchanges.
- 1904 Amsterdam Congress. Participation of Socialists in bourgeois governments condemned. Unification of French Socialist party.
- 1905 July 14. Law on the Compulsory Assistance of the Aged and Incurable.
- 1906 May 6. General Elections. Unified Socialists, 894,934 (exclusive of Independent Socialists).
- July 6. Law on the Weekly Day of Rest.
- October 25. Creation of Department of Labour and Social Welfare (Viviani).
- 1909 March to May. Two postal strikes.
- 1910 Briand, Millerand, Viviani—three Socialists in Cabinet.
- April 5. Old Age Pension Act.
- General Elections. Unified Socialist party, 1,107,369 votes.
- October. Railroad Strikes. Briand calls out the reserves.

CHAPTER VII

EDUCATION

§ 1. REVOLUTION AND EMPIRE.

Relation of educational problem to religion and politics—Education on the eve of the Revolution—Ruin of the old system—Abortive plans—The Central Schools.

Napoleon: Elementary education ignored—The Lycées—The Facultés—The University: its nature and purpose.

THE problems of French education cannot be understood except in the light of political and religious history. This is the inevitable result of the rift in the country's tradition. Education is meant to spread knowledge and to fit men for life: but to discern true from false knowledge, to tell rightly what kind of individual and social life is worth living implies a criterion, a philosophy, a faith. In America there are innumerable eddies in the broad stream of national consciousness: there is but one main current. Christianity and eighteenth-century rationalism, individualism, and democracy have been harmonized, or at least blended, for over a hundred years; hence a comparatively simple conception of what education should be. The guide knows whither he is leading: the road and the pace alone are in question. In other terms, the principles of education are beyond dispute, the problem is mainly one of pedagogy. All over Europe, on the contrary, and particularly in France, conflicting faiths clash furiously—conservatism against radicalism, Christianity against freethought. The school is a strategic position as keenly fought for as Parliament itself.

Before 1789 education was entirely under the control of the clergy. The State had direct authority only over few special

institutions, such as the Royal College (Collège de France). In villages the parish priest taught a few promising lads; in the cities the elementary and secondary schools were mostly in the hands of friars. Girls were brought up in convents. The Jesuits had been particularly successful in the education of the upper bourgeoisie and the aristocracy. Rich families had ecclesiastical preceptors. Latin and mathematics were the essential parts of the curriculum. The twenty-two old universities were moribund.

It cannot be denied that the upper classes of that time were intellectually bold, alert, logical, tolerably well informed, and cultured in the broadest sense of the term. Through a large number of scholarships and charitable institutions the sons of the people had access to a liberal schooling. Minor cities took pride in their learned bodies, their "academies." Education on the eve of the Revolution was, it may be granted, obsolete, lopsided, chaotic in the extreme; but it was not so inefficient as modern democrats would have us believe. If it had been, the universal diffusion of *philosophical* ideas revealed in the *Cahiers* of 1789 would be inconceivable.*

The Revolution ruined this ancient order: the universities ceased to exist, the colleges lost their income, the convents were dispersed, the priests were banished or under constant suspicion. The new regime had a lofty conception of national education. Plan after plan was proposed and discussed at length, but the results were disappointing. The first reason is that some of the schemes, like those of Condorcet and Lepeletier de Saint-Fargeau, were grandiose but impracticable. Even the more modest required vast resources which were not forthcoming at a time of civil and foreign war. The local authorities were as poor and powerless as the central administration. There was a dearth of competent teachers: the clerics were not available, the laymen of some culture had more brilliant careers open to them. Thus illiteracy increased, and the generation which grew to manhood in the last decade of the eighteenth century was undoubtedly more ignorant and probably less intelligent than its predecessors.

* *Cahiers*: the lists of grievances and proposed reforms drawn by the primary assemblies before the elections to the States General.

In secondary education the humanities, in spite of the craze for classical antiquity, suffered most heavily. The central schools, which after 1795 took the place of the old colleges, offered a system of elective courses: the great majority of students took science and drawing, whilst history, legislation, and "general grammar" were neglected. The immediate practical value of the sciences was realized by the State as well as by private citizens; if Lavoisier's services to chemistry failed to save his life, other scientists enjoyed the enlightened protection of the Government. The most interesting creations of the Convention—the Polytechnic School, the Bureau des Longitudes, the reorganized Museum of Natural History, or the Conservatory of Arts and Crafts—were scientific, and more especially technical institutions. On the other hand, the famous French Academy lost its prestige with its identity, and survived as a mere section of the new Institute of France. The alleged antagonism between democracy and disinterested culture was already apparent.

No attempt was made to provide an equivalent for the old universities. There were only two law schools and three medical schools left for the whole of France. Even these were not well attended: for whoever cared to set himself up as a lawyer or a physician could do so without a degree. There soon was a scarcity of trained and skilful practitioners.

Enormous was the task awaiting the First Consul in this as in all other fields. Unfortunately he was totally unprepared for this side of it. He was a born administrator; in legislation he saw with great clearness a few essential points; but he was no educator, and his suggestions were often chaotic and impracticable to a surprising degree.* His advisers, Chaptal and Fourcroy, were great chemists, but their minds lacked philosophic breadth. Something was achieved, of course. With the return of normal conditions education was bound to progress. But the intellectual development of France was handicapped rather than promoted by the creations of Napoleon.

Elementary education was simply ignored. A paltry subsidy of 4,250 francs to the Catholic schools was all the contribution

* Liard, *L'Enseignement Supérieur*, etc., II, 22-3.

of the State to that essential service. Teachers were instructed not to go beyond the three R's and the Catechism, wherein "our duties towards our Sovereign Napoleon the Great" were properly emphasized. Prefects were at liberty to create normal schools in their departments, but only one, Lezay-Marnésia, in the lower Rhine, availed himself of the permission.

In secondary education the central schools disappeared. Some of them had met with indifferent success: little wonder during a period of upheaval and regeneration! but many were flourishing. Experience had revealed many imperfections: they did not properly articulate with any other grade; they were "suspended in mid-air"; their system of electives was detrimental to literary culture. But, compared with the colleges of the ancient regime, they were remarkably practical, democratic, open to modern ideas. Their courses on "the history of free nations" and comparative legislation—the first to be suppressed by Bonaparte—could have provided an adequate preparation for citizenship in a modern State. Experts agreed that a reform was needed: hardly any one advocated a return to the pre-Revolutionary methods. Yet the lycées were hardly anything but the old colleges, with their interminable Latin course, their emphasis on rhetoric and formal logic, their neglect of history and natural science, their monastic discipline. The central school student enjoyed excessive freedom in the selection of his courses: now uniformity prevailed, enforced throughout the Empire by a centralized bureaucracy. The boarding system, too, was restored in all its rigour. For eight or nine years, and for ten months in the year, boys were to see little or nothing of their families. Every one of their movements would be regulated by the rolling of drums. They had to wear a military uniform. Their headmasters resided in the schools and were celibates like the monks of old. The lycée was a combination of the cloister and the barracks. Its aim was to drill obedient subjects: individuality was constantly repressed.

The lycées were supposed to provide all the general culture needed for life. Consequently, superior education was entrusted, not to universities, but to technical schools, in which disinterested science had no place. The professions were no longer free of

access as under the Revolution: a degree was necessary to qualify as a physician or a lawyer. The granting of this degree, which created a privilege for its holder and constituted a guarantee for the State, thus became the chief end of superior education. A rigid system of examinations was established, so that the degrees of the new facultés might not become a farce like those of the old universities. There was a gain in efficiency. But formalism and cramming always go with the examination method, and they still prevail.*

No less than twenty-seven facultés of Letters and as many facultés of Sciences were planned. This very abundance should warn us that they were but in name similar to the professional schools of law, medicine, and divinity. They were at best a sort of undergraduate department. As a matter of fact, most of them had a purely nominal existence; they had no teaching staff and no buildings of their own, but borrowed both from the lycées. With the advancement of learning they had little to do. Their rôle was threefold. In a sense they were professional; they prepared teachers for secondary education. Essentially they were examining bodies, stamping with official approval the products of the lycées and guarding the entrance to the professions. Accessorily, they were institutes or athenæums, centres for popular lectures opened to the general public. These characters they have retained throughout the nineteenth century and are but slowly losing at present. University professors still waste much time examining high-school students, and the old-fashioned literary course, full of wit, eloquence, and allusions, is still occasionally given for the benefit of fashionable ladies and retired magistrates.

In France, therefore, there were no genuine universities, since the different facultés of the same region did not form a group, but were absolutely unrelated and often located in

* In addition to three medical schools and nine law schools, Napoleon organized two schools of Protestant and nine schools of Catholic theology. This was the consequence of the official association between the State and the Churches. The Catholic schools were always viewed with suspicion by Rome: they disappeared in 1885 unregretted. The Protestant schools became independent of State control in 1905.

different towns; and there was no Philosophische Fakultät worthy of the name, nothing even that we might call a College of Liberal Arts. The results of these deficiencies were disastrous enough; they would have been much worse but for the existence in Paris of a certain number of institutions which partly supplied the need. First of all, two relics of the ancient regime, the Royal College and the King's Garden, reorganized by the Convention as the Collège de France and the Museum of Natural History. The College, founded by Francis I to promote the study of classical languages, is an admirable centre of disinterested investigation, preparing to no career, requiring and granting no degrees. The Museum, annexed to a zoological and botanical garden, is also an organization for teaching and research; it is unequalled for the number of famous scientists on its roll. The Normal School and the Polytechnic School were created by the Convention, but did not assume their final form until later. In the Normal School, the severe selection of a competitive entrance examination, and the small number of students, all boarders, have created an atmosphere and a tradition of no small importance in the history of French literature and science. The Polytechnicians are also a picked body of young men; more numerous than the Normalians and subjected to strict military discipline, they show less individuality, a more rigid esprit de corps. The curriculum is so encyclopedic, the studies so thorough, that the school has turned out not only artillery officers and government engineers, but scientists, philosophers, and even poets. These and other survivals or creations such as the Paris Observatory, the Bureau of Longitudes, and the School of Modern Oriental languages, counteracted the sterilizing influence of Napoleon's system.

This system was completed by the creation of the Imperial University, decided upon in 1806, but not effected until two years later. The general problem was to reconstitute the unity of the nation, to reconcile the old France and the new. The Concordat and the University were means to that end. The University was to include every form and degree of public education throughout the land. No one could open a school

or become a teacher without entering its ranks and conforming to its regulations. The University represents the omnipotent State in its educational capacity. In Napoleon's intention, it was to remain to a certain extent independent of the State. Liberty of education was contrary to Napoleon's principles: to him it meant anarchy; a monopoly directly exercised by the secular power would have been intolerable to the Catholics, whose support was essential to his plans; give over education to the Church he would not and could not, for it was impossible to undo so openly the work of the Revolution, and besides he was jealous of his own prerogatives. So he devised this intermediate organ, this curious entity, this separate corporation, endowed, privileged, and yet non-political. Laymen and priests were to find place in it, under the authority of a Grand Master appointed by the Emperor. He hoped to make it a real "Order," submitted to rules of celibacy and life in common; the very name Grand Master pointed in that direction. He hoped especially that this "Order" would hold, preserve, and teach the principles of the regime created by him, and bring up the new generation in the reverence of his dynasty. He tried to manufacture a tradition in a decade. The undertaking was grandiose and not wholly selfish: for Napoleon considered his power, his interests, as identical with those of the new France. But it was doomed to failure; the new regime had no principles of its own broad enough to be acceptable to all Frenchmen, and definite enough to provide a firm basis for national education. The apparent unity secured by the University was the result of compromise and compulsion: it was conformity, not harmony. Like the Concordat, the University was a constant cause of discord. But it did not endure so long. Barely forty years after its inception it was a thing of the past (1850). To-day hardly anything remains of the Napoleonic conception, except its administrative framework.*

* The University of France was then divided into educational districts or "academies" (there are sixteen at present). The rectors of these academies are the equivalent of State Superintendents or Commissioners of Education, at the same time as university presidents.

§ 2. CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY.

The Restoration—The University preserved—The clerical question—The Sorbonne trio—Elementary education; mutual and simultaneous systems—The July monarchy—Heyday of the University—The Collège de France trio—Attacks of the Catholics against the monopoly—Guizot law on elementary education.

The University was so entirely Napoleon's work that it was not expected to survive his downfall. In 1814-15, Royer-Collard and Guizot were commissioned to draw up an ordinance which created seventeen regional universities, thereby destroying the single, centralized organization of the Empire. The return from Elba caused this plan to be set aside. With the Second Restoration, the attack on the University was renewed with great ardour. The Catholics, the Ultra-Royalists, denounced it as a centre of "Jacobinism." But more pressing problems called the attention of the Government and the University was "provisionally" maintained.* For the Grand Master and the Superior Council were substituted a Committee of Five, in which Royer-Collard and Cuvier played the leading parts. After six years of this temporary regime, the constitution and privileges of the University were purely and simply confirmed, and the position of Grand Master revived (February 27, 1821). Once more it was apparent that Louis XVIII was the successor of Napoleon I and not of Louis XVI. The centralized institutions of the Empire were so convenient, they represented so clearly the ideal which the old French kings were slowly attempting to realize, that the restored monarchy could not afford to discard them. Thus the prefectoral administration was preserved, in spite of a strong sentiment in favour of provincial franchises; thus it was not found possible to dispense with the Concordat; thus the University was saved. This does not mean that the genius of Napoleon had created the indispensable framework of modern France: it means that his autocracy had spoiled his successors, who, naturally

* A few facultés of sciences and seventeen facultés of letters were suppressed.

enough, were reluctant to give up any of the prerogatives he had enjoyed: self-denial is even less to be expected of a government than of individuals.

The University was retained as *instrumentum regni*. It would have to bring up the new generation in the love of legitimate monarchy and the Catholic Church. Every effort was bent in that direction. Cousin, Guizot, whose teaching seemed too liberal, were dismissed. The Normal School had already been suppressed for the same reason. The Grand Master was a priest, Mgr. de Frayssinous. In 1824, when the Ministry of Public Education became a Cabinet position, it was significantly linked with the Department of Ecclesiastical Affairs. The bishops were empowered to visit all the schools in their dioceses. They were at the head of the committees for the appointment of teachers. Yet the Church was not satisfied with such tremendous influence: what she wanted was direct control. The University stood in the way; although permeated by the clergy, it was in principle a lay institution. So the Catholics did not disarm, and Lamennais, at that time a thoroughgoing Ultramontane, accused the State schools of teaching "practical atheism and the hatred of Christianity." It is interesting to note that, nearly a century ago, the Bourbon monarchy was attacked exactly in the same terms as the Republic of Jules Ferry, Paul Bert, and Émile Combes. It proves that nothing short of absolute domination will satisfy the Church. Unable to secure that, she attempted to break down the monopoly enjoyed by the State. The preparatory seminaries, since 1814, were no longer under the jurisdiction of the University; they were gradually turned into ordinary high schools, and enrolled more students than the official lycées and colleges.* The Jesuits, under the name of Fathers of the Faith, were developing their institutions. The plan of attack was well concerted.

But the reactionary De Villèle administration was driven from office. The Liberals came in with De Martignac, and the "encroachments of clericalism" were checked. As a

* In 1828, 50,000 against 35,000 in the public high schools and 28,000 in the private high schools under University supervision.

measure of protection against the Jesuits, all teachers were required to sign a declaration that they did not belong to a religious order not legally authorized in France. The preparatory seminaries were reduced to their proper sphere, the education of future candidates for the priesthood, and the maximum number of their students was fixed at 20,000 (June 16, 1829). Cousin and Guizot were reinstated in their University positions. They and Villemain attracted crowds to the old Sorbonne. Cousin, a genuine philosopher with a dash of the mountebank—Plato-Scapin, as Sainte-Beuve called him—denounced materialism and preached with admirable eloquence his eclectic idealism—Plato, Kant, Hegel compounded to suit the taste of the Liberal bourgeoisie. At that time, Cousin believed that philosophy transcended religion, that it was religion purified from popular prejudices; and he came dangerously near what the orthodox are pleased to call the “abyss of pantheism.” Guizot expounded with lofty gravity the philosophy of French civilization. The ultimate triumph of safe and sane liberalism, as represented by the middle class, was the underlying principle of all his courses. Villemain was not a man of the same calibre. Yet he lectured with brilliant success on the literature of the eighteenth century, rightly insisting on the comparative study of French and foreign authors. These three professors, Mignet aptly said, had France for their audience. A time when the triumphs of educators eclipsed those of opera singers is not to be despised. Yet it may be said that the influence on the development of French education was not wholly good. Admirable work was done at the Sorbonne, the Collège de France, the Museum, by men like Cauchy, Leclerc, Biot, Ampère, Thénard, Daunou, Quatremère de Quincy, Silvestre de Sacy, Abel Rémusat, Boissonade, J. L. Burnouf, Gay-Lussac, Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, Cuvier. Cousin, Guizot, Villemain themselves were scholars as well as orators. Cousin, flashy though he was, did excellent service in editing important texts,* and he actually created in France the historical study of philosophy. Guizot was an indefatigable and conscientious

* Proclus in six volumes, Pascal, etc.

investigator, and it was under his direction that in after years the great collection of documents relative to French history was commenced. But it was not these substantial achievements that their disciples and rivals admired or envied; it was the exhilaration of swaying an assembly in which the aristocracies of birth, beauty, wealth, intellect and political power were represented. The great trio of 1829 are partly responsible for Bellac—for the many elegant, witty, and shallow courses which have so long been the bane of French universities.*

For primary education the Bourbon monarchy showed no more generosity than the Empire. It was left entirely to the Church, to the local authorities, and to private initiative. Thousands of villages had no school whatever. In many others, "teaching" fell to the lot of some person otherwise unemployable—pauper, cripple, Napoleonic veteran. Oftentimes the school was annexed to some shop—the wine-shop not excluded. When the master himself was illiterate, as it occasionally happened, his duties were perforce limited to the herding of the village ragamuffins whilst their parents were at work. In the cities, however, some progress was made. The "mutual" or "monitorial" system, applied with success in England by Bell and Lancaster, was then introduced. The Society for Promoting Elementary Education founded a number of schools, for adults as well as for children. But political and religious difficulties were grafted on the pedagogical problem. The mutual system was admirably adapted to a country where everything had to be done, and done with limited resources. On the other hand, according to the conservatives, it ruined discipline and transformed the school house into a congeries of unruly republics. In the institutions of the Brothers of the Christian Doctrine, the master did not commit to any of his pupils a particle of his authority: the proper habits of order and subordination were thus instilled. So the mutual schools were favoured by the liberals whilst

* The revived interest in mediæval history, due to romanticism and political reaction, resulted in the creation of the School of Charters, 1821, for the training of librarians, record-keepers, and paleographers.

“simultaneous instruction” remained the rule with the religious orders. Neither method was practised or practicable in the smaller rural communities: there the master devoted his attention to one pupil at a time, with extremely unequal results.

The revised charter of 1830 promised the liberty of education, *i.e.*, the end of the monopoly established by Napoleon. But this promise was not kept. Lamennais, Lacordaire, and Montalembert, who, on the strength of it, had opened an independent school, were prosecuted. The Voltairian Liberals who assumed power were great admirers of the Emperor, and therefore of the University, one of his most personal creations. They cherished it all the more because it was obnoxious to the Church. The constitutional, anti-clerical, theistic, and bourgeois spirit which prevailed in it was theirs. Like the advisers of Louis XVIII, they were loath to deprive themselves of such an admirable means of domination. The reign of Louis-Philippe represents the heyday of the University. Under Napoleon it was still in its formative stage; under the Restoration it was treated with suspicion, governed by men like Mgr. de Frayssinous, who, “hopeless of getting any good out of it, was merely trying to prevent as much harm as he could.” After 1830, with such Ministers and Grand Masters as Guizot, Cousin, Villemain, and even Salvandy, it reached its fullest development.

However, it was weakened by its very triumph: it lost to politics some of its best-known masters, whose places were filled year after year by less famous—and underpaid—substitutes. The Collège de France, instead of the Sorbonne, became the centre of attraction; there Michelet, Quinet, and a Polish refugee, Mickiewicz, preached to eager audiences the gospel of democracy. In the forties, the old college was indeed a church, and Quinet was justified in likening his mission to that of an Emerson or a Channing. It was greatly through these three warm-hearted poets, historians, and prophets that the rising generation was permeated with romantic humanitarianism. They heralded the Revolution of 1848, with its beautiful Utopian spirit. From the scientific point of view

their courses did not count: they did not even have the incentive value of Cousin's, Guizot's, and Villemain's; their message was to the people. It was at the Normal School, and especially at the Archives, that Michelet did his admirable work as a scholar and a teacher.

This was also the time when the University was most consistently and most bitterly assailed. Canon Desgarets, Montalembert, Veuillot, led the attack. Cousin, Villemain, defended their position with ability and authority. Quinet, Michelet, made a counter-campaign against the Jesuits. Guizot was caught between his party allegiance and his professed principles. Thus the fight went on, and Louis-Philippe fell before any conclusion was reached. But the Catholics had not wasted their efforts. The bourgeoisie, grown conservative now that it was in power, was beginning to look with less favour upon the University, and to seek an alliance with the Church. Cousin himself had lost much of his assurance: he now offered his philosophy rather as an introduction to religion than as an improvement upon it. Guizot dealt with the Jesuits with half-hearted, unconvincing rigour—much more leniently than Vatimesnil had done under Charles X. This change of attitude was hastened by the Revolution of 1848. But it was well under way as early as 1845.

To the government of the Citizen King belongs the credit of having for the first time organized popular education. The law of June 22, 1833, prepared by Guizot, may seem timid and incomplete compared with the ambitious schemes of the Revolution or with modern achievements. But it was a radical improvement. Each "commune" was compelled to keep up at least one primary school. Towns over 6,000 were obliged to maintain in addition one higher primary school. To meet the expenditure, 3 per cent. was added to local direct taxes. Should this resource prove inadequate, the department or the State would make up the deficiency.* Attendance was not

* Only boys' schools were considered. The education of girls was not organized until three years later, and as this was done by an ordinance instead of a law, the local bodies could not be compelled to provide the funds. Girls' schools were thus ignored until 1850.

compulsory, only pauper children were excused from tuition fees, salaries were ridiculously small, and in populous cities classes were so large that the monitorial system had still to be resorted to. In 1847 the State spent only 3,000,000 francs for public education, and nearly 40,000,000 for public worship. But the system worked, and, modest though it was, results were soon apparent. In 1830 more than one-half of the military contingent could neither read nor write. In 1847 the proportion had fallen to one-third.

3. SECOND REPUBLIC AND SECOND EMPIRE.

The Revolution of 1848—The Falloux law on the liberty of education—Clerical influences under Napoleon III—Reaction under Fortoul—Admirable work by Victor Duruy.

The Revolution of 1848, like the Convention of 1792, held out magnificent promises. The liberty of education was formally declared in the Constitution. Hippolyte Carnot, the son of Lazare Carnot, the "Organizer of Victory," became Minister of Public Education. He planned to make elementary schools unsectarian, gratuitous, and compulsory. Little came out of these high ambitions. The only actual foundation of Carnot was a Superior School of Administration, which disappeared soon after his fall.

The promised liberty of education was realized through the Falloux law, but not in the generous, democratic spirit in which it had been announced. "Three facts," says M. Liard, "are bound together like the terms of a syllogism in the short public career of M. de Falloux. The closing of the national workshops causes the upheaval of June. The Days of June strike the bourgeoisie with terror. The terrified bourgeoisie vote the law of 1850 as a measure of social preservation."* In the committee in charge of the bill, Thiers and Cousin, once the staunchest supporters of lay education, were now willing to turn it over to the clergy. "The 40,000 schoolmasters are 40,000 priests of atheism and socialism," said Thiers. Some Catholics hoped that the Church would secure absolute control of all

* L. Liard, *L'Enseignement Supérieur*, etc., ii, 233.

schools. This, however, did not come to pass. Thiers was one of those Voltairians who thought that religion was needed for the people, not for themselves: whilst entrusting elementary education to priests, nuns, and friars, he would have liked to keep intact the authority of the State in secondary education. Cousin wanted to save the University, as it had been saved under the Restoration, by placing it under the supervision and influence of the clergy. The erstwhile anti-clerical bourgeoisie, therefore, did not surrender unconditionally. It was necessary to come to a compromise. The Catholic leaders, on the other hand, Dupanloup, Falloux, Montalembert, were enlightened men, and belonged to the liberal wing of their party. The Falloux law was extremely disappointing for the fanatics. They roundly charged de Falloux with treason. Many of its provisions have long since been amended. But in spite of the constant attacks of the Radicals, its principle stands to the present day. This is sufficient justification for this much-maligned measure.

The Falloux law dealt exclusively with elementary and secondary education. Its first effect was to destroy the Napoleonic University. Public education ceased to form a separate entity, a corporation, an order, with its Grand Master, its endowment, its civil rights and privileges: it became an administrative department like any other. The Church was thus rid of a potential rival in spiritual leadership.

It was well understood that the Church alone would profit by the liberty of education: she alone had the organization, the financial resources, and the prestige required for such an undertaking. But "liberty" was not enough: she secured valuable privileges. The bishops were ex-officio members of the academic councils, and their authority therein was really greater than that of the rectors themselves.* Catholic schools could be endowed and subsidized by the local authorities and by the State. Bishops and priests could open secondary schools without any of the formalities imposed upon their lay rivals. In elementary education, the letter of affiliation (or "letter of obedience") of a friar or a nun was accepted instead of a

* The number of "academies" and rectors had been increased to 89—one in each department. That made the rector a comparatively small personage.

qualifying certificate. But the Catholics failed to carry one of their most important points: the granting of degrees remained the monopoly of the State.

Did Louis-Napoleon, in order to gain the support of the Catholics, promise them further advantages—perhaps even that complete control of education which had ever been the goal of their desires? There were rumours to that effect, but they cannot be substantiated. Certain it is that, whilst Napoleon, during the first period of his reign, from the coup d'état to the Italian campaign, was the stanch ally of the Church, he no less firmly refused to become her tool. The law of 1854 strengthened the hands of the State in educational matters. The number of academic districts was reduced from 89 to 15: the rector was thereby restored to a position of influence, and was better able to hold his own against the bishop.

The administration of Minister Fortoul, from 1851 to 1856, has remained famous for its reactionary character. An oath of personal allegiance to the President or Emperor was exacted of every educator: whoever refused to take it was debarred from teaching. Villemain, Cousin, Guizot were put on the retired list. Michelet, Quinet, Mickiewicz lost their professorships at the Collège de France. Many others—Barthélémy Saint-Hilaire, Vacherot, Jules Simon, Barni, Challemel-Lacour were summarily dismissed. Philosophy in the lycées was reduced to formal logic. Contemporary history was excluded. The course of studies was "bifurcated": students were required to choose, when much too young for such a decision, between two branches, the one exclusively scientific, the other exclusively literary. Minister Rouland, not a very competent man either, corrected some of the mistakes of his predecessor (1856-63).

After 1859, and especially about 1863, the Empire became more liberal. Fortunately the right man was found to carry out the new policy. One of Napoleon's hobbies was to write a life of Cæsar, his hero, the prototype of those "providential men" among whom he hoped some day to rank. Among the scholars whom he consulted was Victor Duruy. He liked the man, promoted him to be inspector-general, and, in 1863, quite unex-

pectedly, made him his Minister of Public Education. Duruy proved equal to the task.

The law of 1867 increased the number and extended the curriculum of primary schools. Ten thousand public libraries—humble, to be sure, but of incalculable usefulness—were created. Elementary education was made practically gratuitous. Duruy wanted to make it compulsory as well, and had won the Emperor to his view when he was driven from office. In 1866 he granted official recognition to the Education League (*Ligue de l'Enseignement*), founded in Alsace by a young teacher, Jean Macé, and two journeymen. He encouraged evening classes for adults and popular lectures.

In secondary education he repaired the harm done under Fortoul, suppressed the “bifurcation,” restored the study of philosophy, introduced that of contemporary history, and created, by the side of the classical course, a “special” one, meant to be more practical. He had planned a system of public high schools for girls, but the opposition of the clergy in this case was too strong for him. In superior education, breaking away resolutely from the false ideal of catering to the general public, he fostered the seminar method by the creation of the “Practical School of Superior Studies.” It was through him, and thanks to the genuine interest of Napoleon III in these matters, that Claude Bernard, Pasteur, Berthelot, Robin, were encouraged in their researches and provided with laboratories, still woefully inadequate, but much better equipped than in the previous decade.

This progressive policy roused the suspicion and anger of the Church. It cannot be denied that materialism, positivism, and even atheism were at that time rampant among scientific men. For one Pasteur, who knew that there was *something* which his microscope could not reveal, there were many followers of Littré and Robin—earnest servants of truth, no doubt, but bigoted in their negative attitude. This was the pretext of a new attack, led by Mgr. Dupanloup, against State teaching in general, the Paris Medical School in particular, and Duruy personally. The matter was brought, in the form of a petition, before the Imperial Senate, and was debated

with a fullness which does credit to the Assembly and the time.*

The irony of fate, in the shape of political combinations, drove Duruy from the Ministry at the very moment when the Empire was becoming decidedly liberal. Duruy was sincerely attached to his Imperial master, who for six years had shielded him from the hostility of the clerical party; but he was thoroughly democratic and progressive. On that account he is perhaps the only Bonapartist official to whom his Republican successors have shown any fairness. He ranks with Guizot and Jules Ferry among the master-builders of French education.

4. THE THIRD REPUBLIC.

§ 4. *Elementary Education*.—Law of 1875 on the liberty of superior education—Jules Ferry, Paul Bert, and the National school system—Anti-clericalism: about 1880—Revival after the Dreyfus case—The neutrality problem—Achievements of the Republic—Shortcomings.

The crisis of primary education, material and moral—Socialism and syndicalism among the teachers.

§ 5. *The Third Republic: Secondary and Superior Education*.—*Secondary*.—The Church holds her own—Reorganization of the course—The Reform of 1902.

Superior Education.—Creation of local universities, 1896—University of Paris: its material importance and prestige—The provincial universities—Their activities—Alleged excess of the scientific spirit—General culture outside the universities: literary lectures, etc.

Note on the Popular Universities.

“It is the German schoolmaster that conquered at Sadowa and Sedan.” France accepted this verdict, and the war of 1870 was immediately followed by a great movement in favour of universal education. Jean Macé’s League started a petition which was soon covered with a million signatures. Yet, for ten years, little was achieved. The political status of the country was uncertain. The conservatives were in power, but not strong and unanimous enough to carry out any definite scheme of their own. The democrats were waiting for their chance of turning the nominal and provisional Republic into a permanent reality. One advantage, however, did the conservative party

* *L’Enseignement Supérieur devant le Sénat, Discussion extraite du Moniteur*, 18mo, Hetzel, 1868; cf. Sainte-Beuve’s speech.

secure: it gave the Falloux law its long-deferred complement relative to the liberty of superior education. Four Catholic universities were immediately founded at Lille, Paris, Angers, and Lyons, with an isolated law school at Toulouse. Mixed juries of State and Church professors were to grant the degrees. Only one institution independent of Church and State alike was created: the Free School of Political Sciences. Taine and Boutmy, the fathers of the scheme, hoped to prepare for their country a generation of competent officials to help in the work of national regeneration. Without becoming such a power in the land, the school has a very creditable record.

As soon as reaction was finally defeated, the Republican party proceeded with its educational programme. The man who assumed this huge responsibility was Jules Ferry, one of the few constructive statesmen of the present regime, the peer of Gambetta and Waldeck-Rousseau. He was ably seconded by Paul Bert, a physiologist of some repute, but, in politics and in religion, a man of more sectarian outlook than his chief. The reorganization of popular education meant war with the clergy. Not that the lay schools were intended to be atheistic, anti-catholic, or even anti-clerical; but they were neutral in religious matters, and Rome maintains that neutrality and hostility are synonymous. "Without the Church there is no salvation." The Catholics, whose spokesman was an active, eloquent, and thoroughly modern prelate, Mgr. Freppel, made desperate efforts to prevent the vote of the education Bills. The Republicans were ready with their reply. By a law passed in 1880 the mixed juries established in 1875 were suppressed and the State resumed the monopoly of granting university degrees. Article VII of that same law debarred members of non-authorized religious communities from giving any kind of teaching.* The proper certificates were required of everybody, instead of the letter of "obedience." Gradually friars and nuns were eliminated from the public schools and their positions filled by lay teachers. This went on, sluggishly at times, for twenty

* This article was rejected by the Senate. Thereupon Ferry, upheld by the Chamber of Deputies, dissolved and expelled a certain number of these illegal organizations; cf. Chapters V. and VIII.

years. The victory of the Radicals, after the Dreyfus crisis, gave a new impetus to this policy of secularization. That the State, professedly unsectarian, should not salary denominational instruction is a defensible point of view. Premier Combes went farther. In 1903 recognition was denied to the religious Orders which had applied for it under the Waldeck-Rousseau law on associations. Still, the Brothers of the Christian Doctrine and a few other communities, authorized by Napoleon, retained their legal status. In 1904 a new law was passed, providing that within ten years all schools under the control of religious Orders should be secularized or closed. This drastic policy was relentlessly applied by Emile Combes himself, and is carried on, although more cautiously, by his successors. The ideal of certain Radicals is manifestly that the State should be the sole educator: all French children should be brought up in the principles of "modern civilization" and steeled against the prejudices and superstitions of the "obscurantists." They would fain adopt, with some slight correction, the motto of old monarchical France: "One faith, one law, one king." There are signs, however, that this sectarian spirit is on the wane. The feud between the former anti-clerical allies—the Radical bourgeoisie and the socialistic people—has brought home to both the dangers of monopoly.

Meanwhile, the Catholic schools, secularized but in name, continue to exist, if not to thrive. But the Church can no longer hope to compete with the State in elementary education: the financial burden is too enormous. So the latest move is to attack the State schools from within: "We are practically compelled to attend these schools," the Catholics contend. "We pay for them like all other French citizens. The law expressly provides that they shall be neutral: it is our right and our duty to enforce the fulfilment of this promise." Every text-book not agreeable to Catholic parents, every unguarded word of a freethinking teacher, is denounced by the priests. The position of certain schoolmasters has thus become intolerable: they have brought suits in their turn against their critics, and the dwindling but still powerful Radical majority is planning legislative measures for the "protection of lay teaching." Thus

every village school is a battlefield and the new generation is brought up in an atmosphere of hatred.

It is a relief to turn from this record of strife to one of positive achievement. Within the last thirty years the Republic has done noble work. Elementary education was made compulsory, gratuitous, and secular by the laws of 1881 and 1882. Money was lavishly spent for school buildings. "As mediæval Europe clad herself in a white mantle of churches, so democratic France covered herself with schools." Teachers' salaries were increased, their tenure of office was made more permanent, representatives were given them in departmental and national councils (*Conseil Supérieur de l'Instruction Publique*). In 1870 the budget of elementary education was 61,500,000 francs; in 1877, 94,397,554; in 1902, 236,598,969; in 1912, 297,944,599. Every teacher is now duly certificated, and many of them hold a higher degree. Thanks to the creation of a number of normal schools and of two superior normal schools,* they are much better informed and more scientifically trained than formerly. Their social standing has been raised in the same proportion: the schoolmaster is no longer a pauper, as under the Restoration, or the curé's humble subordinate, as under the Empire. And, under the leadership of splendid men like Ferdinand Buisson, Félix Pécaut, Octave Gréard, it cannot be said that the moral aspect of their mission has been neglected.†

However, there is a tendency among Republicans to claim for their party the sole credit for this progress. It may be well to bear in mind that under Louis-Philippe and Napoleon III education had advanced at a still faster rate;‡ that the salaries paid to French teachers are inferior to those of their English

* At Fontenay-aux-Roses for women and at Saint-Cloud for men.

† Buisson, Director-General of Primary Education; Pécaut, Director of the Superior Normal School for Girls, Fontenay-aux-Roses; Gréard, Director of Education for Paris.

‡ School enrolment—1837, 2,690,035; 1850, 3,322,423 (+ 632,388 in thirteen years); 1876, 4,716,935 (+ 1,394,512 in twenty-seven years); 1904, 5,448,030 (+ 731,095 in twenty-eight years); of course, with a stationary population and a number of children of school age actually decreasing the school enrolment cannot indefinitely progress, but the efforts of previous regimes should not be ignored or minimized.

and German colleagues; that France, although far ahead of the Catholic countries, Italy, Spain, and Belgium, is still behind those where Protestantism prevails; that whilst monarchical Russia has stamped out illiteracy *altogether* there are still four French conscripts out of every hundred who can neither read nor write.

The teaching profession is at present going through a crisis which has material and moral causes. For some twenty years after the Ferry laws all went apparently well. The danger came from without—from the Church. Schoolmasters preached unquestioningly “the immortal principles of 1789” and the gospel of patriotism. They devoted their spare hours to extension and social work—popular lectures, savings banks, mutual help societies. In reward they were surfeited with fulsome praise by Radical politicians and their salaries seemed large in comparison with those of the immediate past. But, like all persons with a fixed income, they suffered sharply from the sudden increase in the cost of living which marked the last fifteen years. Unlike employees in private industries, they had no means of voicing their economic grievances except through the influence of some friendly member of Parliament. Now, lobbying for larger pay is a form of begging, and the teachers did not like it: first cause of discontent. Circumstances had often pitted the schoolmaster against the parish priest. He was the local representative of Republican ideas: as such, his position was, in the broadest sense, a political one. This was emphasized by the fact that he was appointed and could be removed by a purely political official, the Prefect. Now, some clever and unscrupulous teachers took advantage of the situation and secured promotion as a reward for political services. The great majority of the profession, sincerely Republican at heart, but unwilling to turn themselves into electoral agents, resented this interference of the politicians and asked to be placed exclusively under the authority of their academic superior, the rector. Second grievance.

During the Dreyfus crisis the Radical and anti-clerical bourgeoisie fought side by side with the more advanced parties, Socialists and Anarchists, and, in the heat of conflict, denounced

"militarism, chauvinism, social prejudices, economic injustice" with a vigour akin to violence. The teachers were in the thick of the fray. They were men of the people themselves and naturally inclined to socialism. Many of them were converted to revolutionary ideas. Their encyclopædic and perforce superficial learning, their habit of laying down the law to immature minds, made them somewhat dogmatic in their attitude. They began to preach pacifism, internationalism, and socialism with the same zeal as, ten years before, they had preached the hoary doctrines of the first Revolution. Dissatisfaction with their economic conditions; revolt against the rule of professional politicians; aspirations towards internationalism and socialism: the teachers wanted to express all that, and they found syndicalism ready at hand. So they formed syndicates or unions and sought affiliation to the General Federation of Labour. The Radical bourgeoisie, as soon as they were through with their anti-clerical campaign, discovered this new danger and recoiled with almost the same terror as M. Thiers in 1848. The situation is serious. It could be relieved by taking politics out of public education and by increasing salaries on a generous scale. But the politicians will not willingly give up their patronage, and military expenditures are draining the resources of the State. The fact that so many teachers have gone over to revolutionary socialism would still remain a menace.*

Thus we now have a three-cornered fight. As anti-clericals and Republicans the teachers are supported, more or less warmly, by the Government. As Socialists and Internationalists they are combated. The bourgeois papers no longer tell them that they are the hope of democracy, the priests of the new order. They are advised to be prudent, modest, even humble-minded, to "know their places" and eschew "dangerous doctrines." We are once more brought face to face with the fact that neutrality in elementary education is a myth. As soon as we go beyond the three R's some philosophy of life is implied. Is

* Another solution, which, as far as we know, has not been seriously considered, would be gradually to eliminate all men teachers. Women are more conservative and satisfied with lower salaries. The example of America shows that it can be done. But it would not afford immediate relief.

The State justified in enforcing conformity to doctrines which a large minority of the people cannot accept? The question is a sorry one and the solution not yet in sight. Fortunately, these difficulties do not prevent most teachers from fulfilling with simple faithfulness their essential duties.

5. THE THIRD REPUBLIC: SECONDARY AND SUPERIOR EDUCATION.

In secondary education the advantage remains with the Church. In spite of Governmental pressure she still educates fully one-half of the children of the middle and upper classes. In purely scientific value her schools may be inferior to those of the State; the culture they give is narrower and less original. Yet they are popular, were it only for social reasons. Parvenus or scheming parents like to send their sons to Jesuit colleges, where they will meet the scions of the aristocracy, learn good manners, and make useful acquaintances. The Fathers are known to follow and help their pupils through life. Perhaps the qualities of intellectual courage and moral self-reliance are not properly emphasized in ecclesiastical education. But other qualities, more negative, yet of undeniable value, are patiently instilled: piety, discipline, reverence, self-denial. If the Fathers do not teach how to *think*, they can teach how to speak and write with refined fluency. Their somewhat artificial methods of cramming facts and ready-made opinions are highly successful in certain competitive examinations. They claim—and there may be some truth in the contention—that whilst a State boarding-school is a jail a Church school is a home. For the education of girls the Church is supreme. The State attempted practically nothing in that line until 1880, and for many years the few lycées for girls did not show any vitality. They seem to have been more successful of late.

The Radicals have tried to cripple Church education in the secondary as well as in the elementary grades. It remains to be seen whether the laws of Emile Combes will be any more effective than the ordinances of Vatimesnil under the Restoration, the orders of Guizot under Louis-Philippe, or the decrees of Jules Ferry under the present regime. It is especially with

reference to secondary education that the Falloux law is obnoxious to the anti-clericals. As a step towards monopoly they propose that Government positions should be reserved to the alumni of Government schools. The Church, on the other hand, chafes under the obligation of having her courses prescribed and her students examined by lay educators. Is it true that the existence of clerical schools perpetuates the unhappy division of the country? The schism exists, but its causes are deeper. Unity could not be restored by legislation. Voltaire, Renan, Anatole France, and Emile Combes were brought up in Catholic institutions.

The State *lycées* and the local *collèges*,* spurred by this formidable rivalry, have valiantly held their own. Their curriculum was repeatedly reformed so as to make it more varied and more practical. Duruy's "special course" had always been looked upon as somewhat inferior to the full classical training. In creating "modern secondary education" in 1891 M. Bourgeois expected to give sciences and modern languages the same status as Greek and Latin. Certain schools like Capitaine College in Paris, which specialized in that new branch, compared favourably with the best classical lycées. By 1899 there existed four parallel courses, each leading to a separate Bachelor's degree: Classical (letters), Classical (sciences), Modern (letters), Modern (sciences). But there was much dissatisfaction about the alleged formal, wasteful, and antiquated character of all of them. The classical B.A. or B.S. degrees were still rated higher than their Modern equivalents.

In 1899 a great investigation was undertaken by a national committee under the chairmanship of M. A. Ribot. This led to a total reorganization of the system of 1902. First of all, the six years of the high school course were divided into two self-contained "cycles," so that at fifteen or sixteen a young man could leave with a limited but well-rounded education. Then the distinction between "classical" and "modern" disappeared. Each cycle was divided into four sections: one with

* The only difference between lycée and collège is that the former is under the immediate control of the State, the latter belongs to the local authority; the lycées, found only in large cities, have the pick of the teachers.

Latin and Greek as major subjects; a second with Latin and modern languages; a third with Latin and sciences; a fourth with sciences and modern languages. Compared with the previous arrangement, this marked a progress of Latin (now taught in three instead of two sections) and a regression of Greek. But the Latin course was made less arduous than formerly, through the omission of "obsolete" exercises; and the direct method was extensively applied in the teaching of modern languages. After eleven years of experience, this reform still evokes much criticism. It is charged with being less thorough than the old without being any more practical. We are told there is a "crisis" in the use and teaching of the French language. The new generations are indifferent to the logicalness of thought and neatness of expression so dear to the old school. Leagues are formed in defence of the humanities. The "Modernists" retort that the Greeks showed such spontaneous greatness *because* they did not study Latin.

Naturally, this pedagogical problem has its social aspect. The lycées are no longer alone in the field: "higher primary" and "technical" education are becoming formidable rivals. The sons of the people, through the free high schools and the normal schools, are forging their way up to the universities. And the universities, thoroughly democratic and up to date in their ideas, are willing to welcome them. This means the triumph of a new pragmatic spirit over hallowed traditions. The bourgeoisie, it is claimed, desirous of keeping a monopoly of the professions, use the expensive humanistic culture as a fence and Latin as a shibboleth. The tone of certain reactionary papers when speaking of "l'esprit primaire" would lend colour to this contention. On the other hand, many unprejudiced thinkers believe that a liberal education is the greatest need of a democracy; that the cultural heritage of a nation is a treasure not to be lightly bartered away; that France, in particular, whose ambition was to be an "Athenian Republic," should protect herself against the ubiquitous Bæotian.

The development of superior education under the present regime has been most gratifying. In 1885 the advanced schools of each academic region, hitherto scattered and un-

connected, were grouped together under the authority of a "general council." This was the first step towards the creation of genuine universities, which was effected in 1896. The long delay was due to the conflict of local interests. It was not deemed advisable to consider each existing "faculté" as the nucleus of a local university: the attraction of Paris was so enormous that there seemed to be no room for more than five or six provincial centres of higher learning. But no city was willing to forgo its claims. The law of 1896 was a compromise. The administrative centre of each academic district became the seat of a university. Some of these institutions were composed of the four regular schools or facultés: law, medicine, letters, and sciences. Others had only three or even two. It was not without a struggle that Douai, for instance, lost its law school to Lille; and the University of Aix-Marseilles is still divided between the two cities: the colleges of law and letters in the sleepy old capital of Provence; those of sciences and medicine in the bustling commercial metropolis.

The military law of 1889 provided a clientele for these universities. Holders of certain degrees were excused from two years of military service. So the sons of the bourgeoisie, hitherto satisfied with a mere baccalauréat, found it profitable to study for the "licence." This regime lasted long enough to create a sentiment and a tradition. When, by the law of 1905, all educational causes of military exemptions were removed, a great falling off in the number of students was expected: but it did not take place.

One half of the total number of students in France are enrolled in the University of Paris. Under the splendid leadership of Vice-rector Louis Liard * the old Sorbonne has reconquered her proud position as the world's greatest centre of learning. It has no less than 17,000 students, of whom 3,000 are foreigners. The administrative offices, the Assembly Hall, the Library, the College of Letters, the Practical School of Superior Studies, the School of Charters, and part of the College of Sciences, occupy the New Sorbonne. This magnificent block of buildings was

* Vice-rector because the Minister of Public Education is ex officio rector of the University of Paris.

ected by Nénot, from 1885 to 1901, in modernized Louis XIII style: the best artists of the time have been employed in its decoration, and the mural painting of Puvis de Chavannes in the Grand Amphitheatre especially is held to be a masterpiece. In addition to the Sorbonne, the other schools and institutes form a veritable academic city in the Latin Quarter. Furthermore, the University of Paris has colonies scattered at the four corners of France: at Roscoff in Brittany, at Wimereux near Boulogne, at Banyuls and Nice in the extreme South. On the other hand, the Collège de France, the Museum of Natural History, both equal to their splendid traditions, the no less famous school of Fine Arts, the different Engineering Schools, the Conservatoire of Music and Elocution, the School of Modern Oriental Languages, although belonging to the State, are not component parts of the University. Law is by far the most popular subject: 16,688 students (900 foreigners) in 1910. This is due to the fact that law in France is a general culture course, preparing for administrative duties, the civil service, politics, journalism, and business, as well as for the bench and bar. Then comes medicine, with 4,080 (765 foreigners). The Colleges of Letters and Sciences, which train their students almost exclusively for the teaching profession, have the smallest enrolment—Letters, 3,115 (1,028 foreign); Sciences, 1,843 (461 foreign)—but the highest standard. The famous Superior Normal School, long independent of the University, has finally been incorporated with it. If we consider that the equivalent of the freshman and sophomore years are given in the lycées, if we bear in mind that several important departments have a separate organization and do not contribute to that huge total of 17,000, we come to realize the enormous size of the University of Paris. Its material prosperity, however, is but the outward sign of its intellectual supremacy. It offers an endless and yet systematic variety of courses, ranging from popular lectures to personal investigations of the most exhaustive character.

This splendid success of the University of Paris was to a certain extent expected. That of the other institutions came as a pleasant surprise, even to the most optimistic. It is often asserted *a priori* that decentralization is impossible in France:

this one attempt should teach us better. The local universities are not mere replicas of the Sorbonne on a diminutive scale. They are "provincial" in the best sense of the term: open wide to new ideas from all over the world, they make a special study of local conditions—historical, geographical, economic. Like the newer universities of England or those of the American Middle West, they keep in touch with practical life and enlist the support of business men. Dijon, for instance, has an Zoological Institute, Lille a textile museum, Besançon a special laboratory for testing watches and clocks. Montpellier has kept its mediæval fame for medicine, Nancy leads in physics and forestry. The South-Western group, Bordeaux, Toulouse, Montpellier, keep active intercourse with the Spanish-speaking countries; Grenoble attracts German students and has created a Franco-Italian Institute at Florence. The central administration interferes only to prevent the wasteful duplication of efforts; every legitimate initiative is encouraged. Private benefactions, almost unheard of for that purpose in the nineteenth century, are no longer negligible, and the cities spend money freely on their universities.

As a result of this transformation, the French system of degrees has lost its rigid simplicity. There is an almost infinite variety of "licences." Original research is as far as practicable substituted for the scholastic examinations of former days. A new Diploma of Superior Studies has been created for those students who wish to go beyond the licence without expecting to get the advanced professional title of Agrégé. As the Doctorates of Sciences and Letters were almost inaccessible to foreigners, a "Doctorat d'Université" has been established, which is equivalent to the German Ph.D.

Need we say that the universities have not been spared by critics? Some useful pessimists, like Mr. Loth, comparing their equipment, their endowment, their organization with those of their German rivals, conclude that much remains to be done: a most excellent spur to further endeavour. Others, of the humanistic persuasion, are dismayed by the "new spirit" which pervades superior education. The vague and brilliant lectures of forty years ago, which were performances rather than lessons,

were bad enough. But have we not rushed into another extreme? Is not erudition stifling culture? The modern scholar, it is alleged, can neither think nor write; he merely accumulates documents, piles up innumerable "slips" which he does not even attempt to classify. If this were true, the danger would be great indeed. But, it is answered, among the professors thus arraigned many are recognized masters of lucid generalization as well as accurate detail. That mediocre students suffer at present from the slip-mania may be granted: perhaps a Caro or a Deschanel could have taught them instead how to say *nothing* with consummate grace. But a method is not to be judged by the failure of the inefficient. France needs the discipline of positive facts; of general ideas she has enough and to spare.

Fortunately for both parties, the old-fashioned course is not dead, but it has emigrated beyond the walls of the Sorbonne. It would be a loss to literature if such lectures as those of M. Jules Lemaître* had not been given. A well-known magazine, *Les Annales*, has created a "university" where an aristocratic public, cultured, bigoted in essentials but open-minded for new-fangled cults, keenly appreciative of certain literary qualities, rather indifferent to mere details, and scorning the drudgery of research, find exactly the kind of teaching to suit their needs and taste. On a much higher level, the Free School of Social Sciences deals in a serious and yet accessible manner with questions too vast, too vague, or too controversial for the Sorbonne and the Collège de France. This division of labour between the regular institutions of learning and private foundations of a less scientific character is excellent, and might well be imitated on the other side of the water.†

* Rousseau, Racine, Fénelon, etc.

† An ambitious movement which miscarried after an auspicious beginning was that of the Popular Universities. The two prototypes, founded before the Dreyfus crisis, were the "Co-operation of Ideas," created by a joiner, G. Deherme, as a school of clear thinking and tolerance; and the University Foundation of Belleville, started by Jacques Bardoux in imitation of Toynbee Hall and other settlements. The Dreyfus case gave the movement a great impetus: intellectual workers and manual labourers communed in the service of justice and truth. But the basic conception was much too vague: People's Palaces, University Extensions, Freethinkers' Clubs—they were everything and nothing. The absence of common principles soon allowed the early enthusiasm to cool. Needless to say that

France, on the whole, may well be proud of her educational system. It is not perfect, but it is not fossilized, and is capable of indefinite expansion and improvement. That the tumult of social and spiritual unrest should cease at the door of the school could not be expected: nay, one may wonder whether it would be desirable. Does Catholic education make the moral division of the country irremediable? Would not enforced conformity to some secular orthodoxy be a remedy worse than the evil? We believe that both these dangers are waning. The growing multiplicity of opinions on all subjects is making for tolerance: the Catholics are not unanimous, neither are the Freethinkers. If there were but two parties, they would come to blows: there are twenty, and they must needs manage to live side by side. The old ideal of dogmatic unity must be given up; but the schools—all schools—are slowly evolving out of this apparent chaos a richer unity, as varied and as undefinable as life itself.

the term "popular universities" was a misnomer, even to denote the ideal which none of these institutions realized. For the Furrow (Sillon), a Catholic imitation of the Popular Universities, cf. next chapter.

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CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

VII. EDUCATION

Plans for National Education introduced by—

- 1790 Talleyrand; 1792, Condorcet; 1792, Lanthenas; 1793, Barrère;
1793, Lepeletier de Saint-Fargeau; 1793, Romme; 1793,
Bouquier; 1794, Lakanal; 1795, Daunou.

Educational foundations of the Convention:

- 1793 Museum of Natural History.
- 1794 Polytechnic School.
(Superior) Normal School.
- 1795 Institute of France.
Central Schools.
- 1803 Creation of Lycées (10 Floréal, An X).
- 1806-8 Creation and organization of the Imperial University.
- 1815 Royer-Collard and Guizot plan to create seventeen local Universities.
- 1824 Ministry of Public Education becomes Cabinet position (coupled with Ecclesiastical Affairs).
Courses of Guizot and Cousin suspended.
- 1827 Same reopened. Brilliant trio: Guizot, Cousin, Villemain.
- 1828 Jesuits' schools closed. Restrictions on Lower Seminaries.
- 1830 Liberty of Education promised by the revised Charter. Campaign of Lamennais.
- 1833 June 22. Guizot's Law organizing Primary Education.
- 1836 Ordinance organizing Primary Education for Girls.
- 1838-51 Michelet, Quinet, Mickiewicz at the Collège de France.
- 1844-45 Campaign of liberal Catholics against University (Montalembert).
Counter-campaign against the Jesuits.
- 1848 Liberty of Education promised by the Constitution. Hippolyte Carnot, Secretary of Education, plans compulsory, gratuitous, and secular education.
- 1850 March 15. Falloux Law, establishing liberty of Primary and Secondary Education.
- 1851-56 Reaction under Secretary Fortoul (1852, "bifurcation").
- 1862 Renan at the Collège de France.
- 1863-69 Progress under Victor Duruy.
- 1865 "Special" Secondary Education organized.
- 1866 Education League authorized (Jean Macé).
- 1867 Practical School of Superior Studies created.
- 1875 July 12. Liberty of Superior Education (Catholic Universities created).
- 1879-82 Jules Ferry and Paul Bert. Superior Council of Public Education reorganized. Compulsory, gratuitous, and secular education established.
- 1880 Secondary Education for Girls organized.
- 1891 "Modern" Secondary Education.

- 1896 July 10. Local Universities constituted.
- 1899 Great Inquiry under A. Ribot, etc., leading to—
- 1902 Reorganization of Secondary Education.
- 1904 July 7. Suppression of Congreganist teaching.

CHAPTER VIII

THE RELIGIOUS QUESTION

§ 1. REACTION, 1800-30.

§ 1. *Reaction, 1800-30.*—The war of the Church against evil; three main lines of conflict—Religious situation in 1800—Reasons of Bonaparte for negotiating the Concordat—Fosters Ultramontanist—Conflicts arising from the Concordat—Napoleon excommunicated and the Pope imprisoned.

Revival of Catholicism in French thought and literature: Chateaubriand, de Maistre, de Bonald, Lamennais.

Alliance of the Church and the Ultra-Catholic party—Clericalism and anti-clericalism under Charles X.

THE Church is a militant organization and her life is war—war against evil under all its forms, suffering, ignorance, unbelief and corruption. We should like to dwell on this, the essential side of her activities, which even Catholic historians are apt to neglect. As a charitable agency the Church is unrivalled. In the field of education her power is still great. Catholic missions in which France has played a leading part, are covering the whole world with a network of churches, schools, and hospitals. Religious orders offer a refuge to the world-weary, the sorrowful, the mystic, the saint. And no fair-minded observer could speak without tender respect of the daily life of the Church, the humble and sublime routine of parish duties. All this, and not the Roman Curia, is the heart of Catholicism and the secret of its perennial appeal. To whoever cares to see deeper into the true religious life of France, we recommend the biographies of a few typical Catholics: Augustin Cochin, the representative of what is best in the old, upright, cultured, and charitable bourgeoisie; Ozanam, a young scholar with the soul of an apostle; Fathée J.-B. Vianney, the saintly village priest of Ars; Sister Rosalie whom the Paris poor have not yet forgotten. Unfortunately

this wealth of silent heroism is hardly capable of historical presentation. Ours is the task, a thankless one, of chronicling the outward, corporate, political life of the Church. And this is made up of three conflicts: the struggle of faith against unbelief, or rather of theology against science and freethought; the struggle of authority against liberty, of theocracy against democracy; the struggle of centralization against local autonomy, of Ultramontaniam against Gallicanism. To touch upon any of these points is to probe wounds and inflict pain: may ours be the callousness of the investigator, and not of the tormentor! In the eyes of many Catholics, whoever does not fully agree with the dominant party in the Church is attacking religion; the opponents of the Cardinal Secretary of State are the enemies of God. It is obvious that no impartial study of these very puzzling problems is possible unless we dismiss once for all such a gratuitous assumption.

When Bonaparte made himself master of France in 1799, the State professed to ignore all forms of worship and tolerated all. Roman Catholic Churches were freely opened. Religious persecution had ceased: if the Roman clergy were still treated with suspicion, it was for purely political causes which would have disappeared with the restoration of order. The Constitutional Church, Gallican and democratic, established by law in 1790 and salaried by the State until 1794, was still in existence as an independent organization—a schismatic body in the eyes of the Romanists. It was neither farcical nor negligible, but its vitality was ebbing fast. The “*Culte Décadaire*,” of a purely civic nature, celebrated on the official day of rest, the tenth day or *Decadi*, was moribund: its last flicker of life was due to the fact that all marriages had to be solemnized at the close of its ceremonies. One new sect, Theophilanthropy, recruited chiefly among the liberal bourgeoisie, was not unlike our Ethical Culture movement. Protestantism, fully emancipated by the Revolution, was satisfied with the new order. Conditions were by no means ideal: different cults were compelled to share the same buildings, and unseemly brawls were too often the result. But it may be asserted that there existed no difficulty which a few years of liberty and tolerance could not have settled.

The reconstructive work of the First Consul, the Concordat of 1802, was therefore not indispensable. France was not clamouring for a renewal of the old alliance between Church and State. The ruling class was still Voltairian: Bonaparte found it no easy task to reconcile his most intimate supporters to his ecclesiastical policy. He was not impelled by his own religious sentiments: although there were in him unexpected touches of mysticism, he was free from what eighteenth-century philosophy called *prejudices*. His treaty with the Pope was the result of political considerations.

First of all, there was the question of the property confiscated from the clergy and put up for sale by the State. The Church excommunicated the purchasers of these "national estates," even at second and third hand. With time, her threats and protests would have become innocuous: meanwhile, they were still a cause of hatred and strife among Frenchmen. Vendée and Brittany were barely pacified. Napoleon thought he could not carry out his plan of national reconciliation without silencing the opposition of the Church. This he could do by offering her material and moral compensations. Experience has taught us that he should have limited himself to financial indemnification and shunned politico-religious entanglements.* However, the temptation to resume the old relationship was overwhelming. The separation regime had so far been an accident, a truce due to the weariness of the combatants: it did not seem to be a permanent solution. Napoleon could not conceive of such a power as the Catholic Church living and growing within the State and yet independent of the State. Union or incessant war: he saw no other alternative. Besides, as he himself said later, with brutal openness, priests would provide him with a ghostly police to supplement his prefects and his gendarmes. He was already haunted by dreams of monarchical restoration: the King of France was the Lord's anointed; his successor would remain a usurper until he secured the goodwill of the Church. A Concordat would take from Louis XVIII his trump card. Finally, Napoleon was conscious of a reaction in favour of

* In 1825 the nobles who had suffered from the Revolution received money, but feudalism was not restored.

gion, and it was his instinctive policy to capture and canalize every important movement, so as to use it for his own ends and to secure the largest share of profit and praise.

The Concordat, signed in Rome in August, 1801, and not promulgated in Paris until April, 1802, secured to the State the following advantages: the owners of former Church property were to be left in quiet possession; there would be a new delimitation of French bishoprics, their number being greatly reduced; the existing bishops, whether Romanist or Constitutional, would be requested to resign; the members of the new episcopate and their successors were to be nominated by the First Consul and confirmed by the Pope; parish priests (*curés*) were to be appointed by the bishops, subject to the approval of the First Consul. Bishops and priests would have to take an oath of fidelity and obedience to the First Consul, and to promise that they would denounce any plot and conspiracy that might come to their knowledge. The First Consul would enjoy all the prerogatives and privileges of the kings his predecessors.

Pius VII had thus shown himself much more tractable than Louis XVI; for these concessions were as radical as those required by the Civil Constitution of the Clergy in 1791, and so indignantly refused by the Holy See. The compensations, it is true, were considerable. Catholicism, so recently under the ban, was recognized as the religion of the majority of the French, and particularly of the Consuls themselves. The Constitutional schism was ended by a compromise; ten of its prelates became Roman Catholic bishops. Feeble as it was, this national and reformed organization might have proved a permanent rallying-point for the opponents of papal encroachments. Finally, bishops and priests received stipends, on a fairly liberal scale, from the Government.

All considered, one may seriously wonder whether the Church was not bartering away precious liberties for doubtful privileges. What tempted and decided the Pope was the unhopèd-for increase of authority that the Concordat gave him over the Gallican Church. For the Roman Pontiff to dispose of French property as if it were his own was unheard of in a land hitherto so jealous of her ecclesiastical autonomy. His requesting all

French bishops to resign was tantamount to the assumption of absolute power. The French clergy gained something in wealth and prestige by the Concordat: but Rome was enormously strengthened.*

This was certainly not what Napoleon had in mind. He wanted to subject the whole Church to the authority of the Pope because he thought that the Pope would be a convenient tool in his hand. He hoped to be a new Constantine, a masterful benefactor whom the Church could not afford to displease. He had failed to gauge the spiritual power of that petty Italian prince whom a mere detachment from the French army could coerce into submission. He considered the Pope as a vassal, almost a dependent. He did not mean to give up a single one of the old Gallican claims: indeed, with the Concordat he promulgated the so-called "Organic Articles," which strictly limited the rights of the Pope in France and made the Gallican declaration of 1682 the official doctrine of all theological seminaries. Rome protested at once against this unilateral addition to a former treaty: Napoleon and his successors maintained that they were strictly within the bounds of their traditional powers of legislation in ecclesiastical matters. Hence a conflict which was to last as long as the Concordat itself.

The future was with Rome, not with Gallicanism. When the king was the legitimate successor of Clovis and the descendant of Saint Louis, anointed with holy chrism which a mystic doctrine had brought down from heaven, endowed with miraculous healing powers, his authority might balance that of the Pope himself. But a Corsican usurper, or a Voltairian Citizen King, even a sceptical and constitutional Louis XVIII, had no spiritual glamour about him, and his word counted for little in Church affairs.

But there were other ambiguities in the Concordat. What, for instance, was to be the status of the religious orders su-

* No fewer than forty prelates refused to obey: they were deposed, but they still considered themselves as the sole legitimate representatives of the Catholic Church in France; the last of them died in 1828, and the "Petite Eglise," as it was called, did not disappear until the last decade of the nineteenth century.

sed by the Revolution? Were the salaries paid to the clergy the remuneration of a public service or a compensation, as French historians and jurists occasionally maintain, for their property confiscated in 1791? Had the Government the right of appointing or merely of *nominating* bishops? These important problems remained unsettled.

The Concordat was therefore a mistake: Napoleon himself seems to consider it as the worst blunder in his career. The Pope was brought to Paris, to grace with his presence the consecration of the new Charlemagne. But, immediately after this brilliant ceremony, difficulties began between the Sacerdote and the Empire. In his ruthless way, Napoleon annexed piece after piece of the Pope's dominion, until in 1809 Rome itself became a French city. The Pontiff, dangerously sick, was hurriedly taken to Savona, thence to Fontainebleau, and kept in strict confinement. The papal archives were brought to Paris—the Vatican in Rome. Thirteen cardinals who, out of sympathy with Napoleon VII, had refused to attend the second marriage of Napoleon, were deprived of their insignia and scattered in provincial towns under police supervision. Meanwhile the Pope secretly excommunicated the Emperor, and refused to consecrate the Bishops appointed by him. A Council was summoned to Paris to cope with this situation (1811). As it proved intractable, Napoleon dismissed it; but, by threats or promises, he secured the individual adhesion of a majority of French Bishops to some *modus vivendi*. In 1813, at last, returning exiled from Russia, he negotiated directly with Pius, in a series of mysteriously mysterious interviews, a new Concordat which the ailing and overruling Pope accepted in January, only to retract it a few months later. 1814 brought deliverance to the Pontiff, to whom his possessions were restored. Such had been the immediate fruits of the Concordat.

Bonaparte's policy was powerless either to foster or to check the revival of Catholicism. This great movement was due to much deeper causes. A century of dry materialism and scoffing skepticism, ten years of revolution, had brought about a revulsion of feelings. Sentiment and imagination were restored to their rightful place in the spiritual world. Logic was discounted.

In all this we can trace the influence of Rousseau, the pioneer reaction as well as of revolution. Authority and tradition had long been known exclusively through their abuses; now they lay shattered, and their services were remembered. A poignant melancholy rose from their ruins, which pious hands sought to restore. This was the work of Chateaubriand. His *Génie du Christianisme* is an event in the history of culture. It came exactly at the right time, and expressed with poetical eloquence the aspirations of the new era. There was much Romantic sensibility and delusion and shallow sentimentalism in the assumed orthodoxy of Chateaubriand. It led most of his disciples into unbelief, even into morbidity. But for a quarter of a century it was the most powerful factor. All the great poets of the following generation, Lamartine, Hugo, Vigny, were for many years professed Catholics; echoes of the *Génie du Christianisme* are everywhere found, altered yet unmistakable, in Michelet's *History of the Middle Ages*, and even in Renan's works. But Chateaubriand, with his æsthetic and sentimental religiosity was by no means the sole advocate of Catholicism. De Bonald, de Maistre, Lamennais were preaching with less charm a severer doctrine, the gospel of authority. De Maistre, in particular, taught that a divinely ordained spiritual power alone could give the world order, peace, harmony—and this power he could find nowhere but in the eternal Church guided by an infallible Pope (*Du Pape*, 1819). Absolutism under the monition of theocracy: such was the ideal of this thorough and inspiring reactionist, whom Balzac called a "Prophet of the Past." Gallicanism now meant a compromise with the constitutional civil authorities issued of the Revolution: this thought both de Maistre and Lamennais abhorred.

Thus was naturally sealed the alliance, in the Ultra-royalist party, between political and religious reaction. The same men wanted to restore the rights and privileges of the nobility and the Church: for them the cause of monarchy by divine right and that of Catholicism were inseparable: the "throne and altar" should stand or fall together. This alliance had affected the life of the Church throughout the nineteenth century.

Under the Restoration, the Church party did not discourage the outbreak of violence known as the White Terror, and the

"Missions," instead of fostering a purely spiritual revival, were crusades against the ideas and the institutions of the modern regime. Strict was the censorship of the Press whenever religion was concerned. Sunday rest ordinances were rigidly enforced. Public education was placed under the control of the clergy, and sacrilege was punishable with death.

But the liberal, anti-clerical opposition was not powerless. It was composed, not only of materialists and Voltairians, but chiefly of reasonable Catholics attached to the traditions of the Gallican Church. The law on sacrilege, which created a great stir, was never applied. A new Concordat, negotiated with the Pope in 1817, was received with such hostility by public opinion that the Ministry thought it wiser to let the matter drop. The "Organic Articles" were not repealed. The one permanent advantage the Church obtained was the creation of several new bishoprics in 1821.

Under Charles X the struggle became sharper. The new King, atoning for a dissipated youth, was a bigoted Catholic. His coronation at Rheims seemed to revive old theocratic claims. He and his most intimate advisers were supposed to be in the hands of a mysterious "Congregation" which governed the State for the best interests of the Church. The dreaded Jesuits had returned as Paccanarists and Fathers of the Faith. This aggressive move of clericalism brought about a revival of Voltairianism. It was the time of Courier's pamphlets, of Béranger's most biting satirical songs. Several popular editions of Voltaire were published. Montlosier, a gentleman of the old school, an ardent defender of feudalism and Gallicanism, denounced the Jesuits with extreme violence, and at his instigation the Courts reaffirmed that the famous Order could have no legal existence in France. The conflict which led to the ordinances and to the Revolution of July, 1830, was a religious as well as a constitutional one. For a few months it was hardly safe for a priest to venture in the streets of Paris in his clerical garb. The Archbishop's palace was sacked by the mob. The same fate befell the Church of St. Germain-l'Auxerrois, for the sole reason that Legitimists had gathered there for a memorial service. The coronation of Louis-Philippe was performed

with great simplicity, almost shamefacedly. It seemed as though Catholicism had been exiled with the last of the old Bourbons.

§ 2. THE GREAT SCHISM, 1830-70.

§ 2. *The Great Schism, 1830-70.*—1830: Liberal Catholicism—Failure of Lamennais—Lacordaire at Notre-Dame—Montalembert in the House of Peers—Attacks against the University and counter-attack against the Jesuits—Conversion of the great Romanticists to humanitarianism.

1848: Temporary reconciliation between the Church and democracy—Immediate rupture—The Roman expedition at home—The coup d'état endorsed by the Catholics—Slow agony of liberal Catholicism—Uncompromising policy of Pius IX—The Syllabus—Papal Infallibility.

But there were still treasures of spiritual life in France, and even in Catholicism. Lamennais, a conservative theologian, in his *Essay on Indifference*, understood the lesson so sharply inflicted. The modern world was based on liberty; could not the Church frankly accept this principle, at least in her relations with the State and with society? Would she not gain more through liberty than through the protection of a secular sovereign like Charles X? Absolutism was dead; the Church herself could not become democratic, but could she not Christianize democracy? Such was the bold change of front which Lamennais advocated in his newspaper *L'Avenir* (*The Future*), supported by two brilliant young men, Montalembert and Lacordaire. Liberalism is the constant refuge of defeated minorities; but the attitude of these men was the result of a sincere conversion rather than a tactical move. Turning the tables against the new Government, they asked at once for a liberty promised by the revised charter: the liberty of education. They even founded an independent school. Now that the Voltairians were in control, they were reluctant to give up the State's teaching monopoly, and the pledge of 1830 was not redeemed. The school of *The Future* was closed by the police and its founders prosecuted. Thus did the State welcome the liberal Catholics.

On the other hand, Lamennais and his friends were not

rtily supported by their co-religionists. The old aristocratic families were still the mainstay of the Church; congenitally unable to understand a new departure, they were horrified at every name of liberty. Although the new movement was conservative in theology and respectful of the Roman hierarchy, timid souls shrank from it as if it were heretical. The publication of *The Future* had to be suspended, and three daring Catholics repaired to Rome to plead their case.

But in 1831 a reactionary pontiff, Gregory XVI, had been elected. In August, 1832, he issued an encyclical letter, *Mirari*, in which liberalism was condemned root and branch. Freedom of thought, or democracy within the Church, the liberals had never advocated. But they were in favour of the separation of Church and State, and, as they claimed for themselves the right to believe, they wanted to respect in others the right not to believe. This was denounced by the Pope as an absurd and erroneous opinion, or rather a piece of folly," bringing from "the fetid source of indifferentism." Lamennais hesitated for a while, his passionate soul torn by a tragic conflict. After some velleities of submission he left the Church. We shall find him later in his third avatar, as the prophet of anti-clerical and democratic Christianity.

His two friends, Lacordaire and Montalembert, after a few years of silent discouragement, resumed their activities, but with greater prudence. Lacordaire was a brilliant orator. Faithful to his principle of modernizing the methods of the Church, he gave at Notre-Dame, from 1835 onward, several series of lectures on the burning questions of the times. He was popular rather than profound, but his romantic eloquence found a ready echo among the young generation, and the effect was heightened when he assumed the white robe of a Dominican friar. He helped to revive in many hearts the poetic religiosity discredited by Chateaubriand. To any deeper influence he has no claim.

Montalembert's liberalism was quite different from the vague, warm-hearted, popular tendency found in Lacordaire. It was of a narrower, parliamentary and aristocratic nature, somewhat

un-French, and probably due to the man's English ancestry and education. He happened to come into his title just before the hereditary peerage was abolished; in the Upper House he found himself, while still very young, the respected leader of the Catholic party. He limited his efforts to the one point on which the interests of the Church were at one with those of liberty: he renewed the campaign of *The Future* against the State monopoly of education. He and Veuillot led the attack with such bitterness that even his former associate, Lacordaire, felt obliged to sound a note of warning. Voltairianism was thrown upon the defensive. As usual, the efforts of the Church party roused a new wave of anti-clericalism, and, as usual, again, the first victims were the Jesuits, the chief educational power and the aggressive vanguard of Catholicism. Liberator Génin, took up the cudgels against them.* The great Romantic and democratic historians, Quinet and Michelet, gave and published a series of anti-clerical lectures.† Eugène Sue wrote his long-popular romance, *The Wandering Jew*, one of the most widely read and most influential books of the century, in which a Jesuit, Rodin, plays the part of the villain. Villemain's dread of the Jesuits became a mental disease which interrupted his career. The Government could no longer ignore the presence of these embarrassing Fathers: the number of their colleges was increasing; one of them, Ravignan, had taken the succession of Lacordaire at Notre-Dame, and they were denounced on every hand. But Guizot did not share the popular prejudice against the famous Society. A conservative Protestant in open sympathy with Rome, and a friend of Metternich, he represented admirably that section of the bourgeoisie which, since 1830, had abjured revolutionary ideas and was ready to strike an alliance with the Church. So, compelled to "do something," he sent to Rome a brilliant economist and statesman of cosmopolitan experience, Count Rossi, and tried to secure through the Pope the voluntary withdrawal of the Jesuits. A little comedy with which all Frenchmen are familiar was then per-

* *Les Jésuites et l'Université*, 1844.

† *Les Jésuites*, jointly, 1843; Quinet, *L'Ultramontanisme*, 1844; Michelet, *Du Prêtre, de la Femme et de la Famille*, 1845.

formed; a few colleges were closed, and soon reopened under a different name. The eighteen years of the July monarchy were thus a time of covert and undecisive hostility between the liberal forces in the lay State and the Roman clergy.

But during that period a great revolution took place, the consequences of which are not yet fully realized beyond the borders of France. It may be said that the main current of religious thought ceased to flow in the traditional channel. Those years of romanticism and Utopian socialism were full of spiritual life: "France was big with Messianic hopes." These undisciplined aspirations assumed forms which may seem to us grotesque enough, like the synthetic "Evadism" of the gentle lunatic who called himself the Mapah. But the New Christianity of the Saint-Simonians, in spite of its ludicrous sides, was a powerful movement which illumined for a few months the lives of strong men, and the memory of which remained sacred to them after thirty years of practical activities. No unconquerable prophet appeared, no Church was permanently established. But there prevailed a certain spirit which, in another work, we have ventured to define as "Romantic Humanitarianism." Its keynote was love—love and pity for the oppressed, for the poor, for the fallen woman, for the sinner, for Satan himself. Universal love means universal brotherhood: mankind is actually one, the collective incarnation of the divine, the growing realization of the immanent God. Of this incarnation Christ was the most perfect type and the supreme symbol. The service of mankind is then the essence of religion: democracy and socialism, with their mystic connotation, are true Christianity. This creed is nowhere expressed with finality: we find it implied in scores of books, in Pierre Leroux's *De l'Humanité*, or in the last published works of the Saint-Simonians, Father Enfantin and Barrault. But the gospel of the new faith, without a trace of dogmatic theology, is Lamennais's brief biblical pastiche, *Words of a Believer*. With its verses full of tenderest pity and burning wrath, this book had a powerful influence. It was chiefly through Lamennais—although many other agencies were at work—that the greatest writers of the day—Hugo, Lamartine, Michelet, George

Sand, even Vigny—were converted to some form of mystic humanitarianism.

There we have the great schism in the religious life of France: on the one hand pessimistic supernaturalism, which holds that man is corrupt and cannot be saved except through the grace of a transcendent God; on the other, optimistic naturalism, which believes that human instincts, human reason, are not deceptive, that God is in everything, and therefore that the universe must be progressing towards the light. These two antinomic conceptions are curiously blended in the faith of most orthodox Christians: they are by no means radically separated even in France. But, on the whole, Catholicism insists on the Fall and redemption through the historic Christ, whose powers are vested in His Church; it stands for the repression of evil by an authority from above, whose rights are established by tradition. It is a doctrine of discipline and conservation. Humanitarianism insists on progress through the expansion of forces within mankind, through the spirit of the immanent Christ. It is a doctrine of emancipation, of growth, and looks towards the future as orthodox Christianity looks towards the past.

Now, although pessimistic supernaturalism may have a more tonic effect upon the individual soul, optimistic naturalism is at the basis of every social improvement. The chief paradox of the situation is this: the Church, resting on authority and tradition, defends the established order, and therefore sides with the rich and the powerful: so the greatest spiritual power is not free from the taint of materialism. The humanitarians, on the other hand, whose philosophy is too often materialistic, are fighting for what they hold to be justice and truth, in a spirit of brotherhood and hope, and are thus the true idealists, the true followers of Christ. The struggle of the Church against the Revolution is not a clear conflict of right and wrong, but a many-sided, puzzling warfare, in which sympathies cannot go unreservedly to either side.

In 1848 it seemed as though Catholicism and humanitarianism were to be reconciled. Pope Pius IX, elected two years previously, was thought to be a true democrat. The Church

and the people had both hailed with delight the fall of the Voltairian bourgeoisie. The Revolutionists were fond of claiming Christ as their Master. The clergy blessed the trees of liberty. Abbé Henry Maret started a democratic paper, aptly called *The New Era*, in which he received the support of Ozanam and Lacordaire. The great Dominican orator himself was sent to the Constituent Assembly.

But within a few months the old antinomy reappeared. Lacordaire soon grew discouraged and resigned his seat. Montalembert censured the Christian phraseology of the Revolutionists as sacrilegious. *The New Era* was bought over and summarily "strangled" by a Legitimist Catholic, La Roche-jacquelin. The Days of June frightened the upper and middle classes into reaction—i.e., into clericalism and ultramontanism. The death of Archbishop Affre on his mission of peace to the barricades was the symbol of an irreparable breach between the Church and the Revolution. At the same time, Pius IX was driven from Rome by an uprising of the people, and when, in 1849, he was restored by a French army, he became the unrelenting foe of every modern idea. A "Roman expedition at home," a campaign of political and social reaction, was carried on by the French conservatives in the name of religion. The Falloux law was meant to break down the State's educational monopoly for the sole benefit of the Church. The coup d'état of December, 1851, which "saved society" from a return of the democrats to power, was endorsed, with some reluctance, by Montalembert, and with lyric enthusiasm by Louis Veuillot.

The twenty-two years during which Louis-Napoleon was the ruler of France, as President or as Emperor, are a critical period in the history of French thought. Catholicism hardened in its policy of resistance to progress. For ten years it reaped the material benefit of its alliance with autocracy. Honours, influence, money were showered on the clergy. French cardinals were by right members of the Senate. Education was entirely under the supervision of the priests, although not under their immediate control. Religious orders were allowed to multiply. In Paris, and all the great cities, magnificent churches were

built. But in 1859 the Emperor's Italian policy jeopardized the Pope's temporal dominion, and Napoleon III thus forfeited the support of the Catholics.

Liberal Catholicism was slowly dying. Lacordaire was silent, devoting all his energy to his college of Sorèze; but in his letters to Madame Swetchine he did not conceal his disgust with the mean-hearted and short-sighted policy of the Ultramontanes. Montalembert, Dupanloup, Gratry, Hello were praised whenever they attacked freethought and democracy; but their slightest velleities of independence were immediately denounced and rebuked. Father Hyacinthe Loyson, an orator full of generous sympathies, was gradually pushed to the verge of secession. Louis Veuillot, a journalist of humble origin, talented and sincere, but narrow, violent, and coarse, was the chief power within French Catholicism.

The last traces of Gallicanism were also vanishing. The unifying, centralizing policy of Rome was progressing unchecked. As the Pope's temporal power was melting away, his spiritual authority steadily increased. Thus he was able, in 1854, to proclaim of his own authority, and without convening a Council, the dogma of the Immaculate Conception. In 1864 he boldly threw the gauntlet to modern thought in his encyclical *Quanta Cura* and his *Syllabus*, or catalogue of errors condemned by Rome. In spite of all the subtle explanations of Mgr. Dupanloup, the lay world understood in their literal sense these famous documents, which ended with the proposition: "Anathema on him who should maintain: that the Roman Pontiff can and must be reconciled and compromise with progress, liberalism, and modern civilization!" Finally, in 1870 Pius IX had the dogma of Papal Infallibility defined by the Vatican Council. A few days after this supreme triumph of ultramontanism the Franco-German War broke out, the Empire fell, the French troops were hastily recalled from Rome, and on the 20th of September the army of Victor-Emmanuel entered the Eternal City. History offers few more dramatic contrasts.

THE THIRD REPUBLIC.

Religious revival after the war—Checked by clerical and political intrigues—Anti-clericalism and the 16th of May—Anti-clericalism and the school question—Leo XIII and the policy of reconciliation with the modern world—The “Ralliés” and the “New Spirit”—The Dreyfus case and religion—Anti-clerical legislation of Waldeck-Rousseau—Emile Combes (Note on Freemasonry)—The Concordat breaks down—Rupture—The Separation law—Hostility to the Separation due to the Roman Curia.

§ 4. *Modernism*.—Gratry and Maret, forgotten forerunners—Revival of Catholic thought and sentiment in the nineties—Vagueness of the Modernist attitude—Encyclical *Pascendi*—Christian democracy: Abbé Lemire—Marc Sangnier and the “Furrow” (Note on Count de Mun’s social activities).

After the war and the Commune, Catholicism had an admirable chance. France was humbled in her pride and, one might say, repentant. There was a genuine return to religion, symbolized by the two votive churches which rose on the heights of Survières and Montmartre like citadels of prayer protecting the cities of Lyons and Paris. France was groping for Christianity: she found again clericalism and ultramontanism. The priests wanted her, bleeding still, to reconquer Rome for the Pope. The old alliance between the Church and political reaction was as evident as ever. The Government of Moral Order and the half-hearted coup d’état of the 16th of May were supported by the rank and file of the Catholics. Hence Gambetta’s war-cry, which was to re-echo throughout the story of the Third Republic: “Clericalism is the enemy!”

The defeat of the Monarchists at the polls in 1877 was a disaster for the Church. As soon as the Republicans were in full control of the government they introduced anti-clerical legislation. The repeal of the Concordat had long been an article of the Radical programme. But the Opportunists shrank from such a bold experiment for fear that the young Republic should not prove equal to the strain. It was understood that separation could mean civil war. From 1879 to 1905 Church and State were united like two well-matched adversaries who dare not let go their hold of each other for a moment.

We have seen how the educational problem was embittered by

the clerical question. In 1880 a certain number of monasteries, convents, and Jesuit schools were closed *manu militari*, after a show of resistance. As usual, they were reopened as soon as the crisis was over.

"Neutrality" in the State schools was denounced as thinly veiled atheism, although Jules Simon, a spiritualist philosopher, had made the existence of God the basis of moral education. Nuns and the Brothers of the Christian Doctrine had charge of the public schools in many districts: the new laws provided that all sectarian elements should gradually be eliminated. There was the bitterness on both sides. Devoted men and women were driven from country schools—as well as from hospitals—even when the local population wanted to keep them. On the other hand, lay teachers in remote parts were too often the victims of social ostracism and even of cowardly violence. No wonder that in many places the schoolmaster has assumed, or been driven to assume, the position of "anti-priest." *

Pius IX died in 1878, after a reign of unparalleled duration and importance. His successor, Leo XIII, was by no means a radical reformer. The Syllabus and Papal Infallibility remained the law of the Church, and the protest against the Italian occupation of Rome was not abandoned. But, cultured, diplomatic, broad-minded within the limits of the Vatican tradition, Leo XIII did much to assuage the strife between Catholicism and modern society. His encyclical *Rerum Novarum*, on the labour question, is the charter of Christian socialism. In 1891 he formally advised French Catholics not to waste their energy in the defence of lost political causes: "This," he reported to have said, clasping a crucifix, "this is the only corpse that the Church clings to." A number of monarchists obeyed not without reluctance, and formed the so-called "rallied" party. Literature was full of vague Neo-Catholicisms. The Government was ready to meet the Church half-way. A "new spirit" pro-

* There was a "clerical question" even in banking. The Catholics founded a financial establishment, the Union Générale, which collapsed in 1882, ruining many small investors. The Panama scandals, in which Jews and anti-clerical politicians were implicated, were considered by the Catholics as a sort of revenge for their own failure.

failed, to use the phrase made famous in 1894 by Spuller, a statesman interested in religious questions. The Méline administration relied for two years on the support of the Catholic "ralliés" (1896-98).

We have already shown how the Dreyfus case opposed once more reaction and revolution, and involved a realignment of parties. An aggressive Order, the Assumptionist Fathers, who had put on a marvellously profitable basis the cult of Saint Anthony of Padua, had at their service a well-drilled and unscrupulous Press. The Dominicans and the Jesuits had prepared in their schools a whole generation of military officers and civil servants entirely devoted to them. Anti-Semitism was gaining ground. It seemed as though a military-clerical coup d'état, a repetition of the 2nd of December, 1851, or of the 16th of May, 1877, might take place at any moment. The Radicals denounced "the alliance between the sabre and the holy-water sprinkler." Every victory of Dreyfus's cause was a defeat for the Church: she had taken the wrong side, and had soon to pay the penalty.

Waldeck-Rousseau wanted to defend the Republic against clericalism. But he hoped this could be achieved within the limits of the Concordat, by suppressing, curbing, and keeping under permanent control the turbulent Catholic elements, those monks in whom breathed again the spirit of Saint-Bartholomew's night. In this he had the support, not merely of the Radicals, but of many reasonable Catholics, and even of a large number of the clergy. The monks were not popular with the priests, who accused them of using vulgar and unscrupulous methods; of ignoring the authority of the bishops; of confiscating all the activities of the French Church, whilst the priests were confined to the least interesting and the least profitable routine duties.

An association law was passed, requiring every religious order to apply for authorization, with a statement of its statutes, membership, and property. This intrusion of the State into their private affairs was intensely disagreeable to organizations which had always managed to dodge taxes and to evade factory laws, and which did not care to reveal the extent of their fabulous wealth. Waldeck-Rousseau retired at the height of his triumph,

recommending M. Combes as his successor. He could not but know that the latter, who had studied for the priesthood, was a rabid anti-clerical. The association law was turned into an instrument for suppressing rather than regulating religious orders. Many did not even apply. The rest were, for the sake of expedition, divided into large groups—teaching orders, commercial orders, contemplative orders—and whole blocks at a time were denied legal recognition. Only a few were authorized. The Premier, a fiery septuagenarian, did not allow this legislation to become a dead letter. A number of convents and monasteries were secularized, or had to emigrate to foreign parts. And, as he could not reach the Brothers of the Christian Doctrine, authorized long before, Combes had a special law passed against “congreganist” education in July, 1904.

THE CHURCH AND FREEMASONRY.—The Church ascribed the persecution she was suffering to the activity of the “Satanic sect,” Freemasonry; for, especially under the Republic, Freemasonry had become the backbone of the radical anti-clerical party. The phrase “Satanic sect” was meant very literally. An anti-clerical of the lowest type, Leo Taxil, announced his conversion to Catholicism (1885), and began to denounce his former associates, the Freemasons, as devil-worshippers. He held the Catholic world breathless with the horrific revelations of a certain Miss Diana Vaughan, who knew all the secrets of the Luciferians. He kept up the deception for a number of years, until, on the eve of being exposed, he publicly confessed that it was a hoax (1897). But many Catholics still believe in this rather crude nursery tale.—Second episode: in 1903–4 the Minister of War, in order to weed out of the army the “clerical” element which had become a danger to the Republic, made use of secret individual reports provided by the Masons. These reports were sold to a Catholic deputy, who published them. France was disgusted with the whole affair, and the popularity of the Radicals has been waning ever since. Unsavoury affairs cropped up in the course of these interminable difficulties: the million of the Carthusian monks, the corrupt practices of Receiver Duez, etc.

Yet Premier Combes did not think that the hour of separation had come. He hated and feared the Church too much to set her free. But, under his administration, the absurdity of the Concordat became manifest. The Republican Government was paying out salaries to its open enemies, and to a fanatical anti-Catholic was entrusted the selection of bishops. The Pope was morally justified in wishing to end this situation; nay, the

Concordat itself provided that a new convention would have to be drawn, in case the head of the French State should be a non-Catholic. But the alternative to the existing regime was separation, not a new treaty. Meanwhile the new Pope, Pius X, and his Secretary of State, Cardinal Merry del Val, adopted a less diplomatic attitude than Leo XIII and Rampolla. Two bishops, accused by members of their dioceses, were called to Rome, in defiance of the Organic Articles. The Government ordered them to ignore the summons; yet they were compelled to resign their functions. The Holy See systematically refused to confirm Combes' appointees. In a few years half the bishoprics of France would have been vacant. The Concordat was breaking down entirely.

Oddly enough, it was the question of the Pope's temporal power in Rome which brought about the long-deferred crisis. After thirty years' estrangement, the reconciliation of Italy and France was sealed by official visits: King Victor-Emmanuel III came to Paris; President Loubet could not but go to Rome. But the Pope cannot allow the head of a Catholic State to meet the "usurper" in the very city he filched from the Church: the Emperor of Austria dares not visit the capital of his ally. A note of protest was sent round to the diplomatic representatives of the Holy See. France would have ignored this platonic manifestation, had it not been discovered that there were two versions of this document—the one communicated to the French Government, which was harmless enough, and another reserved for the other Powers, couched in much more offensive language. France immediately recalled her ambassador from the Vatican, and expelled the papal nuncio from Paris.* Naturally the Concordat lapsed *ipso facto*. A new regime had to be organized.

This regime, unfortunately, could not be the result of an agreement between Church and State, since all diplomatic relations were broken between the Vatican and Paris. Besides, the Papacy would never have accepted the principle of the

* Later the diplomatic papers of the Papal Legation in Paris were seized, and afforded evidence of Mgr. Montagnini's active intervention in French politics.

separation, which was now inevitable. France, therefore, was obliged to legislate on ecclesiastical affairs without consulting the official representatives of the Church. But there were in Parliament many sincere and able Catholics, with whose constant collaboration the law was prepared. The bigoted anti-clericalism of Combes was no longer the dominant factor. The man who became identified with the Separation law, Aristide Briand, was singularly broad-minded. Even Radical Republicans, haunted with the ominous precedent of the First Revolution and the Vendée, were willing to be generous on all minor points. The law, such as it was, promulgated in July, 1905, provided liberal pensions for aged priests, and a series of transitional measures gradually to wean the Church from State support. The State renounced its right of appointing, or even nominating, bishops. All the other restrictions which for a century had paralysed Catholicism, were removed. Ecclesiastical property, after an inventory, would be turned over to the Catholics themselves, organized into "Associations for Public Worship," which the clergy were free to compose exactly as they saw fit. In order to prevent schism, it was stated that the property would always be attributed to the associations in communion with the original Church. A minority of Roman Catholics, therefore, would remain in possession, even if the majority of the parishioners should go over to Protestantism or Gallicanism.

This regime, which safeguarded the dignity, the discipline, and even the material interests of the Church, was in every way more liberal than the one Rome had accepted in Prussia. When the French bishops met in general convention, they first of all sent to the Pope a telegram endorsing his *theoretical* condemnation of the separation, but by a substantial majority they agreed upon a policy of compliance with the law. Pius X affected to ignore this, the main result of their activities, and on the strength of their first message he affirmed that the French episcopate were with him in his uncompromising resistance. A number of Catholic professors and members of the Institute ventured to draw up a petition, respectfully entreating His Holiness not to hurl France into an interminable conflict.

they were sneered at by the Vatican Press as "green cardinals." * The next general elections were fought chiefly on the Separation question, and the policy of the Government was unequivocally endorsed even by the rural districts. In a word, there is convincing evidence that the bulk of French Catholics were willing to give the law a fair trial. The opposition came from Rome.

The Curia, deluded by a few incorrigible French reactionists, probably thought that it could drive the Government into acts of open persecution, which would cause a revulsion of feelings and the overthrow of the present Republic. These expectations were disappointed: M. Briand and the majority who supported him remained calm and firm. The churches were not closed. The violent and ignorant element seized upon the inventories as a pretext for disturbances in a few great cities and in some remote villages. But these unjustifiable riots were blamed by the more enlightened Catholics, and the venerable Curé of Sainte-Clotilde said to the mixed crowd of toughs and aristocrats who pretended to "defend" his church: "You are pious hooligans!" † Year after year, as a result of this militant policy, the Church has forfeited some of the real advantages that the law of 1905 provided for her. Public worship has never been interrupted or disturbed. But the tenure of the churches is precarious: no one is responsible for structural repairs, and a number of religious buildings have already been closed and condemned as unsafe. However, a *modus vivendi* is being evolved. Without any further legislation, the Catholics will probably secure the full title to their own churches, by individual purchases at a nominal price from the municipalities. But many years and many millions will have been wasted in useless strife.

To define the attitude of Rome in this affair, we are compelled to use again the words clericalism and ultramontanism. The Curia was afraid lest the new regime should give the French Catholics some authority over their own finances, and therefore over their local policy and hierarchy. The spiritual and disci-

* The uniform of members of the Institute is braided with green palms.

† "Des Apaches pieux."

plinary powers of the Pope were not threatened by the separation; on the contrary, his authority was freed from any trace of lay interference. But more was wanted: the total subjection of the national clergy and laity, in all things, to the Holy See. This goal has been reached: the last liberties of the Gallican Church have disappeared. It remains to be seen whether a deep blow has not been struck thereby at Catholicism itself. No schism has taken place. The Catholics have shown an admirable example of passive obedience; but many of them feel that they have been treated with scant respect, led against their own better sense into a hopeless battle. How long will discipline stand such a strain?

In this question of disestablishment, the chief point of interest is perhaps this silent crisis within the Church rather than the open conflict with the State. It is an episode in the war of extermination waged by the Roman autocracy against all forms of liberalism. The crushing out of the Modernist and Sillonist movements is another manifestation of the same policy.

§ 4. MODERNISM.

Modernism is not the direct continuation of Liberal Catholicism, for Lamennais before the fall, Montalembert and Lacordaire all their lives, were conservative in their theology. Under the Second Empire, two Catholic philosophers, Abbé Henri Maret and Father Gratry, attempted to reconcile fearless and cogent thinking with the dogmatic tradition. Gratry, who as chaplain of the Superior Normal School influenced a number of young men, revived the Oratorian order for that very purpose. Maret was the head of the Theological School at the Sorbonne; he gathered there a number of remarkable professors—Bautain, Gratry, Lavigerie, Freppel, Perreyve, Adolphe Perraud. These two men met with indifferent success: Gratry died isolated, almost persecuted and in despair; Maret never secured full canonical recognition for his school, which was finally suppressed by the State, and he lived under a constant menace of excommunication. Both are deeply forgotten in our days. But they prepared a second generation of scholars and thinkers, who under the more liberal rule of Leo XIII attained high dignities:

Perraud even became a cardinal. He and Mgr. Duchesne were members of the Institute of France. However, it should not be imagined that Leo XIII was personally inclined to modernism: he intimated that the *Summa* of Saint Thomas Aquinas was to remain the basis of all philosophical teaching in the Church, and Abbé Loisy was dismissed from the Catholic Institute of Paris in 1894.

We have noted the so-called neo-Catholic movement immediately before the Dreyfus crisis. It was but a superficial sign of the great revival of religious thought, which, although "the Affair" interfered with its development, bore magnificent fruit. Within the last ten or fifteen years the Catholics can boast such able men as Blondel, Fonsegrive, Laberthonnière, Sertillanges, Maumus, Le Roy, Goyau, Houtin, who dropped by the way, and the lost leader, Loisy. All are earnest thinkers and believers. Negligible in comparison are the political converts like Maurras, Lemaître, Bourget, Barrès—orthodox Catholics who are probably not Christians. The Lyons review *Demain* (*To-morrow*) was as great a credit to the faith which inspired it as the Assumptionist paper *La Croix* was a disgrace. Any one who will compare the substantial and suggestive catalogue of the Catholic publishers Bloud, for instance, with the sickening literature in vogue twenty years ago will be struck with the difference.

There was no "school" of modernists. The tendency was a spirit, or, to use their own favourite phrase, a *life*, rather than a doctrine. It may be considered as part of the anti-intellectualist movement of which William James and Bergson are the leaders. With Houtin, once a modernist priest himself, we do not believe that modernism had any great future in France. The country is still too fond of sharply defined logical thinking to be satisfied with these hazy syntheses. The encyclical *Pascendi Dominici Gregis* in 1907, which summed up the new theories with superadded clearness and condemned modernism root and branch, was on the whole favourably received by genuine freethinkers.* The fact remains that this latest attempt at

* Liberal Protestants, on the contrary, were as a rule very favourable to modernism.

liberalizing Catholic theology through immanentism or creative evolution has failed. A few individuals left the Church, like Loisy and Houtin; others protested anonymously; but the movement of revolt was an imperceptible ripple on a boundless sea. The Roman hierarchy has proved that it could enforce conformity in matters of faith just as it could maintain discipline in questions of government.

At the same time yet another manifestation of liberalism was defeated. The dream of Christian democracy, which appeared to Lamennais in 1831, to many Socialists as late as 1848, and again to Loyson and Gratry a generation later, was revived by Marc Sangnier and Abbé Lemire. The latter is a priest interested in practical social reforms; he has won the devotion of the Flemish peasants who send him to the Chamber of Deputies, and the respectful sympathy of his anti-clerical colleagues. The former is a wealthy and eloquent philanthropist who created, somewhat on the line of the Dreyfusist "Popular Universities," an active social and educational centre called "Le Sillon" (the Furrow). As soon as it was realized that both of them were genuinely democratic, they were treated with suspicion, and even sharply rebuked. In every field Catholicism stands for conservatism and authority: these are the essence of the system. There always will be parties and classes interested in the defence of the existing order; the Opportunists, once anti-clerical, have made their peace with the Church; one may foresee the time when the Radicals will go to Canossa, if thereby they can obtain assistance against the Socialists. If the Socialists should ever consolidate themselves in power, they would discover the merits of Roman inertia. Catholicism polarizes all the elements of resistance to progress: this is the secret of its eternity.*

* It may be added that if the Catholics are conservative, they need not be narrowly and unintelligently so. The Le Play school of political economists, for instance, is not negligible. The working men's clubs founded by Count Albert de Mun after the war are not without influence. The young men's Catholic associations, created by the same "aristocratic Socialist," have 120,000 members between the ages of 15 and 30. They are orthodox, conservative, yet full of life. Their conventions are important events: it was before the meeting of 1898, at Besançon, that Brunetière gave his famous speech on the necessity of faith. The Union of Catholic Railwaymen boasts of 50,000 members. (The Yellow or anti-

But, whilst it is for many a mere ecclesiastical police, a buttress of social inequality, it remains, for untold thousands, a school of charity and sacrifice, a gateway to the better life. The Voltaireanism has gradually lost caste and sunk to the level of Monsieur Homais. The modern doubter is a disciple of Renan and has a keen sense of the beauty and grandeur of religion. Anti-clericalism, since the disestablishment law, is on the wane. Religious peace is not in sight; but violent and degrading warfare, let us trust, is at an end.

5. PROTESTANTISM, ETC.

Protestantism reorganized under Napoleon—The two established Churches—The Revival and the Free Evangelical Churches—*La Revue de Strasbourg* and liberal theology—Conflict between orthodox and liberals: Coquerel and Guizot—The Declaration of Faith of 1872; schism—Honourable but unimportant part of Protestantism in French life.

Judaism organized under Napoleon—Complete emancipation after 1818—Scholars and artists among French Jews—Anti-Semitism: Drumont and *La Libre Parole*—The Dreyfus case: minor importance of anti-Semitism (Note on the Jews in Algeria).

Other Religions—Failure of new Churches: Gallicanism (Abbé Châtel, Father Hyacinthe Loyson)—Saint-Simonianism—Positivism.

Cousin's eclecticism as the "natural religion" of the middle classes—Its long-continued influence.

Intense interest of modern France in religious questions.

The history of Protestantism in the nineteenth century is curiously parallel with that of Catholicism. Freed from all disabilities by Louis XVI and the Revolution the Protestants were organized into two State Churches by Napoleon Bonaparte in 1802.* Two theological schools were created, at Montauban and Strasbourg. Protestantism did not much profit by its new official status or by the wave of religious feeling which swept over France: it remained a small, historical body, formal in its creed and living on its traditions. It was not until the end of the Napoleonic wars had reopened France to English influences that a "revival" took place, thanks chiefly to the efforts of

Socialist syndicates of Messrs. Japy and Biétry are looked upon with sympathy by the Catholics, but are not organized on a religious basis.)

* The Augsburg Confession, or Lutheran Church, mostly in Alsace; and the Reformed, or Calvinistic Church.

Wesleyans. This movement was not encouraged by the established Churches. Conservative Protestants took exception both to the "undignified" methods of the revival and to its excessive emphasis of one dogma, the Atonement. In spite of conciliatory efforts at the synods of 1848-49, these differences led to a disruption, almost to a schism; Agénor de Gasparin and Frédéric Monod founded the Union of French Evangelical Churches, on the basis of revival theology, and independent of the establishment.

From 1850 to 1869 the *Revue de Strasbourg* was the organ of those we might call the "higher critics" of the day—Reuss, Colani, Schérer. But the attempted reconciliation of science with traditional dogma was not effected. Schérer went over to extreme freethought, and in a valedictory article Colani had to confess failure. Strasbourg was an active centre of Protestant thought, and an admirable point of contact between the cultures of France and Germany. The fate of war, in 1870-71, made it an outpost of aggressive Germanism, to the great loss of both countries. France lost nearly one-half of her Protestant population, and the Strasbourg theological school was transferred to Paris.

The struggle between conservatism and liberalism is best exemplified by the Coquerel episode. Athanase Coquerel, junior, a thoroughgoing Liberal, was suspended by a Presbyterial Council, in spite of the unanimous support of his congregation (1864). Guizot, in this affair, assumed the rôle of a Protestant pope: he claimed that "the Council of the Church must be the defender of the souls of Coquerel's flock, and *decide for them the supreme question of faith and life.*" This is essentially the Catholic attitude. In 1872, again under the inspiration of Guizot, a synod accepted a stricter confession of faith; the expected, we might even say the desired, result was a formal separation between the Orthodox and the Liberal elements.

The Protestants, through men like Ferdinand Buisson and Félix Pécaut, played an honourable part in the development of public education. Their rôle during the Dreyfus crisis was also creditable. They showed no animosity during the interminable conflict between the State and the Catholic Church. They

accepted the Separation law without enthusiasm, for, whilst it was in accord with their principles, it was no less evidently detrimental to their material interests. Some foreign observers had prophesied a great forward movement of Protestantism after the Separation: but no such revival has taken place. The breach between Liberals and Orthodox has not even been healed.

Certain so-called Nationalist writers affect to consider Protestantism in France as a foreign element. This is manifestly and wilfully unfair: the sons of the Huguenots, the disciples of Calvin, are French of the French. But it is true that they form a small nation—barely 700,000 in number—within the main body; that their traditions are different from those of the rest of the country; that they cannot help turning their eyes towards those lands where their faith is in the ascendant like England and Germany; that, in education, in outlook, not seldom in race, they are more cosmopolitan than the average. There is no national anti-Protestant prejudice in France, although there are local difficulties in the south and in the east. But there is a sort of reciprocal coolness, recognized by competent judges like Paul Sabatier and Roberty, between the Protestant minority and their Catholic or Free-thinking countrymen. These facts point to the conclusion that French Protestantism is an obstinate survival rather than a growing force.

The Revolution removed all the political and civil disabilities of the Jews. In the case of the Portuguese Jews, few in number, thoroughly assimilated, and found mainly in Paris and Bordeaux, this was effected almost immediately and without protest. The problem of the German Jews, in Alsace and the Rhine provinces annexed to France in 1795, was not settled without difficulty. In this case, the energetic methods of Napoleon proved permanently effective. In 1806 he summoned an assembly of Jewish notables, somewhat arbitrarily chosen by the Prefects. That assembly was succeeded in 1807 by a Grand Sanhedrim. This authoritative body declared: that the Bible did not prevent the Jews from accepting the French legal system; that polygamy had long been abolished; that they considered themselves loyal Frenchmen and were ready to serve

France by all means in their power. Thereupon the Jewish Church was organized on the hierarchic and centralized plan dear to Napoleon, and took its official place in the national system; but it was not until 1831 that the rabbis were salaried by the State, like the ministers of the other religions. However, anti-Semitic sentiment was still strong in the eastern provinces, and, by the Madrid decree of 1808, Napoleon felt it necessary to institute a provisional regime for the German Jews. They were not allowed to settle in other parts of the Empire, except as agriculturists; they could not buy substitutes for serving in the army: these exceptional measures were to remain in force for ten years. In 1815, by the treaties of Vienna, France lost her recent acquisitions of German territory, and the Alsatian problem became more manageable. In 1818 no one asked that the Madrid decree be renewed, and all French Jews enjoyed exactly the same rights as other citizens.

Until the last decade of the nineteenth century France was practically free from anti-Semitism, although in 1844 Toussenel published his *Les Juifs Rois de l'Epoque*, a study of financial feudalism. The typical French Jew is neither the wealthy banker nor the sordid dweller in the Ghetto: he is an artist and a scholar. The French-Jewish roll of fame is brilliant; philologists and archæologists especially will remember the names of H. Derembourg, Oppert, S. and T. Reinach, A. and J. Darmesteter, Michel Bréal. In music and the drama, whether as actors or authors, the Jews are also particularly strong. In 1880, M. Edouard Drumont began his anti-Semitic campaign, which he has continued with unflagging energy, undeniable talent, and intense sincerity. His paper, *La Libre Parole*, has set the example which the Catholic Press, *La Croix* for instance, was only too willing to imitate. French anti-Semitism is not a racial prejudice: it is a mixture of Catholic fanaticism, demagogic pseudo-socialism, and anti-German Chauvinism. A few cosmopolitan families, like the Rothschild, are fabulously wealthy and bear Teutonic names: this was sufficient to draw upon them the jealousy and hatred of the populace. Anti-Semitism played some part in the inception

of the Dreyfus case; but although it remained noisy enough, it soon became a minor element in that great conflict. Even at the height of the crisis, when the anti-Dreyfusists seemed wholly in control, no anti-Semite was returned to the Chamber of Deputies by European France: it was Algeria, where conditions were absolutely different, which sent Drumont, Morinaud and others, for one legislature only, to the Palais-Bourbon. It may be noted that the old aristocracy, ultra-Catholic though it be, has no insuperable objection to the matrimonial annexation of Jewish heiresses, and that the spokesman of monarchy, tradition, society, and the Church, the editor of the *Gaulois*, M. Arthur Meyer, is a Jew. In the eyes of the Socialist there is no difference between Jewish and Christian capital. So it is not probable that the Jewish question will ever become a national danger in France.

THE JEWS IN ALGERIA.—The Algerian Jews are not in any way superior to the Arabs or the Berbers; neither are they much more in sympathy with French civilization; yet they were enfranchised all at once by the Cremieux decree in 1870, whilst the Mohammedans are still treated as a conquered people. The first result of this injustice was the great insurrection of 1871. The Algerian Jews, however, are fast getting Europeanized, and will soon be *bona fide* French citizens.

The three religions recognized by the State until 1905 do not exhaust the spiritual life of France. No other Church, it is true, achieved any degree of influence. Abbé Châtel under Louis-Philippe, Father Hyacinthe Loyson after 1870, attempted to start schisms on Gallican lines; but the result was disheartening. Recent efforts in the same direction, after the Separation, would have passed absolutely unnoticed had not the Roman Catholics invaded the schismatic places of worship and interrupted their services—a dangerous example to set before the Parisian populace! Saint-Simonianism about 1830 was meant to be a new Christianity. Under Bazard and Enfantin it had preachers and seminaries, some sort of ritual, and enough mystic exaltation to give it a place among real religions. But, as a sect, it ended in division, scandal, prosecution, and the farcical pilgrimage to the East, in quest of “the Mother.” Positivism is a mighty movement; but the formal cult of humanity devised by Auguste Comte

in his latter years was not accepted even by his most prominent disciple Littré, and by the rest of the world was either ignored or ridiculed. The many queer little sects that amuse Parisian society for a season need not detain our attention.

Of greater significance are what we might call the lay churches, or the substitutes for organized religion. The most definite of these was Cousin's eclecticism. This philosophy did not claim to be original, but to represent the "common sense" of the race in religious matters, from Plato to Hegel, by way of Plotinus, Descartes, Voltaire, Rousseau, and Kant. It taught the existence of God, the spirituality, immortality, and responsibility of the soul; after 1830, it became the official doctrine of State education—and Cousin knew how to keep discipline in his "regiment"! But it was mercilessly assailed by the Catholics, for whilst attempting to preserve all the essentials of Christian metaphysics, it had no place for specifically Christian dogma. Under the Second Empire it lingered ingloriously, still entrenched in official positions (with Caro, for instance), but jeered at by the orthodox on the one hand and the positivists on the other. The best representative of the second generation of "spiritualists" was Jules Simon, whose books on *Duty* and *Natural Religion* were aptly called "Missals for freethinkers." When Jules Ferry laid the foundations of unsectarian State education in 1879–82, it was Jules Simon who managed to have the essential tenets of spiritualism preserved as the moral basis of the new system. As a sign of the discredit into which this school of thought has fallen, we may note that Premier Combes excited an outburst of derision in the Chamber of Deputies when he professed himself "an old-fashioned spiritualist philosopher." M. Homais, the typical bourgeois described by Flaubert in *Madame Bovary*, held the religion of "Socrates, Voltaire, Rousseau, Franklin, and Béranger," i.e., that of Victor Cousin and Jules Simon. His modern congeners—no whit deeper or more original than he—swear by Darwin, Huxley, Spencer, and Haeckel. Spiritualism was naught but a compromise—a hateful thing in matters of faith. Yet it would be unjust to deny that it satisfied, somehow, the needs of many souls who were by no means despicable.

The Fatherland, the Revolution, Humanity, Science, have in turn or simultaneously been proposed to our veneration. Even the cult of Reason was revived during the Dreyfus crisis by the former priest, Victor Charbonnel, whom Emerson and the Chicago Congress of Religions had first caused to stray from the Roman path. Socialism is with many an idealistic faith, implying the "New Theology's" central belief that mankind is divine, the collective incarnation, the progressive self-realization of the permanent God. Certain it is that the haunting sense of the Great Beyond is present in the France of to-day, as much as in any other period in her history. Paris, apart from its Catholic and Protestant schools of theology, is admirably equipped for the study of religion.* Societies like the Union of the Servants of Truth or the Union of Free-thinkers and Free-believers, books like Charles Péguy's *Mystery of the Charity of Joan of Arc*, afford definite evidence of this spiritual activity. Even reckless negation may be a sign of intense concern in religious things: the dull of soul is a born conformist. The creed of France baffles definition; but to follow an unnamed master, when night is darkest, is not that the supreme triumph of faith?

* Courses in the Faculté des Lettres, Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, Collège de France, Ecole des Hautes Etudes Sociales, Musée Guimet, etc.

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CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

VIII. THE RELIGIOUS QUESTION

- 1775-99 POPE PIUS VI.
 1789 November 2. Principle of alienation of Church Property voted.
 1790 February 13. Religious Orders suppressed.
 July 10. Church Property put up for sale.
 July 12. Civil Constitution of the Clergy.
 1791 September 27. Final Emancipation of French Jews.
 1791-93 Persecutions against Non-jurors.
 1793 November 10. Celebration of the Festival of Reason.
 1794 June 8. Celebration of the Festival of the Supreme Being (Robespierre officiating).
 September 18. Complete separation of Church and State.
- 1793-1823 POPE PIUS VII.
 1801 July 15 to August 28. Concordat signed.
 1802 April 2. Organic Articles of the Protestant Churches.
 April 8. Concordat promulgated, with the Organic Articles.
 Chateaubriand, *Le Génie du Christianisme*.
 1804 December 2. Coronation of Napoleon I. Pope Pius VII officiating.
 1805-9 Annexation of Papal territory.
 1806-8 Reorganization of French Judaism. Assembly of Notables.
 1807 March 2. Decree confirming the decisions of the Grand Sanhedrim.
- 1808-18 Temporary exceptional regime for Alsatian Jews.
 1809 Pontifical States annexed. Pope a prisoner (Savona, Fontainebleau) until 1814.
 1811 June to August. National Council of Paris.
 1813 New Concordat signed, January 25th; retracted by Pope, March 24th.
 1814 Pope returns to Rome.
 Catholic Society of Home Missions.
 1817 New Concordat, not ratified by French Parliament.
- 1817-23 Lamennais, *Essai sur l'Indifférence en Matière de Religion*.
 1818 Cook evangelizes the South. Beginning of Protestant Revival.
 1819 Joseph de Maistre; Du Pape.
 1821 New Bishoprics created.
- 1823-29 POPE LEO XII.
 1826-28 Agitation against the Jesuits (Montlosier). Jesuit Colleges closed.
 1829-30 POPE PIUS VIII.

- 1830-32 Lamennais's Liberal Efforts (newspaper *L'Avenir*).
 1831 Archbishop's Palace sacked by Parisian mob.
 1831-46 POPE GREGORY XVI.
 1832 Encyclical *Mirari Vos* condemning Liberalism.
 Dispersion of Saint-Simonian School (New Christianity).
 1833 Ozanam founds Society of St. Vincent de Paul.
 1833 Lamennais, *Paroles d'un Croquant*.
 1835 Lacordaire's Lectures at Notre-Dame begin.
 1839 Littré's translation of Strauss's *Life of Jesus*.
 1844-45 Attacks of Liberal Catholics against State Education renewed.
 1845 Comte's Religious Evolution. Calendar, 1849. Catechism, 1852.
 Agitation against the Jesuits-Rossi Mission.
 1846 Miraculous Apparition at La Salette.
 1846-78 POPE PIUS IX.
 1848 June. Archbishop Affre killed on Barricade.
 November. Roman Republic.
 1849 April to July. Roman Expedition.
 1848-49 Important Protestant Synods.
 1849 Union of French Evangelical Churches.
 1850-69 *Revue de Strasbourg* (Liberal Protestant).
 1850 Falloux Law on Education (compromise favourable to Catholics).
 1851-54 A. Comte, *Système de Politique Positive, ou traité de sociologie instituant la religion de l'humanité*.
 1854 December 8. Dogma of Immaculate Conception proclaimed.
 1855 Damaging Law Suit about La Salette Miracle.
 1858 Miraculous Apparition at Lourdes.
 1860 Part of Papal States annexed by Italy.
 1862 Renan's Course suspended.
 1863 Renan's *Life of Jesus*.
 1864 December 8. Encyclical *Quanta Cura* and Syllabus.
 Coquerel-Guizot Incident (Liberal v. Orthodox Protestants).
 1866-67 French Army of Occupation evacuates Rome, and returns.
 1869 December 8. Council of the Vatican.
 1870 January 3. Infallibility proposed by Cardinal Manning, adopted
 July 13.
 September 20. Italian Troops enter Rome.
 Secession of Father Hyacinthe Loyson.
 October 24. Crémieux Decree, emancipating Algerian Jews.
 1872 Protestant Synod. Declaration of Faith. Secession of the
 Liberals.
 1877 Acute Politico-religious Crisis. Gambetta, "Clericalism is the
 enemy!"
 1878-1903 POPE LEO XIII.
 1879 Jules Ferry's Bill on Education (Article VII).
 1880 March 29. Ferry Decrees, dissolving Unauthorized Orders.
 1886 *seq.* Edouard Drumont: *La France Juive* (anti-Semitism).
 1891 Encyclical *Rerum Novarum* (on Christian Socialism).
 1892 Pope Leo XIII advises French Catholics to rally to the Republic.
 1894 Minister Spuller, *The New Spirit*.
 1896-97 Leo Taxil and the Masonic-Luciferian hoax.

- 897-99 Height of the Dreyfus Case. Anti-Semitism and anti-clericalism.
- 1901 Waldeck-Rousseau Law on Associations (special provisions for Religious Orders).
- 1903 Authorization required under Waldeck-Rousseau Law refused by Premier Combes. Unauthorized Orders dissolved.
- POPE PIUS X.
- Geay and Le Nordez affairs.
- 1904 April 24. Visit of President Loubet to Rome.
- April 28. Protest of the Pope.
- July 7. Law against Teaching Orders.
- July 30. Diplomatic relations with Rome severed.
- 1905 July 3. Separation Law.
- 1906 February 11. Pope's protest against Separation Law (*Vehementer Nos*).
- April. Montagnini Papers published.
- May 30 to June 1. Plenary Assembly of French Bishops.
- Troubles caused by Inventories.
- 1907 January 2. New Law, under which much Church Property forfeited.
- Encyclical *Pascendi*, against the Modernists.

CONCLUSION

Taking stock—*Liabilities*: (1) The falling birth-rate—(2) War danger and militarism—(3) Alcoholism—(4) Bourgeois pettiness—(5) A divided soul; latent civil war; fits of fanaticism and cynical indifference.

Assets: The heritage: (1) European France—(2) The Colonial Empire—(3) Hoarded capital—(4) Cultural traditions—(5) Prestige—(6) Evidences of undiminished vitality.

How does France stand in this the second decade of the twentieth century? Is she a wounded nation slowly bleeding to death, or still the pioneer of the Western world? To this tremendous question we shall not attempt to give any direct answer. We shall simply pass in review the problems modern France has to face, her assets and liabilities in the universal struggle for life.

First in the debit column we should place the falling birth-rate. France, some prophets of evil assert, will soon become a second-rate Power. France is in danger of losing her national identity. We think that this peril has been exaggerated. There is no actual decrease in the population of France from census to census; only the increase is exceedingly small. There is no proof whatever that this stagnation is due to racial decay. The phenomenon is practically universal among civilized nations. If there is room in France for more people, without lowering the standard of life, more will come from other parts of Europe. The unity of France is geographical and cultural, not racial. If France should close her frontiers against immigration, or if foreigners came in large, homogeneous, unassimilable hordes, then the danger would be great. Nothing of the kind is taking place. Should the population of France remain absolutely stationary, it would still be large enough to maintain an independent culture second to none. In everything that is worth

while mere numbers avail little. The England of Elizabeth was a pigmy compared with China or the modern Russian Empire.

Only in the hypothesis of a single-handed conflict with Germany would France's limited population place her at a disadvantage. Other things being equal, 65,000,000 have a better chance to win than 39,000,000. This leads us to the second danger that overshadows France: the constant possibility of war. This is a moral as well as a material danger: it warps her thought and hampers her progress. More insidious, costlier than war, without any of war's redeeming features, such as they may be, militarism is weighing the country down. Every Frenchman, the young scientist at a critical moment in his studies as well as the man with the hoe, is sentenced thereby to three years of that barrack life which, to many, is no better than penal servitude. The country, we are told, is growing richer in spite of the ever-increasing burden. But how long will the thrift and toil of the people keep pace with that abysmal waste? A nation whose population does not increase, and whose natural resources are incapable of sudden expansion, cannot spend billions on social improvements and on armaments for ever; it is burning the candle at both ends. When it comes to a choice—and the hour cannot be long deferred—will the French decide to protect themselves against the problematical aggressions of neighbours with whom they have lived at peace for over forty years, or against ever-present, relentless foes—ignorance, disease, want, and crime? A small portion of the population is affected with chauvinistic hysteria, and clamours for revenge; another is haunted with unreasoning fear; a third suffers from civic cowardice and dares not speak out its candid opinion; a fourth seems to champion international peace in the sole interest of social war. But a growing number of men in all walks of life see the criminal folly of militarism, and the possibility of checking its further growth. France is, next to America, the great Power in which the pacifist movement is strongest. Even in this dark hour there is a gleam of hope.

The third menace is alcoholism. France, the country of wine, could not be called an alcoholic nation. The change, a comparatively recent one, is ascribed to the growth of the cities, and to

conscription. The ruin of the French vineyards by the phylloxera pest is also said to have demoralized the market and favoured the sale of noxious or adulterated products. In 1881, with the triumph of the Republican party, alas! and at the very moment when national education was organized, all restrictions as to the number of saloons or public-houses were removed, and France was soon covered with dram-shops. Then the alcohol distilled at home for private consumption is free from excise duties: a tremendous premium to intemperance. As a result, the country-side is often worse than the city slums. Finally, absinthe has wrought havoc among men too high in the social scale for common drunkenness—professional men, business men, Government employees, army officers? . . . What is to be done? The innumerable company of bar-keepers and home distillers* are the ruling power in the land. Even absinthe, denounced as a poison by the highest medical authorities, is still freely retailed. A prohibition law passed by the Chamber of Deputies was emasculated by the Senate so as to exclude only one of the components of the drug; and people will now indulge more freely in that subtle destroyer of health, will, and reason under the false impression that it has been made innocuous. The situation is growing worse: France stands next to Denmark in the *per capita* consumption of alcohol. But the upper classes are converted to temperance. Education, the development of sports and outdoor exercises, are swelling the ranks of the total abstainers, who, a generation ago, were ridiculed as fanatics, milksops, or freaks. So there is a double process going on: alcoholism is spreading among the working classes, temperance will soon rule above. Sooner or later the people imitate the virtues as well as the vices of their social superiors; the evil may thus increase to a maximum, then the ebb tide will be felt. At least we fervently hope so, for the health and sanity of a great nation.

A fourth danger is timidity: pettiness, narrow individualism, wasteful routine, in business and in matters of general policy—in other words, the oppressive anarchy of dull incompetence. This is the result of disunion. There are no universally accepted

* *Bouilleurs de cru.*

principles, no final arbiters, no sense of discipline, no respect for authority. The executive is annihilated; the omnipotent legislature is in the hands of parochial politicians hypnotized by the thought of re-election. Appropriations are frittered away on partial improvements, generally outgrown before they are completed, whilst schemes of truly national import are simply ignored. The theoretical radicalism of the French does not prevent them from falling into the worst kind of "opportunism" ---a pennywise, hand-to-mouth policy. The economic equipment of France is permanently obsolete, although costly; her social legislation is intricate and timid; the fight against national evils—alcoholism, tuberculosis, pornography—is half-hearted. Business lacks enterprise: the small workshop, the small store still prevail, with their limited outlook and antiquated methods. France is still wonderfully rich; but real wealth is not a hoard of precious metal, it is the capacity of producing and consuming, and in this respect France is not leading in the race. The French may have a heavier purse than the Germans, but Germany is adding proportionally more to the actual riches of the world. The experience of the Second Empire shows that this defect is not inherent in the French character: the deadlock of creeds and parties has brought about a paralysis of the collective will. A divided nation cannot even buy and sell with business-like precision. Socialism, Imperialism, plutocracy on the grand scale would be better for the purse and even for the spirit of France than this dead level of bourgeois pettiness.

The history of France in the nineteenth century is the tragedy of a nation with a divided soul. This is no immemorial curse, no taint in the blood of the people. For eight hundred years the French, proud of their common heritage, had remained remarkably loyal to their dynasty and to their faith. Unity was their ideal, and they had achieved it earlier and more completely than any other nation. Nor was the reform spirit of the eighteenth century responsible for the sudden break in the country's tradition. Radical though they were, the principles of 1789 were the term of a long evolution, and by no means incompatible with constitutional monarchy or with the Christian religion. But for the baleful influence of his wife and brothers,

Louis XVI might have lived and died the beloved sovereign of regenerated France. Preventable misunderstandings and crimes brought about the terrible events of the Revolution, which in their turn created a chasm between the old world and the new. Sharp and constant opposition between progressives and conservatives, in every political body and in every Church, may be a condition of normal life. But France lives in the dread of radical reaction or revolution, in an atmosphere of latent civil war.

This is especially evident in politics. Within the span of one man's life—Guizot, for instance—France has known eleven different regimes, and none was ever felt to be permanent and secure. Even the government most unequivocally endorsed by the quasi-unanimity of the people, the Second Empire, remained, in the eyes of an irreconcilable minority, a criminal adventure, bound to end, as it eventually did, in shame and disaster. After forty-three years of Republic, many of the ablest thinkers in France profess monarchical ideas, and are openly working for the overthrow of the regime. The crisis opened in 1789 is not yet over. Republics, empires, kingships are makeshifts and experiments rather than final solutions.

This prolonged instability is due to excessive haste and radicalism. Although every regime was in fact a compromise, none was willing to confess its own precarious and "pragmatic" character; each in its turn, on its advent, announced that "the era of revolutions was closed" by the virtue of some magic principle. This theoretical intolerance rejected the supporters of rival schemes into anti-constitutional opposition. Even the government of Louis-Philippe, the most eclectic of all, did everything to irritate the Legitimists and, after 1840, nothing to placate the Democrats. The present Republic has endured more than any other regime, because, for many years, it was frankly provisional. But, since 1880, it has fallen into the same error as its predecessors. It has banished the Pretenders, whose presence in France was an element of national reconciliation. It has enacted that no future revision of the Constitution could alter the republican form of government. It is opposed to the direct election of the Chief Magistrate, to the referendum

and plebiscite, to women's suffrage, and even to proportional representation, because, forsooth, these methods of consulting the people might endanger the stability of existing institutions. In other words, the Republic places itself above democracy, whereas it ought to be the truest embodiment of democracy. The ghosts of legitimacy and absolutism have not yet been exorcised: Marianne believes in her divine right as sincerely as Louis XIV. France has been governed by many parties: she has not yet tried, unreservedly, the government of the people by the people, even though the people should elect to be ruled by a d'Orleans or a Napoleon.

The same unhappy division prevails in religious matters. Instead of the infinitely varied compound of individualism and tradition which governs the faith of English-speaking countries, we find in France two rigid and mutually exclusive systems; Catholicism can no more admit free-thought than free-thought can tolerate Catholicism. Each in so doing would be untrue to its own ideal. The accusations of hypocrisy, superstition, and wilful spiritual blindness are bandied to and fro. And Christianity is distorted so as to teach hatred: and free-thought is warped so as to mean intolerance.

In this atmosphere of conflict, every new problem gives rise to passionate antagonism. A century ago, though the "throne and the altar" were shaken, the Fatherland and property were still held sacred. To-day, they are attacked and defended with the same fury as formerly the Church and monarchy. Thus new wounds are inflicted before the old ones have time to heal.

And these are not mere word-battles, but grim realities. The Terrors of 1793 and 1815, the Days of June, 1848, the proscriptions of December, 1851, the Commune and the repression of the Commune are deep red stains in modern French history. The spirit that made those things possible—the frantic distrust and hatred, the wild fanaticism—are still there, and may break out at any moment in that fair land of cheerful toil, moderate desires, and smiling common sense. This is the outstanding characteristic, the chief paradox, and the chief weakness of French civilization.

Any sympathetic observer from without is immediately

impressed with the futility of all this bitter strife. For compromise, after all, is indispensable, and all French Governments in the past century have been compromises. The Restoration had to accept the essential conquests of the Revolution; the present Republic keeps the constitution framed by Legitimists and Orleanists, the administration established by Napoleon, the social order, the foreign policy of the old monarchy. There has been progress under the most reactionary regime, conservation under the most radical. One cannot but feel that without these spasmodic efforts to rush or stem the course of history things would have been very much as they are. In spite of the Red Terror there are still noblemen and Catholics. In spite of Thiers's ruthlessness in 1871, socialism has not been stamped out. This mighty wrestling for abstract principles is fine, dramatically and ethically, even though its material results should be nil. One may hold that the blood of martyrs, whatever the cause for which it is shed, is never shed in vain. Yet the waste far exceeds the gain. Revolutionary France has been an "awful example" as well as a pioneer. What a few ideas have gained in apparent clearness they have lost in immediate applicability. Neither the fear nor the hope of cataclysmic changes is conducive to patient endeavour. And worst of all this splendid and impracticable spirit of no-compromise, which makes heroes and saints, leaves the common herd a prey to scepticism. Because some will take all things tragically many refuse to take anything seriously. "*J'm'en fichisme*" is the complement and the corrective of fanaticism, and in the interval between two revolutions the worst radical will confess that "*plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose.*"

Without any thought of disparaging the fierce earnestness of the French, it may be said that it has led them astray. Not because it was earnestness, not even because it was fierce; but because it was hastily systematic and one-sided. With undeniable courage facts have been ignored, feelings suppressed, personal interests sacrificed, for the sake of certain abstract idols called logic and consistency. This explains but a small part of French history, but it explains much of it that is specifically French.

Barring a miracle, no synthesis is conceivable that would permanently reconcile all the warring elements of French thought. So the one remedy is a purely negative one: old-fashioned liberalism. The word has fallen into disrepute. In politics, in sociology, in religion, it seems to stand for much that is half-hearted and ineffectual. Liberty is nothing in itself. The point of importance is what is done with it. We take liberalism to mean: "Strive to achieve something rather than to hamper your neighbour." France still believes in repressive policies, in enforced conformity.* But there are welcome promises of change. The creation of local universities with a fair amount of autonomy was a step in the right direction, and has proved admirably successful. The Separation law, in spite of minor mistakes, was truly a liberal measure. Strange to say, there are in syndicalism, with all its coarse violence, precious elements of liberation: from the tyranny of capitalists, from the tyranny of bureaucrats, from the tyranny of politicians, from the tyranny of majorities. The collapse of the old spirit of system is setting free vast reserves of energy hitherto wasted in mutual check. Already we hear much less talk about reason, and much more about intuition, faith, and life. It is still mostly talk. But "words are seeds that grow to deeds."

These, according to French and foreign observers, are the dangers which beset France. We have stated the facts, with reluctance, but without fear, because we believe them to be true. Fortunately, they tell but half of the story, and we shall now enumerate the assets of France.

First of all, her inherited wealth of land, money, culture, and prestige. France is an old nation: Cæsar brought her within the pale of Western culture two thousand years ago. A hundred years later she had forged to the very front, and has kept there ever since, fighting and wasting plentifully, but also hoarding and learning.

The area of European France is small, as modern "world-powers" go. The fertility of her soil is not exceptional. She

* At the time of writing, the Barthou Ministry is trying to cudgel patriotism into the proletariat.

has no precious minerals, and not enough coal to meet the demand of her industries. But the country is wonderfully varied and well balanced, responsive to good cultivation, pleasant to inhabit, situated on the highways of commerce, in the very heart of modern civilization.

Then there is the colonial Empire, which has grown to such huge dimensions within the last third of a century. This Empire is second in size to none but those of England and Russia, and although it includes the Sahara desert, its inhabitable portions are probably as extensive as the areas of corresponding fertility in the United States. The value of this asset is hard to determine: the Empire is still in the making. Speaking with due circumspection, we should say that Indo-China, if it be long retained, will prove a responsibility rather than a source of strength; that Madagascar, unless her long-heralded mineral wealth turns out at last to be a reality, is not a country of unlimited promise; that Western Africa, with the finest races in the Dark Continent, may become as prosperous as the Southern United States. All these are possessions, Northern Africa alone is an extension of France. There are already a million Europeans in Algeria, Tunis, and Morocco; and the native Berbers are recognized by all ethnologists to be pure Europeans. If the selfish proclivities of the colonists are not curbed, these lands will remain scenes of hatred and conflict; if the wiser counsels of European France prevail, if education is spread among the natives, who are eager for it, the Berbers and even the Arabs will soon be, not assimilated, but reconciled, associated, with the French. And this would open magnificent vistas.

France is a capitalist among nations. The thrift and foresight of the people have led to the accumulation of a tremendous hoard. Germany found, at the time of the Agadir crisis, that the "woollen stocking" of the French peasantry was a weapon mightier than her sword. France levies on the activities of the rest of the world a yearly toll equal to her military expenditure.

More precious than gold are the traditions of France—the art treasures, the storied cities which are a liberal education, the immemorial uninterrupted culture, the skill and taste which these cannot fail to breed. This is a source of wealth and

power barely equalled by any European nation, and which we of the younger West must shift without for ages to come.

Then, growing out of this glorious past, comes another asset—the prestige of France. Tainted with Napoleonitis, impaired by the disasters of 1871, distorted and smirched by indecent literature, this prestige is still a potent factor, and makes France the second home of every man of culture.

But land, money, tradition, prestige would be things of naught if the people had lost their soul. Their wealth would pass into stronger hands, their culture would turn to rottenness and their prestige to contempt, as with the Greeks of Byzantium. Once, about twenty years ago, the French themselves wondered if it had not come to that. The cry of “decadence” was raised, by malevolent rivals, by sensationalists, by “æsthetes” in quest of a new pose, by earnest patriots who had lost their star. When a belated echo of this cry reaches us now, how faint and strange and silly it sounds! For the one great asset of the French people is their indomitable vitality. They often work at cross-purposes, and the results are not adequate to the energy and the ingenuity displayed. But, even in wasteful conflict, one cannot fail to admire the evidence of power. In the twentieth century, as ever before, the French are among the pioneers. It is not merely on farces and fashions that they imprint their stamp, imperiously; but on new industries and new sciences like automobiling, submarine navigation, aeronautics, radio-activity; on new forms of social thought, like syndicalism; on new philosophies, like Bergsonism.

I do not see France as a goddess, austere and remote: I see her intensely human, stained with indecencies and blasphemies, scarred with innumerable battles, often blinded and stumbling on the way, but fighting on, undismayed, for ideals which she cannot always define. An old nation? A wounded nation?—Perhaps; but her mighty heart is throbbing with unconquerable life.

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